Knowledge,context, and social standards

This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives reply to skepticism in order to defend this reply against the objection that it is ad hoc.A shorter version of this paper, entitled Knowledge and Context, was presented as a symposium at the 1986 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association and appeared in the Journal of Philosophy 83 (October 1986) 574-83. Because of space limitations, much of the material in sections 1 and 2 of this longer version was compressed into footnotes. Section 3 and many of the footnotes were deleted entirely and the argument of section 5 was presented in a condensed form. I am grateful to Frederick Schmitt and the editors of Synthese for the opportunity to present the paper in its original form.     

Ernest Sosa, Knowledge, and Understanding

This paper offers and analysis of Ernest Sosa's Virtue Perspectivism.Although Sosa has been credited with fathering the influentialcontemporary movement known as Virtue Epistemology, I argue that Sosaimprudently abandons the reliabilist-based insights of VirtueEpistemology in favor of a reflection-based, ``perspectival' view.Sosa's mixed allegiance to reliabilist-based and reflection-based viewsof knowledge, in fact, leads to an unwelcome tension in his thoughtwhich can be relieved by recognizing that his reflection-based view isin fact an account of the cognitive state of understanding,rather than an account of knowledge. Sosa makes mattersdifficult for himself because he expects too much, as it were, from theconcept of knowledge, and in the process burdens his view with elementsof reflection it does not require. To solve the problem, I suggest thatSosa needs to develop a two-tiered epistemology whichrecognizes that knowledge, on the one hand, and understanding, on theother, both have necessary and sufficient conditions unique tothemselves.     

Knowledge,certainty, and assertion

Researchers have debated whether knowledge or certainty is a better candidate for the norm of assertion. Should you make an assertion only if you know it's true? Or should you make an assertion only if you're certain it's true? If either knowledge or certainty is a better candidate, then this will likely have detectable behavioral consequences. I report an experiment that tests for relevant behavioral consequences. The results support the view that assertability is more closely linked to knowledge than to certainty. In multiple scenarios, people were much more willing to allow assertability and certainty to come apart than to allow assertability and knowledge to come apart.     

Testimonial Knowledge Without Knowledge of what is Said

This article discusses the following question: what epistemic relation must audiences bear to the content of assertions in order to gain testimonial knowledge? There is a brief discussion of why this issue is of importance, followed by two counterexamples to the most intuitive answer: that in order for an audience to gain testimonial knowledge that p they must know that the speaker has asserted p . It is then suggested that the argument generalises and can be made to work on different sets of assumptions about the conditions for knowledge, and the conditions under which a proposition is asserted.     

Knowledge of proofs

If proofs are nothing more than truth makers, then there is no force in the standard argument against classical logic (there is no guarantee that there is either a proof forA or a proof fornot A). The standard intuitionistic conception of a mathematical proof is stronger: there are epistemic constraints on proofs. But the idea that proofs must be recognizable as such by us, with our actual capacities, is incompatible with the standard intuitionistic explanations of the meanings of the logical constants. Proofs are to be recognizable in principle, not necessarily in practice, as shown in section 1. Section 2 considers unknowable propositions of the kind involved in Fitch's paradox:p and it will never be known thatp. It is argued that the intuitionist faces a dilemma: give up strongly entrenched common sense intuitions about such unknowable propositions, or give up verificationism. The third section considers one attempt to save intuitionism while partly giving up verificationism: keep the idea that a proposition is true iff there is a proof (verification) of it, and reject the idea that proofs must be recognizable in principle. It is argued that this move will have the effect that some standard reasons against classical semantics will be effective also against intuitionism. This is the case with Dummett's meaning theoretical argument. At the same time the basic reason for regarding proofs as more than mere truth makers is lost.I am much indebted for comments to Lars Bergström, Per Martin-Löf, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Fredrik Stjernberg, Dag Westerståhl and Tim Williamson. I owe even more to the many seminars about truth and meaning, led by Dag Prawitz, at the philosophy department of Stockholm University. These were especially intense in the mideighties, when I was a graduate student.     

Sympathy,Interpersonal Awareness and Acknowledgment

According to a popular thought, sympathy is an epistemic phenomenon: in sympathizing with others we come to be aware of them as fellow sentient beings. This view–which I call the Epistemic View–effectively characterizes sympathy as a form of social cognition. In this paper, I will argue against the Epistemic View. As far as I can see, this view radically misconstrues the way sympathy is directed at others. I will at the same time provide some material for, and motivate, an alternative proposal according to which the primary significance of sympathy is practical rather than epistemic. On this account, sympathy is a form of interpersonal acknowledgment rather than interpersonal awareness.

     

VAN FRAASSEN ON THE NATURE OF EMPIRICISM

Abstract: A traditional view is that to be an empiricist is to hold a particular epistemological belief: something to the effect that knowledge must derive from experience. In his recent book The Empirical Stance, and in a number of other publications, Bas van Fraassen has disagreed, arguing that if empiricism is to be defensible it must instead be thought of as a stance: an attitude of mind or methodological orientation rather than a factual belief. In this article I will examine his arguments for this claim in detail. I will argue that they do not succeed and that empiricism is, contrary to van Fraassen's claim, better thought of as a truth‐evaluable doctrine than as a stance.     

