Voting “Against Islamization”? How Anti‐Islamic Right‐Wing,Populist Political Campaign Ads Influence Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Muslims as Well as Voting Preferences

We explore the effects of anti‐Islamic right‐wing, populist political campaign ads on voting intention for a right‐wing populist party using a quota‐based online experiment (N = 174). Additionally, we investigate implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic affective associations) and explicit attitudes (i.e., overtly expressed evaluations) toward Muslims as underlying mechanisms of these effects. We find that exposure to the political campaign ads prompts explicit hostile attitudes toward Muslims mediated by implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes in turn shape voting intention. Moreover, implicit attitudes toward Muslims predict voting preference beyond the influence of explicit attitudes. Thus, resentments toward Muslims may foster voters’ support for anti‐Islamic right‐wing populist parties even “under the radar” of conscious awareness. In sum, this study demonstrates for the first time the entire process of right‐wing, populist political campaign ads’ effects on voting preferences via implicit and explicit attitudes toward Muslims.     

Hard times and European youth. The effect of economic insecurity on human values,social attitudes and well‐being

While economic downturns have adverse effects on young people's life chances, empirical studies examining whether and to what extent human values, social attitudes and well‐being indicators respond to sudden economic shocks are scarce. To assess the claim that human values are less affected by economic shocks than social attitudes and well‐being, two distinct yet related studies based on the European Social Survey (ESS) are conducted. The first employs a fixed effects pseudo‐panel analysis of the 2008–2014 ESS‐waves to detect whether changes over time in the socio‐demographic group's unemployment risk and national youth unemployment affect individual dispositions to varying degrees. The second study captures micro‐ and cross‐national effects in the 2010 ESS cross‐section. Unique for this set‐up is that we can test whether the findings hold for over‐time changes in youth unemployment within countries (pseudo‐panel), as well as for cross‐country differences in youth unemployment (multilevel). Both studies indicate that political trust, satisfaction with the economy and subjective well‐being are lowered by economic risk and hardship, while social trust and self‐rated health are less affected by changes in youth unemployment. Secondly, human values are immune to economic risk, underscoring that values transcend specific situations and are therefore resistant against sudden economic shocks.     

Justice for the People? How Justice Sensitivity Can Foster and Impair Support for Populist Radical-Right Parties and Politicians in the United States and in Germany

Many people argue that support for populist radical-right political agents is motivated by people feeling “left behind” in globalized Western democracies. Empirical research supports this notion by showing that people who feel personally or collectively deprived are more likely to hold populist beliefs and anti-immigration attitudes. Our aim was to further investigate the psychological link between individuals' justice concerns and their preferences for populist radical-right political agents. We focused on stable individual differences in self-oriented and other-oriented justice concerns and argue that these should have opposing correlations with preferences for populist radical-right parties. We tested our hypotheses in two national samples, one from the United States (N = 1500) and one from Germany (N = 848). Sensitivity to injustice towards oneself enhanced the likelihood of preferring Trump (United States) and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) (Germany) via increased anti-immigration attitudes and increased populist attitudes. Sensitivity to injustice towards others reduced the likelihood of preferring Trump and AfD via decreased anti-immigration attitudes. We discuss our findings in regard to how stable individual differences in the evaluation of fairness can motivate intra- and interpersonal political conflicts in modern w estern societies and how politics and mass media can fuel these conflicts.     

Unravelling the relationship between populism and belief in conspiracy theories: The role of cynicism,powerlessness and zero-sum thinking

In recent years, it has been argued that conspiracy beliefs and populist attitudes go hand in hand. Despite their theoretical and empirical similarities, it remains unclear why these constructs are so closely associated. Across three studies, we examined the processes underlying the relationship between belief in conspiracy theories and populist attitudes. Study 1 (Greece, N = 275) and Study 2 (United Kingdom, N = 300) revealed that the relationship between populist attitudes and conspiracy beliefs is mediated by political cynicism and zero-sum thinking. In Study 3 (USA, N = 300, pre-registered), we use a vignette of a fictitious country to experimentally show that having a newly elected populist party in power (as compared to a well-established party) reduced participants' tendency to believe conspiracy theories. Moreover, this was due to increased empowerment, decreased political cynicism and decreased zero-sum thinking. These findings reveal various complementary mediators of the link between populist attitudes and conspiracy thinking and suggest that electing a populist party in power may reduce conspiracy beliefs among the public.     

