Old Testament and Church Ministries in Two Ecumenical Dialogues

Abstract: To understand any church institution as founded by Jesus, one must take account of its relationship to his work of bringing the Old Testament revelation and its institutions to their eschatological realization. A sample of the work of recent ecumenical dialogues (BEM and the international Lutheran– Roman Catholic document on church and justification) shows that their discussions of church institutions have failed to do this adequately. This failure has complicated the efforts at unity to which these dialogues intend to contribute. Attention to the Old Testament roots of church institutions can help ecumenical ecclesiology to focus better on some important issues.     

A Response to G. Scott Davis

This defense of my essay on Vitoria and Suárez argues that my use of the term “religious war” is based on religious authority at least as much as religious cause, and that Davis’s decision to discuss only Vitoria limits his ability to come to terms with my thesis. To Davis’s argument that for Vitoria war was justified against the Indians only as a necessity of simple justice and to protect the innocent, I argue that his disjunction between simple justice and religious cause is a false one that fails to come to term with the church’s primary reason for approaching Indians, with the Thomistic understanding of the relation between nature and grace and between reason and revelation, and with the distinction between what justice requires in relation to the church and Christians and what it requires for others. I explain finally that my claim is not that the Catholic political rulers readily responded to papal calls for war except when it was in their interest, but that papal war was central to the normative just‐war tradition of the church in canon law and among major theologians like Vitoria and Suárez.     

Challenging the By-Product Theory of Religion in the Cognitive Science of Religion

In this short article I argue that neurotheology should be conceived and practiced within a theological framework. Taking the case of Catholic theology as an example, five proposals are provided that offer a glimpse and, in my estimation, a realistic account of a (future) Catholic neurotheology. I identify two possible modes of how to practice Catholic neurotheology and conclude that any Catholic neurotheology that attempts to be practiced in accordance with these five proposals will be extremely challenging for Catholic theology.     

Care,Commitment and Moral Distress

Moral distress has been the subject of extensive research and debate in the nursing ethics literature since the mid-1980s, but the concept has received comparatively little attention from those working outside of applied ethics. In this article, I defend a care ethical account of moral distress, according to which the phenomenon is the product of an agent’s inability to live up to one of her caring commitments. This account has a number of attractions. First, it places a greater emphasis on the importance of the relationship between the caregiver and her cared-for than that found in previous accounts. Second, it does not make problematic assumptions about the correctness of a caregiver’s moral judgments, as has been claimed in relation to previous accounts of moral distress. Finally, my account allows for a clear conceptual distinction to be drawn between moral distress and other forms of negative moral emotion such as guilt and regret. Earlier accounts draw this distinction by appealing to the causal aetiology of moral distress, but as I show here, such appeals are ultimately unsuccessful unless they are made from an explicitly care ethical starting point. One of the implications of my account is that moral distress has the potential to occur in the context of any caregiving relationship. This claim is explored in the final section of the paper, in relation to student-teacher and parent-child caregiving.     

Natural Sounds and Musical Sounds: A Dual Distinction

In this article I consider the relationship between natural sounds and music. I evaluate two prominent accounts of this relationship. These accounts satisfy an important condition, the difference condition: musical sounds are different from natural sounds. However, they fail to meet an equally important condition, the interaction condition: musical sounds and natural sounds can interact in aesthetically important ways to create unified aesthetic objects. I then propose an alternative account of the relationship between natural sounds and music that meets both conditions. I argue that natural sounds are distinct from music in that they express a kind of alterity or “otherness,” which occurs in two ways. It occurs referentially, because the sources of natural sounds are natural objects rather than artifactual objects, such as instruments; it also occurs acoustically, because natural sounds tend to contain more microtones than macrotones. On my account, the distinction between music and natural sounds is both conventional and vague; it therefore allows music and natural sounds to come together.     

Sex in the Head

Abstract Recent philosophical writing on sexual desire divides broadly into two camps. Reductionists take sexual desire to aim at an essentially physical bodily pleasure, whereas intentionalist accounts take a focus upon the reciprocal interaction of the mental states of the partners to be crucial for understanding the phenomenon. I argue that the apparent plausibility of reductionism rests upon the flawed assumption that sexual pleasure has the same uniform bodily character in all sexual encounters, which rests in turn upon flawed assumptions in the philosophy of mind. Drawing on an Aristotelian understanding of persons as essentially embodied minds, I outline an alternative account of sexual desire, showing how the nature of the sexual pleasure we take in the body of another can be transformed by the significance the person or situation has for us. I proceed to show that my account of sexual desire is able to accommodate the entire range of sexual phenomena, including those that seem to undermine standard intentionalist accounts as well as those that reductionists have difficulty in fully explaining. Finally I make some brief remarks about the implications of my account of sexual desire for sexual morality, suggesting some reasons why it casts doubt on the view that universal participant consent is sufficient for a sexual act to be morally unproblematic.     

