Object individuation: infants' use of shape, size, pattern, and color.

Recent research indicates that when an event-monitoring paradigm is used, infants as young as 4.5 months of age demonstrate the ability to use featural information to individuate objects involved in occlusion events (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998a, Object individuation in infancy: The use of featural information in reasoning about occlusion events. Cognitive Psychology 37, 97-155; Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142). For example, in one experiment (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998b, Object individuation in young infants: Further evidence with an event monitoring task. Developmental Science 1, 127-142) 4.5-month-old infants saw a test event in which a green ball with colored dots disappeared behind one edge of a narrow or wide screen, and a red box with silver thumbtacks appeared at the other edge; the narrow screen was too narrow to hide both objects simultaneously, whereas the wide screen was sufficiently wide to hide both objects at the same time. The infants looked reliably longer at the narrow- than at the wide-screen test event. These and control results suggested that the infants had: (a) used the featural differences between the ball and box to conclude that two objects were involved in the event; (b) judged that both objects could fit simultaneously behind the wide but not the narrow screen; and hence (c) were surprised by the narrow-screen event. The present experiments build on these initial findings by investigating the features to which infants are most sensitive. Four experiments were conducted with infants 4.5-11.5 months of age using the same procedure, except that only one feature was manipulated at a time: shape, size, pattern, or color. The results indicated that 4.5-month-olds use both shape and size features to individuate objects involved in occlusion events. However, it is not until 7.5 months that infants use pattern, and 11.5 months that infants use color, to reason about object identity. It is suggested that these results reflect biases in the kind of information that infants attend to when reasoning about occlusion events. Possible sources of bias are discussed.     

Comparing infants' use of featural and spatiotemporal information in an object individuation task using a new event-monitoring design

Discussions have recently taken place on whether spatiotemporal information is more important than featural information when infants attempt to individuate objects. Hitherto, spatiotemporal and featural information have only been compared directly by using cognitively demanding 'event-mapping designs' (e.g. Xu & Carey, 1996), whereas the simpler event-monitoring designs (e.g. the 'wide-screen/narrow-screen' by Wilcox and colleagues) have not been employed for such a comparison. The present research offers a new event-monitoring design, the rotating screen design, that allows for such a direct comparison. Three experiments in which 9.5-, 8.0-, and 6.5-month-old infants attempt to individuate objects by spatiotemporal and featural information are reported. The results showed that whereas the 9.5-month-old infants were able to individuate objects by spatiotemporal as well as featural information, the infants of the younger age groups only successfully individuated objects when provided with spatiotemporal information, but not with featural information.     

Infants' representations of three-dimensional occluded objects

Infants' ability to represent objects has received significant attention from the developmental research community. With the advent of eye-tracking technology, detailed analysis of infants' looking patterns during object occlusion have revealed much about the nature of infants' representations. The current study continues this research by analyzing infants' looking patterns in a novel manner and by comparing infants' looking at a simple display in which a single three-dimensional (3D) object moves along a continuous trajectory to a more complex display in which two 3D objects undergo trajectories that are interrupted behind an occluder. Six-month-old infants saw an occlusion sequence in which a ball moved along a linear path, disappeared behind a rectangular screen, and then a ball (ball-ball event) or a box (ball-box event) emerged at the other edge. An eye-tracking system recorded infants' eye-movements during the event sequence. Results from examination of infants' attention to the occluder indicate that during the occlusion interval infants looked longer to the side of the occluder behind which the moving occluded object was located, shifting gaze from one side of the occluder to the other as the object(s) moved behind the screen. Furthermore, when events included two objects, infants attended to the spatiotemporal coordinates of the objects longer than when a single object was involved. These results provide clear evidence that infants' visual tracking is different in response to a one-object display than to a two-object display. Furthermore, this finding suggests that infants may require more focused attention to the hidden position of objects in more complex multiple-object displays and provides additional evidence that infants represent the spatial location of moving occluded objects.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

There has been some debate about whether infants 10 months and younger can use featural information to individuate objects. The present research tested the hypothesis that negative results obtained with younger infants reflect limitations in information processing capacities rather than the inability to individuate objects based on featural differences. Infants aged 9.5 months saw one object (i.e. a ball) or two objects (i.e. a box and a ball) emerge successively to opposite sides of an opaque occluder. Infants then saw a single ball either behind a transparent occluder or without an occluder. Only the infants who saw the ball behind the transparent occluder correctly judged that the one-ball display was inconsistent with the box-ball sequence. These results suggest that: (a) infants categorize events involving opaque and transparent occluders as the same kind of physical situation (i.e. occlusion) and (b) support the notion that infants are more likely to give evidence of object individuation when they need to reason about one kind of event (i.e. occlusion) than when they must retrieve and compare categorically distinct events (i.e. occlusion and no-occlusion).     

Sex differences during visual scanning of occlusion events in infants

A growing number of sex differences in infancy have been reported. One task on which they have been observed reliably is the event-mapping task. In event mapping, infants view an occlusion event involving 1 or 2 objects, the occluder is removed, and then infants see 1 object. Typically, boys are more likely than girls to detect an inconsistency between a 2-object occlusion event and a 1-object display. The current research investigated underlying reasons for this sex difference. Three eye-tracking experiments were conducted with infants at 9 and 4 months (mean age). Infants saw a ball-box or ball-ball occlusion event followed by a 1-ball display; visual scanning of the occlusion event and the 1-ball display was recorded. Older boys were more likely than older girls to visually track the objects through occlusion and more likely to detect an inconsistency between the ball-box event and the 1-ball display. In addition, tracking objects through occlusion was related to infants' scanning of the 1-ball display. Both younger boys and girls failed to track the objects through occlusion and to detect an inconsistency between the ball-box event and the 1-ball display. These results suggest that infants' capacity to track objects through occlusion facilitates extraction of the structure of the initial event (i.e., the number of distinct objects involved) that infants can map onto the final display and that sex differences in the capacity emerge between 4 and 9 months. Possible explanations for how the structure of an occlusion event is extracted and mapped are considered.     

Can an agent's false belief be corrected by an appropriate communication? Psychological reasoning in 18-month-old infants

Do 18-month-olds understand that an agent's false belief can be corrected by an appropriate, though not an inappropriate, communication? In Experiment 1, infants watched a series of events involving two agents, a ball, and two containers: a box and a cup. To start, agent1 played with the ball and then hid it in the box, while agent2 looked on. Next, in agent1's absence, agent2 moved the ball from the box to the cup. When agent1 returned, agent2 told her "The ball is in the cup!" (informative-intervention condition) or "I like the cup!" (uninformative-intervention condition). During test, agent1 reached for either the box (box event) or the cup (cup event). In the informative-intervention condition, infants who saw the box event looked reliably longer than those who saw the cup event; in the uninformative-intervention condition, the reverse pattern was found. These results suggest that infants expected agent1's false belief about the ball's location to be corrected when she was told "The ball is in the cup!", but not "I like the cup!". In Experiment 2, agent2 simply pointed to the ball's new location, and infants again expected agent1's false belief to be corrected. These and control results provide additional evidence that infants in the second year of life can attribute false beliefs to agents. In addition, the results suggest that by 18 months of age infants expect agents' false beliefs to be corrected by relevant communications involving words or gestures.     

A direct comparison of infants' use of featural and spatiotemporal information when individuating objects in a non-occlusion event-monitoring design

A central issue within the field of object individuation concerns the kind of information that infants rely on when they succeed in individuating objects. By means of the violation-of-expectation strategy, the present study reports a comparison of 8.0- and 6.5-month-old infants' use of featural and spatiotemporal information in a new non-occlusion event-monitoring design. Using a mirror setup the memory demands were minimized, because all apparent changes in the unexpected test events took place in full view of the infants. The results indicate that the 8.0- and 6.5-month-old infants individuated objects successfully regardless of whether they were provided with featural or spatiotemporal information. The results are discussed in relation to the relevant literature.     

Why do young infants fail to search for hidden objects?

