Methodological and theoretical improvements in the study of superstitious beliefs and behaviour

Via four studies (N = 901), we developed an improved Belief in Superstition Scale (BSS) composed of three distinct components (belief in bad luck, belief in good luck, and the belief that luck can be changed), whose structure was supported through exploratory (Study 1) and confirmatory (Studies 2 and 3) factor analyses using divergent samples. We found that among theoretical predictors, higher ‘chance’ locus of control (i.e., the belief that chance/fate controls one's life) best predicted all three BSS subscales (Studies 2–3). In Study 3, we found that BSS subscale scores were reliable, but largely invariant across age and education with a non‐general psychology sample. In Study 4, the BSS subscales best predicted participants’ superstitious attitudes and behaviour in a new lottery drawing paradigm among other commonly used superstition scales. Taken together, our results indicate that the BSS is a valuable addition to the burgeoning research on superstitious attitudes and behaviour.     

NON‐CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE

The paper is an investigation into the prospects of an epistemology of non‐conceptual knowledge. According to the orthodox view, knowledge requires concepts and belief. I present several arguments to the effect that there is non‐conceptual, non‐doxastic knowledge, the obvious candidate for such knowledge being non‐conceptual perception. Non‐conceptual perception seems to be allowed for by cognitive scientists and it exhibits the central role features of knowledge—it plays the knowledge role: it respects an anti‐luck condition, it is an achievement, it enables one to act for a reason, and it provides justification. Furthermore, it makes a straightforward and elegant explanation of (doxastic) perceptual knowledge possible: doxastic perceptual knowledge builds on non‐conceptual perception as non‐conceptual knowledge. Three objections that might naturally arise will be discussed and answered. Thus, the prospects of an epistemology without belief seem to be much better than the orthodoxy wants to have it. We can extend knowledge into the non‐conceptual realm.     

Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution

Robust Virtue Epistemology (RVE) maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti‐luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti‐luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck.     

Cognitive and affective Theory of Mind in mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease

Theory of Mind (ToM) allows one's own and others' cognitive and emotional mental states to be inferred. Although many patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) display impaired social functioning as their disease progresses, very few studies have investigated ToM in AD. Those that have done so suggest that patients' ToM deficits are the consequence of other cognitive impairments. The aim of this study was thus to investigate changes in both the cognitive and the affective dimensions of ToM in AD, using tasks designed to circumvent the patients' comprehension difficulties. Sixteen mild to moderate AD patients and 15 healthy controls matched on age, sex and education level underwent cognitive (preference judgment and first‐ and second‐order false belief) and affective (Reading the Mind in the Eyes) ToM assessments. Comprehension of false belief stories was verified and an additional neuropsychological examination was undergone. We observed impaired performances by AD patients on all the ToM tasks. While working memory and executive functioning impairments contributed to the deterioration in the more complex aspects of cognitive ToM abilities as highlighted by a correlation analysis, we failed to observe any comprehension difficulties in patients who performed poorly on simple cognitive ToM tasks, which suggests that AD truly affects cognitive ToM.     

Belief in good luck and psychological well-being: the mediating role of optimism and irrational beliefs

The authors examined the relationship of belief in good luck with depression and anxiety within the context of a number of cognitive and personality variables used to explain depression and anxiety. Undergraduate students (46 men, 98 women) were administered measures of belief in good luck, depression, anxiety, optimism, neuroticism, attribution style, self-esteem, and irrational beliefs. The results showed that belief in good luck was significantly related to optimism and irrational beliefs. A number of models were tested to determine whether irrational beliefs or optimism mediated the relationship between belief in good luck and depression and anxiety. The findings suggested that negative relationships between belief in good luck and both depression and anxiety are best addressed by the theory that belief in good luck engenders optimistic traits and a reduced level of irrational beliefs.     

