Compassion: An east‐west comparison

Compassion is an emotion that occupies a central position in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy while it is often a neglected subject in contemporary western philosophy. This essay is a comparison between an Eastern view of compassion based upon Mahāyāna Buddhist perspectives and a western view of the same emotion. Certain principles found in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy such as the Bodhisattva Ideal, and suffering (dukkha) to name two, are explored for the information they contain about compassion. An essay by Lawrence Blum is taken as representative of a Western view (but not exclusively) and it is analyzed for its shortcomings in light of the Buddhist view. The conclusion briefly describes the value of understanding an eastern view on compassion as a means of filling the void one finds in western medical ethics discourse which focuses so heavily, and redundantly, upon issues such as patient autonomy and paternalism.     

Gift narration: dynamic themes of reciprocity,debt, and social relations in Theravāda Buddhist Myanmar

ABSTRACT

Scholarly studies of Buddhist gift-giving have explored the many ways in which gifts are or are not reciprocal. This topic is revisited in this article by the author drawing greater attention to the practice of narration. Instead of understanding Buddhist words about dāna as representing religious doctrines or the experience of its social practice, the author considers how Buddhists narrate dāna as a means of maintaining relationships with self and others. Examining narratives of one monastic gift-recipient, meanings of dāna and moral principles of gift-giving are shown to vary alongside shifting relations between givers and receivers. This case suggests that themes of reciprocity are most salient when narrators grapple with interpersonal threats. Offering possible interpretations of this correlation, the author argues how reciprocal forces could be external social conditions to which narratives respond as well as created ex nihilo through the practice of narration as a strategy of ordering interpersonal conflicts potentially unrelated to reciprocity.     

Being in two minds: The divided mind in the Nyāyasūtras

In this paper I suggest that the division between manas and atman in Nyaya philosophy can be interpreted in the light of Western discussions about irrationality. In Western philosophy irrationality has been explained by postulating a divided mind. This helps to account for a generally rational mind that is nevertheless sometimes prone to irrationality. I argue that the division of the mind bears similarities to the division between manas and ātman. Looking at the arguments of the Naiyāyikas Gautama and Vātsyāyana for the existence of a permanent self, I do not find any of them convincing in the light of Buddhist criticism. However, by arguing for the division between manas and ātman, the Naiyāyikas have inadvertently provided their strongest argument for the existence of a self because they have managed to account for irrationality.     

The self and the person as treated in some Buddhist texts[1]

The theme of our conference is “The Concept of a Person”. One of the most original attitudes of the Buddha towards this problem was to have dissuaded his followers from clinging to the concept of “person”. The word “person” in Pāli is puggala (= individual), which represents in early middle Indian dialect puthakala, a derivation of Sanskrit: prithak (= prith or prath+ añc = separately, one by one). [2] Puggala means person or man, an individual as opposed to a group. Its equivalent in Sanskrit is pudgala., which means a personal entity or an individual. If there were any unique and permanent substance unifying this personal entity, it would be the self or the soul, attan in Pali and ātman in Sanskrit. The self and the person are closely related to each other. I will trace the evolution of these two notions as treated in some Buddhist texts, firstly in the primitive basic Buddhist texts in verse or in short sentences, secondly in the prose part of some sūtras and finally in later developed Mahāyāna Buddhist texts. Then I will confront these notions with the experience of their followers, by taking the example of Zen master Dōgen (1200–1253).     

Mettābhāvanā in Traditional and Popular Buddhist Contexts

Some have referred to relatively recent forms of popular Buddhism as an ‘engaged’ Buddhism that has revived or redirected traditional Buddhist ideas and practices found in meditation texts to reflect a greater social or worldly emphasis than suggested in earlier historical moments. One of these ideas is the quadripartite framework of the ‘immeasurable states’ (aprameya/appameya) or ‘divine abidings’ (brahmavihāra), the most prominent of which in popular Buddhism is mettā (friendliness/loving-kindness). This article traces the philosophy of the ‘immeasurable states’ found in meditation texts from various Indic traditions (Buddhist, Jain, and Hindu) and then presents the ways in which these traditional ideas (especially mettā) have informed popular Buddhist movements in the twentieth century. Points of discussion include: ‘engaged’ Buddhism's relationship with traditional Buddhist ethics; arguments concerning the coalescence of monastic-centred meditation practices with popular Buddhist notions of social service; and the distinct utilization of mettā in contemporary Buddhist societies in contrast to the mobilizing impulses of comparable religious communities (Hindu and Jain) with a similar heritage of mettā discourse in South Asia.     