Knowledge,Cognitive Achievement,and Environmental Luck

This article defends the view that knowledge is type‐identical to cognitive achievement. I argue, pace Duncan Pritchard, that not only knowledge, but also cognitive achievement is incompatible with environmental luck. I show that the performance of cognitive abilities in environmental luck cases does not distinguish them from non‐abilities per se. For this reason, although the cognitive abilities of the subject are exercised in environmental luck cases, they are not manifested in any relevant sense. I conclude by showing that this explanation is not ad hoc as it can be generalized to apply to causal features besides cognitive abilities.     

Disagreeing about who we are

ABSTRACT

One argument that has been suggested for conventionalism about personal identity is that it captures that certain disagreements about personal identity seem irresolvable, without being committed to the view that these disagreements are merely verbal. In this paper, I will take the considerations about disagreement used to motivate conventionalism seriously. However, I will use them to motivate a very different, novel, and as yet unexplored view about personal identity. This is the view that personal identity is a non-representational concept, the nature of which isn’t to be accounted for in terms of what entity it represents, but its non-representational role. I highlight that we find structurally very similar concerns about disagreement in another philosophical debate, namely in meta-ethics. But, in meta-ethics, such sorts of considerations are, traditionally, thought to support one distinctive view: meta-ethical expressivism, a non-representational view about normative thought and discourse. This suggests that we should take a similar view seriously for personal identity. I also develop what such an unfamiliar view might look like, using expressivism as a template. On this view, judgements about personal identity are plans that regulate who to hold accountable.     

Enkratic Agency

An enkratic agent is someone who intends to do A because she believes she should do A. Being enkratic is usually understood as something rationality requires of you. However, we must distinguish between different conceptions of enkratic rationality. According to a fairly common view, enkratic rationality is solely a normative requirement on agency: it tells us how agents should think and act. However, I shall argue that this normativist conception of enkratic rationality faces serious difficulties: it makes it a mystery how an agent's thinking and acting can be guided by the enkratic requirement, which, as I shall further argue, is something that an adequate conception of enkratic rationality must be able to explain. This, I suggest, motivates exploring a different account of enkratic rationality. On this view, enkratic rationality is primarily a constitutive requirement on agency: it is a standard internal to agency, i.e., a standard that partly spells out what it is to exercise one's agential powers well.     

Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge

The paper presents a dilemma for both epistemic and non‐epistemic versions of conceivability‐based accounts of modal knowledge. On the one horn, non‐epistemic accounts do not elucidate the essentialist knowledge they would be committed to. On the other, epistemic accounts do not elucidate everyday life de re modal knowledge. In neither case, therefore, do conceivability accounts elucidate de re modal knowledge.     

Islam Returns to Spain: Religious Diversity,Political Discourse and Women's Rights

On February 14, 2013, the Tribunal Supremo of Spain handed down a judgement which gave constitutional protection to the burka and which also contained important statements concerning contemporary Spanish society, its religious and cultural diversity and the convivencia of cultures and religions. Contrary to the position of the Tribunal Supremo, and showing very little variation, the political discourse is in favour of a ban, basing its arguments principally on women's rights, but with a perceptible shift towards public safety. This article will examine this bifurcated reaction to this manifestation of renewed religious diversity in Spain: the politicians’ arguments in favour of prohibition reflect the protectionist view of the French and Belgian parliamentary debates prohibiting the burka, but place them in the framework of the post-Franco rights-based society. On the other hand, the Tribunal Supremo anchors its judgement in a narrative of a free and democratic Spanish state and society in which a woman's individual freedom of choice takes precedence over all other considerations, including social norms.     

Libertarianism and Free Determined Decisions

Free determined decisions are free decisions that are causally determined by the character of the agent. Robert Kane is a libertarian about free will who believes some of our free decisions are determined in this way. According to Kane, for a determined decision to be free it must proceed from the agent's character and the agent must have shaped that character through previous undetermined free decisions. In recent writings, Mark Balaguer has argued that human beings may well possess libertarian freedom, but he rejects Kane's view that free determined acts must proceed from a character that is constructed from prior undetermined free decisions. This essay explains Balaguer's argument for rejecting the Kanean view and critically responds to it in defense of Kane's position on free determined decisions.     

The complex tapestry of free will: striving will,indeterminism and volitional streams

The aim of this paper is to respond to recent discussion of, and objections to, the libertarian view of free will I have developed in many works over the past four decades. The issues discussed all have a bearing on the central question of how one might make sense of a traditional free will requiring indeterminism in the light of modern science. This task involves, among other things, avoiding all traditional libertarian appeals to unusual forms of agency or causation (uncaused causes, noumenal selves, non-event agent causes, etc.) that cannot be accounted for by ordinary modes of explanation familiar to the natural and human sciences. Doing this, I argue, requires piecing together a “complex tapestry” of ideas and arguments that involve rethinking many traditional assumptions about free will. The paper also argues that one cannot get to the heart of historical debates about free will without distinguishing different kinds of freedom, different senses of will, and different notions of control, among other distinctions. I especially focus here on different notions of freedom and control that are necessary to make sense of free will.

