青少年道德情绪判断与归因特点研究

运用情境故事考察246名青少年在犯过情境中的道德情绪判断与归因特点,以年龄、犯过类别、行为者意图结果的匹配关系为因素进行对数线性分析。结果表明：犯过类别、行为者意图结果的匹配关系对青少年道德情绪判断与归因存在重要影响,青少年道德情绪判断与归因上的年龄差异主要存在于12岁组和14岁以上组之间,12岁组的情绪判断较为单一,归因上以道德定向为主,而14岁以上组出现了更多复杂情绪判断及移情定向归因。     

道德情绪判断、错误信念与行为问题的关系——损人情境中幼儿反应的一项研究

运用投射性情境故事和Rutter量表(教师问卷)研究了204名幼儿对损人情境的道德情绪判断、错误信念水平、行为问题及其关系。结果表明:(1)男性幼儿的违纪行为显著高于女性,神经症行为得分在不同年龄之间差异达到显著性水平。(2)随年龄增长,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的人数会减少、而判断为消极的人数会增加,对失败损人者之情绪判断为消极的居多、而对成功损人者情绪判断为积极的为主。(3)幼儿已经基本能完成道德情境中的错误信念任务,当接受别人的"错误"表扬时会产生积极情绪。(4)未完成错误信念任务儿童的神经症得分显著高于完成者,对成功损人者之情绪判断为积极的儿童的神经症得分显著高于判断为消极者。     

诺布效应及其理论解释

诺布效应(Knobe effect)是指副作用的道德效价影响行为意图判断的现象——当副作用是好的时候, 人们认为行为实施者是无意图地引发该副作用; 当副作用是不好的时候, 人们则认为行为实施者是有意图的。Knobe等人认为现象的产生是由于人们的道德考虑影响了行为意图的判断; 其他的研究者则从心理偏见、意图语言的实用意义、主要目的与副作用间的利益-损失权衡等角度来解释该效应。通过对各研究的总结可以发现, 诺布效应以归因过程为基础, 显示了道德判断对心理理论的影响, 其潜在的机制很可能就是人们自动无意识加工的结果在之后有意识的理性加工过程中发挥了作用。意图直觉判断会影响道德判断, 而道德判断的直觉也会影响理性的意图分析过程。     

4-10岁儿童对结果与意图信息整合能力的研究

本研究采用情绪判断归因作业,考察了4—10岁儿童在中性动机情境中,对结果与意图信息的整合能力。结果表明：在结果与意图匹配情境中,儿童以积极的情绪判断为主;在结果与意图不匹配情境中,儿童以消极的情绪判断为主。而在对情绪判断进行归因时我国儿童采用了更多的标准,经统计分析表明,在中性动机情境中,4—10岁儿童都已具备了整合结果与意图信息的能力。     

幼儿在不同规范标准下的意图判断：“副作用”效应

在幼儿对主人公的行为意图做出判断后加入奖惩任务,用意图"有无"判断和星星分配的数量作为考察"副作用"效应的指标,探讨幼儿在不同规范标准下能否利用理性策略对主人公的心理状态进行推断。结果发现:(1)幼儿对带来积极和消极"副作用"的行为意图"有无"判断没有差异;(2)相比于消极"副作用",幼儿倾向于给带来积极"副作用"的行为者分配更多的星星作为奖励;(3)"副作用"效价对4、 5、 6岁幼儿分配行为的影响是一致的;(4)在道德规范标准和约定规范标准下,"副作用"效价对4、 5、 6岁幼儿分配行为的影响是一致的。结果表明:(1)使用星星分配数量作为指标考察幼儿的行为意图判断更敏感。(2)幼儿会把违背规范的行为推断为有意的,遵守规范的行为推断为无意的。且这种表现在4～6岁之间具有稳定性。不同规范标准下,幼儿的这一表现没有差异。(3)研究结果支持了意图判断"副作用"效应的理性推理观点。     