Recent evidence indicates that infants as young as 3.5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when hidden (Baillargeon, 1987a; Baillargeon & DeVos, 1990). Why, then, do infants fail to search for hidden objects until 7 to 8 months of age? The present experiments tested whether 5.5-month-old infants could distinguish between correct and incorrect search actions performed by an experimenter. In Experiment 1, a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or under (impossible event) a clear cover. Next, a screen was slid in front of the objects, hiding them from view. A hand then reached behind the screen and reappeared holding the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they understood that the hand's direct reaching action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood in front of but not under the clear cover. The same results were obtained in a second condition in which a toy was placed in front of (possible event) or behind (impossible event) a barrier. In Experiment 2, a toy was placed under the right (possible event) or the left (impossible event) of two covers. After a screen hid the objects, a hand reached behind the screen's right edge and reappeared first with the right cover and then with the toy. The infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event, suggesting that they realized that the hand's sequence of action was sufficient to retrieve the toy when it stood under the right but not the left cover. A control condition supported this interpretation. Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that by 5.5 months of age, infants not only represent hidden objects, but are able to identify the actions necessary to retrieve these objects. The implications of these findings for a problem solving explanation of young infants' failure to retrieve hidden objects are considered.     

How 7-month-olds interpret ambiguous motion events: Category-based reasoning in infancy

This paper investigates the role of static and dynamic attributes for the animate-inanimate distinction in category-based reasoning of 7-month-olds. Three experiments tested infants’ responses to movement events involving an unfamiliar animal and a ball. When either the animal or the ball showed self-initiated irregular movements (Experiment 1), infants expected the previously active object to start moving again. When both objects were moving together in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 2), infants expected only the animal to start moving again. Initial looking preferences for each object did not influence results. When either the facial features of the animal were removed, or its furry body was replaced by a plastic spiral in an ambiguous motion event (Experiment 3), infants formed no clear expectation regarding future movements. Based on this set of findings we conclude that 7-month-olds flexibly combine information about the static and dynamic properties of objects in order to reason about motion events.     

Event-mapping tasks: investigating the effects of prior information and event complexity on performance

Infants younger than 11.5 months typically fail in event-mapping tasks with complex event sequences, yet succeed when the event sequences are made very simple and brief. The present research explored whether younger infants might succeed at mapping complex event sequences if infants were given information to help them organize and structure the event. Three experiments were conducted with 7.5-month-olds. In all of the experiments, the infants were shown a two-phase test event. In the first phase, infants saw a box–ball occlusion sequence in which the objects emerged at least once to each side of the screen, reversing direction each time to return behind the screen. In the second phase, infants saw a one-ball display. Prior to the test trials, infants were shown an “outline” of the test event that contained the basic components of the event. The experiments varied in (a) the kind of information included in the event outline and (b) the complexity of the box–ball test sequence (i.e., the number of object reversals). The results revealed that the 7.5-month-olds benefitted from viewing an event outline, although the performance of the males was more robust than the females. These results add to a growing body of research indicating that young infants can succeed on event-mapping tasks under more supportive conditions and provide insight into why event mapping is such a difficult task for young infants.     

Object permanence in five-month-old infants

A new method was devised to test object permanence in young infants. Five- month-old infants were habituated to a screen that moved back and forth through a 180-degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. After infants reached habituation, a box was centered behind the screen. Infants were shown two test events: a possible event and an impossible event. In the possible event, the screen stopped when it reached the occluded box; in the impossible event, the screen moved through the space occupied by the box. The results indicated that infants looked reliably longer at the impossible than at the possible event. This finding suggested that infants (1) understood that the box continued to exist, in its same location, after it was occluded by the screen, and (2) expected the screen to stop against the occluded box and were surprised, or puzzled, when it failed to do so. A control experiment in which the box was placed next to the screen provided support for this interpretation of the results. Together, the results of these experiments indicate that, contrary to Piaget's (1954) claims, infants as young as 5 months of age understand that objects continue to exist when occluded. The results also indicate that 5-month-old infants realize that solid objects do not move through the space occupied by other solid objects.     

