The Machine Paradigm and Alternative Approaches in Cognitive Science

In a recent paper called To think human out of the machine paradigm, it is stated that psychological science operates within a machine paradigm that is committed to mechanical causality. In addition, it is emphasizes the epistemological and methodological limitations of explanations based in deterministic mechanics and instead argues for the need of an ‘organic paradigm’ that takes into consideration psychological processes such as subjectivity, inter-subjectivity, and agency. Although there is no doubt that much psychological science has operated under a machine paradigm, we argue that recent psychological research is pursued using a wide variety of approaches and with an absence of a partially integrated meta-theoretical corpus. The present situation looks more like a Tower of Babel of epistemological approaches and empirical programs. The reconsideration of the organic paradigm and an explicitly addressed epistemological framework could constitute a step forward and lead to an explanatory pluralism built on greater dialogue within the psychological sciences.     

Time for Paradigmatic Substitution in Psychology. What are the Alternatives?

This article focuses on the “machine paradigm” in psychology and its consequences for (mis)understanding of human beings. It discusses causes of the mainstream epistemology in Western societies, referring to philosophical traditions, the prestige of some natural sciences and mathematical statistics. It emphasizes how the higher psychological functions develop dialectically from a biological basis and how the brain due to its plasticity changes with mental and physical activity. This makes a causal machine paradigm unfit to describe and explain human psychology and human development. Some concepts for an alternative paradigm are suggested.     

Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism

Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods. This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology.     

Entre neurosciences et neurophilosophie : la psychologie cognitive et les sciences cognitives

The cognitive sciences are all at once a scientific field with far-reaching epistemological implications and the locus of institutional confrontation between several academic disciplines. In this context, cognitive psychology occupies a key historical and theoretical position. It is therefore essential to clearly situate its contribution to the origin and the development of the cognitive sciences. For some, cognitive psychology may end up being dissolved by cognitive neuroscience, with its brain imaging techniques, which in the long run, should solve the age-old problem of brain-mind dualism. For others, this epistemic wager can only be won by reducing cognition to its most elementary states and processes. Here, the problem of mental representation (of meaning and consciousness) is brought to bear to rule out a view that strictly reduces the mind to the brain. Will the cognitive sciences, then, be nothing more than a mere stage in the integration of cognitive psychology into the cognitive neurosciences? Or on the contrary, will the other disciplines in the cognitive sciences be led to recognize the specificity of cognitive psychology and put it at the centre of their research program? The debate is underway, but the scientific and institutional outcome is uncertain.     

Connecting Information with Scientific Method: Darwin’s Significance for Epistemology

Theories of epistemology make reference—via the perspective of an observer—to the structure of information transfer, which generates reality, of which the observer himself forms a part. It can be shown that any epistemological approach which implies the participation of tautological structural elements in the information transfer necessarily leads to an antinomy. Nevertheless, since the time of Aristotle the paradigm of mathematics—and thus tautological structure—has always been a hidden ingredient in the various concepts of knowledge acquisition or general theories of information transfer. We hold that Darwin’s Evolutionary Theory is the first scientific theory which consistently presupposes a non-tautological structure for the information transfer and, at the same time, keeps it strictly distinct from the tautological metric of scientific observation. The consequences of this technique—namely the dissociation of information from intentionality—have not yet been fully drawn.     

RESPONSE‐DEPENDENCE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL CLAIMS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Abstract: The analysis here is an attempt to show how the current epistemological theory of response‐dependence (R‐D) may be relevant to understanding putative ontological claims of the empirical social sciences. To this end I argue that the constitutive features of human response, central to R‐D theory, can be made explicit for social science. I conclude that for the empirical social sciences the implication of combining R‐D and certain forms of statistical analyses leads to the possibility of an events‐based ontology.     

Ludwig Boltzmann's Bildtheorie and Scientific Understanding

Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie, which asserts that scientific theories are ‘mental pictures’ having at best a partial similarity to reality, was a core element of his philosophy of science. The aim of this article is to draw attention to a neglected aspect of it, namely its significance for the issue of scientific explanation and understanding, regarded by Boltzmann as central goals of science. I argue that, in addition to being an epistemological view of the interpretation of scientific theories Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie has implications for the nature of scientific understanding. This aspect has as yet been ignored because discussion of the Bildtheorie has been restricted to the realism-instrumentalism debate. To elucidate my analysis of Boltzmann’s Bildtheorie concrete examples are presented, and the pragmatist and Darwinist roots of Boltzmann’s view are discussed. Moreover, I propose to use Boltzmann’s ideas as a starting-point for developing a novel analysis of the notion of scientific understanding, of which a brief impression is given. It shows that the study of Boltzmann’s philosophy is not only of historical interest but can be relevant also to modern philosophy of science and to the methodology of theoretical physics. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Is This a World Where Knowledge Has to Include Justification?