意图信息在物权判断和道德判断中的作用

意图会影响人们的道德判断，但尚不清楚意图在物权判断中的作用。本研究以156名非法学专业的大学生为被试，通过包含不同意图（恶意/善意/无意）的故事情景，考察了在损失求偿和获益分享情境中人们的物权判断和道德判断。结果发现，在损失求偿情境中，不管是出于善意、恶意还是无意，被试均判断行为者应当赔偿他人损失，但不认为善意和无意的行为者应受谴责。在获益分享情境中，被试仅认为善意的行为者应当分享给他人带来的收益且应当受赞扬，但不认为恶意和无意的行为者应当受到赞扬。综合来看，意图对常人物权判断和道德判断的影响不一致，物权判断比道德判断较少受意图信息的影响，涉及更多的理性思维，反映其具有领域特异性。     

行为意图与行为结果的匹配关系对儿童道德情绪判断及归因影响的实验研究

运用故事情境的临床访谈方法,考察了不同匹配情境对4-6岁儿童道德情绪判断及归因的影响.结果表明(1)当行为意图与行为结果匹配时,即便4岁幼儿也能做出正确的道德和情绪判断;当两者非匹配时,儿童的道德判断和情绪判断都不稳定;(2)在情绪归因过程中,年幼儿童以结果定向为主,年长儿童以意图定向为主;(3)4-6岁儿童在情绪判断任务中不存在年龄差异;(4)道德情境的冲突性因素影响了幼儿的道德情绪判断及归因.     

两种道德情境下中学生的自我与他人情绪判断

将246名中学生分为三个年龄组,运用情境故事考察其在犯过和亲社会道德情境下的自我与他人情绪判断。进行卡方检验发现,在犯过情境中,12岁组的自我和他人情绪判断均以消极情绪为主,14和16岁组的自我和他人情绪判断之间存在差异,表现为他们对犯过情境中损人者的情绪判断多为积极情绪,而对自己的情绪判断则多为消极情绪;在亲社会情境中,三个年龄组的自我和他人情绪判断之间不存在差异,多以积极情绪判断为主。     

父母教育焦虑和青少年情绪与行为问题的关系:父母消极教养方式的中介作用

本研究通过两个子研究,共选取1155名中小学生及其母亲或父亲作为被试,分别考察了母亲教育焦虑和父亲教育焦虑如何通过母亲和父亲消极教养方式对青少年情绪与行为问题产生影响。结果表明:(1)父亲和母亲教育焦虑均对青少年情绪与行为问题有显著正向预测作用;(2)父亲和母亲消极教养方式均在母亲教育焦虑和青少年情绪与行为问题关系中存在中介效应;(3)母亲消极教养方式在父亲教育焦虑和青少年情绪与行为问题关系中存在中介效应。     

青少年负性情绪事件性质判断偏向的情绪弹性和性别效应

研究以青少年学生为被试,采用测验和实验的方法考察了情绪弹性和性别变量对青少年在四类负性情绪事件性质的判断偏向上可能产生的影响。结果表明：（1）情绪弹性对青少年加工负性情绪事件信息时的判断偏向产生一定影响,低情绪弹性个体在面对与一般生活情境相关的负性情绪事件时,更倾向于从消极方面对事件的性质加以判断。（2）性别对青少年加工负性情绪事件信息时的判断偏向不产生实质性影响。     