Researching Faith Maturity Questions on the Methods and Findings of Valuegenesis

The issue of Catholic elementary-school survival is complex. This study found in general that astute management is more important than overall wealth. Major contributors to survival include integrated church/school financial planning; a combination of a certain level of church support for the school and efficient school management; and clarity about the role of the school in the Church's evangelical mission. The most vulnerable moments for the Catholic elementary schools, presuming otherwise strong management, are during times of sweeping neighborhood change. This study produced some financial ratios that may be helpful in strenghtening Catholic elementary schools.     

Accidentally True Belief and Warrant

The Proper Functionist account of warrant – like many otherexternalist accounts – is vulnerable to certain Gettier-style counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. In this paper, I briefly survey the development of the account, noting the way it was altered in response to such counterexamples. I then argue that Alvin Plantinga's latest amendment to the account is flawed insofar as it rules out cases of true beliefs which do intuitively strike us as knowledge, and that a conjecture recently put forward by Thomas Crisp is also defective. I conclude by presenting my own suggestion as to how the account can be made less vulnerable to counterexamples involving accidentally true beliefs. Although I stay within the confines of Proper Functionism here, I think that my proposal (modulo a few details) could be attached to other externalist accounts of warrant as well.     

The Emergence and Development of Protestantism in Macedonia

Abstract

This paper explores the political activity of the Catholic Church in Poland in the years 1990–2009 in terms of categories of political strategies. I argue that the church as an institution applied varied strategies with the aim of influencing the politics of the day. These took on three forms, in which the church acted as (1) a political principal, (2) a creator of political values and (3) an interest group. In the period between 1990 and 1997 the church attempted to exert a direct influence on the political scene by supporting the Catholic national parties. In the period between 1997 and 2004 the church focused on the second of the above-mentioned strategies by supporting the establishment of Christian Democratic parties. In the years 2004–2009 we can observe a more varied strategy consisting of a formal withdrawal from political activity with a simultaneous acceptance of political engagement on the part of the Catholic national Radio Maryja. During the whole period under analysis the church effectively acted as an interest group. This has resulted in a growing dependence of the church on the state, which – in connection with symptoms of institutional crisis – may lead to a particular kind of ‘cartelisation of the church’.     

Corpus Mysticum and Religious Experience: Henry,Lacoste and Marion

While usually denoting the church and/or the sacrament of the Eucharist, the ‘mystical body of Christ’ has become a theological grammar for Catholic phenomenologists Michel Henry, Jean‐Yves Lacoste and Jean‐Luc Marion to think through the possibility of religious experience. This article traces out some of the richly detailed accounts of religious experience proffered by Henry, Lacoste and Marion, paying heed to how they narrate the non‐worldly, invisible disclosure of that religious experiencing. The final section outlines a deeper integration of the three by highlighting the need for an encounter with Christ to be both non‐worldly and worldly, between presence and absence, and thus an experience that is concrete, lived, but also mediated by the visible church.     

Functionalism and propositions

Conclusion Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects.     

Memory and identity

Among the many topics covered in Sven Bernecker’s impressive study of memory is the relation between memory and personal identity. Bernecker uses his grammatical taxonomy of memory and causal account to defend the claim that memory does not logically presuppose personal identity and hence that circularity objections to memory-based accounts of personal identity are misplaced. In my comment I investigate these claims, suggesting that the relation between personal identity and memory is more complicated than Bernecker’s analysis suggests. In particular, I argue (1) that while he shows that some memories do not presuppose personal identity he fails to show that those that are appealed to in memory-based accounts of personal identity do not, and (2) that the features of his view that allow him to define memory without reference to personal identity also obscure important features of memory that must be part of a complete account.     

Impressions of the Church of Sweden: liberal and catholic with nuances of Lutheranism

The Church of Sweden is difficult to describe or to characterise, whether as a Folk Church, a national church, as catholic or liberal, or as, in some sense, Lutheran. This article refers to aspects of its complex relations with the Roman Catholic Church and with Lutheranism at large. The author detects, from ecumenical agreement and practice, an incipient new communion of churches, based on a common claim to be catholic and also to be open to developments in society. This group includes the Church of Sweden, the Church of England, the Episcopal Church in the USA, the Old Catholic Churches of the Union of Utrecht and the Philippine Independent Church, all of which are in communion with each other. The author's presentation is set out in relation to the Church of Sweden's liturgical and sacramental life, its church–state relations, and in an account of the rather asymmetrical shape of ecumenism in Sweden, in all of which the question of gender plays a role.     