Different Religions,Different Politics? Religion and Political Attitudes in Argentina and Chile

Various theories attempt to explain political outcomes. One of the most bitterly contested schools of explanation deals with culture, attitudes, and values. In the broadest sense, this tradition argues that political and social outcomes are determined in large part by the shared beliefs and values of the populace or a subgroup thereof. Thus, Stephen White (1984) has defined political culture as “historically formed beliefs and behavior,” recognizing that one's political attitudes and behavior are usually formed by inherited values as well as life experience. Moreover, scholars of political culture expect continuity of values over time and therefore are intrigued by cases of changing beliefs and attitudes. Thus, the explosive growth of evangelical and Pentecostal Protestantism in Latin America, where Protestants have grown from a handful to 20–30 percent of the population in a single generation, provides a unique opportunity for study. This rapid shift to Protestantism and its consequences for democracy have been fiercely debated in recent years. Max Weber's Protestant ethic thesis suggests that Protestantism may provide a catalyst for the establishment of democratic norms. However, many contemporary scholars argue that evangelical Protestantism is conservative, authoritarian, and politically passive. Do different religions result in different political attitudes? Does religious devotion, as distinguished from denomination, affect one's politics? This article evaluates political attitudes among Protestants and Catholics in Argentina and Chile to examine the claims of recent political culture arguments that modern Latin American Protestantism is resistant to democratic values. Survey data indicate that religious intensity (“devout‐ness”), rather than religious affiliation, does influence political attitudes, and that demographic and political engagement variables also influence democratic values.     

Political Distrust and Gendered Attitudes: The Japanese State and Women

We explore sources of political trust by examining one’s gender role attitudes as they relate to political trust in Japan. We hypothesize that progressive gender role attitudes are associated with political distrust. This political distrust is perhaps caused by relative deprivation which progressive individuals experience, given that gender relations are still traditional in Japan. We further hypothesize that this distrust among women extends to the government itself. We analyze the 2003 Japanese General Social Survey, a national representative survey of Japanese adults. Based on multivariate analyses of 1,807 respondents, we find support for our hypotheses. Our findings suggest that gender issues are salient among progressive individuals, especially among women.     

Humanisation,democracy and trust: The democratisation of the school ethos

A democratic state is characterised by more than its particular principles and institutions; its citizens must have the democratic virtues and attitudes. One such important attitude is trust, as commentators on the current attempts to create democratic institutions in the USSR emphasise. The paper gives an account of social trust and also the important, though problematic, role that distrust plays in a democracy. Finally the paper considers how the school can instantiate social trust in its own ethos.     

Socio‐economic,socio‐political and socio‐emotional variables explaining school bullying: a country‐wide multilevel analysis

Why do some countries, regions and schools have more bullying than others? What socio‐economic, socio‐political and other larger contextual factors predict school bullying? These open questions inspired this study with 53.316 5th‐ and 9th‐grade students (5% of the national student population in these grades), from 1,000 schools in Colombia. Students completed a national test of citizenship competencies, which included questions about bullying and about families, neighborhoods and their own socio‐emotional competencies. We combined these data with community violence and socio‐economic conditions of all Colombian municipalities, which allowed us to conduct multilevel analyses to identify municipality‐ and school‐level variables predicting school bullying. Most variance was found at the school level. Higher levels of school bullying were related to more males in the schools, lower levels of empathy, more authoritarian and violent families, higher levels of community violence, better socio‐economic conditions, hostile attributional biases and more beliefs supporting aggression. These results might reflect student, classroom and school contributions because student‐level variables were aggregated at the school level. Although in small portions, violence from the decades‐old‐armed conflict among guerrillas, paramilitaries and governmental forces predicted school bullying at the municipal level for 5th graders. For 9th graders, inequality in land ownership predicted school bullying. Neither poverty, nor population density or homicide rates contributed to explaining bullying. These results may help us advance toward understanding how the larger context relates to school bullying, and what socio‐emotional competencies may help us prevent the negative effects of a violent and unequal environment. Aggr. Behav. 35:520–529, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

The Climate‐Change Dilemma: Examining the Association Between Parental Status and Political Party Support1

Determining when, and for whom, positive attitudes toward climate‐change actions translate into actual behavior is critically important in promoting pro‐environmental behavior. An important way climate change can be tackled is through changes to social policy at the governmental level, which, in turn, depends on individual voting behavior in democratic nations. The present study examined this issue with regard to political party support in New Zealand, and demonstrated—using a large general population sample of voters—that support for climate‐change actions predict differential support for center‐left and center‐right political parties only for people who have children. Parental status moderated the link between support for climate‐change actions and voting intentions. Practical and theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Christian Mission,Politics, and Socio‐Economic Development: The Contribution of Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation

This article considers the contribution of the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation to the political and socio‐economic development of Zambia. First, the introduction and growth of Christianity in the mining areas of the Copperbelt are explored. Next, the article traces the formation and development of the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation. In the third place, it analyzes the role played by the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in the politics and development of Zambia during the first decades of its formation, including its participation in Zambia's struggle for independence. After political independence, the foundation continued to fulfil a major part in facilitating reconciliation between blacks and whites. The article argues that the participation of the church in God's mission in the world cannot be divorced from socio‐economic and political realities.     