Side-effect actions,acting for a reason,and acting intentionally

What is the relation between acting intentionally and acting for a reason? While this question has generated a considerable amount of debate in the philosophy of action, on one point there has been a virtual consensus: actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional. Recently, this consensus has been challenged by Joshua Knobe and Sean Kelly, who argue against it on the basis of empirical evidence concerning the ways in which ordinary speakers of the English language describe and explain certain side-effect actions. Knobe and Kelly's argument is of interest not only because it challenges a widely accepted philosophical thesis on the basis of experimental evidence, but also because it indirectly raises an important and largely neglected question, the question of whether or in what sense an agent can perform a side-effect action for a reason. In this article, I address this question and provide a positive answer to it. Specifically, I argue that agents act for a reason whenever they perform side-effect actions as trade-offs. Thus, I claim that there are three distinct types of rational action: actions performed as ends in themselves, actions performed as means to further ends, and side-effect actions performed as trade-offs. Given this multiplicity of types of rational action, the question of whether or not actions performed for a reason are necessarily intentional is in need of refinement. The more specific question that lies at the heart of this article is whether or not side-effect actions performed as trade-offs are necessarily intentional. I conclude that, contrary to what Knobe and Kelly suggest, the question remains open.     

“The Group Knobe Effect”: evidence that people intuitively attribute agency and responsibility to groups

In the current paper, we present and discuss a series of experiments in which we investigated people’s willingness to ascribe intentions, as well as blame and praise, to groups. The experiments draw upon the so-called “Knobe Effect”. Knobe [2003. “Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] found that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of actions influences people’s assessment of whether those side-effects were brought about intentionally, and also that people are more willing to assign blame for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise for positive side-effect of actions. Building upon this research, we found evidence that the positiveness or negativeness of side-effects of group actions influences people’s willingness to attribute intentions to groups (Experiment 1a), and that people are more willing to assign blame to groups for negative side-effects of actions than they are to assign praise to groups for positive side-effects of actions (Experiment 1b). We also found evidence (Experiments 2a, 2b, 3 and 4) that the “Group Knobe Effect” persists even when intentions and blame/praise are attributed to groups non-distributively, indicating that people tend not to think of group intentions and group blame/praise in distributive terms. We conclude that the folk are collectivist about group intentions, and also about the blameworthiness and praiseworthiness of groups.     

Intentional action and the frame-of-mind argument: new experimental challenges to Hindriks

Based on a puzzling pattern in our judgements about intentional action, Knobe [(2003). “Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language.” Analysis 63: 190–194] has claimed that these judgements are shaped by our moral judgements and evaluations. However, this claim goes directly against a key conceptual intuition about intentional action – the “frame-of-mind condition”, according to which judgements about intentional action are about the agent’s frame-of-mind and not about the moral value of his action. To preserve this intuition Hindriks [(2008). “Intentional Action and the Praise-Blame Asymmetry.” The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630–641; (2014). “Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives.” Mind & Language 29: 51–72] has proposed an alternate account of the Knobe Effect. According to his “Normative Reason account of Intentional Action”, a side-effect counts as intentional only when the agent thought it constituted a normative reason not to act but did not care. In this paper, I put Hindriks’ account to test through two new studies, the results of which suggest that Hindriks’ account should be rejected. However, I argue that the key conceptual insight behind Hindriks’ account can still be saved and integrated in future accounts of Knobe’s results.     

Harming is more intentional than helping because it is more probable: the underlying influence of probability on the Knobe effect

Knobe [2003. Intentional action and side effects in ordinary language. Analysis, 63, 190–194] demonstrated that people’s intentionality judgments in side effects depend on the outcome of the side-effect, indicating that people’s judgments of intentionality of action depend on not only the intention of the actor but also on the result of the action. However, on the basis of findings in judgment and decision making, the current study proposes another hypothesis to Knobe’s (2003) results: the participants’ intentionality judgments are related to not only the outcomes themselves but also the probabilities of outcomes predicted from the action. To test this hypothesis, the present study employed an identical experimental procedure to Knobe (2003), except that it required not only intentionality but also probability judgments for outcomes that resulted from the actions of a company president. The results replicated the findings of Knobe (2003) and showed a relationship between probability and intentionality judgment.     

