Recognition Memory in Pigeons for Stimuli Presented Repeatedly: Perceptual Learning or Reduced Associative Interference?

Todd and Mackintosh (1990) found that recognition memory of pigeons for pictures was better when the same pictures were used each session (a recency task) than when different slides were used (a novelty task); they attributed the superior performance on the recency task to perceptual learning. Three experiments explored two alternative accounts. One was that their use of a within-subject design could have allowed the strategy adopted in the recency task to influence adversely the strategy used in the novelty task. This possibility was ruled out by Experiment 1, which showed superior performance in the recency task when a between-subject design was used. A second account proposes that slide-reward associations formed (in both tasks) during first presentations of slides interfere with appropriate performance during second presentations (associative interference); in the recency task, however, the high long-term associative strength of the slides restricts the consequence of a single slide-reward pairing to a short-term effect, and associative interference occurs at short retention intervals only. This account was explored in Experiment 2, which found no evidence that increases in retention interval resulted in reduction of associative interference in the recency task, and in Experiment 3, where associative interference was shown to occur but was of comparable magnitude in the recency and novelty tasks. By elimination, the results support a perceptual learning interpretation.     

Forest before trees? It depends where you look

Because it may be deduced from the more elementary principles of visual processing, global precedence (Navon, 1977) is not a primary perceptual principle. Subjects were presented with a large letter made out of small ones and asked to make an identification response on the basis of either the large or small letter. When fixation was controlled to provide adequate stimulation from the small letter, there was no difference in reaction time (RT) between the large and small targets. Also, there was no difference in interference due to response incompatibility of the unattended letter based on target size. However, when the stimulus was presented peripherally, unpredictably to the right or left of fixation, RT was faster to the large target and interference was substantially greater for the small target. Functions for the development of associative strength and associative interference are presented. Global precedence is dependent on factors tending to degrade small stimuli more than large ones.     

Application of variable criterion theory to choice reaction time

A theory of choice reaction time ICRT is presented which is based on a variable criterion model assuming the decision criterion to be normally distributed. The theory provides functions of time describing the growth of component processes following stimulus onset. For correct responses, these processes are sensory and associative strength. For errors, the processes are sensory strength, generalized associative strength, and associative inhibition. A model for separating the effects of these processes from that of response competition is presented. The theory describes, with great accuracy, the CRT distributions of correct responses and errors, not only for the experiment for which it was derived, but also for a second experiment in which the criterion was experimentally manipulated. It accounts for the basic facts of the speed-accuracy tradeoff, not only with respect to the two experiments with different speed requirements, but also with respect to the variation of speed over trials within each experiment. While derived from group data, the theory also describes the performance of individual subjects. The mean and variability of the criterion distribution and the ability to utilize associative inhibition are identified as the major sources of individual differences. Methodological problems involved in the scaling analysis of group data are also discussed.     

Perceptual simulation in property verification

If people represent concepts with perceptual simulations, two predictions follow in the property verification task (e.g., Isface a property of GORILLA?). First, perceptual variables such as property size should predict the performance of neutral subjects, because these variables determine the ease of processing properties in perceptual simulations (i.e., perceptual effort). Second, uninstructed neutral subjects should spontaneously construct simulations to verify properties and therefore perform similarly to imagery subjects asked explicitly to use images (i.e., instructional equivalence). As predicted, neutral subjects exhibited both perceptual effort and instructional equivalence, consistent with the assumption that they construct perceptual simulations spontaneously to verify properties. Notably, however, this pattern occurred only when highly associated false properties prevented the use of a word association strategy. In other conditions that used unassociated false properties, the associative strength between concept and property words became a diagnostic cue for true versus false responses, so that associative strength became a better predictor of verification than simulation. This pattern indicates that conceptual tasks engender mixtures of simulation and word association, and that researchers must deter word association strategies when the goal is to assess conceptual knowledge.     

