B. F. Skinner and G. H. Mead: on biological science and social science.

Skinner's contributions to psychology provide a unique bridge between psychology conceptualized as a biological science and psychology conceptualized as a social science. Skinner focused on behavior as a naturally occurring biological phenomenon of interest in its own right, functionally related to surrounding events and, in particular (like phylogenesis), subject to selection by its consequences. This essentially biological orientation was further enhanced by Skinner's emphasis on the empirical foundations provided by laboratory-based experimental analyses of behavior, often with nonhuman subjects. Skinner's theoretical writings, however, also have affinity with the traditions of constructionist social science. The verbal behavior of humans is said to be subject, like other behavior, to functional analyses in terms of its environment, in this case its social context. Verbal behavior in turn makes it possible for us to relate to private events, a process that ultimately allows for the development of consciousness, which is thus said to be a social product. Such ideas make contact with aspects of G. H. Mead's social behaviorism and, perhaps of more contemporary impact in psychology, L. Vygotsky's general genetic law of cultural development. Failure to articulate both the biological and the social science aspects of Skinner's theoretical approach to psychology does a disservice to his unique contribution to a discipline that remains fragmented between two intellectual traditions.     

Internal Objects - A Theoretical Analysis of Jungian and Kleinian Models

In this paper I discuss the ways in which experimental and objective research from cognitive science and developmental psychology can help analysts evaluate the theoretical models of mental objects which we use; I indicate the ways in which such evidence tends to support models of internal objects as mental representations or developmental capacities rather than as wish-fulfilling expressions of instinctual drives. This land of empirical evidence is not just of academic interest but also has direct clinical relevance, particularly with borderline patients; such patients' sense of identity is totally dependent on the analyst's understanding of their internal world and for this to be misunderstood by the analyst can be catastrophic. An accurate theoretical model of mental objects can therefore help analysts to contain their patients more effectively.     

试析现代西方心理学的文化转向

西方心理学正在展现出对文化影响日渐增加的关注。这种文化转向既有科学哲学和历史的原因,也受到世界范围内心理学本土化运动的影响。文化转向的主要表现是：(1)对心理学自然科学模式的反思与诘难;(2)多元文化心理学的兴起;(3)跨文化心理学面临的批评及其转变;(4)认知心理学、发展心理学和健康心理学等分支领域对文化影响的关注。作者认为,文化的转向对于西方心理学的发展具有积极的意义。     

The Psychology of Simonton's Science: Commentary on Simonton (2009)

ABSTRACT— One key assumption of the psychology of science is that psychological factors make certain interests, talents, and abilities more likely and others less likely ( Feist, 2006 ). The line of argument that Simonton (2009 , this issue) puts forth—integrating and uniting the metaliteratures on dispositional and developmental influences on scientific and artistic creativity—is not only consistent with this assumption from the psychology of science, but it is also a breeding ground for a host of testable hypotheses and calls for future empirical investigations. Given Simonton's own extraordinary levels of scientific creativity, indeed it would be interesting to turn his ideas back on him to see how his science is a product of his own developmental and dispositional experiences. We'll leave that, however, for future biographers and psychologists of science.     

解释心理起源的新理论范式——进化心理学

进化心理学旨在通过进化的心理机制来解释人类行为的适应性,是解释人类心理起源和本质的一种新兴理论范式。该文首先简要分析了进化心理学的诞生背景;其次介绍了该理论的研究内容,其中重点阐述了进化的心理机制的适应性和领域特异性;然后评述了该理论对认知科学、发展心理学和消费者行为学的积极影响;最后对该理论的局限性与发展前景进行了小结。     

论现象学心理学的理论特征

现象学心理学将现象学哲学落实到心理学中,反对自然科学心理学的自然主义主张,以维护心理现象的原本面目为己任,成为一种激进的人文科学心理学。其理论特征表现为：严格的现象学哲学观;激进的人文科学观;鲜明的生活面向观;独特的意向性心理本质观;坚实的质性研究观;批判的价值负载观。     

认知控制在第三方惩罚中的作用

第三方惩罚是一种特殊的利他行为, 在维护社会规范和人类合作中发挥着重要作用。现有研究对遵守社会规范行为及其认知机制进行了大量探讨, 而第三方惩罚这一维护社会规范行为的认知加工过程, 尤其是认知控制在其中发挥的具体作用, 是目前研究的热点之一。通过(1)借助不同技术方法来探究认知控制在第三方惩罚中的具体作用; (2)从发展的视角, 在认知控制发展的关键阶段来考察其作用随年龄的发展变化, 用以解释第三方惩罚这一利他行为的发展轨迹, 完善对第三方惩罚的认知基础的理解, 并构建第三方惩罚决策的心理模型。     

