“迷信”琐谈

看到4月11日《杂文报》7版凡夫唐的文章《我“迷信”吗》,我不禁哑然失笑,你又学习算命,又抽签拜神,还请道士招魂开路,超度亡灵……你要不算迷信,世上还有什么算迷信?《现代汉语词典》的“迷信”条的注解是:“1.信仰神仙鬼怪等,2.泛指盲目的信仰崇拜。”这两条你都够格,你是当今中国的标准迷信人。     

浅谈迷信与俗信

一、定义 所谓"迷信",指非理性、反科学、对个人与社会有直接危害的极端信仰,它以迷狂为特征,是巫术、宗教中有害成分的强化[1].迷信有广义和狭义之分.广义上的迷信是指不查事情的真伪而受迷惑,盲目地信仰或崇拜,其对象不限于鬼神,还包括迷信书本、古人等.狭义上的迷信是指相信占星、卜筮、风水、命相、鬼怪等,即是通称的封建迷信.     

中国特异功能迷信的文化分析

迷信是一个外延甚广的范畴。它包括相信星占、卜筮、风水、命相等一切缺乏理性实质的信仰或习俗,也包括对其他一切事物的非理性解释及崇拜。本文仅试图就中国传统乃至现代的特异功能迷信,进行一些文化分析。本文所论及的特异功能迷信,主要指对于某些人声称具有超常能力,包括所谓超常视觉、超常听力、用奇功异术求长生医病患及神秘预言能力不加怀疑的轻信。     

谈谈“迷信”

“迷信”这个词广泛地被人应用,大概不是从“文化大革命”之后开始的。虽然“破除迷信”是当时人们的口头禅,但是那多指“现代迷信”。其实,“破除迷信”已经是将近一百年的老生常谈了,迄今人们一听到自己不能相信的事物还喜欢用“迷信”二字驳斥对方,或指责对方的愚昧,而且还喜欢在前面加上“封建”二字,名曰“封建迷信”。要是你反问一句,“什么叫封建迷信?”他也许干瞪眼,说不出什么道道来。因为总爱指责别人搞迷信的人,往往迷信自己就是真理的化身。     

迷信、邪教之辨析

一、迷信内涵及其本质 迷信是指非理性的、无根据地盲目信仰和崇拜神仙鬼怪等超自然物的行为和思想,是“相信不该信的东西”。中国社会的迷信思想比较深厚。胡适说,中国百姓“天旱了,只会求雨;河决了,只会拜金龙大王;风浪大了,只会祷告观音菩萨或天后娘娘;荒年了,只好逃荒:瘟疫来了,只好闭门等死;病上身了,只好求神许愿”。迷信活动和迷信思想形形色色,古代有图腾崇拜、巫术、解梦鬼神、相术、占卜、算命、风水、拆字、祥异、择吉、符咒、求雨等等。 迷信的本质是非科学的,是愚昧无知的表现。迷信存在的原因是多方面的,有社会原因、认识原因和心理原因等等。 从历史角度分析,迷信思想、巫术意识是中国传统文化的一部分,有些思维方式不科学。何祚庥在《追踪到公审——胡万林事件采访内幕》中认为,“为什么反对伪科学有较大的阻力。中国社会的历史本来就是个封建社会,迷信思想本来就有比较深厚的传统。不仅在老百姓中,在相当一些干部里面,     

运气观念:诸种态度与迷信

乍看起来,"迷信"一词的用法使它不可能在人文科学中严格运用.这个词的涵义,即它的内涵带有强烈的主观性和消极色彩;至于它的外延即应用范围,则又很不确定,使它成为一个可以同随便什么东西拉扯在一起的概念.迷信的各种各样定义不但证明它带有极端的主观性——这些定义完全取决于界定者的观点——,而且突出了它的消极色彩:迷信是通过不存在之物,而不是通过存在之物来界定的.教士的定义——例如,普卢塔克以希腊教的名义,圣托马斯·阿奎那以基督教的名义——将迷信视为背离官方宗教,主要是在民间发展起来的左道旁门,不但曲解教义,而且空洞无稽."迷信"一词的拉丁词源Superstare,原意为"凌驾于某物之上"(所谓某物,不言     

417例城乡居民迷信观念与迷信行为调查

封建迷信是指带有封建社会印迹,以对超自然力量的盲目信仰与崇拜为基本特征的社会心理意识和行为活动方式。封建迷信大体可分为三个层次,即迷信观念、迷信行为和迷信活动。迷信观念是个体对于鬼神、命运、因果报应等的经验性理解和盲     