     

Adolescent Developmental Disruptions: Haunted by the Future,Guarded by Haunting Ancestors

This article will explore two potentially disruptive developmental phenomena that occur during life transitions. One is the role of anticipatory haunting during adolescence, and the other is the strict adherence to an already defined life narrative at the gate to young adulthood (Levy-Warren, 2016a, 2016b). Historically, in psychoanalytic theory, we have looked at flaws in an adolescent’s foundation as causal in adolescent paralysis. Anticipatory haunting, fearing what is to come, also can be traumatic enough to disrupt an adolescent’s development. Similarly, in the transition from late adolescence to young adulthood, we have assumed that the past must be left behind for the youth to progress in development and that focusing on the past can inhibit the envisioning of a future. In this instance, the necessity for a particular kind of reworking of the young adult’s history so that a future can be envisioned is articulated. Each of these points of view represents a departure from traditional ways of understanding and treating developmental disruptions.     

An objection to gareth evans' account of self-identity

In chapter seven ‘Self Identification’ of his challenging book The Varieties of Reference, Gareth Evans attempts to give an account of how it is that one is able to think about oneself self‐consciously. On Evans’ view, when one attempts to think of oneself self‐consciously that person is having what he calls an ‘I’ thought. Since these ‘I’ thoughts are a case of reference, more specifically self‐reference, Evans thinks that these thoughts can be explained by employing the same theoretical framework that he uses to explain other kinds of reference. Evans thinks all thoughts are essentially structured, and this means that they must fall under his ‘generality constraint’. Since ‘I’ thoughts are also ‘thoughts’ they are essentially structured as well, and they too must be subject to the generality constraint. The radical implication of this is that Evans thinks that if ‘I’ thoughts are subject to the generality constraint, then he can show that self‐reference must be reference to a thing which we can locate on a spatio‐temporal map. In this article I hope to accomplish three things. First, I will spell out in detail the argument Evans uses to arrive at his claim that self‐reference must be reference to something located on a spatio‐temporal map. Second, I will raise an objection, which states that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is not a consequence of the generality constraint. Finally I will argue that Evans’ conclusion that self‐reference must involve spatio‐temporal location is in fact in tension with the generality constraint, rather than being an implication of it.     

Content Validity and Cognitive Tests: Response to Kehoe (), Ployhart (), and Sackett ()

The most important fact emerging from the combination of my article and the three commentaries is the consensus judgment that content validity is appropriate scientifically and professionally for use with tests of specific cognitive skills used in job performance. This is important because the 1978 Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures have typically been interpreted as not permitting such usage, and this is particularly the case in the interpretation given to the Guidelines by federal government enforcement agencies. Although the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology Principles and the Standards do not prohibit such usage, many industrial–organizational psychologists believe that it is not professionally or scientifically appropriate to employ content validity methods with cognitive measures. The hope is that this series will convince them otherwise. On this point, all four authors in the series are in agreement. The major disagreement among us concerns whether specific cognitive skills used in content valid tests must be considered constructs or not. My position, and apparently that of Kehoe, is that they need not be so considered. I argue that constructs must be invoked only in the context of a substantive theory. Sackett and Ployhart, on the other hand, argue that all measures taken on people must be viewed as constructs, regardless of whether any theoretical propositions and assumptions are involved. In this response, I present reasons why this need not be the case.     

What is Wrong With Moral Testimony?

Is it legitimate to acquire one’s moral beliefs on the testimony of others? The pessimist about moral testimony says not. But what is the source of the difficulty? Here pessimists have a choice. On the Unavailability view, moral testimony never makes knowledge available to the recipient. On Unusability accounts, although moral testimony can make knowledge available, some further norm renders it illegitimate to make use of the knowledge thus offered. I suggest that Unusability accounts provide the strongest form of pessimist view. I consider and reject five Unavailability accounts. I then argue that any such view will fail. But what is the norm rendering moral testimonial knowledge unusable? I suggest it lies in the requirement that we grasp for ourselves the moral reasons behind a moral view. This demand is one testimony cannot meet, and that claim holds whatever account we offer of the epistemology of testimony. However, while appeal to this requirement forms the most plausible pessimist view, it is another question whether pessimism is correct.     

Constitutive Rules: Games,Language, and Assertion

Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, languages, and speech acts in the sense that they make possible playing them, speaking them and performing them. This raises the question what it is to perform rule-constituted actions (e. g. play, speak, assert) and the question what makes constitutive rules distinctive such that only they make possible the performance of new actions (e. g. playing). In this paper I will criticize Searle's answers to these questions. However, my main aim is to develop a better view, explain how it works in the case of each of games, language, and assertion and illustrate its appeal by showing how it enables rule-based views of these things to respond to various objections.