Do Suicides’ Characteristics Influence Survivors’ Emotions?

The suicide of a related person can often induce severe negative emotional reactions. The objective of this study was to explore the relationships between sociodemographic and diagnostic data of suicides and survivors' emotions and to close this substantial gap. The main outcome of this study was that survivors' severity of emotional disturbance was inversely correlated with age of suicides. In the multivariable approach, only age remained related to the majority of the assessed survivors' emotions, whereas other characteristics, such as gender, presence of psychiatric disorder, or suicide method were not associated with survivors' emotions. Age had a dominant impact on the relationship between suicides' characteristics and survivors' emotional reactions and supersedes the effect of most suicides' characteristics including diagnoses.     

Why ‘spiritism’?

Some of the early representatives of psychoanalysis had a lifelong interest in certain ‘occult’ phenomena. Although several theories were born for the purpose of understanding the interest of Sigmund Freud, Carl Gustav Jung or Sándor Ferenczi in spiritualism and related phenomena, interpreters usually ignore the changing cultural meaning and significance of modern occult practices like spiritualism. The aim of the present essay is to outline the cultural and historical aspects of spiritualism and spiritism in Hungary, and thus to shed new light on the involvement of Ferenczi – and other Hungarian psychoanalysts like Géza Róheim, István Hollós, and Mihály Bálint – in spiritualism and spiritism. The connections between spiritualism and the Budapest School of Psychoanalysis will be discussed, highlighting the cultural and scientific significance of Hungarian spiritualism and spiritism in the evolution of psychoanalysis. Taking into account the relative lack of the scientific research in the field of spiritism in Hungary, it can be pointed out that Ferenczi undertook a pioneering role in Hungarian psychical research.     

Whither ‘TRS’?

Books reviewed in this article:
Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon (eds), Guide to the Study of Religion
J'annine Jobling and Ian Markham (eds), Theological Liberalism, Creative and Critical     

‘Who am I?’

The dreams and existential questions of those, who came into being in order to replace a dead person, pivot around a central cry: ‘Who am I?’ If conceived, born or designated as a replacement child, such an individual may suffer—even as an adult—from a rarely recognized unconscious confusion of identity, compounded by grief and survivors’ guilt. From before the child is born, the archetypal forces of death and life are joined in a fateful constellation; the soul of the replacement child bears the shadow of death from the very beginning of life. Hope for the replacement child lies in an emergence of true self as soul recreates original life. Analysis can help the replacement child experience a ‘rebirth into true life’, not as ‘the one who returned’, but as a psychologically newborn individual; the path of individuation countering the replacement child‘s identification with the dead. Jungian analysis offers unique concepts for understanding and healing the replacement child; C.G. Jung himself was born after two stillborn babies and an infant that lived only five days.     

A Rose by Any Other Name? From ‘Christian Doctrine’ to ‘Systematic Theology’

Christian thought is uniquely resistant to systematization, yet over the centuries has produced remarkable systematic accounts of Christian truth, including those of the patristic and medieval eras before Christian theology became systematically self-conscious in modernity. The more recent fate of the notion of system is traced in Schleiermacher, Hegel and Kierkegaard, and an argument advanced that systematic theology is the expression of personal skill learned in community, and its unity and integrity are aesthetic and moral as much as rationalistic.     

What are ‘Universalizable Interests’?

Many of Habermas's critical commentators agree that Discourse Ethics fails as a theory of the validity of moral norms and only succeeds as a theory of the democratic legitimacy of socio-political norms. The reason they give is that the moral principle (U) is too restrictive to count as a necessary condition of the validity of norms. Other commentators more sympathetic to his project want to abandon principle (U) and remodel Discourse Ethics without it. Still others want to downplay the role of universalizing moral discourse and to make more of Habermas's less demanding, though still somewhat vague, conception of ethical discourse. Against this chorus of critical voices Habermas maintains that his conception of moral discourse and the moral principle (U) are central to Discourse Ethics in general, and to the normative heart of his political theory in particular. The conflict may have arisen in part because the concept of a 'universalizable interest' which is central to Habermas's understanding of moral discourse and of the moral principle (U) remains opaque even after nearly two decades of critical debate. Actually Habermas's concept of interest is pretty obscure too. But the obscurity surrounding the concept of interest is not the source of the confusion. For our present purposes we can simply stipulate that an interest is a reason to want. The notion of reason rests loosely on the notion of a need, and the concepts of need and desire are take left deliberately vague. The source of the current confusion lies in the notion of universalizability that is in play. Once we pay due attention to the conditions of the universalizability of interests contained in Habermas's formulation of the moral principle (U), we can distinguish between a weaker and a stronger version of the principle. I argue that only the weaker version is defensible. But I also want to show that Habermas is tempted into defending the stronger version, and to explain why he does so.     

Do you see what I see? Infants’ reasoning about others’ incomplete perceptions

Twelve‐month‐olds realize that when an agent cannot see an object, her incomplete perceptions still guide her goal‐directed actions. What would happen if the agent had incomplete perceptions because she could see only one part of the object, for example one side of a screen? In the present research, 16‐month‐olds were first shown an agent who always pointed to a red object, as opposed to a black or a yellow object, suggesting that she preferred red over the other colours. Next, two screens were introduced while the agent was absent. The screens were (1) red or green on both sides; (2) red on the front (infants’ side) but green on the back (the agent’s side) or vice versa; or (3) only coloured red or green on the front. During test, the agent, who could see only the back of the screens, pointed to one of the two screens. The results revealed that while infants expected the agent to continue acting on her colour preference and point to the red rather than the green screen during test, they did so in accord with the agent’s perception of the screens, rather than their own perceptions: they expected the agent to point to the red screen in (1), but to the green‐front screen in (2), and they had no prediction of which screen the agent should point to in (3). The implications of the present findings for early psychological reasoning research are discussed.     

