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1.
Steven L. Reynolds 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):19-35
Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking
that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons
that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first
problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change
our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief,
if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing
assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that
we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. 相似文献
2.
Allen Wood 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,63(1-3):7-24
‘Evidentialism’ is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion
one’s beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections
based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically
unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and
other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism
is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations. 相似文献
3.
A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes thatAnn believes that Bob’s assumption is wrongThis is formalized to show that any belief model of a certain kind must have a ‘hole.’ An interpretation of the result is that if the analyst’s tools are available to the players in a game, then there are statements that the players can think about but cannot assume. Connections are made to some questions in the foundations of game theory.Special Issue Ways of Worlds II. On Possible Worlds and Related Notions Edited by Vincent F. Hendricks and Stig Andur Pedersen 相似文献
4.
We formalise a notion of dynamic rationality in terms of a logic of conditional beliefs on (doxastic) plausibility models.
Similarly to other epistemic statements (e.g. negations of Moore sentences and of Muddy Children announcements), dynamic rationality
changes its meaning after every act of learning, and it may become true after players learn it is false. Applying this to
extensive games, we “simulate” the play of a game as a succession of dynamic updates of the original plausibility model: the
epistemic situation when a given node is reached can be thought of as the result of a joint act of learning (via public announcements)
that the node is reached. We then use the notion of “stable belief”, i.e. belief that is preserved during the play of the
game, in order to give an epistemic condition for backward induction: rationality and common knowledge of stable belief in
rationality. This condition is weaker than Aumann’s and compatible with the implicit assumptions (the “epistemic openness
of the future”) underlying Stalnaker’s criticism of Aumann’s proof. The “dynamic” nature of our concept of rationality explains
why our condition avoids the apparent circularity of the “backward induction paradox”: it is consistent to (continue to) believe
in a player’s rationality after updating with his irrationality. 相似文献
5.
James M. Joyce 《Synthese》2007,156(3):537-562
Richard Jeffrey long held that decision theory should be formulated without recourse to explicitly causal notions. Newcomb
problems stand out as putative counterexamples to this ‘evidential’ decision theory. Jeffrey initially sought to defuse Newcomb
problems via recourse to the doctrine of ratificationism, but later came to see this as problematic. We will see that Jeffrey’s
worries about ratificationism were not compelling, but that valid ratificationist arguments implicitly presuppose causal decision
theory. In later work, Jeffrey argued that Newcomb problems are not decisions at all because agents who face them possess
so much evidence about correlations between their actions and states of the world that they are unable to regard their deliberate
choices as causes of outcomes, and so cannot see themselves as making free choices. Jeffrey’s reasoning goes wrong because
it fails to recognize that an agent’s beliefs about her immediately available acts are so closely tied to the immediate causes
of these actions that she can create evidence that outweighs any antecedent correlations between acts and states. Once we
recognize that deliberating agents are free to believe what they want about their own actions, it will be clear that Newcomb
problems are indeed counterexamples to evidential decision theory. 相似文献
6.
Brad Armendt 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(1):71-87
The idea that beliefs may be stake-sensitive is explored. This is the idea that the strength with which a single, persistent belief is held may vary and depend upon what
the believer takes to be at stake. The stakes in question are tied to the truth of the belief—not, as in Pascal’s wager and
other cases, to the belief’s presence. Categorical beliefs and degrees of belief are considered; both kinds of account typically
exclude the idea and treat belief as stake-invariant, though an exception is briefly described. The role of the assumption of stake-invariance in familiar accounts of degrees
of belief is also discussed, and morals are drawn concerning finite and countable Dutch book arguments. 相似文献
7.
Mikel Burley 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(3):141-153
This article addresses some issues concerning the relation between religious beliefs and the fruits of those beliefs, where
‘fruits’ implies certain relevant forms of behaviour and affective attitudes. My primary aim is to elucidate the dispute between
D. Z. Phillips and theological realists, emphasizing the extent to which this dispute is symptomatic of a deeper disagreement
over how words acquire their meanings. In the course of doing so, I highlight an important difference between two alternative
realist claims, exemplified by Trigg and Hick respectively, and draw attention to an infelicity in Phillips’ way of presenting
his case. 相似文献
8.