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.     

Mediating and moderating processes in the relationship between multicultural ideology and attitudes towards immigrants in emerging adults

Few studies examine intercultural relations in emerging adulthood. Framed from the perspective of the Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies (MIRIPS) project, the current paper examined the mediating role of tolerance and perceived consequences of immigration in the relationship between multicultural ideology and attitudes towards immigrants. Additionally, the moderating role of context was analysed. A two‐group structural equation modelling was performed on data collected from 305 Italian emerging adults living both in northern and in southern Italy with different socio‐political climates towards immigrants. In both groups, tolerance and perceived consequences of immigration mediated the relationship between multicultural ideology and attitudes towards immigrants. Also, this indirect relationship was significantly higher for the northern than southern Italians. These findings provide provisional evidence of mediating and moderating processes in the relationship between multicultural ideology and attitudes towards immigrants and suggest important implications for practitioners interested in promoting intercultural relations among emerging adults.     

Psychological similarities and dissimilarities between left-wing and right-wing populists: Evidence from a nationally representative survey in France

Research in political science has focused on definitions of populism, platforms of populist parties, and demographic characteristics of those who support populist parties. Yet little is known about the psychological characteristics of populist supporters and how they might differ as a function of left-right ideology. Using a measure of populist attitudes in general, we investigated the role of Big Five personality traits as well as authoritarianism, social dominance, and system justification in a nationally representative sample of French respondents. We observed meaningful variability in relations between psychological characteristics and the endorsement of populist attitudes as a function of left-right ideological orientation, as well as variability in the psychological predictors of support for Jean Luc Mélenchon (a left-wing populist) and Marine LePen (a right-wing populist). We conclude that left-wing and right-wing populists are not the same, psychologically speaking, and that the differences are consistent with the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary forms of populism.     

Differences in Aggression,Attitudes Toward Women,and Distrust as Reflected in Popular Music Preferences

This article examines the complex relationship between dispositions, popular music preferences, and attitudes. In accordance with selective-exposure and excitation-transfer theories, it was expected that anger and self-esteem dispositions would influence popular-music preferences and attitudinal differences. Using a sample of 243 persons, we examined hypotheses and research questions seeking to link music preferences with three attitudes: aggression, attitudes toward women, and trust/distrust. Anger and self-esteem were treated as covariates. Multivariate analysis of covariance showed significant attitudinal differences among those who preferred different music genres. As compared with most other genres, heavy-metal music listeners exhibited more aggression and lesser regard for women, and rap listeners showed more aggression and distrust. Implications of these findings were discussed.     

‘Not in our front garden’: Land use conflict,spatial meaning and the politics of naming place

Strategies aimed at reducing land use conflict often stress the need to make planning decisions more democratic. However, this goal is obstructed by overly‐narrow conceptual perspectives that neglect the symbolic significance of place. We illustrate this by examining place names, which function as repositories of socio‐political meaning. Drawing on elements of discursive and rhetorical psychology and subject positioning theory, we investigated the variety of meanings associated with place names in the context of a proposed housing development in Swindon, in the South of England. Thirty interviews with different stakeholders were conducted to gauge their opinions towards the proposal. Noting differences in the way the proposed site was named, we analysed the range of meanings associated with each name in relation to participants' stances towards development. Our results show how, in naming place, spatial meanings are negotiated and contested in ways that support contrasting political objectives. We conclude that planning professionals should exercise greater sensitivity towards existing spatial meanings, especially place names. In addition, socio‐political understandings of subjective spatial relationships can serve as a basis for achieving more productive dialogue and improving development designs. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Farewell to multiculturalism? sharing values and identities in societies of immigration