心境对未来事件发生概率判断的影响

本研究采用短影片人为诱发心境的方法,用正性和负性两种情绪事件作为刺激材料,在控制人格变量的前提下,探讨了大学生在不同心境下对未来事件发生概率的判断中是否存在心境一致性效应。结果表明：（1）愉悦心境会增加做出积极判断的倾向,悲伤心境会增加做出消极判断的倾向;（2）无论是在愉悦心境还是在悲伤心境中,被试在对未来事件发生概率的判断上不存在性别差异。结果支持心境对未来事件发生概率判断有所影响,即诱发的心境与未来事件的效价存在一致性效应。     

Emotion Regulation and the Quality of Social Interaction: Does the Ability to Evaluate Emotional Situations and Identify Effective Responses Matter?

We examined self and friends' ratings of social relationship quality and everyday social interactions in 3 studies involving 544 college students in Germany, Spain, and the United States. Scores on a situational judgment test measuring strategic emotion regulation ability (SERA) were negatively related to conflict with others. SERA was more consistently and strongly related to conflict with others than to the positive dimension of relationship quality (support, companionship, and nurturance). The relationship between SERA and conflict was generally not mediated by trait positive or negative affect, and it remained significant or marginally significant controlling for the Big Five personality traits. These findings highlight the importance of the ability to evaluate emotional situations and identify effective responses to these in interpersonal emotion regulation. Furthermore, they suggest that situational judgment and flexible response selection may help people to manage conflicts more than to bond with others.     

Enough skill to kill: Intentionality judgments and the moral valence of action

Extant models of moral judgment assume that an action’s intentionality precedes assignments of blame. Knobe (2003b) challenged this fundamental order and proposed instead that the badness or blameworthiness of an action directs (and thus unduly biases) people’s intentionality judgments. His and other researchers’ studies suggested that blameworthy actions are considered intentional even when the agent lacks skill (e.g., killing somebody with a lucky shot) whereas equivalent neutral actions are not (e.g., luckily hitting a bull’s-eye). The present five studies offer an alternative account of these provocative findings. We suggest that people see the morally significant action examined in previous studies (killing) as accomplished by a basic action (pressing the trigger) for which an unskilled agent still has sufficient skill. Studies 1 through 3 show that when this basic action is performed unskillfully or is absent, people are far less likely to view the killing as intentional, demonstrating that intentionality judgments, even about immoral actions, are guided by skill information. Studies 4 and 5 further show that a neutral action such as hitting the bull’s-eye is more difficult than killing and that difficult actions are less often judged intentional. When difficulty is held constant, people’s intentionality judgments are fully responsive to skill information regardless of moral valence. The present studies thus speak against the hypothesis of a moral evaluation bias in intentionality judgments and instead document people’s sensitivity to subtle features of human action.     

Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect

The concept of acting intentionally is an important nexus where theory of mind and moral judgment meet. Preschool children's judgments of intentional action show a valence-driven asymmetry. Children say that a foreseen but disavowed side effect is brought about "on purpose" when the side effect itself is morally bad, but not when it is morally good. This is the first demonstration in preschoolers that moral judgment influences judgments of whether something was done on purpose (as opposed to judgments of purpose influencing moral judgment). Judgments of intentionality are usually assumed to be purely factual. That these judgments are sometimes partly normative-even in preschoolers-challenges current understanding. Young children's judgments regarding foreseen side effects depend on whether the children process the idea that the character does not care about the side effect. As soon as preschoolers effectively process the theory-of-mind concept "not care that P," children show the side-effect effect.     

青少年主观幸福感、心理健康及其与应对方式的关系

通过对广州地区1431名中学生进行问卷调查,考察青少年主观幸福感、心理健康状况及其与应对方式的关系.结果发现,(1)当前青少年学生的主观幸福感、心理健康状况总体上处于中等水平;(2)随着年级的升高,主观幸福感逐渐降低,成绩差的学生体验到的消极情感显著高于成绩中等和较好的学生;(3)男生的心理健康状况在整体上优于女生,年级和成绩也对心理健康有一定影响;(4)积极的应对方式有利于青少年主观幸福感和良好心理健康的发展,而消极的应对方式、尤其是消极情绪关注的应对方式不利于青少年的主观幸福感和心理健康.