Reasoning about the height and location of a hidden object in 4.5- and 6.5-month-old infants

The present experiments examined 6.5- and 4.5-month-old infants' ability to represent and to reason about the height and location of a hidden object. In Experiments 1 and 2, the infants were habituated to a screen that rotated back and forth through a 180 degree arc, in the manner of a drawbridge. Following habituation, a box was placed behind the screen, and the infants saw two test events. In one (possible event), the screen rotated until it reached the occluded box; in the other (impossible event), the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the space occupied by the box. The results indicated that (a) the 6.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through the top 80%, but not the top 50%, of the box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants failed to be surprised even when the screen rotated through the top 80% of the box (4.5-month-old infants do show surprise, however, when the screen rotates through the entire (100%) box (Baillargeon, 1987a]. Experiments 3 and 4 tested whether infants would be better at detecting that the screen rotated farther than it should if provided with a second, identical box to the side of the box behind the screen. This second box stood out of the screen's path and so remained visible throughout the test trials. The results indicated that with the second box present (a) the 6.5-month-old infants showed surprise when the screen rotated through the top 50% of the occluded box and (b) the 4.5-month-old infants were surprised when the screen rotated through either the top 80% or the top 50% of the box. The results of Experiment 5 revealed that the improvement in performance brought about by the second box disappeared when this box was no longer in the same fronto-parallel plane as the box behind the screen. Different models are considered to describe the impressive quantitative and qualitative physical reasoning abilities revealed by these findings.     

Why don't they just let it go?

Discrepancies between what children expect about physical causality (indexed by looking time) and how they act on that knowledge have led to criticisms of claims about what infants "know." Baillargeon [Baillargeon, R. (1999). Young infants' expectations about hidden objects: A reply to three challenges. Developmental Science, 2, 115-163] advocates examining more tasks before revising views of early cognitive development. We report another discrepancy which suggests an additional indicator of what is salient for preverbal infants. While examining the Uzgiris-Hunt test performances of 40 children (26 females), 7.6-26.9-months-old, infants appeared captivated by the bouncing of a small rubber ball. However, most infants reproduced the motion of the bounce event itself, repeatedly hitting the ball against the table, rather than the experimenter's action (dropping). Comparing performances of those who did and did not imitate the drop, two possibly interrelated interpretations remained consistent with the data: infants perform goal-directed imitation of interesting phenomena, perhaps because they believe they must apply force to make them happen.     

The drawbridge phenomenon: representational reasoning or perceptual preference?

Two experiments investigated whether infants would look longer at a rotating "drawbridge" that appeared to violate physical laws because they knew that it was causally impossible, as claimed by R. Baillargeon, E. S. Spelke, and S. Wasserman (1985) and R. Baillargeon (1987a). Using a habituation paradigm, they reported that infants looked longer at a display that appeared impossible (rotated 180 degrees while an obstructing box was behind it) than at one that appeared possible (rotated only 112 degrees, appearing to stop at the box). Experiment 1 eliminated habituation to 180 degree screen rotations. Still, infants looked longer at the 180 degree impossible rotations. Critically, however, infants also looked longer at possible 180 degree rotations in Experiment 2, in which no obstruction was present. Moreover, no difference in effect size was found between the 2 experiments. These findings indicate that infants' longer looking at 180 degree rotations is due to simple perceptual preference for more motion. They question R. Baillargeon's (1987a) claim that it is due to infants' representational reasoning about physically impossible object permanence events.     

Object individuation and event mapping: developmental changes in infants’ use of featural information

The present research examined the development of 4.5‐ to 7.5‐month‐old infants’ ability to map different‐features occlusion events using a simplified event‐mapping task. In this task, infants saw a different‐features (i.e. egg‐column) event followed by a display containing either one object or two objects. Experiments 1 and 2 assessed infants’ ability to judge whether the egg‐column event was consistent with a subsequent one‐column display. Experiments 3 and 4 examined infants’ ability to judge whether the objects seen in the egg‐column event and those seen in a subsequent display were consistent in their featural composition. At 7.5 and 5.5 months, but not at 4.5 months, the infants successfully mapped the egg‐column event onto the one‐column display. However, the 7.5‐ and 5.5‐month‐olds differed in whether they mapped the featural properties of those objects. Whereas the 7.5‐month‐olds responded as if they expected to see two specific objects, an egg and a column, in the final display the 5.5‐month‐olds responded as if they simply expected to see ‘two objects’. Additional results revealed, however, that when spatiotemporal information specified the presence of two objects, 5.5‐month‐olds succeeded at tagging the objects as being featurally distinct, although they still failed to attach more specific information about what those differences were. Reasons for why the younger infants had difficulty integrating featural information into their object representations were discussed.     