联想启动与知觉启动的比较研究

采用快速命名方法探讨不同加工水平对联想启动效应的影响。被试分别在深、浅加工条件下学习一系列颜色词,然后完成颜色命名和再认任务,并设立词命名任务,以比较联想启动和知觉启动的异同。结果表明,在颜色命名任务中,深、浅加工条件下均可形成对颜色词的启动效应,但浅加工条件下的再认成绩明显低于深加工,出现了联想启动和再认的分离现象。词命名表现出与颜色命名相似的结果,但它们在有意识回忆方面仍存在一定的差异,提示知觉表征系统单独并不能支持联想启动,联想启动可能是多个记忆系统共同作用的结果。     

Neural correlates underlying true and false associative memories

Despite the fact that associative memory studies produce a large number of false memories, neuroimaging analyses utilizing this paradigm typically focus only on neural activity mediating successful retrieval. The current study sought to expand on this prior research by examining the neural basis of both true and false associative memories. Though associative false memories are substantially different than those found in semantic or perceptual false memory paradigms, results suggest that associative false memories are mediated by similar neural mechanisms. Specifically, we found increased frontal activity that likely represents enhanced monitoring and evaluation compared to that needed for true memories and correct rejections. Results also indicated that true, and not false associative memories, are mediated by neural activity in the MTL, specifically the hippocampus. Finally, while activity in early visual cortex distinguished true from false memories, a lack of neural differences between hits and correct rejections failed to support previous findings suggesting that activity in early visual cortex represents sensory reactivation of encoding-related processing.     

Asymmetric interference in 3‐ to 4‐month‐olds' sequential category learning

Three‐ to 4‐month‐old infants show asymmetric exclusivity in the acquisition of cat and dog perceptual categories. The cat perceptual category excludes dog exemplars, but the dog perceptual category does not exclude cat exemplars. We describe a connectionist autoencoder model of perceptual categorization that shows the same asymmetries as infants. The model predicts the presence of asymmetric retroactive interference when infants acquire cat and dog categories sequentially. A subsequent experiment conducted with 3‐ to 4‐month‐olds verifies the predicted pattern of looking time behaviors. We argue that bottom‐up, associative learning systems with distributed representations are appropriate for modeling the operation of short‐term visual memory in early perceptual category learning.     

Age differences in associative and strategic processes in human conditional learning

Research indicates associative and strategic deficits mediate age related deficits in memory, whereas simple associative processes are independent of strategic processing and strategic processes mediate resistance to interference. The present study showed age-related deficits in a contingency learning task, although older participants' resistance to interference was not disproportionately affected. Recognition memory predicted discrimination, whereas general cognitive ability predicted resistance to interference, suggesting differentiation between associative and strategic processes in learning and memory, and age declines in associative processes. Older participants' generalisation of associative strength from existing to novel stimulus–response associations was consistent with elemental learning theories, whereas configural models predicted younger participants' responses. This is consistent with associative deficits and reliance on item-level representations in memory during later life.     

Unitization mitigates interference by intrinsic negative emotion in familiarity and recollection of associative memory: Electrophysiological evidence

Emotion exerts varied influences on memory. While task-relevant item memory is often enhanced by emotion, associative memory is generally impaired. Unitization is known to improve associative memory, but its effects and mechanisms in protecting associative memory from emotional interference are rather obscure. The current study investigated associative memory by employing experimental manipulation of unitization (vs. nonunitization) encoding strategy and stimulus emotion (neutral, intrinsic negative, and extrinsic negative), combined with event-related potential (ERP) signatures of familiarity (FN400 old/new effects) and recollection (parietal late positive component/LPC old/new effects) in memory recognition. Both behavioral and ERP indices of associative recognition from the nonunitization group confirmed emotional interference in associative memory. Importantly, it was primarily intrinsic (vs. extrinsic) emotion that impeded associative memory. Unitization encoding improved memory performance in general, accompanied by enhanced recollection process and induction of familiarity process, which is typically not involved in associative memory recognition and was indeed absent in the nonunitization group. Importantly, unitization helped to preserve behavioral performance (specifically, response speed though not recognition strength) from interference by intrinsic emotion while largely reversed the detriment of intrinsic emotion on ERP indices of familiarity and recollection processes. Interestingly, a synergy between intrinsic emotion and unitization encoding was observed, which could underpin the facilitation of familiarity process in associative recognition of emotional pairs. Overall, current findings highlight interference by intrinsic emotion in associative memory, which is nonetheless responsive to mitigation by unitization encoding.     