Group beliefs 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Raimo Tuomela 《Synthese》1992,91(3):285-318
It is argued in this paper that there can be both normative and nonnormative, merely factual group beliefs. The former involve the whole social group in question, while the latter only relate to the distributions of personal beliefs within the group. The paper develops a detailed theory, called the positional account of group beliefs, to explicate normative, group-involving group beliefs. Normative group beliefs are characterized within this approach in terms of joint acceptances of views by the group members — or their representatives — acting in their right positions and tasks, and in a sense creating group commitments for all the members to accept (and keep accepting) the view in question. Also aggregate accounts of group belief are considered in the paper, especially the shared we-belief approach. Such aggregate accounts purport to account for merely factual group beliefs.I wish to thank Kaarlo Miller and Philip Pettit for critical comments. 相似文献
9.
Bryan Pickel 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):193-211
I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue
that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe
propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore
pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’,
such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity
to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument. 相似文献
10.
Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
11.
Ming Xu 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2006,35(6):599-619
We prove some embedding theorems for classical conditional logic, covering ‘finitely cumulative’ logics, ‘preferential’ logics and what we call ‘semi-monotonic’ logics. Technical tools called ‘partial frames’ and ‘frame morphisms’ in the context of neighborhood semantics are used in the proof. 相似文献
12.
This paper examines the existence and consequences of consumers' position-based beliefs about product layouts. We propose that consumers believe that options placed in the center of a simultaneously presented array are the most popular. This belief translates into their choosing options placed in the center more often than those on the sides of a display: the center-stage effect (Studies 1 and 5). Results are driven by inferences of product popularity rather than higher levels of attention to products in a given position (Studies 2 and 3). The preference for middle options is accentuated when people explicitly take into account other people's preferences, increasing the need to choose a popular option (Study 3), but attenuated when layout-based information is not diagnostic (Study 4). Increasing the accessibility of own preferences for the intrinsic attributes about the products reduces the use of position-based beliefs to make judgments and attenuates the center-stage effect (Study 5). Theoretical implications for marketplace meta-cognitions, visual information processing, position effects, and the use of overall cognitive beliefs versus perceptual attention and memory-based individuating information to make judgments are discussed. 相似文献
13.
In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching
a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral
to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present
experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning.
Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’
belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information).
Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks
as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks.
At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike:
They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs
and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial
expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious
beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this
study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial
evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences
are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event,
rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity. 相似文献
14.
Frank Baeyens Paul Eelen Geert Crombez Jan De Houwer 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》2001,20(2):183-203
In previous research (Baeyens, Vansteenwegen et al., 1996) we demonstrated that when observers consume a series of CS+ and CS−flavored drinks while simultaneously watching
a videotaped model who synchronically drinks identical drinks and facially expresses his evaluation (dislike to CS+, neutral
to CS−) of the liquids, the observers acquire a dislike for CS+ flavored relative to CS−flavored drinks. The aim of the present
experiments was to test some predictions derived from a “direct conditioning” theory of such observational flavor learning.
Using the same observational flavor conditioning procedure, we investigated (Exp. 1) the effect of manipulating the observers’
belief concerning the relationship between the drinks that they and the model were consuming (same/different/no information).
Observational flavor conditioning was obtained when observers were led to believe that they were drinking the same drinks
as the model did, and when they were not informed about this relationship, but not when told to be drinking different drinks.
At the same time, however, the observers were not able to correctly identify the source of the model’s expression of dislike:
They showed no CS-US contingency-awareness. Whereas the former finding suggests the causal involvement of conscious beliefs
and cognitive inference processes in observational learning, the latter is more in line with the idea that the model’s facial
expressions may act like a US’ which is automatically associated with the paired flavor CS+, without any involvement of conscious
beliefs or cognitive inferences. These two crucial findings were replicated in Exp. 2. Also, we obtained evidence in this
study that the belief manipulation affected learning through its influence on the observers’ attention for the model’s facial
evaluative expressions. These results can be integrated either by a cognitive theory allowing the beliefs on which the inferences
are based to be of an implicit nature, or by a “direct conditioning” theory that conceives of the US’ as an interpreted event,
rather than as a mechanistically and invariantly acting physical entity. 相似文献
15.
Andrés Perea 《Synthese》2007,158(2):251-271
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player
satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy
(that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions
for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped. 相似文献
16.
Ray Bull 《Current Psychology》1992,2(3):269-281
Throughout the history of psychology the controversial belief in a relationship between physical appearance and criminality
has reared its ugly head! Though modern criminologists do not believe that criminals belong to a single physical type, it
is possible that the general public, the police, juries, and so forth, may believe in such relationships and act accordingly.
The present paper describes some investigations of the extent to which the general public and the police believe that ‘the
face fits the crime’. Studies of the facial appearance of prison inmates are reviewed, as is research on the effects of plastic
surgery on prison recidivism rates. The relationship between children’s physical appearance and behavioural abnormalities
is discussed, as is the literature on the way that we react to children as a function of their facial appearance. Studies
concerning society’s reactions to facial disfigurement are presented to show that there may be some support for Cavior, Hayes
and Cavior’s (1975) view that ‘low physical attractiveness contributes to careers of deviancy’. 相似文献
17.
Ray Bull 《Current psychology (New Brunswick, N.J.)》1992,2(3):269-281
Throughout the history of psychology the controversial belief in a relationship between physical appearance and criminality
has reared its ugly head! Though modern criminologists do not believe that criminals belong to a single physical type, it
is possible that the general public, the police, juries, and so forth, may believe in such relationships and act accordingly.
The present paper describes some investigations of the extent to which the general public and the police believe that ‘the
face fits the crime’. Studies of the facial appearance of prison inmates are reviewed, as is research on the effects of plastic
surgery on prison recidivism rates. The relationship between children’s physical appearance and behavioural abnormalities
is discussed, as is the literature on the way that we react to children as a function of their facial appearance. Studies
concerning society’s reactions to facial disfigurement are presented to show that there may be some support for Cavior, Hayes
and Cavior’s (1975) view that ‘low physical attractiveness contributes to careers of deviancy’. 相似文献
18.
Richard Bradley 《Synthese》2007,156(3):513-535
Richard Jeffrey regarded the version of Bayesian decision theory he floated in ‘The Logic of Decision’ and the idea of a probability
kinematics—a generalisation of Bayesian conditioning to contexts in which the evidence is ‘uncertain’—as his two most important
contributions to philosophy. This paper aims to connect them by developing kinematical models for the study of preference
change and practical deliberation. Preference change is treated in a manner analogous to Jeffrey’s handling of belief change:
not as mechanical outputs of combinations of intrinsic desires plus information, but as a matter of judgement and of making
up one’s mind. In the first section Jeffrey’s probability kinematics is motivated and extended to the treatment of changes
in conditional belief. In the second, analogous kinematical models are developed for preference change and in particular belief-induced
change that depends on an invariance condition for conditional preference. The two are the brought together in the last section
in a tentative model of pratical deliberation.
This paper is one of a pair dedicated to Richard Jeffrey and prepared for a workshop held in his memory at the 26th International
Wittgenstein Symposium. My thanks to the organisers of, and the participants in, this workshop and to two anonymous referees
for their comments. 相似文献
19.
Tommaso Piazza 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):311-324
Many stored beliefs, like beliefs in one’s personal data or beliefs in one’s area of expertise, intuitively amount to knowledge,
and so are justified. This uncontroversial datum arguably tells against evidentialism, the position according to which a belief
is justified if it fits the available evidence: stored beliefs are normally not sustained by one’s available evidence. Conee
and Feldman have tried to meet this potential objection by relaxing the notion of available evidence. According to their proposal,
stored beliefs are dispositionally justified, because they are justified by the evidence one has the disposition to retrieve;
such evidence, as a consequence, is to be characterize as available, though in a derivative sense. Goldman has criticized
this proposal, by offering a counterexample to the claim that a disposition to generate a piece of evidence may qualify as
a justifier. In this paper I critically examine two possible replies to Goldman’s example stemming from Conee and Feldman,
and finally propose my own, based on a distinction, inspired by Audi, between dispositional evidence and the disposition to
have evidence. Though this proposal differs from Conee and Feldman’s one, I will conclude that it fits pretty well their intuitions.
相似文献
Tommaso PiazzaEmail: |