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The main goal of this paper is to show that Pettit and Smith's (1996) argument concerning the nature of free belief is importantly incomplete. I accept Pettit and Smith's emphasis upon normative constraints governing responsible believing and desiring, and their claim that the responsibly believing agent needs to possess an ability to believe (or desire) otherwise when believing (desiring) wrongly. But I argue that their characterization of these constraints does not do justice to one crucial factor, namely, the presence of an unreflective, sub-personally constituted, ability to spot the kind of situations in which the reflective critical abilities constitutive of responsible believing (and desiring) should be deployed. 相似文献
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Herbert Fingarette 《Current Psychology》2008,27(1):1-5
In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can,
however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal
processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice.
Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about
the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism. 相似文献
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Ross Thomas Brady 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2010,39(5):511-529
Free Semantics is based on normalized natural deduction for the weak relevant logic DW and its near neighbours. This is motivated
by the fact that in the determination of validity in truth-functional semantics, natural deduction is normally used. Due to
normalization, the logic is decidable and hence the semantics can also be used to construct counter-models for invalid formulae.
The logic DW is motivated as an entailment logic just weaker than the logic MC of meaning containment. DW is the logic focussed
upon, but the results extend to MC. The semantics is called ‘free semantics’ since it is disjunctively and existentially free
in that no disjunctive or existential witnesses are produced, unlike in truth-functional semantics. Such ‘witnesses’ are only
assumed in generality and are not necessarily actual. The paper sets up the free semantics in a truth-functional style and
gives a natural deduction interpetation of the meta-logical connectives. We then set out a familiar tableau-style system,
but based on natural deduction proof rather than truth-functional semantics. A proof of soundness and completeness is given
for a reductio system, which is a transform of the tableau system. The reductio system has positive and negative rules in
place of the elimination and introduction rules of Brady’s normalized natural deduction system for DW. The elimination-introduction
turning points become closures of threads of proof, which are at the points of contradiction for the reductio system. 相似文献
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Herbert Fingarette 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2008,27(1):1-5
In everyday language, the central question raised by “free choice” is not causation but whether I do what I want. We can,
however, grant that our wants are caused. We commonly fail to appreciate this because there is no consciousness of these causal
processes. Nevertheless a question about the causation of my want may on occasion become relevant to the freedom of my choice.
Thus one may ask if my want is caused by my knowledge and values, or by causes alien to these. This is not a question about
the truth, or implications, of the theory of universal determinism. 相似文献
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The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis. 相似文献
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Roberto Cignoli 《Studia Logica》1996,56(1-2):23-29
The dual spaces of the free distributive lattices with a quantifier are constructed, generalizing Halmos' construction of the dual spaces of free monadic Boolean algebras. 相似文献
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Steven Rieber 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):223-252
This paper proposes a contextualist solution to the puzzle about free will. It argues that the context-sensitivity of statements
about freedom of the will follows from the correct analysis of these statements. Because the analysis is independently plausible,
the contextualism is warranted not merely in virtue of its capacity to solve the puzzle. 相似文献
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《Philosophical Papers》2012,41(2):263-287
Abstract This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist ‘internal reading’ of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only ‘external reading’ available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a ‘commitment-theoretic’ account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended. 相似文献