我会在谁面前舍弃利益?——博弈对象的能力与社会距离对名利博弈倾向的影响

通过构造虚拟的捐献情境及贸易情境,结合博弈任务,以大学生为被试探讨了名利博弈对象的能力和社会距离对名利博弈中博弈者的博弈行为倾向的影响。结果表明,在捐献情境下,被试在高能力的名利博弈对象面前比在低能力的名利博弈对象面前更倾向于做出接近自己半数报酬的捐献行为,牺牲利益以获取好名声。在贸易情境下存在名利博弈对象的能力与社会距离的交互作用,被试仅在面对低能力的名利博弈对象时会考虑社会距离因素,在社会距离近的名利博弈对象面前比在社会距离远的名利博弈对象面前提出更低的售价,牺牲自己的利益以获得好名声。研究结果初步证实名利博弈对象能力与社会距离对名利博弈具有重要影响以及个体在名利博弈中具有策略性。     

欺骗判断与欺骗行为中自我控制的影响

欺骗判断与欺骗行为有着不同的心理机制, 正确认识二者之间的关系有助于增强人际间的信任和团队的长远利益。采用行为学实验从两种视角下考察自我控制对欺骗的影响。实验1采用材料评定的方法考察了识别他人自我控制能力状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现对比高自我控制能力的人, 被试更倾向于认为低自我控制能力的人更有可能为了自己的利益产生欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验2采用颜色Stroop任务考察了识别他人自我控制资源衰竭状况对欺骗判断的影响, 结果发现当识别他人自我控制资源衰竭时, 在评价他人为自己利益去欺骗、为他人利益去欺骗以及在特定情境中欺骗倾向上, 没有发现任何显著的主效应或交互作用。实验3采用视觉−感知任务来考察不同水平的自我控制能力对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比高自我控制组, 低自我控制组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。实验4采用颜色Stroop任务和视觉−感知任务来考察自我控制资源对欺骗行为的影响, 结果发现, 对比控制组, 自我控制资源衰竭组有更多的欺骗行为和欺骗倾向。这些研究结果表明, 在进行欺骗判断时, 相比自我控制资源状况, 个体会优先识别他人的自我控制能力水平来判断其是否具有欺骗动机或欺骗倾向。在欺骗行为中, 高自我控制能力的个体, 能够更好地抑制自私动机, 更多的考虑长远利益, 出于自身利益去欺骗的可能性会更小; 自我控制资源充足的个体, 更有可能会经得住诱惑, 自私自利的欺骗行为发生的可能性也会更小。     

负性情绪抑制对社会决策行为的影响

利用心理生理实验法, 通过将情绪抑制操作引入最后通牒博弈实验范式, 探讨负性情绪抑制的主观情绪体验、生理反应及其对社会决策行为的影响。以40名大学生为被试, 采用MP150型16导生理记录仪记录皮肤电反应和心率。实验为2 (组别：情绪抑制组、自然观看组) × 2 (性别：男、女) × 2 (博弈对手：人、计算机) × 4 (分配方案：￥5：￥5、￥7：￥3、￥8：￥2、￥9：￥1)的混合设计, 其中组别和性别为被试间因素, 博弈对手和分配方案为被试内因素。结果发现：(1)对负性情绪进行抑制没有减少被试相应的主观体验, 情绪抑制使皮肤电反应性增强; (2)负性情绪抑制的主观体验和生理反应不存在性别差异; (3)在面对不公平的分配方案时, 情绪抑制组被试比自然观看组更倾向于拒绝接受。结果表明在最后通牒博弈中,情绪抑制影响回应者的行为反应,使他们更倾向于做出不理智的决策。     