Traces of the artist: Sensitivity to the role of the artist in children's pictorial reasoning

In three studies we investigated the question of whether children consider the attributes of the artist (sentience, age level, affective style, emotion) when making judgments about the traces (drawings) made by that artist. In Study 1, 2–5‐year‐old children were asked to find pictures drawn by a machine, an adult, an older and a younger child. Results indicated that children younger than 4 years do not consider the artists' attributes when making judgments, but 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds do. Furthermore, whereas the oldest children were adept at both machine‐person (sentience) and person‐person (age) contrasts, 4‐year‐olds succeeded only with person‐person contrasts. In Study 2, videotaped artists displayed differences in degree of agitation (affective style) while drawing, and this attribute was manipulated in the drawing by varying line density, asymmetry, line overlap and line gap, or all four features, across stimuli. Three‐ and five‐year‐old children judged whether a calm or agitated person drew the stimuli. Findings showed that five‐year‐old, but not 3‐year‐old, children easily completed the task. In Study 3, 3‐, 5‐ and 7‐year‐old children judged whether happy or sad artists made paintings of matching emotional tone. Performance on this picture judgment task was contrasted with performance on three theory of mind tasks (false belief, emotion and interpretative). The results indicated that 5‐ and 7‐year‐olds successfully judged the impact of artists' emotions on paintings, but 3‐year‐olds did not. Performance on the picture task was related to that on the false belief task, but not to the emotion or interpretive tasks. Taken together, the results suggest that children's view of visual symbols includes a consideration of the qualities of the artist beginning around 5 years, and there appears to be a common link between judgments of the mind behind the visual symbol in the picture task and judgments of mental state reasoning in the false belief task.     

Physical Attractiveness of Face and Voice: Effects of Positivity,Dominance, and Sex1

We investigated the joint and interacting effects of affect, sex, and nonverbal channel (face and voice) on the perception of physical attractiveness. In both studies we found that positive affects were rated as more attractive than negative affects, regardless of the channel (face, or voice). We also found that dominant affects were rated as more attractive when displayed in the face whereas submissive affects were rated as more attractive when displayed in the voice.     

Beyond the myth of venting: Social sharing modes determine the benefits of emotional disclosure

When individuals experience an emotion, they talk about it afterwards. A popular ‘emotional venting’ belief claims that doing so dissolves the emotional impact. This study tested a model of when and how sharing emotions is beneficial. It predicts that benefits vary according to the listener's response mode. A socio‐affective (empathic) mode was expected to buffer emotional distress temporarily. A cognitive (reframing) mode was anticipated to grant emotional recovery. Participants viewed an aversive film and then talked about it with an intimate. The latter was instructed to adopt either cognitive or socio‐affective response modes in a 2 × 2 design (cognitive/non‐cognitive; socio‐affective/neutral). Emotional, cognitive and social benefits were assessed immediately afterwards and again 2 days later following re‐exposure to the film. As predicted, emotional recovery occurred exclusively when the listener stimulated the participant's cognitive work. Cognitive variables (basic assumptions) were also positively modified by these conditions. Listeners' socio‐affective responses entailed enhanced social integration (i.e. greater proximity to the listener; less loneliness) and an impression of feeling better. These results demonstrated that sharing emotions can lead to multiple benefits depending upon the listeners' response modes: emotional recovery, consolidation of shattered assumptions, social integration and temporary distress reduction. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Sanitary‐Mask Effect on Perceived Facial Attractiveness

Currently, some Japanese women use a sanitary mask to hide their faces when not wearing makeup, perhaps because they believe that they are more attractive (or less ugly) when wearing a sanitary mask than when not wearing makeup. The present study examined the effect of wearing a sanitary mask on the perception of facial attractiveness. We manipulated the presence or absence of a mask in the main experiments or an occluder (e.g., notebook) in control experiments and asked participants to rate facial images. The results revealed that attractive faces wearing a sanitary mask were perceived as less attractive than the same faces without the mask, contrary to Japanese women's belief. This is the first study to demonstrate a new phenomenon, the sanitary‐mask effect, in which observers underestimate the physical attractiveness of a mask‐wearing face. Importantly, the pattern of the results of perceived attractiveness was substantially altered when a control object occluded the faces. This suggests that facial occlusion by a sanitary mask has a unique effect, due to occlusion and unhealthiness priming.     

