Where do hypotheses come from?

Why are human inferences sometimes remarkably close to the Bayesian ideal and other times systematically biased? In particular, why do humans make near-rational inferences in some natural domains where the candidate hypotheses are explicitly available, whereas tasks in similar domains requiring the self-generation of hypotheses produce systematic deviations from rational inference. We propose that these deviations arise from algorithmic processes approximating Bayes’ rule. Specifically in our account, hypotheses are generated stochastically from a sampling process, such that the sampled hypotheses form a Monte Carlo approximation of the posterior. While this approximation will converge to the true posterior in the limit of infinite samples, we take a small number of samples as we expect that the number of samples humans take is limited. We show that this model recreates several well-documented experimental findings such as anchoring and adjustment, subadditivity, superadditivity, the crowd within as well as the self-generation effect, the weak evidence, and the dud alternative effects. We confirm the model’s prediction that superadditivity and subadditivity can be induced within the same paradigm by manipulating the unpacking and typicality of hypotheses. We also partially confirm our model’s prediction about the effect of time pressure and cognitive load on these effects.     

Where do Bayesian priors come from?

Bayesian prior probabilities have an important place in probabilistic and statistical methods. In spite of this fact, the analysis of where these priors come from and how they are formed has received little attention. It is reasonable to excuse the lack, in the foundational literature, of detailed psychological theory of what are the mechanisms by which prior probabilities are formed. But it is less excusable that there is an almost total absence of a detailed discussion of the highly differentiating nature of past experience in forming a prior. The focus here is on what kind of account, even if necessarily schematic, can be given about the psychological mechanisms back of the formation of Bayesian priors. The last section examines a detailed experiment relevant to how priors are learned.     

Adolescent Suicidality: Who Will Ideate,Who Will Act?

Responses to the 1999 Youth Risk Behavior Survey including suicide ideation, attempt, medically treated attempt, and six problem behaviors were analysed. Youth across the spectrum ideated. Overwhelmingly, the 17% of youth with more than three problem behaviors were the youth who acted; they accounted for 60% of medically treated suicidal acts. Compared to adolescents with zero problem behaviors, the odds of a medically treated suicide attempt were 2.3 times greater among respondents with one, 8.8 with two, 18.3 with three, 30.8 with four, 50.0 with five, and 227.3 with six. A count of problem behaviors offers a reliable way to identify suicide risk.     

Will psychoanalysis fulfill its promise?

Although Freud had aspirations of a university structure for psychoanalytic education the sociopolitical structure of the Austro-Hungarian empire precluded this, and psychoanalysis developed by default in the central European heartland within a part-time, private-practice educational structure. With its rapid spread in the post-World-War-II United States, and its ready penetration of American academic psychiatry, a counter educational structure arose in some quarters: the department-of-psychiatry-affiliated institute within the medical school. This article outlines beyond these other, more ambitious, academic vistas (the David Shakow model, the Anna Freud model, the Menninger Foundation, Emory University (USA), AP de BA (Argentina)); conceptions even closer to the ideal (idealized) goal of full-time placement within the university, with strong links to medicine, to the behavioral sciences and to the humanities. The putative advantages of such a structure are presented.     

What is this thing called frequency?

When researchers are interested in the influence of long-term knowledge on performance, printed word frequency is typically the variable of choice. Despite this preference, we know little about what frequency norms measure. They ostensibly index how often and how recently words are experienced, but words appear in context, so frequency potentially reflects an influence of connections with other words. This paper presents the results of a large free association study as well as the results of experiments designed to evaluate the hypothesis that common words have stronger connections to other words. The norms indicate that common words tend to be more concrete but they do not appear to have more associates, stronger associates, or more connections among their associates. Two extralist cued recall experiments showed that, with other attributes being equal, high- and low-frequency words were equally effective as test cues. These results suggest that frequency does not achieve its effects because of stronger or greater numbers of connections to other words, as implied in SAM. Other results indicated that common words have more connections from other words, including their associates, and that free association provides a valid index of associative strength.     

Who Will Sing With the Perpetrator?

Child sexual abuse is a relational crime that affects not only the people in the child’s and perpetrator’s social network; the whole of society is affected. Child sexual abuse is at the same time extremely personal and pervasively social. Just as healing is required for individuals, so too does society need to tend to its wounds. Conceptualizing child sexual abuse as an emergent property of a limitless multitude of systems and subsystems implies that no one can be considered an innocent, objective observer of doer–done-to relating between victims, perpetrators, and guilty bystanders. We are participants in what we are observing. Our openness to connect with the experience of victims should not be at the expense of openness to listen to the experience of perpetrators and community leaders who must also be heard, in order to heal.     

Has the time come to rehabilitate Gestalt theory?

Summary The distinction is drawn between the metatheoretical commitments of Gestalt theory and their instantiations in explicit theory. It is argued that the metatheoretical commitments of Gestalt theory reflect important insights which might have served as the foundation of a theory of perception that avoids a number of the major difficulties associated with constructivism and the theory of direct perception. For this reason rehabilitation of the reputation of Gestalt theory is urged. In the concluding section certain similarities between the foundational premises of Gestalt theory and parallel distributed processing approaches are noted.The contents of this paper were presented initially at a symposium on perceptual theory in honor of Irvin Rock which convened in Washington, DC, on the occasion of the 1986 meetings of the American Psychological Association