不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

组织危机沟通回应策略对员工情绪和行为的影响

通过实验探究危机情境下组织回应策略对员工的负性情绪和行为倾向的影响。实验一采用被试间设计。探讨公众舆论危机情境下组织回应策略(机会解释,威胁解释)对员工情绪和行为倾向的影响。实验二采用2×2的被试间实验设计,探讨管理惩戒危机情境下利益相关性(主相关,他相关)和组织回应策略类型对员工情绪和行为倾向的影响。结果发现,威胁解释下被试的负性情绪更高;机会解释下的被试发生负性网络行为可能性高于威胁解释,但现实行为倾向水平均较低;员工利益主相关情境下,被试负性行为倾向更高,危机情境类型和组织回应策略类型交互作用显著。研究表明:机会解释对抑制员工的负性情绪更有效;威胁解释对抑制员工的负性网络行为倾向更有效;员工利益主相关的危机情境会使员工的负性情绪和负性行为水平更高。     

青少年自我肯定性的发展及转换的印象知觉对其影响的研究

本文以问卷法考察初二、高二和大二学生自我肯定性的发展及转换的印象知觉对其的影响。结果发现:1)被试自我肯定性的发展随年龄增长经历了“较肯定——较不肯定——较肯定”的过程且无性别差异。2)高估自己的人比低估者更倾向于自我肯定。3)主观上他人对己的看法比客观上他人对已的看法对己影响更大.主观上认为他人对己看法的分歧性越大,对自己越肯定。     

双重身份下女性对抗性别偏见的回应行为

偏见不是一种单方面的社会心理现象, 而是偏见持有者、偏见对象、旁观者等多方相互作用和共同建构的结果。当女性在作为受害者和旁观者两种不同身份时, 她们对性别偏见持有者的回应既有相同之处, 也存在着一些差异。压力应对模型和对抗偏见反应模型可作为适应女性双重身份下对抗偏见的两种解释模型, 在面对偏见持有者时, 不同身份下女性对性别偏见的回应行为主要受到乐观、代价/收益、痛苦水平和女权主义等因素的影响。未来研究应进一步聚焦对抗性回应行为的效度争议、对内隐性别偏见持有者的干预和拓展想象接触的替代作用。     

最后通牒博弈中回应者的情绪唤醒和决策行为研究

运用心理生理实验法,探讨自主神经唤醒对最后通牒博弈中回应者决策行为的影响。结果发现:(1)不公平提议引起被试更大的皮肤电活动变化,表明他们对不公平提议产生更强的情绪反应。(2)情绪唤醒状态可以预示决策行为,被试做出拒绝行为前的皮肤电变化显著大于接受行为前的活动变化。(3)在最后通牒博弈中,博弈双方的性别配对差异影响回应者的决策行为。     

传统美德认同和责任情境对大学生责任行为倾向的影响

责任行为是个体在特定责任情境下履行责任和承担后果的行为。本研究采用问卷调查方法着重探讨大学生的传统美德认同和责任情境因素对责任行为倾向的影响。结果表明,传统美德认同,以及责任情境中的责任性质和责任对象都对大学生的责任行为倾向有显著影响,且三者的交互作用显著：（1）传统美德认同高的大学生在履行责任情境中,其责任行为倾向显著强于美德认同低的大学生;（2）履行责任时的责任行为倾向显著强于承担后果时的责任行为倾向,但低美德认同者的两种行为倾向在他人责任情境中无差异;（3）在履行责任情境中,大学生对自我的责任行为倾向显著强于对他人的责任行为倾向;但美德认同低的大学生在承担后果情境中则相反。     

4～6岁幼儿经济博弈中的信任行为及其影响因素

本研究通过两个实验考察幼儿是否在博弈任务中表现出对陌生人的信任行为,同时考察可能对幼儿的信任产生影响的因素,包括个体认知因素(观点采择)和环境因素(负性反馈和代际传递)。研究对189名4~6岁幼儿及其家长进行多种任务的测量。实验一通过修订Evans和Krugger(2011)的信任博弈任务,考察幼儿在匿名信任博弈中的信任行为,结果发现与4岁幼儿相比,6岁幼儿对他人的信任更低;实验二考察了幼儿信任的影响因素,结果发现,幼儿在得到负性反馈结果后再次进行信任博弈任务时,他们对他人的信任比前次有所降低,6岁幼儿对他人返还数量的预期比4岁幼儿下降程度更大;6岁幼儿的信任行为(第一次给出意愿)与观点采择能力显著相关;6岁幼儿的信任水平与家长的信任水平显著相关。     

