Facets of personality and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

The relationship between individual differences in autobiographical memory and personality was examined by having 118 undergraduates complete the NEO Personality Inventory after rating 15 word‐cued autobiographical memories on 20 scales. The Openness to Feelings facet (O3) correlated with measures of belief in the accuracy of memories, recollection, sensory imagery and emotion. Four other facets had correlations with belief (A3—Altruism, E1—Warmth, E4—Activity, E6—Positive Emotions). These facets also deal with emotional components of personality. In multiple regressions, measures of belief and measures of recollection were predicted by different variables, and for measures of belief, the O3 facet increased the variance accounted for beyond that of just the cognitive variables. Our results are consistent with and extend studies of the effects of depression and emotional suppression on autobiographical memory. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Encoding specificity manipulations do affect retrieval from memory

In a recent article, P.A. Higham (2002) [Strong cues are not necessarily weak: Thomson and Tulving (1970) and the encoding specificity principle revisited. Memory &Cognition, 30, 67-80] proposed a new way to analyze cued recall performance in terms of three separable aspects of memory (retrieval, monitoring, and report bias) by comparing performance under both free-report and forced-report instructions. He used this method to derive estimates of these aspects of memory in an encoding specificity experiment similar to that reported by D.M. Thomson and E. Tulving (1970) [Associative encoding and retrieval: weak and strong cues. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 86, 255-262]. Under forced-report instructions, the encoding specificity manipulation did not affect performance. Higham concluded that the manipulation affected monitoring and report bias, but not retrieval. I argue that this interpretation of the results is problematic because the Thomson and Tulving paradigm is confounded, and show in three experiments using a more appropriate design that encoding specificity manipulations do affect performance in forced-report cued recall. Because in Higham's framework forced-report performance provides a measure of retrieval that is uncontaminated by monitoring and report bias it is concluded that encoding specificity manipulations do affect retrieval from memory.     

On the immunity of perceptual implicit memory to manipulations of attention

In four experiments, we examined the effect of manipulating study phase attention in a Stroop task on the extent of repetition priming in the lexical decision task (LDT). Experiment 1 replicated the immunity of the LDT to division of attention reported by Szymanski and MacLeod (1996), using a standard Stroop configuration. Response times to previously encountered words were identical regardless of whether the participants were required to read the words or name the color in which they were presented. Experiment 2 demonstrated that implementing the Stroop manipulation across separate visual objects reduced but did not eliminate priming of unattended words, provided the words remained in the attended region of the stimulus display. When this constraint was removed in Experiment 3, priming of unattended words disappeared. Experiment 4 demonstrated statistically equivalent priming for attended and unattended words when the Stroop manipulation remained in the same visual object but attention was directed to a single letter of the word. In all four experiments, the Stroop manipulation had a clear effect on recognition. These results qualify claims that the LDT might be immune to manipulations of study phase attention and suggest that the LDT has a lower threshold level of attention at encoding than do other standard implicit tests of memory.     

Age differences in collaborative memory: the role of retrieval manipulations

In two experiments, we examined age differences in collaborative inhibition (reduced recall in pairs of people, relative to pooled individuals) across repeated retrieval attempts. Younger and older adults studied categorized word lists and were then given two consecutive recall tests and a recognition test. On the first recall test, the subjects were given free-report cued recall or forced-report cued recall instructions (Experiment 1) or free recall instructions (Experiment 2) and recalled the lists either alone or in collaboration with another subject of the same age group. Free-report cued recall and free recall instructions warned the subjects not to guess, whereas forcedreport cued recall instructions required them to guess. Collaborative inhibition was obtained for both younger and older adults on initial tests of free-report cued recall, forced-report cued recall, and free recall, showing that the effect generalizes across several tests for both younger and older adults. Collaborative inhibition did not persist on subsequent individual recall or recognition tests for list items. Older adults consistently falsely recalled and recognized items more than did younger adults, as had been found in previous studies. In addition, prior collaboration may exaggerate older adults’ tendency toward higher false alarms on a subsequent recognition test, but only after a free recall test. The results provide generality to the phenomenon of collaborative inhibition and can be explained by invoking concepts of strategy disruption and source monitoring.     