If any thesis is all-but-universally accepted by contemporary epistemologists, it is justificationism—the thesis that being an instance of knowledge has to include being epistemically justified in some appropriate way. If there is to be any epistemological knowledge about knowledge, a paradigm candidate would seem to be our knowledge that justificationism is true. This is a conception of a way in which knowledge has to be robust . Nevertheless, this paper provides reason to doubt the truth of that conception. Even epistemology's supposed conceptual core is not as epistemically unchallengeable as we might have assumed to be the case.     

What is the Thematic Structure of Science?

The paper justifies the concept of “thematic structure” or “order of knowledge” over the traditional “classification of sciences” due to the uncertainty of many classification criteria. The thematic structure of science has, of course, various levels and various dimensions. Arguments against any forms of separating the humanities from sciences in the traditional sense of the term are presented and discussed. Equally unacceptable are attempts at sharp separation of technical disciplines and humanities. The thematic structure of humanities is not created by some material aspects but rather through the interest — or problem-oriented aspects. In addition to the natural sciences and the humanities there exists an important sphere of sciences on artefacts or, using the term by H. Simon, the sciences of the artificial. For the contemporary research activities is typical what could be denoted as “interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary complex.” The paper traces a set of epistemological criteria for the justification of the relative independence of a scientific discipline. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Culture and Personal Epistemology: U.S. and Middle Eastern Students’ beliefs about Scientific Knowledge and Knowing

Middle Eastern (Omani) and Western (U.S.) students’ beliefs about knowledge and knowing in the sciences were compared on four dimensions of personal epistemology proposed by Hofer and Pintrich (Review of Educational Research (1997), 67, 88–140). As predicted, given their experiences with comparatively traditional political and religious institutions, Omani more so than U.S. college students were more likely to accept scientific authorities as the basis of scientific truth. Furthermore, Omani men were more accepting of authorities than were Omani women, but there was no gender difference among U.S. students. Omani more than U.S. students also believed that knowledge in the sciences was simpler and more certain, which is consistent with comparisons between U.S. and Asian students (e.g., Qian & Pan, 2002, A comparision of epistemological beliefs and learning from science text between American and Chinese high school students. In B. K. Hofer & P. R. Pintrich (Eds.), Personal epistomology: The psychology of beliefs about knowledge and knowing (pp. 365–385), Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum). Students in the two countries did not differ, however, in whether their beliefs were based on personal opinions versus systematic evidence. Suggestions for further research included directly assessing experiences with, and attitudes toward, authorities in academic and other areas of students’ lives.     

Logos of a Living Earth: Toward a New Marriage of Science and Myth for Our Planetary Future

The social and ecological crises of the twenty-first century represent a failure of the techno-industrial way of living and knowing. It has become apparent that we need both a new mythos and a new science. In this essay, I draw attention to the important epistemological and cosmological implications of enactivism, a still emerging paradigm within the life sciences. Guided by the insights of the enactive paradigm, I offer a new story of human origins and destiny in an attempt to contribute to a more livable future for our species and the rest of the community of life on Earth.     

Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences<Superscript>1</Superscript>

Academia’s mathematical metaphysics are briefly explored en route to an elaboration of the qualitatively rigorous requirements underpinning the calibration and unambiguous interpretation of quantitative instrumentation in any science. Of particular interest are Gadamer’s emphases on number as the paradigm of the noetic, on the role of play in interpretation, and on Hegel’s sense of method as the activity of the thing itself that thought experiences. These point toward and overlap with (1) Latour’s study of the metrological social networks through which technological phenomena are brought into language as modes of being that can be understood, and (2) the way that Rasch’s models for measurement comprise a potential beginning for metaphysically astute, qualitatively and quantitatively integrated, mathematical methods in the social sciences. The paper closes with observations on the general problem that is philosophy, the need to remain open to multiplicities of meaning even as clear understandings are sought and obtained.     

