Illusory contours as the solution to a problem

The perception of certain figures with illusory contours entails a reversal of figure and ground. It is hypothesized that this process occurs in two stages. First, some factor must suggest or cue the reversal. Experiments are described that isolate three such factors, namely, alignment of physically present contours, recognized incompletion of parts of the stimulus array, and set. Once cued, however, other experiments indicate that in a further stage of processing the solution is examined with respect to its compatibility with the stimulus display or with other preceptual properties to which the display gives rise. Only if such compatibility is present will the perception of a figure with illusory contours be maintained.     

Moorean pluralism as a solution to the incommensurability problem

Several prominent ethical philosophers have attempted to demonstrate that there exist instances or types of value that are of crucial moral significance but which cannot legitimately be compared with one another. Bernard Williams and Michael Stocker, for example, argue that it can sometimes be rational to regret having chosen the all-things-considered better of two alternatives, and that this sense of regret entails that the goodness of the worse option is not made up for by and is therefore incommensurable with that of the better. Joseph Raz and others have made similar points. In this paper, I propose a theory of value that is monistic in that it countenances just one sort of morally crucial value, but pluralistic in that several distinct properties bearer this value. I then explain how this view avoids incommensurable values without doing violence to the core intuitions that seemed to necessitate them, and how it fits into a larger conception of morality, right conduct, and moral psychology.     

Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action

My primary aim is to defend a nonreductive solution to the problem of action. I argue that when you are performing an overt bodily action, you are playing an irreducible causal role in bringing about, sustaining, and controlling the movements of your body, a causal role best understood as an instance of agent causation. Thus, the solution that I defend employs a notion of agent causation, though emphatically not in defence of an account of free will, as most theories of agent causation are. Rather, I argue that the notion of agent causation introduced here best explains how it is that you are making your body move during an action, thereby providing a satisfactory solution to the problem of action.     

Tooley's solution to the inference problem

Conclusion Tooley's speculative theory, I have tried to show, is beset with difficulties. I warned that this theory threatens to fail in its goal of illuminating the possible nature of a necessitation relation if it employs radical principles about parts and wholes and universals. Secondly, I argued that regardless of how we interpret the crucial phrase existing only as a part of, the speculative theory cannot solve the inference problem without appealing to such radical principles. Finally, I considered and rejected a version of Tooley's speculative theory that attempts to solve the inference problem using the Indiscernibility of Identicals.I conclude that the speculative theory fails. Tooley must fall back to the stipulative theory and live with the lack of an illuminating solution to the inference problem. But this is not to admit defeat. While it would be nice to have a more complete account of its workings, we may view the introduction of the necessitation relation as a theoretical posit, analogous to the positing of subatomic particles in physics to account for various data.I would like to thank Phillip Bricker for his persistent help with this paper. I would also like to thank David Lewis and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for their comments.     

A solution to the many attitudes problem

Philosophical Studies - According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief,...     

The elegant solution to the problem of impotence

Although most therapists are committed to debunking the dual myths that sex requires an erection and that sex equals intercourse, sex researchers continue to use successful intercourse as a primary dependent variable. It is here asserted that RET therapists would do well to approach the problem of erectile dysfunction from a more elegant philosophical perspective. The treatment approach outlined here is aimed at reducing client disturbance as well as increasing sexual satisfaction rather than at simply helping the client to regain his potency.     

A new solution to the problem of luck

The issue of whether and how we have the control necessary for freedom and moral responsibility is central to all control accounts of freedom and moral responsibility. The problem of luck for libertarians aims to show that indeterministic agents are ill-equipped with the control required for freedom and moral responsibility. In view of this, we must either endorse scepticism about the possibility of free and morally responsible agents, or make some form of, possibly revisionary, compatibilism work. In this paper, I shall offer a new solution to the problem of luck for libertarians. After outlining the problem of luck, I shall argue that, given a particular approach to mental causation, indeterminism can be viewed as an essential requirement of free and morally responsible action. After this, I shall distinguish between different types of inability and show how this provides us with a solution to the problem of luck. Finally, I shall consider some advantages and objections to the proposed solution.     

Differential activation solution to the motion correspondence problem

The correspondence problem arises in motion perception when more than one motion path is possible for discontinuously presented visual elements. Ullman's (1979) "minimal mapping" solution to the correspondence problem, for which costs are assigned to competing motion paths on the basis of element affinities (e.g., greater affinity for elements that are closer together), is distinguished from a solution based on the differential activation of directionally selective motion detectors. The differential activation account was supported by evidence that path length affects detector activation in a paradignm for which motion correspondence is not a factor. Effects on detector activation in this paradigm also were the basis for the successful prediction of path luminance effects on solutions to the motion correspondence problem. Finally, the differential activation account was distinguished from minimal mapping theory by an experiment showing that the perception of an element moving simultaneously in two directions does not depend on whether the two motions are matched in path-length determined affinity; it is sufficient that the activation of detectors responding to each of the two motion directions is above the threshold level required for the motions to be perceived. Implications of the differential activation solution are discussed for the stability of perceived motions once they are established, and the adaptation of perceived and unperceived motions.     