Standing up for an affective account of emotion

This paper constitutes a defence of an affective account of emotion. I begin by outlining the case for thinking that emotions are just feelings. I also suggest that emotional feelings are not reducible to other kinds of feelings, but rather form a distinct class of feeling state. I then consider a number of common objections that have been raised against affective accounts of emotion, including: (1) the objection that emotion cannot always consist only of feeling because some emotions—for example, indignation and regret—necessarily have a cognitive component (say, the perception of a lost opportunity in the case of regret); (2) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because in order to explain how emotions have intentional objects we will have to recognise that emotion consists of cognition; and (3) the objection that emotion cannot consist only of feeling because emotion, but not feeling, can be variously assessed or evaluated. However, I demonstrate how an affective account of emotion might be successfully defended against all of the objections that are cited.     

Three‐year‐olds express suspense when an agent approaches a scene with a false belief

Research on early false belief understanding has entirely relied on affect‐neutral measures such as judgments (standard tasks), attentional allocation (looking duration, preferential looking, anticipatory looking), or active intervention. We used a novel, affective measure to test whether preschoolers affectively anticipate another's misguided acts. In two experiments, 3‐year‐olds showed more expressions of suspense (by, e.g. brow furrowing or lip biting) when they saw an agent approach a scene with a false as opposed to a true belief (Experiment 1) or ignorance (Experiment 2). This shows that the children anticipated the agent's surprise and disappointment when encountering reality. The findings suggest that early implicit knowledge of false beliefs includes anticipations of the affective implications of erring. This vital dimension of beliefs should no longer be ignored in research on early theory of mind.     

Envy divides the two faces of narcissism

In this article, we test psychodynamic assumptions about envy and narcissism by examining malicious envy in the context of narcissistic grandiosity and vulnerability. In Study 1, students (N = 192) and community adults (N = 161) completed trait measures of narcissism, envy, and schadenfreude. In Study 2 (N = 121), participants relived an episode of envy, and cognitive‐affective components of envy were examined in the context of both self‐ and informant reports of their envy and narcissism. In Study 3 (N = 69), narcissism was linked to reports of envy covertly induced in the laboratory. Vulnerable narcissism was strongly and consistently related to dispositional envy and schadenfreude (Studies 1–2), as well as to all cognitive‐affective components of envy (Study 2). Furthermore, it facilitated envy and schadenfreude toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). Grandiose narcissism was slightly negatively related to dispositional envy (Studies 1–2), and it did not predict informant reports of envy or cognitive‐affective components of the emotion (Study 2). Finally, it did not exacerbate envy, hostility, or resentment toward a high‐status peer (Study 3). The results suggest envy is a central emotion in the lives of those with narcissistic vulnerability and imply that envy should be reconsidered as a symptom accompanying grandiose features in the diagnosis of narcissistic personality disorder.     

Connecting the dots: Illusory pattern perception predicts belief in conspiracies and the supernatural

A common assumption is that belief in conspiracy theories and supernatural phenomena are grounded in illusory pattern perception. In the present research we systematically tested this assumption. Study 1 revealed that such irrational beliefs are related to perceiving patterns in randomly generated coin toss outcomes. In Study 2, pattern search instructions exerted an indirect effect on irrational beliefs through pattern perception. Study 3 revealed that perceiving patterns in chaotic but not in structured paintings predicted irrational beliefs. In Study 4, we found that agreement with texts supporting paranormal phenomena or conspiracy theories predicted pattern perception. In Study 5, we manipulated belief in a specific conspiracy theory. This manipulation influenced the extent to which people perceive patterns in world events, which in turn predicted unrelated irrational beliefs. We conclude that illusory pattern perception is a central cognitive mechanism accounting for conspiracy theories and supernatural beliefs.     

Intuitive knowledge

In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you sensorily aware of the concrete objects it is about. The analogous idea about intuition is that an intuition makes a belief amount to knowledge in part by making you intellectually aware of the abstract objects it is about. I expand both ideas into fuller accounts of perceptual and intuitive knowledge, explain the main challenge to this sort of account of intuitive knowledge (i.e. the challenge of making sense of intellectual awareness), and develop a response to it.     