Becoming (and Remaining) an Analyst in Latin America

The following overview of the development of psychoanalysis in Brazil and in Porto Alegre outlines the current situation and the challenges to psychoanalysis in my country. I will explain my own experiences on becoming an analyst, the main reasons for my choice, my main influences, and my evolution as a clinical psychoanalyst and as a member of psychoanalytic and psychiatric institutions. I include my main contributions to psychoanalysis and consider two broad areas of interest: psychoanalytic technique and its teaching, and the relationship of psychoanalysis and culture. As for the former, my main interests are studies on countertransference and analytic neutrality, to which I will propose a comprehensive concept. As for the latter, I discuss a culture that contrasts vividly with the one in which Freud created the discipline, psychoanalytic views on violence and perversity, psychoanalytic institutions, and the application of analytic ideas for the understanding of some artists and their work.

I will also describe some general features of my country and the development of psychoanalysis in it; report my experiences as a candidate and an analyst; and offer some information about my evolution as an analyst through papers I have written over the past 30 years.     

Prejudice, Prodigality, and the Precariousness of Life

In this essay, I focus on James Dittes' Bias and the Pious (1973), which addresses the relationship of religion and prejudice from a psychological perspective. I give particular attention to his discussion of the needs that underlie prejudice, his suggestion that religion may meet these needs better than the prejudice itself, and his distinction between contractual and prodigal faith. The incident discussed in the book involving conflict between the minister and church leaders of Augustana Lutheran Church in Omaha is highlighted because of my personal association with this church.     

Causation and Identity

Causal accounts of the transtemporal identity of physical objects and of persons are not completely new. Passages in Hume can be read as suggesting causal accounts of the identity of physical objects and of the self, as can Kant's arguments that the successive states of an objective substance must be causally connected; and in this century, a variety of causal accounts of the identity conditions for persons and for physical objects have been proposed. Such accounts, especially for physical objects, have not been very fully developed, however, and here I want to provide a more detailed motivation for, and development of, a causal account of identity through time and to examine some of its implications. I think that my general line of argument applies both to persons and to physical objects, though to keep the discussion manageable I shall concentrate on the latter.     

THE CATHOLIC IMAGINATION AND MODERNITY: WILLIAM CAVANAUGH'S THEOPOLITICAL IMAGINATION AND CHARLES TAYLOR'S MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINATION1

This essay argues that William Cavanaugh's ‘Theopolitical Imagination’ uncovers some of the possibilities latent within the Catholic imagination. While his critique of modernity is often persuasive, this essay questions whether Cavanaugh's assessment of modernity can be complemented by a more differentiated approach. What Charles Taylor provides is both a bolstering of Cavanaugh's thesis about the power of the imagination and an alternative: that there is a way of thinking about the relationship between the Church and modernity other than in dialectical terms – namely a ‘Ricci reading’ of modernity.     

Reflections on change in science and religion

Science and the Catholic church are both conservative, slow-to-change institutions. However, science has institutionalized procedures that ensure that ample amounts of criticism of currently accepted theories and methodologies will always be present. This arrangement of continuous conjectures and refutation in science ensures often slow but steady change. Because supporters often think of religions as trafficking in timeless truths, criticism of church beliefs and practices (even when intended to stimulate reflection and improvement) is frequently seen as being disloyal to the institution. Because of the growing crises caused by world overpopulation, I argue that the Catholic church's opposition to all artificial methods of birth control now lacks whatever moral force it might have had when originally promulgated. By highlighting theological perspectives that might be appropriate for the ecological realities of the 21st century, I hope the church will see the wisdom of reevaluating many of its positions in the light of rapidly approaching ecological imperatives.     

Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion

Abstract

I can, given the right conditions, transmit my knowledge to you by telling you some information. If I know the time, and if all goes well, I can bring it about that you know it too. If conditions are right, all I have to do is assert to you what time it is. Paradigmatically, speakers use assertions to transmit what they know to their hearers. Clearly, assertion and testimony are tightly connected. The nature of this connection, however, is not so clear. According to many accounts, assertion has an epistemic constitutive norm. This norm appears to be able to account for some important features of testimony: first, testimonial knowledge transmission, second, the reliability of testimony, and third, the epistemic rights exchanged in cases of testimony. In this paper, however, I argue against this apparent ability. The constitutive norm of assertion, I argue, plays no role in accounts of testimonial knowledge transmission, or of the epistemic rights that testimony confers. This is especially clear when we consider the general norms to which we’re held. Epistemological accounts of testimony can and should, therefore, avoid the difficult debate over the constitutive norm of assertion.