The copycat solution to the shadow correspondence problem

Cast shadows (henceforth simply 'shadows') depicted in artworks can fulfil some of their perceptual roles, such as helping the retrieval of 3-D structure and of relative positions of objects, without having to be geometrically or physically accurate. The visual system displays a wide tolerance for shadows that are mostly inaccurate, at times making use of the scarce accurate but relevant information that can still be retrieved from them. However, the extent of the tolerable inaccuracy is at present still unexplored. I propose that inaccuracy can be not only totally acceptable but in some cases is even likely to be preferable to accuracy if the main perceptual role of shadows is to help locate in a scene the objects that cast them. I examined a small but effective historical corpus of pictorial endeavours, from which it appears that in some cases painters have used a copycat strategy for drawing the terminator of a shadow, ie they have produced a replica of the visible profile of the caster, which in the norm yields an impossible shadow. The copycat strategy is perceptually effective for solving the correspondence problem of associating a shadow with its caster; copycatting can be more effective than other solutions, including the depiction of the geometrically correct shadow, and is complementary to coarser solutions to the correspondence problem. These phenomena provide insight into the computations effectively used by the brain to deal with space perception. In particular, the brain is not relying on some sort of simplified physical model of the world, for the shadows produced by the copycat effect would correspond to a more complicated physical situation than the one encountered in real life.     

Children's capacity to remember a novel problem and to secure its future solution

Much of humans’ success rests on foresight, the ability to predict what will happen or what is needed in the future. Surprisingly little is known about how this faculty develops. In three experiments (N = 170), 3‐ and 4‐year‐old children were presented with simple puzzles. Fifteen minutes later in a different room they were given the opportunity to secure a solution to take back to the puzzle. Only the older children performed above chance, whereas both age groups could solve the task in an instant condition. The same pattern of results emerged for another task involving selection of something to ‘feed ’ a puppet whose favorite food was initially unavailable. Control conditions suggest that temporal rather than spatial displacement influenced performance. Verbal reports substantiated the conclusion that by age 4 some children can remember a novel problem sufficiently enough to recognize a solution and select that solution in anticipation of applying it to the problem in the future.     

A neuroengineering solution to the optimal tracking problem

A mathematical solution is developed for an optimal sensory-to-motor transformation. This specifies a unique vector of motor command signals for goal-directed upper limb movement, conditional on cost of muscular effort vs. performance accuracy. Derivation is based on a realistic model of visual tracking, incorporating characteristics of external tracking system, target and disturbance as well as multivariable, nonlinear, time-varying characteristics of neuromuscular and biomechanical systems internal to the human operator. The optimal transformation removes redundancy in a 58-dimensional muscle system to give a two-dimensional response, thus solving the degrees-of-freedom problem. While adaptive filter neural networks are required to implement the general solution, an instructive linear matrix approximation reveals computational modules with observable behavioural correlates such as prediction, synergy generation and speed–accuracy compromise.PsycINFO classification: 2330     

A modest solution to the problem of religious disagreement

Many assume that the best, and perhaps only, way to address the so-called Problem of Evil (PoE) is to claim that God does not do evil, but that God merely allows evil. This assumption depends on two claims: (i) the doing-allowing distinction exists and (ii) the doing-allowing distinction is morally significant. In this paper I try to undermine both of these claims. Against (i) I argue that some of the most influential analyses of the doing-allowing distinction face grave difficulties and that these difficulties are only exacerbated when applied to God. Against (ii) I argue that broadly Kantian considerations give a better explanation of the moral differences in paradigm cases than the doing-allowing distinction and, when applied to God, effectively dissolve the moral significance of the doing-allowing distinction. The upshot of this is that those who claim God does evil are no worse off than those who claim God allows evil regarding the PoE.     

A Kantian solution to the problem of imperceptible differences

There are cases such as climate change where the cumulative effects of the actions of several agents lead to grave harm but where no individual agent can make a perceptible difference for the better or worse. According to Derek Parfit, dealing with such imperceptible difference cases requires substantial changes to the way we think about morality. In On What Matters, Parfit builds on Kantian Ethics to address the problem of imperceptible differences, but the transformation that Kant's theory undergoes in his hands is radical. I argue that Parfit's changes to Kant's theory are not only unnecessary but also detrimental to making sense of the ethical dimensions of action in collective contexts. Building on the notion of imperfect duties, I offer an alternative solution to the problem of imperceptible difference cases that remains closer to Kant's original theory and avoids the difficulties of Parfit's approach.