From Buddha's speech to Buddha's essence: philosophical discussions of Buddha‐vacana in India and China1

This is a comparative study of the discourses on the nature of sacred language found in Indian Abhidharma texts and those written by 7th century Chinese Buddhist scholars who, unlike the Indian Buddhists, questioned ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. This issue labeled fo‐chiao t'i lun, the theory of ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching', was one of the topics on which Chinese Yogācāra scholars have shown a keen interest and served as the inspiration for extensive intellectual dialogues in their texts. It is in Hsüan‐tsang's massive and organized translation works, begun in 648, that various previous translations of the term buddhavacana from Indian Abhidharma texts were given the unified translation of fo‐chiao. (Fo‐chiao literally means “the Buddha's teachings,” and is the term used in the modern period for “Buddhism.”) By combining fo‐chiao with the term t'i, meaning ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ throughout his translations, Hsüan‐tsang attempted to define ‘the essence of the Buddha’s teaching'. In Indian Abhidharma texts, the nature of the Buddha's word was either ‘sound’ (?abdha), the oral component of speech, or ‘name’ (nāma), the component of language that conveys meaning, or some combination of the two. From the time of Hsüan‐tsang's translation, however, discourse on the nature of sacred language was no longer relegated to the category of language or of epistemological investigation, but became grounded in the Chinese discussion investigating the ‘essence’ or ‘substance’ of the Buddha's teaching, and even of ‘Buddhism’ itself. As such, it sought to transcend the distinction between language and meaning. This gradual but explicit process of inquiry into the nature of ‘the Buddha’s word' was a necessary antecedent to the transition to a ‘Chinese’ Buddhism.     

The Concept of Intermediate Existence in the Early Buddhist Theory of rebirth

This article investigates the concept of intermediate existence in the early Buddhist theory of rebirth. The main sources investigated for this article are the Pāli canonical and commentarial literature. My main thesis is that early Buddhist discourses contain instances that suggest a spatial-temporal gap between death and rebirth known as ‘intermediate existence’ (antarābhava), in contrast to the idea of Theravāda Buddhist theory that rebirth takes place immediately without a spatial-temporal gap. In order to prove this, I argue that the ‘one who liberates in interval’ (anarāparinibbāyī) attains Nibbāna in the intermediate existence and the concept of gandhabbā in early Buddhist discourses refers to a being in intermediate existence, not to a dying consciousness (cuti-viññāna), and there are indirect inferences to an spatiotemporal gap between death and rebirth in the early Buddhist discourses.     

Suffering and the Shape of Well-Being in Buddhist Ethics

This article explores the defense Indian Buddhist texts make in support of their conceptions of lives that are good for an individual. This defense occurs, largely, through their analysis of ordinary experience as being saturated by subtle forms of suffering (du?kha). I begin by explicating the most influential of the Buddhist taxonomies of suffering: the threefold division into explicit suffering (du?kha-du?khatā), the suffering of change (vipari?āma-du?khatā), and conditioned suffering (sa?skāra-du?khatā). Next, I sketch the three theories of welfare that have been most influential in contemporary ethical theory. I then argue that Buddhist texts underdetermine which of these theories would have been accepted by ancient Indian Buddhists. Nevertheless, Buddhist ideas about suffering narrow the shape any acceptable theory of welfare may take. In my conclusion, I argue that this narrowing process itself is enough to reconstruct a philosophical defense of the forms of life endorsed in Buddhist texts.     

Contaminants and the Path to Salvation: A Study of the Sarvāstivāda Hṛdaya Treatises

The Sa?gītiparyāya is the earliest Sarvāstivāda philosophical text that enumerates a series of contaminants (anu?aya), i.e. innate proclivities, inherited from former births, to do something of usually evil nature. This early list comprises seven such contaminants. As it is the contaminants that lead a worldling (p?thagjana) to doing volitional actions and thus to forming a karmic result (karmavipāka), these contaminants naturally also bear on the path to salvation. The gradual development of the peculiar Sarvāstivādin path to salvation necessitated a gradual refinement and reinterpretation of the original list of seven contaminants. Apart from a mere technical aspect, this reinterpretation also reflects the viewpoint of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhist philosophy on the nature of contaminants, i.e. their acceptance of a latent and an active state of the defilements, vis-à-vis the Vaibhā?ika viewpoint according to whom no such difference exists. Within Sarvāstivāda literature, the H?daya treatises illustrate this philosophical development.     