幸福感研究的本土化——浅谈道家幸福观

积极心理学的核心目标是理解和帮助人们获得幸福和主观幸福感。积极心理学将幸福确定为自己的研究对象,使关于幸福的讨论成为一门显学。作为一门实证科学,积极心理学采用较为完善的实验方法与测量手段,研究人类的力量和美德等积极方面,但是目前的研究存在理论基础薄弱的问题。幸福是一个复杂且主观的概念,不同文化对幸福的理解不同,对于幸福的研究带有浓重的文化色彩。因此在研究幸福的过程中,必须关涉文化。道家思想是中国传统文化的重要组成部分,道家思想蕴含了丰富的幸福理论.弘扬优秀传统文化,对道家幸福观进行梳理和阐发对幸福研究有重要理论和实践意义。     

Clara and William Stern's conception of a developmental science

Clara and William Stern were two pioneers of developmental psychology who are now almost forgotten, although their works have miraculously survived war and exile. The Sterns' theoretical conception of development and their extensive empirical work were inspired by the new discipline of child psychology which had been established in the nineteenth century. In this contribution we present the Sterns' academic work in developmental psychology with the aim of setting a counterbalance to the present mainstream in this discipline. We wish to show that it is certainly worthwhile to take a look back into history, and that “old” does not necessarily mean “obsolete”.     

Psychology as a Science of Subject and Comportment,beyond the Mind and Behavior

The turn of qualitative inquiry suggests a more open, plural conception of psychology than just the science of the mind and behavior as it is most commonly defined. Historical, ontological and epistemological binding of this conception of psychology to the positivist method of natural science may have exhausted its possibilities, and after having contributed to its prestige as a science, has now become an obstacle. It is proposed that psychology be reconceived as a science of subject and comportment in the framework of a contextual hermeneutic, social, human behavioral science. Thus, without rejecting quantitative inquiry, psychology recovers territory left aside like introspection and pre-reflective self-awareness, and reconnects with traditions marginalized from the main stream. From this perspective psychology might also recover its credibility as a human science in view of current skepticism.     

Evolutionary psychology from a developmental systems perspective: comment on Lickliter and Honeycutt (2003)

Although agreeing with R. Lickliter and H. Honeycutt (2003) that evolutionary psychology lacks and should adopt a coherent developmental model to explain how evolved mechanisms become expressed in phenotypes, it is argued that adhering to the principles of developmental systems theory, despite enhancing evolutionary psychology, would not change appreciably its basic focus. The concepts of innateness and modularity, what is inherited and what evolves, as well as the possible role of developmental plasticity in the evolution of human cognition are discussed. It is proposed that evolutionary psychology can incorporate the developmental systems perspective into its theorizing, with the end result being a science that more closely reflects human nature.     

New reasons for realism

Summary Both the psychology of perception and the philosophy of perception seem to show a new face when the process is considered at its own level, distinct from that of sensation. Unfamiliar conceptions in physics, anatomy, physiology, psychology, and phenomenology are required to clarify the separation and make it plausible. But there have been so many dead ends in the effort to solve the theoretical problems of perception that radical proposals may now be acceptable. Scientists are often more conservative than philosophers of science. I end, therefore, as I began, with a plea for help.     

William James and Sigmund Freud: "The Future of Psychology Belongs to Your Work"

Although James and Freud are generally not considered scientific by experimental psychologists, both wrote about their view of what a scientific psychology should look like. Their radically different philosophical epistemologies and historical origins are reviewed, to provide an understanding of their respective visions for psychology. James took his stand on a new metaphysical foundation for the way experiments should be conducted with his formulation of radical empiricism. Freud attempted a neurological explanation of the unconscious in his "Project for a Scientific Psychology." Remarkably, their definitions of psychology as a science had a similar ring. Likely, this is because both took a phenomenological position with regard to how they defined science, which is also probably the primary reason their ideas on the subject have always been rejected by experimentalists. The humanistic implications of the neuroscience revolution, however, have caused a reassessment of their respective positions, as philosophical questions about the nature of consciousness have brought both Freud and James back into vogue, but in new and unexpected ways.     

Attachment theory and research: Resurrection of the psychodynamic approach to personality

Since the rise of the social-behaviorist approach to personality and its elaboration with cognitive concepts following “the cognitive revolution,” psychodynamic theories, usually identified with Sigmund Freud, have taken a beating. This makes it easy for mainstream personality-social psychologists to brush the psychodynamic approach aside. At the same time, researchers in both developmental and personality-social psychology have made great progress in testing and elaborating ideas presented by John Bowlby in his famous trilogy on attachment and loss. What outsiders to that perspective may not realize is that Bowlby was a psychoanalyst who saw himself as retracing Freud’s steps but with the advantage of new theoretical and empirical strategies. In this article, we conceptualize attachment theory as a contemporary psychodynamic approach, show how this theory has helped to bring psychodynamic psychology back to life, and review empirical evidence from our laboratories that supports many of the psychodynamic hypotheses advanced by Bowlby.     