For critics of multiculturalism, societies of immigration need to strengthen cohesion based on shared democratic values and national identities. This article suggests that democratic values are not a sufficient basis for political cohesion, because they are universal and cannot identify a particular polity toward which one ought to be loyal. Immigrants are always asked to accept a package deal that includes not only democratic values, but also the hegemony of established national cultures. Shared democratic values may also not be strictly necessary for political cohesion. They must be embedded in political institutions and ought to be respected by office holders, democratic politicians, and parties, but democratic states must tolerate that most citizens appear to hold illiberal beliefs including illiberal attitudes toward immigrants. Immigrants are then often asked to profess a commitment to values that citizens do not widely share. If political loyalty, cannot be exclusively based on democratic values, must societies of immigration then ask newcomers to assimilate into a shared national identity? The article argues that this requires, first, a self-transformation of these identities in response to immigration. Instead of regarding shared identities as overriding all other affiliations, democratic states should see them as overarching and overlapping. Different attitudes toward dual nationality illustrate the implication of this suggestion. The article concludes by proposing a catalyst model of multiculturalism as an alternative to the metaphors of the melting pot, the salad bowl, and the mosaic.     

The Role of Inclusive and Exclusive Victim Consciousness in Predicting Intergroup Attitudes: Findings from Rwanda,Burundi, and DRC

The present research examined the differential relationship between distinct construals of collective victimhood—specifically, inclusive and exclusive victim consciousness—and intergroup attitudes in the context and aftermath of mass violence. Three surveys in Rwanda (N = 842), Burundi (N = 1,074), and Eastern DRC (N = 1,609) provided empirical support for the hypothesis that while exclusive victim consciousness predicts negative intergroup attitudes, inclusive victim consciousness is associated with positive, prosocial intergroup attitudes. These findings were significant when controlling for age, gender, urban/rural residence, education, personal victimization, and ingroup superiority. Additionally, exclusive victim consciousness mediated the effects of ingroup superiority on negative intergroup attitudes. These findings have important theoretical implications for research on collective victimhood as well as practical implications for intergroup relations in regions emerging from violent conflict.     

A Multi‐Source,Multi‐Study Investigation of Job Performance Prediction by Political Skill

Political skill is a social effectiveness construct with a demonstrated capacity to predict job performance. However, because performance prediction research in this area to date has made exclusive use of self‐reports of political skill, and due to frequent distrust of self‐ratings of constructs in important personnel decisions, there is a need to investigate how multiple alternative sources of political skill and job performance measures relate, thus raising both theoretical and methodological issues. In three studies, employing a triadic data collection methodology, and utilising both cross‐sectional and longitudinal designs, this research tested the hypotheses that employee political skill, measured from the perspective of employees' assessor A, will positively predict job performance rated by assessor B (i.e. Hypothesis 1a), and vice versa, that employee political skill measured by assessor B will predict job performance ratings measured by assessor A (i.e. Hypothesis 1b).     

Good Workers and Crooked Bosses: The Effect of Voice Suppression by Supervisors on Employees’ Populist Attitudes and Voting

This study is the first to explore the effect of political socialization in the workplace on populist attitudes. We investigate the effect of workplace voice suppression on employees' populist attitudes and voting. We expect employees who were suppressed by supervisors to hold more populist attitudes and to be more likely to vote for a populist party than employees who were not. We argue that some employees experience voice suppression by supervisors as stressful, so splitting is likely to be employed as a defense mechanism. Splitting is achieved through cognitive distinction and antagonism between “the good workers” and “the crooked bosses.” Such a split mental framework can generalize into a worldview that contrasts “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a core characteristic of populism. We predict that the extent to which suppression triggers splitting and consequentially incites populist attitudes and voting depends on employees' acceptance of power distance. We test our hypotheses using SEM on survey data from 2990 members of the Dutch labor force. Our results show that experiences of voice suppression are positively related to populist attitudes and populist voting. As expected, this effect is stronger for employees who are less accepting of power distance.     

Living in a Non‐Communist Versus in a Post‐Communist European Country Moderates the Relation Between Conservative Values and Political Orientation: A Multilevel Study

We performed a multilevel, multinational analysis using the 2012 European Social Survey dataset (N = 41 080, nested in 20 countries) to study how living in a non‐communist versus in a post‐communist country moderates the link between individual conservative values (drawn on Schwartz's theory of basic human values) and political orientation (assessed as self‐placement on the left–right axis and attitude towards economic redistribution). The results supported the moderating role of living in a non‐communist versus in a post‐communist country in the case both of political self‐placement and of attitude towards economic redistribution, even controlling for the countries' degree of individualism, power distance and democracy. Specifically, conservative values were positively related to a rightist political self‐placement among participants living in countries without a communist past, and to a favourable attitude towards economic redistribution in countries with a communist past. The limitations, implications and future directions of this study are discussed. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology