A critique of the microcounselling approach to problem understanding

Microcounselling approaches involve teaching the component behaviours of effective counselling or interviewing within a problem-solving framework. Egan, Ivey and Carkhuff, as proponents of this view, stress that later action stages of the problem-solving cycle should be based on an adequate understanding of the client's problem. The relationship between the skills which comprise the microcounselling approach and the goal of problem understanding is examined. It is argued that the approach lacks any explanation of how problem understanding is reached, and that it concentrates instead on the communication techniques involved in the discovery and modification of the client's understanding. This omission leaves counsellors without a rationale for the modification of their clients' views and without a means to regulate their use of the various microskills. Information theory and recent research on complex problem-solving are introduced to explain the skills involved in reaching a high-quality understanding of a client's problem. Given that these complex cognitive processes are not addressed in the microcounselling approach, suggestions are made for its modification.     

A set-theoretical approach to the problem of hierarchical clustering

A set-theoretical formalization is developed for the problem of generating hierarchically organized collections of subsets, or to use a phrase common in the applied substantive literature, for the problem of hierarchical clustering. A number of terms are introduced to characterize those clustering methods that attempt to limit the size of the overlap between each pair of subsets constructed at a specific “compactness” level. Several examples, motivated primarily by graph theory, are discussed briefly to illustrate the various set-theoretical concepts presented.     

A masking approach to the problem of form perception

The effects of deletion of certain components of a dotted triangle are studied, using a masking technique. Masking interference is achieved by varying the density of randomly placed dots within which stimulus triangles must be detected. The results of the study indicate that deletion of the dots composing the corners of the triangles decreases performance no more than deletion of an equivalent number of randomly chosen dots. However, the detectability of the line of dots composing the sides is functionally related to the recognition of the orientation of the triangle. The results suggest that the relationship of the parts of such a stimulus figure may be more important than the specific parts themselves.     

An information-processing approach to attribution of responsibility

The research literature on defensive attribution of responsibility is reviewed within the framework of a nonmotivational information-processing model which proposes that attributed responsibility is a function of the difference between the perceived contingent probability (congruence) of an outcome, given a perpertrator's behavior, and the noncontingent probability (prior expectancy) of that outcome. Results of previous research on effects of the characteristics of outcomes, perpetrator, and victim on responsibility ratings are reinterpreted in terms of the influence these factors have on estimates of congruence and prior expectancy. Secondary analyses of data from a recent study of causal reasoning resulted in a correlation of .78 between attribution of responsibility and a simple additive model of estimated contingent and prior probabilities of an accident.     

Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.     

Limits to problem solving in science

Popper, Polanyi and Duncker represent the widely held position that theoretical and experimental scientific research are motivated by problems to which discoveries are solutions. According to the argument here, their views are unsupported and - in light of counter-instances, anomalous chance discoveries, and the force of curiosity - over-generalized.     

Moral responsibility and the problem of manipulation reconsidered

It has been argued that all compatibilist accounts of free action and moral responsibility succumb to the manipulation problem: evil neurologists or their like may manipulate an agent, in the absence of the agent’s awareness of being so manipulated, so that when the agent performs an action, requirements of the compatibilist contender at issue are satisfied. But intuitively, the agent is not responsible for the action. We propose that the manipulation problem be construed as a problem of deviance. In troubling cases of manipulation, psychological elements such as desires and beliefs, among other things, are acquired via causal routes that are deviant relative to causal routes deemed normal or baseline. We develop and defend rudiments of a baseline that is acceptable independently of whether one has compatibilist or incompatibilist leanings.     

Evolutionary social science: A new approach to violent crime

Evolutionary Social Science unites evolutionary psychology and social science. Its core assumptions are that: (1) modern societies owe their character to an interaction of hunter–gatherer adaptations with the modern environment; (2) some changes in societies reflect change in individuals; (3) historical changes and cross-societal differences can be due to similar adaptational mechanisms, and (4) different social contexts modify development through adaptive mechanisms. Preliminary research is reviewed concerning historical and cross-national variation in violent crime to illustrate the new research strategy. Societal differences in violence can be partly explained in terms of reduced parental investment and increased mating aggression.     

A semantics-based approach to the "no negative evidence" problem

Previous studies have shown that children retreat from argument-structure overgeneralization errors (e.g., * Don't giggle me ) by inferring that frequently encountered verbs are unlikely to be grammatical in unattested constructions, and by making use of syntax-semantics correspondences (e.g., verbs denoting internally caused actions such as giggling cannot normally be used causatively). The present study tested a new account based on a unitary learning mechanism that combines both of these processes. Seventy-two participants (ages 5–6, 9–10, and adults) rated overgeneralization errors with higher (* The funny man's joke giggled Bart ) and lower (* The funny man giggled Bart ) degrees of direct external causation. The errors with more-direct causation were rated as less unacceptable than those with less-direct causation. This finding is consistent with the new account, under which children acquire—in an incremental and probabilistic fashion—the meaning of particular constructions (e.g., transitive causative = direct external causation) and particular verbs, rejecting generalizations where the incompatibility between the two is too great.     

Achievements of the hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to natural science A comparison with constructivist sociology

The hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to the natural sciences has a special interest in the interpretive phases of these sciences and in the circumstances, cognitive and social, that lead to divergent as well as convergent interpretations. It tries to ascertain the role of the hermeneutic circle in research; and to this end it has developed, over the past three decades or so, a number of adaptations of hermeneutic and phenomenological concepts to processes of experimentation and theory-making. The purpose of the present essay is to show how appropriate these concepts are to an important current research program (solar neutrinos) and thus to point out what difference they make to our understanding of science as a whole. This goal is pursued by means of comparison. The program of social constructivism in natural science has produced alternative but parallel concepts, embodied in an alternative and parallel vocabulary. The contrast between this vocabulary and that of hermeneutics and phenomenology reveals, so I argue, the advantages of the latter. But actually it does more: It reveals as well the pre-understanding or prejudgment of science embedded in each approach.     

Vice epistemology has a responsibility problem

Vice epistemology is in the business of defining epistemic vice. One of the proposed requirements of epistemic vices is that they are reprehensible—blameworthy in a non‐voluntarist way. Our problem, as vice epistemologists, is giving an analysis of non‐voluntarist responsibility that will count just the right qualities, no more and no less, as epistemic vices. If our analysis of non‐voluntarist responsibility ends up being too narrow, then it risks excluding some qualities that we want to count as epistemic vices, such as implicit biases. Whereas, if it ends up being too broad, it risks including qualities that we do not want to count as epistemic vices, such as impaired vision. I recommend a three‐step program for vice epistemologists: 1. admit that we have a responsibility problem; 2. strive to define the responsibility problem; 3. work together with specialists in non‐voluntarist responsibility to solve the responsibility problem.     

An approach to the problem of differential prediction

A procedure for maximizing selective efficiency is developed for application to situations in which it is desired to select from a single group of applicants for several possible assignments. The problem of comparable units for the several criteria whose values must be compared to each other for differential assignment purposes is discussed. It is demonstrated that, assuming linear regressions, maximal selection is obtained if individuals in any given assignment are differentiated from those rejected according to critical rejection scores on the multiple weighted sum of the predictors and from another possible assignment by critical difference scores which are merely the differences between the two critical rejection scores. Since the relationships just indicated give no way of determining the magnitude of the critical scores required to select the required number of persons for each assignment, a successive approximation procedure for accomplishing this purpose has been devised and a computational example is worked out.The opinions expressed are those of the author and are not to be construed as official or as those of the War Department.