Cross-modal and non-sensory influences on auditory streaming

Carlyon et al (2001 Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 27 115-127) have reported that the buildup of auditory streaming is reduced when attention is diverted to a competing auditory stimulus. Here, we demonstrate that a reduction in streaming can also be obtained by attention to a visual task or by the requirement to count backwards in threes. In all conditions participants heard a 13 s sequence of tones, and, during the first 10 s saw a sequence of visual stimuli containing three, four, or five targets. The tone sequence consisted of twenty repeating triplets in an ABA - ABA ... order, where A and B represent tones of two different frequencies. In each sequence, three, four, or five tones were amplitude modulated. During the first 10 s of the sequence, participants either counted the number of visual targets, counted the number of (modulated) auditory targets, or counted backwards in threes from a specified number. They then made an auditory-streaming judgment about the last 3 s of the tone sequence: whether one or two streams were heard. The results showed more streaming when participants counted the auditory targets (and hence were attending to the tones throughout) than in either the 'visual' or 'counting-backwards' conditions.     

The role of agency for perceived ownership in the virtual hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion shows that people can perceive artificial effectors as part of their own body under suitable conditions, and the virtual hand illusion shows the same for virtual effectors. In this study, we compared a virtual version of the rubber-hand setup with a virtual-hand setup, and manipulated the synchrony between stimulation or movement of a virtual “effector” and stimulation or movement of people’s own hand, the similarity between virtual effector and people’s own hand, and the degree of agency (the degree to which the virtual effector could be controlled by people’s own movements). Synchrony-induced ownership illusion was strongly affected by agency but not similarity, which is inconsistent with top-down modulation approaches but consistent with bottom-up approaches to ownership. However, both agency and similarity induce a general bias towards perceiving an object as part of one’s body, suggesting that ownership judgments integrate various sources of information.     

The range effect as a function of stimulus set,presence of a standard,and modulus

The intramodal range effect (an inverse relationship between stimulus range and exponent in Stevens’s power law) has been well documented, but its conditions have not been tested. Both the estimates of stimulus magnitudes and their exponents are affected by context, stimulus location, and different standards and moduli, but how these variables might interact with the variable of stimulus range has not been studied. In the present research, exponents were derived from magnitude estimates of line length for each of three different stimulus: ranges at two different locations on the scale of length, with or without a modulus. Moduli of 50 and 500 permitted an analysis of the effect of response magnitude on the range effect. Because different ranges had stimulus values in common, the effect of range and location on exponents from those common values could be determined. Exponents decreased as stimulus range increased, but only in the free-modulus condition. For that condition, exponents derived from magnitude estimates of only the common stimuli also showed the range effect and response magnitude did not influence the range effect. Exponents were higher for stimulus ranges at the lower location, but location does not appear to contribute to the range effect. Although the range effect is not explained, the conditions under which it holds and some factors that may influence it are considered.     

The Anderson-Winawer illusion: It’s not occlusion

In their recent article, Anderson and Winawer (2005) presented a dramatic lightness illusion in which identical texture patches appear to be either black or white. Albert (2007) argued that the Anderson and Winawer (2005) illusion can be explained by a simple theory in which occlusion cues determine the depth relationships of the different surfaces, and determine which stimulus areas are perceived as seen in plain view. Using both modeling and psychophysical methods, however, I show that alterations such as those that Albert used actually reverse the illusion within the range of figure contrasts that Anderson and Winawer (2005) tested. Albert’s theory (and any occlusion-based theory), therefore, cannot account for Anderson and Winawer’s (2005) data, at least in the lower figure-contrast range. I propose a novel scene-interpretation strategy to account for the effects.     

Induction-, test-, and comparison-figure interactions under illusion and figural aftereffect conditions

Ganz (1966a, b) has argued that an induction figure will displace a test figure placed near it under both illusion and figural aftereffect conditions. The data from Experiments I and II show that most of the illusion produced by the figures studied by Ganz results from an interaction between the comparison and induction figures. The data from Experiment III suggest that both the test and comparison figures interact with the induction figure under figural aftereffect conditions. Although the induction-test figure interactions do not contradict Ganz’s model, the induction-comparison figure interactions cannot be explained by it. The data also suggest that researchers should be extremely cautious in drawing conclusions about the processes underlying illusions and figural aftereffects unless they are confident that there is no interaction between the induction and comparison figures.     

Increment of the extinction illusion by long stimulation

We quantitatively examined the effect of stimulus duration on the extinction illusion. A white disc was presented or not presented at an intersection of a grey grid (intersection configuration) or on a homogeneous background (background configuration). The extinction illusion was quantified as the subtraction of no-disc responses in the background configuration (ie baseline) from no-disc responses in the intersection configuration, when the disc was presented. Experiment 1 showed a temporal effect: the extinction illusion increased as stimulus duration increased; this temporal effect was observed when the disc was presented at 9 deg from the fixation point and when the stimulus duration was 1000-6000 ms. Experiment 2 showed a visual field anisotropy: the extinction illusion occurred more frequently in the upper visual field than in the lower visual field, when the stimulus duration was 200 ms; the anisotropy was not observed when the stimulus duration was 6000 ms. Experiment 3 showed an alley-length effect: when the grid alley was long, the extinction illusion occurred more frequently in the 6000 ms condition than in the 200 ms condition; the temporal effect was not observed when the grid alley was short. These results suggest that the temporal effect of the extinction illusion might be due to perceptual filling-in of luminance information of the grid alley.     

Binocular brightness combinations: Additive and nonadditive aspects

A conjoint measurement procedure is used for the measurement of binocular brightness as a function of left and right luminance inputs. For nonzero stimulation, the data confirm earlier findings: the system can be described as additive with a scale exponent of 1. If zero stimulation is included, however, no additive solution can be found (due to Fechner’s paradox). This fact, combined with various critical remarks in the literature with respect to the existence of a real luminance-averaging system, has led us to propose a model which takes account of Fechner’s paradox, and incorporates “realistic” exponents without requiring a multistage processing mechanism where different levels are characterized by different sensory scales. The proposed model makes the weighting coefficients for the two eyes dependent in a continuous way on the strength of stimulation in the two eyes, especially on the amount of contrast of the monocular stimuli. For zero background stimulation, contrast can be expressed in terms of luminance of the stimulus. In this way, the model is reduced to a simple testable form. While it much simpler than Engel’s (1969) model, the experimental results indicate that it might also work for the more general case.     

Diamond-winged variants of the Müller-Lyer figure: A test of Virsu’s (1971) centroid theory

Diamond-winged variants of the Müller-Lyer figure were used to test predictions of Virsu’s (1971) theory of the Müller-Lyer illusion based on efferent readiness for eye movements toward the figure’s center of gravity, A Müller-Lyer figure with diamond-shaped wings resulted in a greater center-of-gravity distance than the corresponding, conventional Müller-Lyer figure, but fin length and the rest of the figure remained constant; in Virsu’s study, fin length and center-of-gravity distance covaried. Results were consistent with Virsu’s data when we used the stimulus conditions that he reported. Results from a wider range of stimuli challenge Virsu’s theory, and thus are consistent with the conclusions of Brigell, Uhlarik, and Goldhorn (1977).     

Differential effects of stimulus context on perceived length: Implications for the horizontal-vertical illusion

Six experiments examined orientation-specific effects of stimulus context on the visual perception of horizontal and vertical lengths: Using a paired-comparison method, Experiments 1–5 showed that the probability of judging a given vertical line to be longer than a given horizontal line was relatively great when the stimulus set comprised relatively long horizontals and short verticals, and relatively small when the stimulus set comprised short horizontals with long verticals. To the extent that stimulus context exerts orientation-specific effects on perceived length, it thereby modulates the degree to which verticals appear longer than physically equivalent horizontals: the horizontal—vertical illusion (HVI). Under various contextual conditions, the HVI was as small as 3% (horizontals had to be 3% greater than verticals to be perceived as equally long) and as great as 15%, equaling about 12% in a “neutral” context. In Experiment 6, subjects judged the absolute physical length of each stimulus, and the results indicated that stimulus context acted largely by decreasing perceived lengths. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that differential effects of context reflect a process of stimulus-specific perceptual attenuation.     

因果错觉的实验研究

本研究分别从可控情境和不可控情境两方面探讨了在工具性条件反射中,人对因果关系的认知的特点。结果发现：1．在可控情境下。延迟反馈可能导致被试的因果错觉;2、在不可控情境下,被试同样表现出因果错觉：迷信和控制幻觉,并且这种现象具有一定的普遍性;3、提供恰当的外部线索能有效地帮助被试消除已经形成的因果错觉。     

Apparent distance reduction with moving stimuli (Tandem Effect): Evidence for an attention-shifting model

Summary When two vertical rods move through a horizontal window in close succession, the Tandem Effect can be observed. It consists of a spatial illusion (distance between the rods looking smaller than it actually is) and a temporal illusion (under certain conditions both rods are seen simultaneously in the window, though the first rod has left the window before the second rod enters it). We report six experiments that explored the distance-reduction illusion and tested an attentional model of the effect. It assumes that attention is initially focused on the first rod and then shifted to the second, when it enters the window. The percept of the pair of rods is integrated from the first rod's position at the beginning, and the second rod's position at the end, of the focus shift. Consequently their subjective distance will be smaller than their physical distance by the distance that they travel during the focus shift. Experiments 1 and 2 established the Tandem Effect as an empirical phenomenon and showed that its size depends on stimulus parameters such as window size and movement speed. Experiments 3–5 tested specific predictions from the attentional model. Experiment 6 examined a further illusion, the Fröhlich Effect, and showed that it can be subsumed under the model. The experiments produced some unexpected effects and some predictions from the model were only partly confirmed. It is shown that the main findings can be combined into two quantitative functions that describe the course of focusing. One implication is that visual attention does not move from one object to another; rather all attention shifts originate in the fovea. We discuss several alternative interpretations of our data and show that they are less satisfactory than the attentional model.     

Using illusory line motion to differentiate misrepresentation (Stalinesque) and misremembering (Orwellian) accounts of consciousness

It has been suggested that the difference between misremembering (Orwellian) and misrepresentation (Stalinesque) models of consciousness cannot be differentiated (Dennett, 1991). According to an Orwellian account a briefly presented stimulus is seen and then forgotten, whereas by a Stalinesque account it is never seen. At the same time, Dennett suggested a method for assessing whether an individual is conscious of something. An experiment was conducted which used the suggested method for assessing consciousness to look at Stalinesque and Orwellian distinctions. A visual illusion, illusory line motion, was presented and participants were requested to make judgments that reflected what they were aware of. The participants were able to make responses indicating that they were aware of the actual stimulus in some conditions, but only of the illusion in others. This finding supports a claim that the difference between the Orwellian and Stalinesque accounts may be empirically observable and that both types of events may occur depending on task and stimulus parameters.     

Shattering the illusion of control: Multi-shot versus single-shot gambles

The illusion of control refers to a phenomenon whereby people believe their chances of success at a task are greater than would be warranted by objective analysis. This article raises two questions. First, how robust is the illusion of control? Second, how might the illusion be ‘shattered?’ Previous experimental demonstrations involved situations that can be likened to unique or single-shot gambles. If, however, the phenomenon is robust, it should occur in repeated or multi-shot gambles in which the outcome depends on a series of gambles involving the same underlying random process. It should also appear in single-shot gambles that are framed so as to superficially resemble multi-shot gambles. We label this the strong illusion of control hypothesis. On the other hand, because people have a better appreciation of probabilistic concepts in tasks they are able to represent as relative frequencies, the introduction of a multi-shot or ‘pseudo-multi-shot’ context might cue people to the random nature of the task, thereby shattering the illusion. The weak illusion of control hypothesis holds that the illusion of control will occur in single-shot but not in multi-shot or pseudo-multi-shot gambles. Two studies are reported that support the weak hypothesis. Alternative explanations are considered and implications are discussed.     

Relative mislocalization of briefly presented stimuli in the retinal periphery

We studied the ability to localize flashed stimuli, using a relative judgment task. When observers are asked to localize the peripheral position of a probe with respect to the midposition of a spatially extended comparison stimulus, they tend to judge the probe as being more toward the periphery than is the midposition of the comparison stimulus. We report seven experiments in which this novel phenomenon was explored. They reveal that the mislocalization occurs only when the probe and the comparison stimulus are presented in succession, independent of whether the probe or the comparison stimulus comes first (Experiment 1). The size of the mislocalization is dependent on the stimulus onset asynchrony (Experiment 2) and on the eccentricity of presentation (Experiment 3). In addition, the illusion also occurs in an absolute judgment task, which links mislocalization with the general tendency to judge peripherally presented stimuli as being more foveal than they actually are (Experiment 4). The last three experiments reveal that relative mislocalization is affected by the amount of spatial extension of the comparison stimulus (Experiment 5) and by its structure (Experiments 6 and 7). This pattern of results allows us to evaluate possible explanations of the illusion and to relate it to comparable tendencies observed in eye movement behavior. It is concluded that the system in charge of the guidance of saccadic eye movements is also the system that provides the metric in perceived visual space.     