WORLDLY AND UNWORLDLY FEELINGS,FABRICATION AND LETTING GO

ABSTRACT

This paper proposes a framework for understanding vedanā and emotion in relation to each other, and both of them in relation to awakening. The vedanā (or feeling tone) that arises in mental experience will be shown to be central to emotion. Western views of emotion will be examined alongside some of the Buddha’s teachings on vedanā. The paper will show mental vedanā, and human emotion in the context of the two psychological orientations of ‘fabrication’ and ‘letting go’, which are then correlated with the Buddha’s notions of ‘worldly’ and ‘unworldly’ feelings. The paper proposes that such contextualisation is useful towards the development of a clear intellectual understanding of the nature of feelings, while (more importantly) it could support practitioners in a process of meditative inquiry and transformation.     

From Etymology to Ontology: Vasubandhu and Candrakīrti on Various Interpretations of Pratītyasamutpāda

The main body of this article presents Vasubandhu’s and Candrakīrti’s discussion on the etymology of pratītyasamutpāda and its meaning(s) as it appears in the Bhā?ya to Abhidharmako?a 3.28ab and Prasannapadā 4.5–9.27, respectively. Both authors put forward and critically examine various Buddhist grammatical analyses and interpretations of the term. Many passages in the indicated sections parallel or nearly parallel to each other suggest that Buddhist discussions on pratītyasamutpāda were held in a very specified manner during the mature phase of Buddhist philosophy in India. In the conclusion of the article, an attempt is made to discern the reason for Buddhists’ mutually competing analyses of the term, showing that their seemingly objectively conducted discussions (i.e. argumentations) regarding pratītyasamutpāda are actually rooted in their ontological (doxic) presumptions. Thus, for example, the nearly identical etymological analyses of the term (and of the meaning of the word-formation) provided by Vaibhā?ika and Candrakīrti resulted in a completely different understanding of the ‘doctrinal’ meaning (artha) of the term. This situation seems to corroborate certain views of some ancient Indian (Buddhist included) philosophers of language, according to whom there is no internal or ‘inborn’ connection between words or word-formation and their meanings, the latter being purely mental (and hence non-verbal) and dependent on the speaker’s intention (vivak?ā).     

Of Seeds and Sprouts: Defilement and its Attachment to the Life-stream in the Sarvāstivāda H[rdot]daya Treatises

The notions of selflessness (anātmaka) and karman are two key concepts in Buddhist philosophy. The question how karman functions with respect to the rebirth of a worldling who is, actually, devoid of a self, was a major philosophical issue in early Buddhist doctrine. Within the Sarvāstivāda school, the Vaibhā[sdot]ikas became the representative of an interpretation of this problem that hinges on the notion of ‘possession’ (prāpti). Their theory was contradicted by the Sautrāntikas, whose interpretation is based on the notion of ‘seed’ (bīja). The Sarvāstivāda H[rdot]daya treatises, compiled in a time period spanning from the beginning of the common era to the fourth century AD, i.e. the period of the rise of the Sautrāntika school, are a particularly interesting set of works, as they reflect the gradual development of these two major theories.     

The Ritual Use of Music in US Jōdo Shinshū Buddhist Communities

US Jōdo Shinshū Buddhist songs in the style of Christian hymns—what the community refers to as gāthā—are an integral part of the lived experience of North American Shin Buddhism. Rather than focusing on processes of acculturation, in the following paper I take gāthā seriously as a form of Buddhist practice, asking questions related not to their origins or legitimacy but to their function and purpose. I argue that gāthā function as a mechanism by which shifting ideas, attitudes, and practices become normative within the community. This function becomes apparent when gāthā are placed within their larger ritual context and are performed by the community as a whole. Following on Rappaport's analysis of ritual, gāthā serve as indexical expressions of canonical orientations toward Buddhist practice and teachings.     

Buddhist Meditation and the British Colonial Gaze in Nineteenth-Century Sri Lanka

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the multiple orientalist expressions that flowed from British pens in nineteenth century Sri Lanka are of use to the scholar of Buddhism, in that they can not only shed light on the growth of Buddhist modernism and the use of the term ‘meditation’ within it, but also on Sri Lankan Buddhist practice on the ground. It first surveys the preconceptions of the British about the concept of ‘meditation’. It then examines the writings of a representative selection of scholar civil servants and Christian missionaries who were resident in Sri Lanka within the century. This data reveal that a vibrant culture of Buddhist devotion and preaching existed throughout the century, together, among the laity, with the practice of ‘meditation’ on objects related to insight into reality. Additionally, it suggests that the jhānas, although hard for westerners to understand, were an important part of Buddhist self-understanding. The paper, therefore, argues that the priority given to vipassanā as the essence of meditation within Buddhist Modernism is a reduction of the diversity within traditional practice and a distortion of the traditionally recognised interrelationship between the jhānas and other forms of mental culture.     

