The Paradox of Abstraction: Precision Versus Concreteness

We introduce a novel measure of abstractness based on the amount of information of a concept computed from its position in a semantic taxonomy. We refer to this measure as precision. We propose two alternative ways to measure precision, one based on the path length from a concept to the root of the taxonomic tree, and another one based on the number of direct and indirect descendants. Since more information implies greater processing load, we hypothesize that nouns higher in precision will have a processing disadvantage in a lexical decision task. We contrast precision to concreteness, a common measure of abstractness based on the proportion of sensory-based information associated with a concept. Since concreteness facilitates cognitive processing, we predict that while both concreteness and precision are measures of abstractness, they will have opposite effects on performance. In two studies we found empirical support for our hypothesis. Precision and concreteness had opposite effects on latency and accuracy in a lexical decision task, and these opposite effects were observable while controlling for word length, word frequency, affective content and semantic diversity. Our results support the view that concepts organization includes amodal semantic structures which are independent of sensory information. They also suggest that we should distinguish between sensory-based and amount-of-information-based abstractness.     

Hypothetico-Deductivism: Incomplete But Not Hopeless

Alleged counter-examples deployed in Park (2004) [Erkenntnis 60: 229–240] against the account of selective hypothetico-deductive confirmation offered in Gemes (1998) [Erkenntnis 49: 1–20] are shown to be ineffective. Furthermore, the reservations expressed in Gemes (1998) [ibid] and (1993) [Philosophy of Science 62: 477–487] about hypothetico-deductivism (H-D) are retracted and replaced with the conclusion that H-D is a viable account of confirmation that captures much of the practice of working scientists. However, because it cannot capture cases of inference to the best explanation and cases of the observational confirmation of statistical hypotheses, it is concluded that H-D cannot supply a complete theory of confirmation.     

视觉运动追踪的加工过程

视觉运动追踪是运动知觉研究的一个重要领域。通过构建视觉运动追踪的过程模型和分析每个阶段的认知加工任务, 可以帮助人们认识运动物体识别的本质。视觉运动追踪包括目标获取和运动追踪两个加工过程：目标获取阶段的主要任务是将目标与背景分离, 集中注意力加工追踪目标; 运动追踪阶段的主要任务是启动平滑追踪眼动和追赶性眼跳, 并发挥行为水平、眼动水平和神经活动水平的预测机制。目标获取同时受背景和目标的运动特征和身份特征影响; 运动追踪系统发挥预测机制的基础是客体表征连续性, 而客体表征连续性的建立同时依赖于目标时空属性和身份特征的编码加工。因此, 视觉运动追踪是视觉系统对客体运动信息和身份语义信息整合的结果。其中, 客体运动信息的加工特性已经获得了比较广泛的研究, 而语义信息加工机制还有待进一步加强。     

The Logic of Multisets Continued: The Case of Disjunction

We continue our work [5] on the logic of multisets (or on the multiset semantics of linear logic), by interpreting further the additive disjunction . To this purpose we employ a more general class of processes, called free, the axiomatization of which requires a new rule (not compatible with the full LL), the cancellation rule. Disjunctive multisets are modeled as finite sets of multisets. The -Horn fragment of linear logic, with the cut rule slightly restricted, is sound with respect to this semantics. Another rule, which is a slight modification of cancellation, added to HF makes the system sound and complete.     

行为决策中出现的分离效应

分离效应（the disjunction effect）是指：当决策者知道事件E会发生,他会采取行动A;当知道事件E不会发生,他仍会采取行动A;而当不知道事件E是否会发生的情况下,他会拒绝行动A。这一现象违背了理性决策理论的确定事件原则（sure-thing principle）。对分离效应的解释主要有基于理由的假设、思维惰性假设和齐当别模型。分离效应是否真的存在以及应该采用何种实验设计来进行研究都还有待进一步探讨。2005年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者Aumann对事件分离情境和事件非分离情境的区分,为进一步研究分离效应指明了新的方向。理解分离效应及其成因有利于人们做出“理性”的决策     

The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony

Using the 7-year psychotherapy of a Holocaust survivor, this paper explores the sometimes contradictory aspects of approaches to trauma. Conceptualizing a “self in pain” as an alternative to contemporary conceptualizations of the traumatized person as having a damaged, dissociated or collapsed self leads to a corresponding alternative clinical approach. The paradoxes of traumatic memory and testimony necessitate an adaptational emphasis and the emergence of a “doubled” in contrast to a dissociated self. The decision to respect this “doubled” self involves a privileging of “reality” over “psychic reality” which then, paradoxically enables this patient to develop a phantasy life.     

The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox

The No-No Paradox consists of a pair of statements, each of which ‘says’ the other is false. Roy Sorensen claims that the No-No Paradox provides an example of a true statement that has no truthmaker: Given the relevant instances of the T-schema, one of the two statements comprising the ‘paradox’ must be true (and the other false), but symmetry constraints prevent us from determining which, and thus prevent there being a truthmaker grounding the relevant assignment of truth values. Sorensen's view is mistaken: situated within an appropriate background theory of truth, the statements comprising the No-No Paradox are genuinely paradoxical in the same sense as is the Liar (and thus, on Sorensen's view, must fail to have truth values). This result has consequences beyond Sorensen's semantic framework. In particular, the No-No Paradox, properly understood, is not only a new paradox, but also provides us with a new type of paradox, one which depends upon a general background theory of the truth predicate in a way that the Liar Paradox and similar constructions do not.     

The Disjunction Effect and Reason-Based Choice in Games

This paper reports an experiment that extends previous find ings of the disjunction effect, sometimes described as a violation of Savage's sure-thing principle. Evidence of the disjunction ef fect is observed using elicited beliefs about others' actions (rather than controlled beliefs) in a prisoners' dilemma studied by Shafir and Tversky (1992) as well as in an asymmetric version of it and in a nondilemma game with a unique equilibrium. Debiasing tech niques as well as implications for these extensions are discussed.     

Sub-Optimal Choice by Pigeons: Failure to Support The Allais Paradox

Pigeons show a preference for an alternative that provides them with discriminative stimuli (sometimes a stimulus that predicts reinforcement and at other times a stimulus that predicts the absence of reinforcement) over an alternative that provides them with nondiscriminative stimuli, even if the nondiscriminative stimulus alternative is associated with 2.5 times as much reinforcement (Stagner & Zentall, 2010). In Experiment 1 we found that the delay to reinforcement associated with the nondiscriminative stimuli could be reduced by almost one half before the pigeons were indifferent between the two alternatives. In Experiment 2 we tested the hypothesis that the preference for the discriminative stimulus alternative resulted from the fact that, like humans, the pigeons were attracted by the stimulus that consistently predicted reinforcement (the Allais paradox). When the probability of reinforcement associated with the discriminative stimulus that predicted reinforcement was reduced from 100% to 80% the pigeons still showed a strong preference for the discriminative stimulus alternative. Thus, under these conditions, the Allais paradox cannot account for the sub-optimal choice behavior shown by pigeons. Instead we propose that sub-optimal choice results from positive contrast between the low expectation of reinforcement associated with the discriminative stimulus alternative and the much higher obtained reinforcement when the stimulus associated with reinforcement appears. We propose that similar processes can account for sub-optimal gambling behavior by humans.     

The Cookie Paradox

We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems to prove that in any situation in which everyone is truly following the rule, no one eats any cookies at all, no matter how many there are to be eaten. The ‘Cookie Argument’ resembles the more familiar argument that surprise exams are impossible, but it's not exactly the same. I argue that the biggest difference is that, unlike the surprise exam argument, the Cookie Argument is actually sound! I conclude the paper by explaining how it could be possible for a group of people to engage in behavior (eating cookies) that guarantees that at least one of the members of the group will violate a rule, even when it's common knowledge in the group that everyone is committed to following that very rule.

Sometimes me think, “What is friend?” and then me say, “Friend is someone to share the last cookie with.” ‐ Cookie Monster, http://youtu.be/LHh0A_bH5ig 1 1 I’m grateful to Eric Carter for this quote.

     

The Apology Paradox

Some leaders and citizens think it appropriate to apologize for historical injustices like slavery or the dispossession of indigenous people. But can we sincerely say 'Sorry' for the deeds of our forebears? By making an apology we are expressing regrets for what they did: we are saying that we prefer that these deeds had not been done. However, if these deeds had not been done, history would have been different, and probably we would not exist. Since most of us are glad to be alive, it seems that our apologies must be insincere. I discuss a number of proposed solutions to this paradox.