The perception of size in a distorted room

This study was concerned with determining the factors important in the size illusion occurring with respect to extraneous objects introduced into an Ames’ monocular distorted room, It was asserted that the distortion in the room was unnecessary in order for the size illusion to be present, A rectangular room plus the extraneous objects produces the same stimulus conditions found in the Ames’ room and, hence, should produce the same illusion in perceived size, In an experiment using a rectangular room, 24 Os judged the size and distance of objects at the same or different distances behind the windows. As in the case of the Ames’ room it was found that the objects of physically equal size were perceived to be in the plane of the windows with the more distant objects appearing to have the smaller size. These results are explained in terms of the action of the equidistance tendency making the objects appear at the distance of the windows and the concept that objects in the same apparent fronto-parallel plane must have equal values of perceived size per unit of retinal size.     

Rapid decrement in the effects of the Ponzo display dissociates action and perception

It has been demonstrated that pictorial illusions have a smaller influence on grasping than they do on perceptual judgments. Yet to date this work has not considered the reduced influence of an illusion as it is measured repeatedly. Here we studied this decrement in the context of a Ponzo illusion to further characterize the dissociation between vision for perception and for action. Participants first manually estimated the lengths of single targets in a Ponzo display with their thumb and index finger, then actually grasped these targets in another series of trials, and then manually estimated the target lengths again in a final set of trials. The results showed that although the perceptual estimates and grasp apertures were equally sensitive to real differences in target length on the initial trials, only the perceptual estimates remained biased by the illusion over repeated measurements. In contrast, the illusion’s effect on the grasps decreased rapidly, vanishing entirely after only a few trials. Interestingly, a closer examination of the grasp data revealed that this initial effect was driven largely by undersizing the grip aperture for the display configuration in which the target was positioned between the diverging background lines (i.e., when the targets appeared to be shorter than they really were). This asymmetry between grasping apparently shorter and longer targets suggests that the sensorimotor system may initially treat the edges of the configuration as obstacles to be avoided. This finding highlights the sensorimotor system’s ability to rapidly update motor programs through error feedback, manifesting as an immunity to the effects of illusion displays even after only a few trials.     

Morinaga’s paradox and figure-ground organization

Morinaga’s paradox of displacement is constructed by setting several copies of the two Mueller-Lyer figures one above the other. The Mueller-Lyer illusion is that the wings pointing out seem farther apart than wings pointing in, and Morinaga’s paradox is that when one looks down a column of wings pointing alternately one way and the other, they appear misaligned but in the opposite direction from the Mueller-Lyer illusion. The hypothesis of this paper is that the subject, under instructions to align the vertical array of wings, sets up a vertical figure-ground organization different from that used in judging the horizontal distance between wings, and that the two illusions are contingent upon the two organizations. The experiment showed that Morinaga’s paradox occurs when only one column of wings is shown, in agreement with the figure-ground hypothesis, and also shows that Morinaga’s paradox disappears when short line segments are introduced which disrupt the vertical figure-ground organization.     

Visual motion disambiguation by a subliminal sound

There is growing interest in the effect of sound on visual motion perception. One model involves the illusion created when two identical objects moving towards each other on a two-dimensional visual display can be seen to either bounce off or stream through each other. Previous studies show that the large bias normally seen toward the streaming percept can be modulated by the presentation of an auditory event at the moment of coincidence. However, no reports to date provide sufficient evidence to indicate whether the sound bounce-inducing effect is due to a perceptual binding process or merely to an explicit inference resulting from the transient auditory stimulus resembling a physical collision of two objects. In the present study, we used a novel experimental design in which a subliminal sound was presented either 150 ms before, at, or 150 ms after the moment of coincidence of two disks moving towards each other. The results showed that there was an increased perception of bouncing (rather than streaming) when the subliminal sound was presented at or 150 ms after the moment of coincidence compared to when no sound was presented. These findings provide the first empirical demonstration that activation of the human auditory system without reaching consciousness affects the perception of an ambiguous visual motion display.