Divine Infinity in Thomas Aquinas: I. Philosophico-Theological Background

A reassessment of Aquinas's doctrine of divine infinity, particularly in the light of the previous history of the concept within Western philosophy and theology. From the critical perspective provided by this history the central place which has been claimed for it in Aquinas's thinking is questioned, as are also its originality and coherence. The notion that the doctrine of divine infinity was introduced to Western thought by Judaeo-Christianity is rejected; from Anaximander onwards it had been a central concept in Greek philosophy. Aristotle however had rejected it so effectively that, for several centuries afterwards, it seems to have led an 'underground' existence until it finally surfaces again in 'Gnostic' and related currents of thought. It is from these circles that it finally, and after some resistance, patchily entered orthodox Christian thinking. Likewise Plotinus was not the source of the doctrine, as some have claimed; historical precedence must be given to the Gnostics. Neoplatonism never, despite the prestige of Plotinus, fully accepted the doctrine; in Proclus it is a subordinate emanation from the One, which is beyond Infinity and Infinitude. Nor, because of the influence of Aristotle, does Islamic Neoplatonized Aristotelianism endorse the doctrine. Aquinas's commitment to it seems to stem from the impact of John of Damascus's stress upon the doctrine, the translation of whose work greatly influenced Western theology from the late twelfth century onward, together with his need to distance himself from the restrictions of the divine power and freedom found in the Arabic Aristotelian philosophers, whom, in general, he regarded as philosophical authorities. But his position on the doctrine is flawed by equivocation and self-contradiction, flowing from his attempt to reconcile Christian personalist theism with Neoplatonized Aristotleain necessitarian monism.     

Thomas Aquinas Holds Fast: Objections to Aquinas within Today's Debate on Divine Action

Various authors within the contemporary debate on divine action in nature and contemporary science argue both for and against a Thomistic account of divine action through the notions of primary and secondary causes. In this paper I argue that those who support a Thomistic account of divine action often fail to explain Aquinas' doctrine in full, while those who argue against it base their objections on an incomplete knowledge of this doctrine, or identify it with Austin Farrer's doctrine of double agency – again failing to do Aquinas justice. I analyse these objections, indicating how they do not address Aquinas' doctrine by offering a brief but full account of the latter.     

The Concurrentism of Thomas Aquinas: Divine Causation and Human Freedom

The paper deals with the problem of divine causation in relation to created agents in general and human rational agents in particular. Beyond creation and conservation, Aquinas specifies divine contribution to created agents’ operation as application in the role of the first cause and the operation of the principal cause employing an instrumental cause. It is especially the latter which is open to varying interpretation and which might be potentially threatening to human freedom. There are different readings of what it is for the secondary agent to “act through the power of the principal cause”. Either the divine cause causes only the existence of the effect of the secondary cause, or it also causes the cause to operate in the sense that it determines its outcome. The latter seems to contradict human freedom. Both readings of Aquinas were developed in the latter half of the sixteenth century within scholastic philosophy and theology.     

Michael J. Dodds,O.P. Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science & Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig has argued for the past-finitude of the world, employing contemporary cosmology in support of the Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of a First Cause. However, his argument has gained little traction in the world of interdisciplinary theology. In what follows, we present Craig's argument and entertain potential objections from the perspective of interdisciplinarians. Finally, we argue that, in spite of the potential objections raised by contemporary theologians, Craig's argument remains theologically pertinent—provided his conclusion is framed within the more modest methodology of a best explanation.     

Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction

Books reviewed:
Thomas G. Weinandy, et al ., eds, Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction. Reviewed by Nicholas M. Healy St John's University, New York     

托马斯伦理学中的柏拉图主义因素--论托马斯对synderesis与conscientia的区分

托马斯伦理学总体上看虽然主要源于亚里士多德,但这并不排除它在个别理论问题上有其他理论渊源.据此笔者认为,托马斯伦理学中也不乏柏拉图主义因素.本文一方面试图厘清托马斯对于synderesis与conscientia所作的区分,另一方面深人审视这种区分的历史渊源,以期从一个侧面把托马斯伦理学中的柏拉图主义因素彰显出来.     

St. Thomas Aquinas on punishing souls

The details of St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological view are subject to debate. Some philosophers believe he held that human persons survive their deaths. Other philosophers think he held that human persons cease to exist at their death, but come back into being at the general resurrection. In this paper, I defend the latter view against one of the most significant objections it faces, namely, that it entails that God punishes and rewards separated souls for the sins or merits of something else: the (non-existent) persons to whom those souls once belonged. The objector takes this entailment to be problematic. I argue that it fits in well with St. Thomas’s views about punishment and about persons.     

Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question “What is truth?”. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals. The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that “truth is not in things but in the mind”, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as “adequation of thing and intellect” enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called “true” because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5–7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If “truth” is transcendental, it must be convertible with “being”. Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things.     

Thomas P. Flint,Divine Providence: The Molinist Account

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -