Challenges To Human Equality

According to liberal egalitarian morality, all human beings are one another's moral equals. Nonhuman animals, by contrast, are not considered to be our moral equals. This essay considers two challenges to the liberal egalitarian view. One is the ``separation problem,' which is the challenge to identify a morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings and all nonhuman animals. The other is the “equality problem,” which is to explain how all human beings can be morally equal when there are some human beings whose psychological capacities (and, in some cases, their psychological potentials as well) are no higher than those of certain nonhuman animals. The focus throughout is on the ethics of killing but the arguments are of broader relevance. The essay reaches a skeptical conclusion about our ability to meet these challenges.     

Developing a social functional account of laughter

Laughter is ubiquitous, universal, and variable. This article develops a social functional account to explain the many physical forms laughter takes and the many social contexts in which it occurs. In contrast to previous perspectives that emphasize the internal state of the producer or the eliciting context, the current social functional account distinguishes laughter according to the behavioral intentions it conveys and the behavioral response it elicits in the recipient. The general function of human and nonhuman laughter is to signal harmless intentions, and within this function, we identify 3 distinct social tasks accomplished by human laughter. We propose that the first social function of laughter, both evolutionarily and developmentally, is to reward the behavior of others and reinforce the ongoing interaction. The second task accomplished by laughter is the easing of social tension and signaling of affiliation and nonthreat. A third form of laughter nonconfrontationally enforces social norms, negotiates status, and corrects undesirable behavior in others by conveying dominance or superiority. We propose that the acoustic modulations that communicate these social intentions follow principles common to human and nonhuman vocal signaling.     

Feelings,Imagination and Self-Understanding

Starting from some considerations about the text ‘Feelings in Literature’ by Johansen (2010), this article discusses the topic of emotions from the standpoint of moral psychology, namely the relationship between emotions and the conduct of our moral life. From this assumption, we will argue that literature, as an exercise of imagination, helps us understand and evaluate our own emotions, what is essential for establishing our uniqueness, distinguishing ourselves from others. In literature we can learn about emotions and we can understand our own feelings. Literature plays an important role in cultural experience, triggering emotional responses.     

Normatively demanding creatures: Hobbes,the Fall and individual responsibility

This paper explores an internal relation between wrong-doing and the ability to think in moral terms, through Hobbes’ thought. I use his neglected retelling of our ‘original sin’ as a springboard, seeing how we then discover a need to vindicate our own projects in terms shared by others. We become normatively demanding creatures: greedy for normative vindication, eager to judge others amid the difficulties of our world. However there is, of course, no choice for us but to choose our own principles of judgment, or at least some authority to provide these. Unconvinced by Hobbes’ remedies, I conclude with one implication for moral philosophy@ a need to look rather differently at agency and responsibility. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Demandingness and Boundaries Between Persons

ABSTRACT

Demandingness objections to consequentialism often claim that consequentialism underestimates the moral significance of the stranger/special other distinction, mistakenly extending to strangers demands it is proper for special others to make on us, and concluding that strangers may properly demand anything of us if it increases aggregate goodness. This argument relies on false assumptions about our relations with special others. Boundaries between ourselves and special others are both a common and a good-making feature of our relations with them. Hence, demandingness objections that rely on the argument in question fail. But the same observations about our relations with special others show that there are many demands special others may not properly make, and since we cannot be more guilty of unjustified partiality in insisting on boundaries between ourselves and strangers than on boundaries between ourselves and special others, there are – as demandingness objections maintain – some demands strangers may not properly make on us.     

Creating social connection through inferential reproduction: loneliness and perceived agency in gadgets, gods, and greyhounds

People are motivated to maintain social connection with others, and those who lack social connection with other humans may try to compensate by creating a sense of human connection with nonhuman agents. This may occur in at least two ways-by anthropomorphizing nonhuman agents such as nonhuman animals and gadgets to make them appear more humanlike and by increasing belief in commonly anthropomorphized religious agents (such as God). Three studies support these hypotheses both among individuals who are chronically lonely (Study 1) and among those who are induced to feel lonely (Studies 2 and 3). Additional findings suggest that such results are not simply produced by any negative affective state (Study 3). These results have important implications not only for understanding when people are likely to treat nonhuman agents as humanlike (anthropomorphism), but also for understanding when people treat human agents as nonhuman (dehumanization).     

Wonder,Mystery, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between wonder and meaning, in particular ‘the meaning of life’, a connection that, despite strong intrinsic connections between wonder and the (philosophical) search for meaning has not yet received any sustained attention. Does wonder ‘merely’ inspire our search for meaning, or does it also point the way towards meaning? In exploring this question I first engage with Hannah Arendt, then examine the suggestion (by Josef Pieper and Rachel Carson, among others) that the meaning wonder points us to lies in connecting us with the mystery of existence. Can there be meaning in mystery, or is wonder––as a state of being lost for words in the face of mystery––rather antithetical to meaning? This discussion leads to the idea, emphasized in recent writing on wonder, that wonder (also) depends on the meaning we ascribe to things. In the final section I discuss wonder as a potential source of meaning in life, then return to the question whether it can also point towards a deeper meaning of life. I conclude that no purely rational justification can be given for this view, but that this need not detract from the importance of wonder in our lives.     

Alleged problems in attributing beliefs,and intentionality,to animals

The ordinary attribution of intentionality to (nonhuman) animals raises serious problems for fashionable linguistic accounts of belief and of intentionality generally; and many of the alleged problems arise from such linguistic theories of mind. Another deeper source of alleged problems is the apartness thesis, that there is a significant difference in kind, with substantial moral import, between humans and other animals; for the last lines of defence of this erroneous thesis consist in making out that there are significant intentional differences. A wide range of recent arguments against assigning intentionality (in the full sense) to animals are criticized in detail: those of Stich and Williams, in terms of animals lacking effective or specifiable concepts (concepts now replacing souls); those of Stich and Davidson based on the requirement for beliefs of an isomorphic belief network; those based on the usual opacity of intentionality; those of Descartes and Davidson and others based on the requirement of, or arguments to the essentiality of, language use for attributions of intentionality; arguments based on the requirement of capacity for pretence or awareness of error; and arguments used by Vendler and Malcolm. Several different arguments for assigning intentionality to animals are then advanced, arguments from cerebral organization, exteriorization arguments, and interiorization arguments from the semantical analysis of intentionality. The main arguments advanced are not analogical; they are not anthropocentric, or the result of personifying languageless animals; and the attributions of intentionality they lead to are not impoverished or of reduced status.     

Simulation, Theory and Collapse

Recent philosophical discussions of our capacity to attribute mental states to other human beings, and to produce accurate predictions and informative explanations of their behavior which make reference to the content of those states have focused on two apparently contrasting ways in which we might hope to account for these abilities. The first is that of regarding our competence as being under-girded by our grasp of a tacit psychological theory. The second builds on the idea that in trying to get a grip on the mental lives of others we might be able to draw on the fact that we are ourselves subjects of mental states in order to simulate their mental processes. Call these the theory view and the simulation view. In this paper I wish to discuss an argument—which I shall call Collapse—to the effect that if our capacities can be explained in the way that the simulationist supposes then they can also be explained along lines that the advocate of the theory view favours. I am not the first person with simulationist sympathies to have addressed this argument. However, my response is somewhat less concessive than others in the literature: while they attempt to soften its force by attempting to reformulate the simulationist view in a way that evades the conclusion of the argument, I attempt to meet it head on and to show that it does not even succeed in refuting the version of simulationism which it takes as its target.

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Subsistence Needs,Human Rights,and Imperfect Duties

I address the usefulness of thinking about a human right to subsistence within conceptions of human rights grounded in ordinary moral reasoning. I argue that that natural rights should be understood as rights in rem, with their dynamism constrained by the requirements of justification and their scope constrained by the distinction between perfect and imperfect duty. I then suggest that many of the most pressing demands which the moral significance of subsistence needs create are plausibly imperfect duties, and so cannot correlate to a natural right to subsistence. This restricts the helpfulness of a human right to subsistence in our reasoning about what we owe to others.     

Chimpanzees and bonobos exhibit divergent spatial memory development

Spatial cognition and memory are critical cognitive skills underlying foraging behaviors for all primates. While the emergence of these skills has been the focus of much research on human children, little is known about ontogenetic patterns shaping spatial cognition in other species. Comparative developmental studies of nonhuman apes can illuminate which aspects of human spatial development are shared with other primates, versus which aspects are unique to our lineage. Here we present three studies examining spatial memory development in our closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and bonobos (P. paniscus). We first compared memory in a naturalistic foraging task where apes had to recall the location of resources hidden in a large outdoor enclosure with a variety of landmarks (Studies 1 and 2). We then compared older apes using a matched memory choice paradigm (Study 3). We found that chimpanzees exhibited more accurate spatial memory than bonobos across contexts, supporting predictions from these species’ different feeding ecologies. Furthermore, chimpanzees – but not bonobos – showed developmental improvements in spatial memory, indicating that bonobos exhibit cognitive paedomorphism (delays in developmental timing) in their spatial abilities relative to chimpanzees. Together, these results indicate that the development of spatial memory may differ even between closely related species. Moreover, changes in the spatial domain can emerge during nonhuman ape ontogeny, much like some changes seen in human children.     

Perceived social support from significant others,family and friends and several socio‐demographic characteristics

The first aim was to explore the relationship between socio‐demographic characteristics and perceived support from significant others, family and friends. Zimet, Dahlem, Zimet, and Farley's Multidimensional Scale of Perceived Social Support (MSPSS) (Journal of Personality Assessment, 52, 1988, 30–41) was administered to 418 males and 623 females between 18 and 77 years of age. The results indicate that family support is higher in males, and the support of friends decreases with age as does the support of significant others. Significant interactions also emerged between gender and age and between gender and marital status. No differences were found for educational level. The second aim was to discover which persons are identified as ‘special persons’ on the items of the ‘Significant others’ sub‐scale of the MSPSS. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

‘The Only Creature God Willed For Its Own Sake’: Anthropocentrism in Laudato Si’ and Gaudium et Spes

The Second Vatican Council’s constitution Gaudium et Spes stated that man is ‘the only creature on earth that God has willed for its own sake’. Post-conciliar Catholic teaching on the environment largely reproduced this anthropocentric theology. Pope Francis’ encyclical letter Laudato Si’, however, appears directly to contradict this well-established tradition with its repeated assertions of the intrinsic value of nonhuman life and its critical approach to the term ‘anthropocentrism’. Questioning this putative discontinuity, this article challenges the perception that Laudato Si’ has definitively rejected anthropocentrism. It suggests that the claim for the intrinsic value of nonhuman life, and the traditional assertion that man is the only creature willed for its own sake, can be seen to converge in light of the traditional theological anthropology of the human being as microcosm. On this view, the centrality of the human person in the order of creation is constituted by its gathering up of the sakes of creatures. The distinctive place of the human does not come at the expense of the rest of creation, but rather is the means of creation’s movement towards the unity and harmony to which God calls it. Laudato Si’ is distinguished not by its rejection of anthropocentrism, but by its refusal to set human and nonhuman over against one another. In contrast, the language of ‘intrinsic value’ is criticised for conceiving created value as a zero-sum game, as though human and nonhuman value are in competition with one another; the language of ‘stewardship’ is criticised for its extrinsicist conception of the human being in the natural order.     

Attachment security,values, and prosocial attitudes

The objective of this study was to determine whether individuals with different attachment styles held different prosocial values and attitudes given their different models of self and of others. A sample of 717 university students completed the ECR ‐S (Experiences in Close Relationships‐Spanish) and the PVQ (Portrait Values Questionnaire), and evaluated different prosocial attitudes. The results showed that secure individuals reported higher scores on self‐transcendence and in the value self‐directions of the dimension openness to change , whereas insecure individuals had higher scores on conservation and self‐enhancement . No differences were found in the attitudes of individuals with different attachment styles. These findings show a link between the dimensions of the universal values theory, and the models of self and of others.     

Creativity in Men and Women: Threat,Other-Interest,and Self-Assessment

Previous research into gender and creativity has provided little evidence for consistent differences between men and women in creative performance. This research revisits this topic by proposing a person × situation approach, arguing that gender differences in creative performance only occur in certain contexts, but not others. Based on the assumption that men and women tend to differ in self versus other orientation, experimental instructions varied whether our participants’ (n = 169) creative efforts benefit the self or others, and whether creativity occurred under conditions of threat or not. In the absence of threat, women outperformed men in the originality of their creative efforts when the task was beneficial to others. This effect was eliminated in the presence of competitive threat. In contrast to some previous work, threat also increased creative performance under some circumstances. Results also revealed gender differences in self-assessment of creativity such that women seemed to be somewhat more attuned to the objective level of the originality of their creative performance than men. The discussion focuses on implications for research on gender differences in creativity, arguing that researchers must appreciate that gender differences in creativity, so far as they exist, are likely embedded in specific situational contexts.     

Glass Panels and Peepholes: Nonhuman Animals and the Right to Privacy

In this paper, I defend the claim that many sentient nonhuman animals have a right to privacy. I begin by outlining the view that the human right to privacy protects our interest in shaping different kinds of relationships with one another by giving us control over how we present ourselves to others. I then draw on empirical research to show that nonhuman animals also have this interest, which grounds a right to privacy against us. I further argue that we can violate this right even when other animals are unaware that we are watching them.     

Experts,Semantic and Epistemic

In this paper I argue that the tendency to defer in matters semantic is rationalized by our reliance on the say‐so of others for much of what we know about the world. The result, I contend, is a new and distinctly epistemic source of support for the doctrine of attitude anti‐individualism.     

Inferential reasoning by exclusion in pigeons, dogs, and humans

The ability to reason by exclusion (which is defined as the selection of the correct alternative by logically excluding other potential alternatives; Call in Anim Cogn 9:393–403 2006) is well established in humans. Several studies have found it to be present in some nonhuman species as well, whereas it seems to be somewhat limited or even absent in others. As inconsistent methodology might have contributed to the revealed inter-species differences, we examined reasoning by exclusion in pigeons (n = 6), dogs (n = 6), students (n = 6), and children (n = 8) under almost equal experimental conditions. After being trained in a computer-controlled two-choice procedure to discriminate between four positive (S+) and four negative (S−) photographs, the subjects were tested with displays consisting of one S− and one of four novel stimuli (S′). One pigeon, half of the dogs and almost all humans preferred S′ over S−, thereby choosing either by novelty, or by avoiding S− without acquiring any knowledge about S′, or by inferring positive class membership of S′ by excluding S−. To decide among these strategies the subjects that showed a preference for S′ were then tested with displays consisting of one of the S′ and one of four novel stimuli (S′′). Although the pigeon preferentially chose the S′′ and by novelty, dogs and humans maintained their preference for S′, thereby showing evidence of reasoning by exclusion. Taken together, the results of the present study suggest that none of the pigeons, but half of the dogs and almost all humans inferred positive class membership of S′ by logically excluding S−. Electronic supplementary material  The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

Animals, pain and morality

While it is widely agreed that the infliction upon innocents of needless pain is immoral, many have argued that, even though nonhuman animals act as if they feel pain, there is no reason to think that they actually suffer painful experiences. And if our actions only appear to cause nonhuman animals pain, then such actions are not immoral. On the basis of the claim that certain behavioural responses to organismic harm are maladaptive, whereas the ability to feel pain is itself adaptive, this article argues that the experience of pain should be viewed as the proximate cause of such occasionally maladaptive behaviour. But as nonhuman animals also display such maladaptive traits, we have reason to conclude that they feel pain. Hence, we have reason to hold that it is indeed possible to inflict needless pain on nonhuman animals, which would be immoral.