Response interference in compatibility tasks

Affective priming (AP) is a well-established phenomenon in which performance to a valenced target is typically better when it is preceded by an affectively congruent prime than when it is preceded by an incongruent prime. Several studies have emphasized a strong similarity between AP and Stroop suggesting that both are driven by response interference. The present study investigated this hypothesis by testing whether a general prediction of the response interference model was verified in the two tasks. This prediction refers to target strength and states that the size of compatibility effects should increase as the strength of the relevant information decreases. In four experiments, we show that this general prediction of the response interference model was verified in AP and Stroop when the strength of the relevant information was manipulated at the perceptual level (Experiments 1 and 2), while the opposite pattern was observed when this variable was manipulated at the semantic level (Experiments 3 and 4). While the results do not undermine the hypothesis that AP and Stroop effects are governed by response interference, they suggest that the model should be refined in order to account for differential effects of target strength in compatibility tasks.     

Interference among memory traces

Several sources of interference in memory are identified. These sources may be grossly classified as processing interference, i.e., that due to disruption of whatever activity occurs during the input or output of to-be-remembered material, or trace interaction, i.e., that due to interference among the stored memories themselves. The latter would appear to be due to simultaneous activation of correct and incorrect associations mediated by confusion among cue stimuli. A consideration of the means by which interference is reduced suggests that interfering associates are not weakened, unlearned, or suppressed except possibly when nominal stimuli are identical and sets of target and interfering items are temporally discriminable. Discriminative encoding of cue stimuli may eliminate these associations, if it operates at the perceptual level. Otherwise, potential interfering associates are activated, but may be rendered functionally impotent by discriminating them from correct associations on the basis of either backward association with discriminative stimulus attributes or differential contextual attributes such as frequency, time, order, and strength.     

Independence versus interference in the perceptual processing of letters

Several experiments are reported that help resolve the discrepancy between studies indicating that letters are perceived independently and studies showing perceptual interference between letters. Two variables were examined which, based on the existing literature, appeared to be important in distinguishing between the perceptual independence and perceptual interference studies. In Experiment 1, the amount of spatial separation between letters was varied. Surprisingly, the letters were perceived independently, regardless of the amount of separation or degree of similarity between them. Thus, it was concluded that the amount of interletter separation is not sufficient to account for the difference between studies demonstrating independence and those demonstrating interference. The results of Experiments 2 and 3 indicated that the type of perceptual limitation that is used to control response accuracy determines whether perceptual independence or interference is obtained. Specifically, perceptual interference was obtained only under masking conditions, whereas perceptual independence was obtained only under energy-limited (no-mask) conditions. Experiment 4 extended these results, indicating that perceptual interference is obtained under prestimulus as well as poststimulus masking conditions. Several interpretations of the perceptual interference data are considered, and it is concluded that the data can best be accounted for in terms of a model based on the principle of feature-specific inhibition.     

The kinds of information that support novel associative object priming and how these differ from those that support item priming

We investigated how the information that supports novel associative and item object priming differs under identical study/test conditions. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants rated the meaningfulness of sentences linking two object pictures at study. At test, they performed either a size judgement or an associative recognition memory task on intact, recombined and novel picture (Experiment 1) or word (Experiment 2) associations. Associative priming was modulated by subjective meaningfulness of the encoded links, and depended on study/test perceptual overlap. In contrast, item priming was neither affected by the meaningfulness of the sentences nor by study/test changes in the stimulus presentation format. Associative priming and recognition were behaviourally dissociated, and associative recognition was probably too slow to have seriously contaminated associative priming. In Experiment 3, participants performed a perceptually oriented task during both experimental phases, and both associative and item priming were observed. These results suggest that associative priming depends on stored associative semantic and perceptual information when the test task requires flexible retrieval of associative information. Under the same conditions, item priming may only require activation of items' semantic properties. When both study and test tasks stress perceptual processing, retrieval of perceptual information is sufficient to support both kinds of priming.     

提取干扰对知觉和概念启动的影响

通过学习—测验范式,分别以词汇判断、语义分类任务为测验,探讨提取干扰对不同识别式记忆的影响差异。结果发现,实验1验证了识别式知觉内隐记忆的提取干扰效应,实验2发现识别式概念内隐记忆在提取干扰下也明显降低;两个实验启动量联合分析发现,相比无干扰条件,概念启动比知觉启动受到提取干扰的破坏更大。上述结果说明识别式内隐记忆的提取干扰具有普遍性,提取干扰产生了不同识别式内隐记忆之间的分离,识别式概念内隐记忆更容易受到提取干扰的影响。     

Do distractors interfere with memory for study pairs in associative recognition?

In an associative recognition task, distractors generally consist of a rearrangement of the items composing the study pairs. This makes it possible that processing the distractors generates retroactive interference on memory for the study pairs. In Experiment 1, we explored this possibility in ayes/no recognition test concerning previously learned arbitrary associations between visual symbols and auditory syllables. Rearranged pairs had a deleterious impact on the accuracy and the speed of responses to related correct pairs. This effect did not vary as a function of the number of training blocks, and furthermore, in Experiment 2, the same effect was observed for overlearned small multiplication facts. These results suggest that exposure to potentially confounding information generates interference even if this information is known to be incorrect. Some implications are outlined, especially with regard to the widespread use of multiple-choice tests in knowledge evaluation.     

额叶在启动效应中的作用机制：对额叶损伤病人颜色命名和词命名任务的分析

以额叶损伤病人为被试,探讨在知觉型联想启动和知觉启动中,额叶的作用及其内在机制。实验任务包括颜色命名和词命名任务,以及相应的再认任务。结果表明,额叶损伤病人在颜色命名和词命名任务中,对旧词和重组颜色词的命名时间都没有明显差别,联想启动和颜色启动效应受损,但轻度记忆损伤病人与正常对照组之间的再认成绩相似。相关分析发现联想启动和颜色启动与额叶的多项功能有中度相关。这表明,额叶参与了知觉型联想启动效应和知觉启动,并且与其抑制和注意等执行功能有关。     

The semantic nature of response competition in the picture-word interference task

Picture-word interference refers to the fact that when a picture (i.e., line drawing) is presented with a word superimposed, picture naming latency is longer than when the picture is presented alone. In addition, naming latency will be further prolonged whenever the word and the picture are members of the same semantic category. This semantic interference effect was investigated in a series of studies in order to develop an appropriate model of the semantic processes involved in picture-word interference. In Experiments 1 and 2, it was determined that the associative strength between the word and the picture is unimportant in the picture-word interference task. In Experiment 3, it was demonstrated that the category typicality of the word and the picture is also unimportant in this task. These results suggest that the semantic processes in picture-word interference would not be well described by a semantic network model. This conclusion was reinforced by Experiment 4, in which it was found that the imageability of a word is a highly important factor in the picture-word interference task. The present set of results suggests that any model of the processes involved in picture-word interference must have at its core the notion of the word’s "relevance" to the task of naming the presented picture.     

On associations between computers and restaurants: Rapid learning of new associations on a conceptual implicit memory test

A novel event-based conceptual implicit memory test was designed to tap the development of new associations between objects and ad hoc categories. At study, participants were presented with a plausible story that linked an incongruous object (computer) with an ad hoc category (restaurant). At test, participants judged whether a given object was typically found in a restaurant. In Experiment 1, judgment time was significantly slower for the incongruous object (computer) when the story had previously linked the computer to the restaurant, relative to when it had not. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and ruled out the alternative interpretation that this interference effect was attributable to a general slowing of responses to all studied items. Unlike in prior studies, this demonstration of associative priming cannot be attributed to perceptual priming or to test awareness in memory-intact participants. The paradigm therefore offers a unique opportunity to study single-trial conceptual learning in memory-intact and memory-impaired populations.     

Perceptual learning in the rat: stimulus differentiation or latent inhibition of common elements?

Preexposure to an unreinforced stimulus facilitates learning (perceptual learning) under some conditions, but it can have the opposite effect (latent inhibition) under other conditions. Researchers have suggested that perceptual learning depends on a change of context, whereas latent inhibition is usually context specific. The associative theory explains both phenomena within a single framework. The authors report 4 experiments that show that perceptual learning does not depend on a context change. The experiments suggest that latent inhibition, unlike perceptual learning, depends on passive exposure. Thus the results do not support the associative theory. They are more consistent with Gibson's stimulus-differentiation theory.     

Perceptual Learning in the Rat: Stimulus Differentiation or Latent Inhibition of Common Elements?

Preexposure to an unreinforced stimulus facilitates learning (perceptual learning) under some conditions, but it can have the opposite effect (latent inhibition) under other conditions. Researchers have suggested that perceptual learning depends on a change of context, whereas latent inhibition is usually context specific. The associative theory explains both phenomena within a single framework. The authors report 4 experiments that show that perceptual learning does not depend on a context change. The experiments suggest that latent inhibition, unlike perceptual learning, depends on passive exposure. Thus the results do not support the associative theory. They are more consistent with Gibson's stimulus-differentiation theory.