From Brahmanism to Buddhism

It is argued that early (canonical) Buddhism to a very considerable extent can and should be seen as reformed Brahmanism.

Speculations about cosmogony in Buddhist sÛtras can be traced back to Vedic sources, above all Rígveda 10.129 & 10.90—two hymns that play a similar fundamental role in the early Upanisads.

Like the immortal and unmanifest Brahman and the mortal and manifest Brahmā, the Buddha, as a mythological Bhagavat, also had two forms (or bodies). In his highest form he is “the profound” beyond being and non‐being, like Brahman. As a teacher, he is like Brahmâ. By suppressing mind and by getting rid of desire a Buddhist should “swim” back to the profound beyond the duality of life and death, which is also suffering. One becomes real and true by seeing the causal identity of tat and tvam, i.e. of macrocosm and microcosm. The spiritual ideals of early Buddhism are thus founded on natural philosophy.     

A Gricean Interpretation of Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi and the No-Thesis View

Nāgārjuna (c. 150–250 CE), the famous founder of the Madhyamika School, proposed the positive catu?ko?i in his seminal work, Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: ‘All is real, or all is unreal, all is both real and unreal, all is neither unreal nor real; this is the graded teaching of the Buddha’. He also proposed the negative catu?ko?i: ‘“It is empty” is not to be said, nor “It is non-empty,” nor that it is both, nor that it is neither; [“empty”] is said only for the sake of instruction’ and the no-thesis view: ‘No dharma whatsoever was ever taught by the Buddha to anyone’. In this essay, I adopt Gricean pragmatics to explain the positive and negative catu?ko?i and the no-thesis view proposed by Nāgārjuna in a way that does not violate classical logic. For Nāgārjuna, all statements are false as long as the hearer understands them within a reified conceptual scheme, according to which (a) substance is a basic categorical concept; (b) substances have svabhāva, and (c) names and sentences have svabhāva.     

Mindfulness-based Therapy in Modern Psychology: Convergence and Divergence from Early Buddhist Thought

This article offers a comparative analysis on mindfulness from mindfulness-based therapies in the contemporary literature and from Buddhist meditation practices in the Pāli Canon. This includes a review of the presiding definitions of mindfulness, recent scientific findings in the literature and the current theories on the underlying mechanisms of mindfulness. The meditation practices from the Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction (MBSR) programme are compared to the origins of mindfulness of breathing meditations from the Satipa??hāna Sutta (MN 10). Further, recent research into the cultivation of skilful states of mind including compassion, self-compassion, loving-kindness, equanimity and sympathetic joy are reviewed and compared to an anthology of texts from the Pāli Canon. Ethical issues emerging from the convergence of science and Buddhist philosophy are also discussed for further consideration.

Abbreviations: AN: A?guttara Nikāya; BPS: Buddhist Publication Society; Dhp: Dhammapada; Dhs: Dhammasa?ga?ī; DN: Dīgha Nikāya; Iti: Itivuttaka; MN: Majjhima Nikāya; Miln: Milindapañha; Pa?is: Pa?isambhidāmagga; SN: Sa?yutta Nikāya; Sn: Sutta Nipāta; Ud: Udāna; Vibh: Vibha?ga; Vim: Vimuttimagga; Vsm: Visuddhimagga     

An All-new Timeless Truth

Donald Lopez argues that we should reject the narrative of compatibility between Buddhism and science as any apparent compatibility is achieved through a process of propositional compromise that sacrifices Buddhism’s distinctive content. This conclusion puts tension on the project within Buddhist modernism to formulate a Buddhism that functions within or alongside modern scientific paradigms. Lopez suggests that we should abandon this project, lest Buddhism should be demythologised away to nothing. While agreeing with Lopez I argue that his conclusion only holds under a particular epistemological assumption that is at odds with the Madhyamaka-Prāsa?gika philosophy of ?ūnyatā. I will argue, therefore, that a Madhyamaka analysis of the tensions in Buddhist modernism opens up the possibility of a frictionless pluralism between Buddhism and science. This resolution can only be achieved, however, if Madhyamaka Buddhists are willing to make a clear distinction between their Buddhism and their Madhyamaka attitude towards that Buddhism.