动态重复决策中先前结果对风险偏好的影响

在没有轮次限制的轮盘赌任务中考察了先前一轮及多轮的决策结果对后续决策风险偏好的影响模式, 结果表明：(1)无论盈亏, 前一轮获益或损失的程度越大后一轮的风险偏好越大; (2)先前获益后, 接下来的下注投入的金额小于先前一轮的获益金额, 先前损失后, 接下来的下注的潜在获益金额大于先前一轮的损失金额。实验结果定量地验证和拓展了私房钱效应(house money effect)和保本效应(break even effect), 在此基础上归纳出了动态重复决策中“决策前景与先前结果合并后规避损失”的决策标准, 即当决策情景具有重复性且可以自由制定决策方案时, 决策的标准是使得先前一次的获益(或损失)与下一次决策的潜在损失(或获益)合并后可以规避损失。实验结果还表明决策者仅合并最近一次的先前结果而不会合并先前连续获益或损失的结果。     

Telling young children they have a reputation for being smart promotes cheating

The present research examined the consequences of telling young children they have a reputation for being smart. Of interest was how this would affect their willingness to resist the temptation to cheat for personal gain as assessed by a temptation resistance task, in which children promised not to cheat in the game. Two studies with 3‐ and 5‐year‐old children (total N = 323) assessed this possibility. In Study 1, participants were assigned to one of three conditions: a smart reputation condition in which they were told they have a reputation for being smart, an irrelevant reputation control condition, or a no reputation control condition. Children in the smart reputation condition were significantly more likely to cheat than their counterparts in either control condition. Study 2 confirmed that reputational concerns are indeed a fundamental part of our smart reputation effect. These results suggest that children as young as 3 years of age are able to use reputational cues to guide their behavior, and that telling young children they have a positive reputation for being smart can have negative consequences.     

信任还是设防？互动博弈中社会善念对合作行为的促进效应

社会善念是个体在人际互动中充满善意地关注、尊重并保护他人选择的需要和权利的行为,通过实施社会善念有助于提升他人的合作行为。为检验这一假设,本实验设置了“施—受”双方的互动博弈情境,采用“物品选择游戏”操纵实施者的社会善念水平,分别利用信任博弈和公共物品游戏测查接受者在互动过程中的信任水平和合作行为。结果发现：相比于低社会善念组,被试在高社会善念组中表现出更高的信任水平和合作行为。进一步路径分析也发现,信任在感知社会善念与合作行为间发挥着部分中介作用。由此可见,社会善念行为的实施为互动双方建立信任关系提供了重要线索,降低了人们时时“设防”的监控动机,使合作带来的利益双赢成为可能。     

What cognitive psychologists should find interesting about tax

People have to pay taxes, and usually they do—even though they would rather not. What determines whether and how much they decide to pay depends on more than a cost—benefit calculation. Results from the literature at the intersection of economics and psychology suggest that many factors are relevant, including people’s perceptions of how the money is being spent, and who (else) is being asked to pay taxes. The results also suggest ways in which government may be able to use framing and various biases to influence payment of and attitudes toward tax. But much remains unknown, including, importantly, the extent to which tax incentives influence behavior.     

视频游戏虚拟化身对自我概念的影响

虚拟化身(virtual avatar)是玩家在视频游戏中的虚拟自我呈现方式, 通过操控虚拟化身, 玩家可扮演不同的角色, 并拥有新的身份。作为现实自我的投射和展示, 虚拟化身会影响个体的自我认同, 并带来自我的变化。近年来, 越来越多的研究开始关注虚拟化身对个体自我的影响。大量研究表明, 在视频游戏中操纵虚拟化身进行行为和身份模拟会影响个体的自我概念。相关理论从不同视角解释了虚拟化身影响自我概念的原因。另外, 已有研究表明虚拟化身与自我概念的关系受到化身线索、视频游戏特征及个体因素的影响; 自我临场感和化身认同是虚拟化身影响自我概念的内在心理机制。未来研究应关注虚拟化身对自我概念的深层次影响和长期影响, 化身形象和行为两种线索的交互影响, 以及虚拟化身带来的自我概念改变对现实行为的影响, 并加强该领域的应用研究。     