Twenty-First Century Science as a Relational Process: From Eureka! To Team Science and a Place for Community Psychology

In this paper we maintain that twenty-first century science is, fundamentally, a relational process in which knowledge is produced (or co-produced) through transactions among researchers or among researchers and public stakeholders. We offer an expanded perspective on the practice of twenty-first century science, the production of scientific knowledge, and what community psychology can contribute to these developments. We argue that: (1) trends in science show that research is increasingly being conducted in teams; (2) scientific teams, such as transdisciplinary teams of researchers or of researchers collaborating with various public stakeholders, are better able to address complex challenges; (3) transdisciplinary scientific teams are part of the larger, twenty-first century transformation in science; (4) the concept of heterarchy is a heuristic for team science aligned with this transformation; (5) a contemporary philosophy of science known as perspectivism provides an essential foundation to advance twenty-first century science; and (6) community psychology, through its core principles and practice competencies, offers theoretical and practical expertise for advancing team science and the transformation in science currently underway. We discuss the implications of these points and illustrate them briefly with two examples of transdisciplinary team science from our own work. We conclude that a new narrative is emerging for science in the twenty-first century that draws on interpersonal transactions in teams, and active engagement by researchers with the public to address critical accountabilities. Because of its core organizing principles and unique blend of expertise on the intersection of research and practice, community psychologists are well-prepared to help advance these developments, and thus have much to offer twenty-first century science.     

Children,childhood, and development in evolutionary perspective

We examine children, childhood, and development from an evolutionary perspective. We begin by reviewing major assumptions of evolutionary–developmental psychology, including the integration of “soft” developmental systems theory with ideas from mainstream evolutionary psychology. We then discuss the concept of adaptive developmental plasticity and describe the core evolutionary concept of developmental programming and some of its applications to human development, as instantiated in life history theory and the theory of differential susceptibility to environmental influence. We then discuss the concept of adaptation from an evolutionary–developmental perspective, including ontogenetic and deferred adaptations, and examine the development of some adaptations of infancy and childhood from the domains of folk psychology and folk physics. We conclude that evolutionary theory can serve as a metatheory for developmental science.     

心理学中实验法的方法论地位重估

认知心理学以实验法为其方法论基础,着力对人类的认识过程进行模型建构。然而,早在20世纪70年代初,其创立者奈塞尔就对心理学的实验范式感到不满,转而寻求心理学的生态学效度。心理学中对实验法的推崇源于自然科学特别是物理学的成功。而实际上,物理学在20世纪初遭遇了实验法所带来的困境。受制于实验法的种种局限,当代认知科学逐渐放弃了方法论的沙文主义立场,接纳了来自语言学、哲学、神经科学等多领域、多视角的研究策略。心理学在一定程度上具有人文科学的性质,因此同样需要采用多重研究手段和方法,而不是一味地笃信实验法的权威性。     

科学心理学的观念及其范畴含义解析

关于心理学作为科学的观念或理想普遍兴起于19世纪下半叶,正是对这个观念或理想的百余年历史的追求和实践,塑造了现代意义上的科学心理学及其历史作为整体的基本面貌,并决定了科学心理学观念的两种范畴含义及其差异,具体表现为在心理学作为科学的整体背景中它的现象学传统或道路与它的科学主义传统或道路之间的对峙关系。历史分析表明,对科学心理学观念的范畴含义的理解和实现,与关于科学观念的范畴含义的探索和理解是密切关联、相互制约的。以人类思维的理论形态的历史转换为背景,我们发现,关于心理学作为科学的观念,只有实现为现象学意义上的科学,才能真正实现它自身;但主流的科学主义传统则要把心理学实现为自然科学,由此实现的科学心理学,只能是对心理学作为科学的观念的异化。     

Applying the Psychology of Science to the Science of Psychology: Can Psychologists Use Psychological Science to Enhance Psychology as a Science?

ABSTRACT— Added to the already tremendous diversity of subdisciplines of psychological science is the psychology of science. Although research on the psychology of science began in 1874, the field has seen a substantial expansion of activity in recent years. One particular subset of this research literature has special importance: namely, inquiries into the psychology of doing great science. These investigations may be assigned into four groups: cognitive, differential, developmental, and social. Each of these deal with critical questions that can, if answered, contribute directly to the improvement of psychology as a science. Potential applications include (a) the identification of scientific talent in psychology, (b) the education of future investigators in psychological science, and (c) the evaluation of psychology's progress as a scientific endeavor.