G. Stanley Hall and his times: Too much so, yet not enough

Early in his career, G. Stanley Hall was an innovator, even a rebel in his thinking--for example, about religion and evolution. He maintained these ideas throughout his career, even into his 70s. Consequently, he became ever more distanced from the thinking of his scientific colleagues. This perspective may help psychologists understand better Hall's monumental Adolescence: Its psychology and Its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, which to contemporary readers may appear full of errors, pedantry, and eccentricities.     

The nonwhite as child: G. Stanley Hall on the education of nonwhite peoples.

Although he was a significant educational reformer during the progressive era, a founder of various journals in psychology and pedagogy, a profile writer, and the individual who brought Freud and Jung to the United States, G. Stanley Hall's ideas on the education of nonwhites were, for his period, quite conventional. Unlike those of some of his contemporaries, Hall's racial ideas were not overtly vicious. He argued that nonwhites were the children of the human race and that their education, like that of children of particular ages, should be based on an understanding of their indigenous culture and inherent capabilities. This argument, although reformist in tone, supported a policy of nonwhite subservience.     

G. Stanley Hall and the institutional character of psychology at Clark 1889-1920

This paper identifies the institutional character of pre-1920 psychology at Clark University with founding President G. Stanley Hall's active "patronage" of "outsiders," argues that the origins of this institutional character can be found in Hall's own personal character and temperament, and traces the influence of this institutional character through much of the psychology done at Clark before 1920.     

Between Peirce (1878) and James (1898): G. Stanley Hall,the origins of pragmatism,and the history of psychology

This article focuses on the 20‐year gap between Charles S. Peirce's classic proposal of pragmatism in 1877–1878 and William James's equally classic call for pragmatism in 1898. It fills the gap by reviewing relevant developments in the work of Peirce and James and by introducing G. Stanley Hall, for the first time, as a figure in the history of pragmatism. In treating Hall and pragmatism, the article reveals a previously unnoted relation between the early history of pragmatism and the early history of the “new psychology” that Hall helped to pioneer. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

G. Stanley Hall, a man of many words: The role of reading, speaking, and writing in his psychological work

The place of G. Stanley Hall within the history of psychology is both assured and problematic. While he is credited with significant contributions, those contributions are predominantly institutional rather than intellectual or scientific in nature. Further compounding the issue is the fact that those who focus on the development of psychology qua science have emphasized psychology's increasing reliance on empirical observations, its use of quantitative measures, and its subordination of language to objective referents. This has obscured the significance of Hall's work, including his massive, two-volume Adolescence (1904), which is typically criticized for falling short in these regards. A more accurate appreciation can be gained through understanding his intentions and the practices of reading, speaking, and writing that were associated with them.     

G. Stanley Hall's Adolescence: Brilliance and nonsense

G. Stanley Hall's two-volume work on adolescence is assessed from the perspective of modern psychology, 100 years after he published it. A surprising number of similarities exist between Hall's views of adolescence and our own, and several of those similarities are discussed here. Some of the most striking differences between Hall's views and the views of today's psychologists are also discussed, specifically, Hall's grounding of his beliefs about adolescent development in a Lamarckian evolutionary psychology that assumed the inheritance of acquired characteristics and memories; his views of sexuality, especially masturbation; and his claim that religious conversion is normative in adolescence. The cultural and historical context of Hall's views is then discussed, with an emphasis on how an awareness of the context of Hall's views can enhance our awareness of the context of our own views today.     

G. Stanley Hall's Adolescence: A centennial reappraisal introduction

This article is an overview of the special issue "G. Stanley Hall's Adolescence: A Centennial Reappraisal." First, a brief biography of Hall is presented. Then each of the six articles in the special issue is summarized. Three of the articles are by historians and three are by psychologists, but all six articles integrate history and psychology.     

G. Stanley Hall's contribution to science, practice and policy: The child study, parent education, and child welfare movements

G. Stanley Hall influenced several social movements that had great implications for child wellbeing: the Child Study, Parent Education, and Child Welfare Movements. However, while Hall laid much of the foundation for the field of scientific child study and policy-relevant research, his legacy is virtually nonexistent. The current article reviews the life and contributions of G. Stanley Hall, and the dual role Hall played in history as a revered leader of the Child Study Movement and a controversial figure in the landscape of early child psychology.     

Theology, Science, and Postmodernism: Responding to Stanley Grenz

This article responds to Stanley J. Grenz's Templeton Lecture, “Why Do Theologians Need to Be Scientists?” published in the June 2000 issue of Zygon (Grenz 2000). In the first part I outline my reasons for finding the kind of theological reflections in which Grenz engages worthy of attention by noting my disagreement with the view that a sufficient response to theological issues can be formulated on the basis of an examination of our biological nature. I assert, in that connection, the autonomy of reason as a way of investigating and understanding the world. In the second part I respond directly to Grenz by explaining my disagreement with the postmodern critique of science upon which he relies and his adherence to Christian eschatology as an answer to the conundrums into which, he posits, we are drawn as a result of that critique. I note that I agree with Grenz, however, that the activity of valuing is necessarily a forward‐looking Godlike endeavor that is not derivable from science. In the third part I suggest that we must be open to the investigation of the possible existence of an objective realm of value and that, in any case, rejection of the postmodern critique of science in many cases pro‐vides a sound basis for the disciplined resolution of factual questions that frequently lie at the base of disagreements about values.