A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations

In this paper we introduce and discuss some models of bargaining. These have the form of repeated plays of a game among pairs of individuals, with the opponents in each particular game drawn randomly from a large population. The players' information about one another is limited to a single quantity, termed reputation, which summarizes the behavior of a player in previous trials of the game, and so changes endogenously. We distinguish some possible decision rules or “customs” which players might use to determine their moves in the game as a function of their own and their opponent's reputation, and investigate whether or not these actions lead to a suitably defined social equilibrium. We then compare the equilibrium customs from the point of view of the welfare of the population as a whole.     

社会阶层与亲社会行为：回报预期的调节作用

近年来关于社会阶层和亲社会行为关系的研究不少,但结论不一致。基于此,本研究假设亲社会行为的社会阶层差异可能与对回报水平的预期有关。实验改编自“独裁者”游戏,通过网络模拟情境进行,采用2（社会阶层：高、低）×2（回报预期：高、低）的混合设计（其中社会阶层为被试间变量）,考察了不同社会阶层被试在两种不同回报预期条件下,亲社会行为的差异。实验结果表明：回报预期和社会阶层之间存在交互作用,进一步的简单效应分析表明,当预期目标有较高的回报水平时,高低社会阶层的亲社会行为差异不显著。当预期目标有较低的回报水平时,与高社会阶层相比,低社会阶层的亲社会行为明显减少。说明回报预期对不同社会阶层的亲社会行为起显著的调节作用。     

It takes two: Honesty–Humility and Agreeableness differentially predict active versus reactive cooperation

Recently, similar six-factor solutions have emerged in lexical studies across languages, giving rise to the HEXACO model of personality. As a core extension of its most well-known predecessor, the five-factor model, the HEXACO model distinguishes between two factors predicting complimentary aspects of prosocial behavior or, more specifically, reciprocal altruism: Honesty–Humility (the tendency toward active cooperation, i.e. non-exploitation) and Agreeableness (the tendency toward reactive cooperation, i.e. non-retaliation). However, this dissociation has not yet been tested to its full extent. To this end, we herein present re-analyses of published studies (N = 1090), showing that Honesty–Humility, but not Agreeableness, indeed predicts active cooperation. More importantly, in a new experiment (N = 410), we found a pattern of two concurrent selective associations, supporting the theoretical distinction between the two factors: Honesty–Humility (but not Agreeableness) predicted active cooperation (non-exploitation in the dictator game), whereas Agreeableness (but not Honesty–Humility) was linked to reactive cooperation (non-retaliation in the ultimatum game).     

Dog rivalry impacts following behavior in a decision-making task involving food

Dogs learn a great deal from humans and other dogs. Previous studies of socially influenced learning between dogs have typically used a highly trained demonstrator dog who is unfamiliar to the observer. Because of this, it is unknown how dynamics between familiar dogs may influence their likelihood of learning from each other. In this study, we tested dogs living together in two-dog households on whether individual dogs’ rivalry scores were associated with performance on a local enhancement task. Specifically, we wanted to know whether dog rivalry impacted whether an observer dog would approach a plate from which a demonstrator dog had eaten all available food, or whether the observer dog would approach the adjacent plate that still contained food. Dog rivalry scores were calculated using the Canine Behavioral Assessment and Research Questionnaire and indicated each dog’s tendency to engage aggressively with the other household dog. Low-rivalry dogs were more likely to approach the empty plate than high-rivalry dogs when the observer dog was allowed to approach the plates immediately after the demonstrator had moved out of sight. This difference between low- and high-rivalry dogs disappeared, however, when observer dogs had to wait 5 s before approaching the plates. The same pattern was observed during a control condition when a human removed the food from a plate. Compared to low-rivalry dogs, high-rivalry dogs may pay less attention to other dogs due to a low tolerance for having other dogs in close proximity.