Is there a ‘psychosomatogenic’ family?*

Review of the literature revealed two family theories of psychosomatic illness: the ‘enmeshed’ family of Minuchin and the family with affect disturbances. We interviewed twelve families, each containing a child with eczema. Most, but not all, of the families do fit in with one or other or both of the proposed interactional patterns, but the theory of a single family type, the ‘psychosomatogenic family’, is not supported. This complements the studies of individuals where specificity hypotheses have proved oversimplified.     

Is transference the ‘total situation’?

This paper examines through the detailed explication of analytic material the author's experience of a psychoanalytic and a Jungian way of understanding the interactions between him and his patient. This comparative approach considers where the differences lie with respect to timing and content of interpretations and where the differences are essentially tactical rather than theoretical.     

‘Kierkegaard’: A Reasonable Fideist?

The task I set myself is to identify whether Climacus is an extreme or moderate fideist, and to go on to evaluate how convincing or persuasive I find Climacus' position. Separating metaphysical and epistemological fideism, I spend the first section of the article denying that Climacus is a 'metaphysical fideist'. This involves looking at the notion of 'truth as subjectivity'. I will claim that in expounding this notorious maxim Climacus can be seen as expressing something almost trivially obvious and/or something substantially wrong. I will further argue that even the obvious version of the maxim needs to be heavily qualified before it can be a sufficient account of 'religious truth'.
In the second section of the article I argue that Climacus should be understood as a moderate fideist, who considers that reason should assent to its own limitations. Although I will approve of reason-exhausting projects, I will complain that the paradox which is supposed to so exhaust my reason does not perplex me in the relevant sense.     

‘Sluts’ or ‘Sleazy Little Animals’?: Young People's Difficulties with Carrying and Using Condoms

Qualitative data from a Western Australian study of sexual behaviour in young people were used to describe difficulties experienced in carrying and using condoms. Both men and women were concerned for their sexual reputation if they carried condoms, although this was more of a problem for the women than the men. However, these fears were not matched by the attitudes of the opposite gender: in general, there was less negativity about condom-carrying than was feared. Many of those who described using condoms had experienced condom failure and other difficulties, and it appeared that they were unfamiliar with the correct way to use condoms. It is suggested that many of these barriers to condom use can be removed with appropriate education and information strategies.     

‘Perceived ownership’ or cognitive dissonance?

In 1992 a study by Beggan claimed it had confirmed the existence of Nuttin's ‘mere ownership effect’. This study examined an alternative mechanism for Beggan's findings in the form of forced compliance cognitive dissonance. Seventy‐three participants volunteered for the study (66 females and seven males). Results support the view that cognitive dissonance, accepting ownership of a target that was earlier perceived with negative affectivity, is a sufficient condition to enhance estimates of a target object. Ownership per se was not found to be a sufficient condition to enhance owner's estimates of an owned object. In light of this finding cognitive dissonance is offered as a possible mechanism for explaining the previous reports of a perceived ownership effect. This mechanism may also be applicable to instant endowment and mere ownership phenomena. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Theologia Incurvata In Se Ipse?: One Feminist Theologian’s Reading of Eberhard Jüngel’s Theology

Books reviewed in this article:
Eberhard Jüngel, Justification: The Heart of the Christian Faith
Eberhard Jüngel, God's Being is in Becoming: The Trinitarian Being of God in the Theology of Karl Barth. A Paraphrase     

Are FACES-II ‘family satisfaction’ scores valid?

It has been suggested that family satisfaction can be measured by having a person complete the Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scale (FACES-II) twice: once as the person essentially sees the family (actual version), and once as they wish the family to be (ideal version). The discrepancy between the actual and ideal scores is contended to be a measure of satisfaction with family. Though conceptually attractive, this measurement strategy was not verified, as assessed in the present study by correlating the actual-ideal discrepancy scores with family discord (Index of Family Relations) scores. Clinical adoption of the actual-ideal discrepancy-score as a measure of family satisfaction is thus seen as premature, until more supportive evidence is demonstrated.     

HOMOSEXUALITY OR HOMOEROTICISM?: ‘NARCISSISTIC EROTICISM’

It may be dangerous for a psychoanalyst to let him/herself be influenced by the social and media pressure that proposes the use of the term 'homosexual' to describe the affective functioning of a homophile, for this assumes—from the outset—that it is of a truly sexual nature. However, following certain Freudian writings and the works of Férenczi in 1911, we know the different mechanisms of the narcissistic register that come into play in the quite particular relational behaviour that should more relevantly be called 'homoeroticism'. On the other hand, our diagnostic and therapeutic approach will benefit from not considering, at the outset, all the economically and psychogenetically very different varieties of homoeroticism, male or female, latent or manifest, in too global a fashion, with reference also to the Freudian concept of psychic bisexuality. The French psychoanalytical research team working with the author has focused on these important issues for a number of years now. This article aims to give a fairly brief account of its work, with the objective of opening up a discussion amongst psychoanalysts, within the framework of Freudian thought.