Experimental manipulations to reduce the negative effects of money

People generally consider money a necessary evil because it invokes dual effects. On one hand, it increases people's productivity and performance, but it also decreases people's sensitivity to others. I conducted three experimental studies with an attempt to reduce the negative effects of money. Results indicated that when money was framed as a social incentive, its negative effect was attenuated and people exerted more helping behavior in both hypothetical and real‐life scenarios. However, when a social incentive was framed in monetary terms, the negative effect of money prevailed in hypothetical but not in real‐life scenarios. Results suggested that money itself is not the root of evil or good, but rather its effects are influenced by our perceptions of its role.     

Remembering pride and shame: self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Remembering pride and shame: Self-enhancement and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory

People's self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image.     

Age,memory type,and the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: Findings from an Italian sample

The present research explored differences in phenomenology between two types of memories, a general self-defining memory and an earliest childhood memory. A sample of 76 Italian participants were selected and categorised into two age groups: 20–30 years and 31–40 years. The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) was administered, taking note of latency and duration times of the narratives. Consistent with the literature, the self-defining memory differed significantly from the earliest childhood memory in terms of phenomenology, with the recency of the memory associated with more intense phenomenological experience. The self-defining memory took longer to retrieve and narrate than the earliest childhood memory. Meaningful differences also emerged between the two age groups: Participants in their 30s rated their self-defining memory as more vivid, coherent, and accessible than participants in their 20s. According to latency findings, these differences suggest an expanded period of identity consolidation for younger adults. Further applications of the MEQ should be carried out to replicate these results with other samples of young adults.     

Encoding specific associative memory: evidence from behavioral and neural manipulations

Within-subjects procedures with rats assessed the associative structures acquired during conditioning trials in which the interval between the stimuli and food was either short or long (i.e., A-10 s→food and B-40 s→food). In Experiments 1 and 2, after these conditioning trials, A and B served as second-order reinforcers for 2 further stimuli (i.e., X→A and Y→B); whereas Experiment 3 used a sensory preconditioning procedure in which X→A and Y→B trials occurred before the conditioning trials, and rats were finally tested with X and Y. In each experiment, Y elicited greater responding at test than did X. This finding supports the contention that the long-lived trace of B (associated with food on B-40 s→food trials) is more similar to the memory of B that was associatively provoked by Y, than is the short-lived trace of A (associated with food on A-10 s→food trials) to the memory of A that was associatively provoked by X. These conclusions were reinforced by the effects of a neural manipulation that disrupted discrimination learning involving the short traces of stimuli but not the long traces of the same stimuli.     

Measuring the phenomenology of autobiographical memory: A short form of the Memory Experiences Questionnaire

The Memory Experiences Questionnaire (MEQ) is a theoretically driven and empirically validated 63-item self-report scale designed to measure 10 phenomenological qualities of autobiographical memories: Vividness, Coherence, Accessibility, Time Perspective, Sensory Details, Visual Perspective, Emotional Intensity, Sharing, Distancing and Valence. To develop a short form of the MEQ to use when time is limited, participants from two samples (N = 719; N = 352) retrieved autobiographical memories, rated the phenomenological experience of each memory and completed several scales measuring psychological distress. For each MEQ dimension, the number of items was reduced by one-half based on item content and item-total correlations. Each short-form scale had acceptable internal consistency (median alpha = .79), and, similar to the long-form version of the scales, the new short scales correlated with psychological distress in theoretically meaningful ways. The new short form of the MEQ has similar psychometric proprieties as the original long form and can be used when time is limited.     

Age differences in autobiographical memory across the adult lifespan: older adults report stronger phenomenology

As an individual’s life story evolves across adulthood, the subjective experience (phenomenology) of autobiographical memory likely changes. In addition to age at retrieval, both the recency of the memory and the age when a memory is formed may be particularly important to its phenomenology. The present work examines the effect of three temporal factors on phenomenology ratings: (a) age of the participant, (b) age at the event reported in the memory, and (c) memory age (recency). A large sample of Americans (N?=?1120), stratified by chronological age, recalled and rated two meaningful memories, a Turning Point and an Early Childhood Memory. Ratings of phenomenology (e.g., vividness of turning points) were higher among older adults compared to younger adults. Memories of events from the reminiscence bump were more positive in valence than events from other time periods but did not differ on other phenomenological dimensions; recent memories had stronger phenomenology than remote memories. In contrast to phenomenology, narrative content was generally unrelated to participant age, age at the event, or memory age. Overall, the findings indicate age-related differences in how meaningful memories are re-experienced.     

Experimental manipulations of perspective taking and perspective switching in expressive writing

Previous studies suggest that those who naturally vary their pronoun use over the course of expressive writing subsequently report the greatest improvements in physical and mental health. To explore possible perspective taking or perspective switching effects, two studies manipulated writing perspectives about emotional events from either a first-person, second-person, or third-person perspective. In Study 1, 55 students were randomly assigned to one of the three writing perspectives and were asked to write from the same perspective for three 5-minute writing sessions. In Study 2, 129 students wrote for three 5-minute sessions, one from each perspective in a counterbalanced order. The results showed that writing from a first-person perspective conferred more perceived benefits and was associated with using more cognitive mechanism words, whether engaged in perspective taking or perspective switching.     

Experimental manipulations of perspective taking and perspective switching in expressive writing

Previous studies suggest that those who naturally vary their pronoun use over the course of expressive writing subsequently report the greatest improvements in physical and mental health. To explore possible perspective taking or perspective switching effects, two studies manipulated writing perspectives about emotional events from either a first-person, second-person, or third-person perspective. In Study 1, 55 students were randomly assigned to one of the three writing perspectives and were asked to write from the same perspective for three 5-minute writing sessions. In Study 2, 129 students wrote for three 5-minute sessions, one from each perspective in a counterbalanced order. The results showed that writing from a first-person perspective conferred more perceived benefits and was associated with using more cognitive mechanism words, whether engaged in perspective taking or perspective switching.     

On the naturalising of phenomenology

In the attempt to construct a scientific approach to consciousness, it has been proposed that transcendental phenomenology or phenomenological psychology be introduced into the framework of cognitive neuroscience. In this article, the consequences of such an approach in terms of basic assumptions, methods for the collection of data, and evaluation of the collected data are discussed. Especially, the proposed notions of mutual constraint and the second perso are discussed. It is concluded that even though naturalising of phenomenology might not prove impossible, the projec has not yet found a coherent basic ground.     

Experimental manipulations of responsibility: An analogue test for models of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Several authors attribute excessive responsibility a predominant role in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) [Salkovskis, P. M. (1985) Behaviour Research and Therapy, 23, 571–583; Rachman, S. (1993) Behaviour Research and Therapy, 31, 149–154; van Oppen, P. & Arntz, A. (1994) Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32, 79–87]. The present studies aimed at demonstrating the link between different levels of perceived responsibility and checking behaviors by experimentally manipulating responsibility in non-clinical Ss. In the first study, a sound recognition task was used to compare checking behaviors in Ss with high (HR) and low (LR) perceived responsibility. Only one variable was significantly different, Ss from the HR group reporting more anxiety during the task than Ss from the LR group. Results did not support a link between responsibility and checking behavior. In a second study HR and LR Ss were compared on a manual classification task. Subjects from the HR group hesitated and checked more, and reported more preoccupation with errors and anxiety during the task than Ss from the LR group. Since perceived severity of the outcome was the most variable affected by the manipulation, the implications for current models of OCD are discussed and an alternative explanation is attempted. Finally, clinical implications are examined and suggestions are made for future directions of research.     

Mathematizing phenomenology

Husserl is well known for his critique of the “mathematizing tendencies” of modern science, and is particularly emphatic that mathematics and phenomenology are distinct and in some sense incompatible. But Husserl himself uses mathematical methods in phenomenology. In the first half of the paper I give a detailed analysis of this tension, showing how those Husserlian doctrines which seem to speak against application of mathematics to phenomenology do not in fact do so. In the second half of the paper I focus on a particular example of Husserl’s “mathematized phenomenology”: his use of concepts from what is today called dynamical systems theory.

No-Self and the phenomenology of agency

The Buddhists philosophers put forward a revisionary metaphysics which lacks a “self” in order to provide an intellectually and morally preferred picture of the world. The first task in the paper is to answer the question: what is the “self” that the Buddhists are denying? To answer this question, I look at the Abhidharma arguments (as presented in Chapter 9 of Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?a-bhāsya) for the No-Self doctrine and then work back to an interpretation of the self that is the target of such a doctrine. I argue that Buddhists are not just denying the diachronically unified, extended, narrative self but also minimal selfhood insofar as it associated with sense of ownership and sense of agency. The view is deeply counterintuitive and the Buddhists are acutely aware of this fact. Accordingly, the Abhidharma-Buddhist writings are replete with attempts to explain the phenomenology of experience in a no-self world. The second part of the paper reconstructs the Buddhist explanation using resources from contemporary discussions about the sense (or lack thereof) of agency.