Priming infants to attend to color and pattern information in an individuation task

Wilcox (Cognition 72 (1999) 125) reported that infants are more sensitive to form than surface features when individuating objects in occlusion events: it is not until 7.5 months that infants spontaneously use pattern information, and 11.5 months that they spontaneously use color information, as the basis for object individuation. The present research assessed the extent to which infants' sensitivity to surface features could be increased under more supportive conditions. More specifically, we examined whether younger infants could be primed to draw on color and pattern features in an individuation task if they were first shown the functional value of attending to color and pattern information (i.e. the color or the pattern of an object predicted the function it would engage in). Five experiments were conducted with infants 4.5 to 9.5 months of age. The main findings were that 9.5- and 7.5-month-olds could be primed to use color information, and 5.5- and 4.5-month-olds could be primed to attend to pattern information, after viewing the function events. The results are discussed in terms of the kinds of experiences that can lead to increased sensitivity to surface features and the mechanisms that support feature priming in young infants.     

What do infants remember when they forget? Location and identity in 6-month-olds' memory for objects

What does an infant remember about a forgotten object? Although at age 6 months, infants can keep track of up to three hidden objects, they can remember the featural identity of only one. When infants forget the identity of an object, do they forget the object entirely, or do they retain an inkling of it? In a looking-time study, we familiarized 6-month-olds with a disk and a triangle placed on opposite sides of a stage. During test trials, we hid the objects one at a time behind different screens, and after hiding the second object, we removed the screen where the first object had been hidden. Infants then saw the expected object, the unexpected other object, or the empty stage. Bayes factor analysis showed that although the infants did not notice when the object changed shape, they were surprised when it vanished. This finding indicates that infants can represent an object without its features.     

Object individuation and labelling in 6-month-old infants

The ability to determine how many objects are involved in physical events is fundamental for reasoning about the world that surrounds us. Previous studies suggest that infants can fail to individuate objects in ambiguous occlusion events until their first birthday and that learning words for the objects may play a crucial role in the development of this ability. The present eye-tracking study tested whether the classical object individuation experiments underestimate young infants’ ability to individuate objects and the role word learning plays in this process. Three groups of 6-month-old infants (N = 72) saw two opaque boxes side by side on the eye-tracker screen so that the content of the boxes was not visible. During a familiarization phase, two visually identical objects emerged sequentially from one box and two visually different objects from the other box. For one group of infants the familiarization was silent (Visual Only condition). For a second group of infants the objects were accompanied with nonsense words so that objects’ shape and linguistic labels indicated the same number of objects in the two boxes (Visual & Language condition). For the third group of infants, objects’ shape and linguistic labels were in conflict (Visual vs. Language condition). Following the familiarization, it was revealed that both boxes contained the same number of objects (e.g. one or two). In the Visual Only condition, infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects at test, showing that they could individuate objects using visual cues alone. In the Visual & Language condition infants showed the same looking pattern. However, in the Visual vs Language condition infants looked longer to the box with incorrect number of objects according to linguistic labels. The results show that infants can individuate objects in a complex object individuation paradigm considerably earlier than previously thought and that linguistic cues enforce their own preference in object individuation. The results are consistent with the idea that when language and visual information are in conflict, language can exert an influence on how young infants reason about the visual world.     

Infant Understanding of the Referential Nature of Looking

To determine whether infants follow the gaze of adults because they understand the referential nature of looking or because they use the adult turn as a predictive cue for the location of interesting events, the gaze-following behavior of 14- and 18-month-olds was examined in the joint visual attention paradigm under varying visual obstruction conditions: (a) when the experimenter's line of sight was obstructed by opaque screens (screen condition), (b) when the experimenter's view was not obstructed (no-screen condition), and (c) when the opaque screens contained a large transparent window (window condition). It was assumed that infants who simply use adult turns as predictive cues would turn equally in all 3 conditions but infants who comprehend the referential nature of looking would turn maximally when the experimenter's vision was not blocked and minimally when her vision was blocked. Eighteen-month-olds responded in accord with the referential position (turning much more in the no-screen and window conditions than in the screen condition). However, 14-month-olds yielded a mixed response pattern (turning less in the screen than the no-screen condition but turning still less in the window condition). The results suggest that, unlike 18-month-olds, 14-month-olds do not understand the intentional nature of looking and are unclear about the requirements for successful looking.