Evolution and learning: An epistemological perspective

The deep formal and conceptual link existing between artificial life and artificial intelligence can be highlighted using conceptual tools derived by Karl Popper's evolutionary epistemology. Starting from the observation that the structure itself of an organism embodies knowledge about the environment which it is adapted to, it is possible to regard evolution as a learning process. This process is subject to the same rules indicated by Popper for the growth of scientific knowledge: causal conjectures (mutations) and successive refutations (extinction). In the field of machine learning such a paradigm is represented by genetic algorithms that, simulating biological processes, emulate cognitive processes. From a practical viewpoint, that perspective allows to identify the two different kinds of learning considered by artificial intelligence, knowledge acquisition and skill improvement, and to get a different view of the problem of heuristic knowledge in learning systems. From a theoretical point of view, these considerations can shade a new light on an old epistemological problem: why do we live in a learnable world?     

Infants' On-line Segmentation of Dynamic Human Action

Identifying the developmental origins of scientific thinking, as well as its endpoint, provides an essential framework for understanding its development. The origins of scientific thinking are claimed here to lie in attainments in epistemological understanding, beginning with the understanding achieved at about 4 years of age that assertions generated by human minds are distinguishable from an external reality against which they can be compared. Despite this achievement, children between 4 and 6 years of age exhibit an epistemological category mistake regarding the source of knowledge. They confuse a theory making it plausible that an event occurred and evidence indicating that the event did occur, as the source of their knowing that the event occurred. Appreciation of this distinction develops rapidly during this age range and reflects increasing mastery of an epistemological understanding we argue to be of foundational status for the development of scientific thinking, defined here as the consciously controlled coordination of theory and evidence.     

Applicability of systems philosophy to the futuristic science of education: Dissident vistas

This dissertation is a futuristic exploration into “dissident vistas” in pedagogical science and, in fact, in human sciences in general. The scope of educational research is often narrowed and distorted by the sociopolitical needs of the established academic elite. The mainstream of the present tradition of pedagogical theory and research has failed to focus on the phenomenon of education as a whole in order to open new perspectives for its beneficial influence on the society. There has been, for decades now, a growing need for education to become a change agent —a strategic tool for serious search after goals and models relevant to the future progress of the human society. Proper new scientific attempts are necessary if education is to be seriously considered as such a change agent. It is the firm conviction of the author that any attitude of today's educationalists towards their work, other than that of serious obligation towards the future of mankind, would be ethically unsound. Certain ambiguity has always surrounded the concept of education: is education a whole system or is it a vague set of very different things (human aspirations, social conditions, intentional input, contextual circumstances, natural processes etc.)? This ambiguity must be reduced, if any explicit discussion of the role of education is sought. In pedagogical science, and indeed in most human sciences, there are very few ontological premises, and certainly no axioms, that the majority of scientists would generally agree on. Systematic ontological and epistemological study of the phenomenon of education is almost nonexistent. It is to this end that this research is hoped to contribute.     

The Need for a Revolution in the Philosophy of Science

There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Mythical Thinking,Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination

This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scientific and non-scientific discourses is addressed. Yet this is juxtaposed with mythical thinking, which is supposed to be the most salient trait of non-scientific discourses. The author demonstrates how the most widespread demarcation criterion, the criterion of verification, is self-contradictory, not only when it comes to logic, but also in the achievement of isolating natural sciences from other forms of knowledge. According to Aristotle induction is a rhetorical device and as far as scientific statements are based on inductive inferences, they are relying on humanities, which rhetoric is a part of. Yet induction also has an empirical component by being based on sense-impressions, which is not a part of the rhetoric, but the psychology. Also the myths are understood in a rhetorical (Lévi-Strauss) and a psychological (Cassirer) perspective. Thus it is argued that both scientific and non-scientific discourses can be mythical.     

Empirical Race Psychology and the Hermeneutics of Epistemological Violence

After identifying the discipline of psychology’s history of contributing pioneers and leaders to the field of race research, epistemological problems in empirical psychology are identified including an adherence to a naïve empiricist philosophy of science. The reconstruction focuses on the underdetermined relationship between data and interpretation. It is argued that empirical psychology works under a hermeneutic deficit and that this deficit leads to the advancement of interpretations regarding racialized groups that are detrimental to those groups. Because these interpretations are understood as actions that bring harm to certain racialized groups, and because these actions are made in the name of science and knowledge, the term epistemological violence is applied. Reflections regarding the meanings and consequences of this term in empirical psychology and the human sciences are presented.     

Emergence and reduction in chemistry: ontological or epistemological concepts?

In this paper I argue that the ontological interpretation of the concepts of reduction and emergence is often misleading in the philosophy of science and should nearly always be eschewed in favor of an epistemological interpretation. As a paradigm case, an example is drawn from the philosophy of chemistry to illustrate the drawbacks of “ontological reduction” and “ontological emergence,” and the virtues of an epistemological interpretation of these concepts.