Speaking a tone language enhances musical pitch perception in 3–5‐year‐olds

Young children learn multiple cognitive skills concurrently (e.g., language and music). Evidence is limited as to whether and how learning in one domain affects that in another during early development. Here we assessed whether exposure to a tone language benefits musical pitch processing among 3–5‐year‐old children. More specifically, we compared the pitch perception of Chinese children who spoke a tone language (i.e., Mandarin) with English‐speaking American children. We found that Mandarin‐speaking children were more advanced at pitch processing than English‐speaking children but both groups performed similarly on a control music task (timbre discrimination). The findings support the Pitch Generalization Hypothesis that tone languages drive attention to pitch in nonlinguistic contexts, and suggest that language learning benefits aspects of music perception in early development. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://youtu.be/UY0kpGpPNA0     

Tracing Attitude Expressions: An Eye‐Tracking Study

Attitudes represent object evaluations, comprising complex underlying cognitive and affective knowledge structures. When people are asked to judge an object, they can use their primary response (i.e., the immediate object‐evaluation linkage) or underlying affective and cognitive knowledge structures. In many situations, a primary response satisfices, but if not, more elaboration is required. Both processes are fundamentally different but may lead to the same attitude. For monitoring underlying processes during attitude expression, we developed an innovative eye‐tracking procedure using eye‐gaze on response scale options. This procedure was applied in three studies to identify the extent to which elaboration differs for attitude objects with weak or strong, univalent or mixed object evaluations (i.e., univalent, neutral and ambivalent). In Study 1, the overall judgment preceded processing of more specific affective and cognitive linkage evaluations. In Studies 2 and 3, the order was reversed, and affective and cognitive bases were assessed prior to overall attitude outcomes. For attitude objects with strong univalent or strong mixed object evaluations, we found similar outcomes on underlying processes. For weak object evaluations, cognition was found to be more predictive and easily accessible if an overall judgment was required first; affect for these objects was more predictive if people had to elaborate on affect and cognition first. We concluded that both affective and cognitive attitudes may require substantial elaboration, albeit in different situations. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hazards mean luck: Counterfactual thinking in reports of dangerous situations and careless behavior

It has been shown (Teigen, 1995) that experiences of "luck" in daily life are dependent upon the existence a worse and close hypothetical (counterfactual) outcome, rather than upon a positive evaluation of what actually happened. The present investigation focuses on the inverse relationship, namely whether a situation with a negative outcome close at hand will be perceived as lucky. To test this hypothesis, students were asked to describe dangerous situations (Experiment 1) and examples of careless behavior (Experiment 3) from their own lives, which subsequently were rated by the actors and by peer groups for good and bad luck, attractiveness, and for closeness and attractiveness of the counterfactual outcome. Dangerous situations and episodes involving careless behavior were generally regarded as more lucky than unlucky. Furthermore, degree of good luck was positively correlated with degree of dangerousness and with degree of carelessness. Luck was related to closeness, aversiveness, and (in Experiment 2) to estimated probability of the counterfactual outcome. It is concluded that luck is primarily determined by negative outcomes that did not happen, and thus a frequent by-product of risk taking and risk exposure.     

Lucky achievement: virtue epistemology on the value of knowledge

Virtue epistemology argues that knowledge is more valuable than Gettierized belief because knowledge is an achievement, but Gettierized belief is not. The key premise in the achievement argument is that achievement is apt (successful because competent) and Gettierized belief is inapt (successful because lucky). I first argue that the intuition behind the achievement argument is based wrongly on the fact that ‘being successful because lucky’ implicates ‘being not competent enough’. I then offer an argument from moral luck to argue that virtue epistemologists should maintain that knowledge is no more valuable than Gettierized belief.     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

福至心灵：幸运感知对消费行为的影响及其理论解释

寻求幸运的行为从古至今广泛存在于人类生活的方方面面, 幸运感知如何影响消费行为的理论成果为消费研究领域做出了重要贡献。通过系统回顾相关文献发现, 个体的幸运感知会对冒险行为、独特性寻求、传染效应、特定事物的态度和幸运消费产生影响。归因理论、人格特质理论、认知启动理论、反事实思维、社会比较理论、控制感理论和启发式决策可以用于解释幸运感知对消费行为的影响。未来研究应深化幸运感知影响消费行为的作用机制并拓展边界条件及其双向结果。