当前我国学生中的鬼神迷信思潮--河南省教育科学"十五"规划重点课题报告

这是一篇触目惊心的报告。其中关于中学生鬼神迷信思想的调查结果,说明了我国学生中的 鬼神迷信思想已发展到了建国以来最严重的时期。这一结果,远远超出了我们的预料。学生们问老 师: “科学世界观和无神论这么重要的内容为什么在大学课本里没有?”那么,我们接着要问:中学 课本里有吗?小学课本里有吗?有多少? 我们在这里再一次向有关部门呼吁:救救我们的孩子!帮帮我们的老师。理直气壮地向我们的孩子说一句:鬼神是不存在的,星座与个人的命运是没有关系的。     

社会转型时期鬼神迷信泛滥的原因与对策

改革开放以来,两个文明建设不断向前推进,科学精神逐步深入人心。但也应看到,某些地方鬼神迷信的沉渣假借科学和传统文化的名义重新泛起,在社会生活中严重泛滥。为什么鬼神迷信现象在我国社会转型,经济社会发展最好的时期表现得如此严重?本文就其根源与对策作以探讨。一、鬼神迷信现象是唯心主义有神论的必然反映鬼神观念是在人类长期的认知过程中产生出来的,开始仅是一种迷信而已,后来,人类社会的发展出现了阶级分化,占统治地位的剥削阶级思想家,为了维护自身的统治地位,将人们已有的迷信思想加以理论化和系统化,并进而产生出了有神论。有…     

警惕迷信宣传品的新动向

信一:说明书中夹带的迷信宣传品 　　科学与无神论编辑部: 　　我是国家机关一名退休职工,前不久在本市一家挺信得过的药店买了一盒&;#215;&;#215;宝(按:妇科保健药品).心想,就凭这家药店的名声,相信不会出什么问题.打开药盒,和说明书放在一起的,是一张宣传品.那宣传品上,印的是十二生肖和人的性格、婚姻、工作以及命运的关系.谁都知道,这已经是上千年以前的迷信了,这些年又有所抬头,但却想不到它会被夹在药品中推销.生肖只有十二个,中国人却有十几亿,差不多一个生肖都有一亿人,难道他们的性格、命运都一样吗?我不知这家药厂是怎么想的,这样做对他们药品的销售有什么好处?……     

If You Can't Change What You Believe,You Don't Believe It

I develop and defend the view that subjects are necessarily psychologically able to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Specifically, subjects can revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence, given their current psychological mechanisms and skills. If a subject lacks this ability, then the mental state in question is not a belief, though it may be some other kind of cognitive attitude, such as a supposition, an entertained thought, or a pretense. The result is a moderately revisionary view of belief: while most mental states we thought were beliefs are beliefs, some mental states which we thought were beliefs are not beliefs. The argument for this view draws on two key claims: First, subjects are rationally obligated to revise their beliefs in response to relevant counter-evidence. Second, if some subject is rationally obligated to revise one of her mental states, then that subject can revise that mental state, given her current psychological mechanisms and skills. Along the way to defending these claims, I argue that rational obligations can govern activities which reflect on one's rational character, whether or not those activities are under one's voluntary control. I also show how the relevant version of epistemic ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ survives an objection which plagues other variants of the principle.     

Every Breath You Take,Every Move You Make

Slow Reckoning: The Ecology of a Divided Planet by Tom Athanasiou, published by Seeker &; Warburg, London, 1997, 385 pp., £12.99 (published in the United States as Divided Planet: The Ecology of Rich and Poor, by Little, Brown &; Company, New York, 1996, $25).     

How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had

Norman forms the belief that the president is in New York by way of a clairvoyance faculty he doesn’t know he has. Many agree that his belief is unjustified but disagree about why it is unjustified. I argue that the lack of justification cannot be explained by a higher‐level evidence requirement on justification, but it can be explained by a no‐defeater requirement. I then explain how you can use cognitive faculties you don’t know you have. Lastly, I use lessons from the foregoing to compare Norman's belief, formed by clairvoyance, with Sally's theistic belief, formed by a sensus divinitatis.     

The You Turn

This introductory paper sets out a framework for approaching some of the claims about the second person made by the papers collected in the special edition of Philosophical Explorations on The Second Person (2014, 17:3). It does so by putting centre stage the notion of a ‘bipolar second person relation’, and examining ways of giving it substance suggested by the authors of these papers. In particular, it focuses on claims made (and denied) in these papers (a) about the existence and/or nature of second person thought, second person reasons for action and second person reasons for belief and (b) about possible connections among thought-theoretical, ethical and epistemological issues and debates in this area.     

You and me

Are there distinctively second-personal thoughts? I clarify the question and present considerations in favour of a view on which some second-personal thoughts are distinctive. Specifically, I suggest that some second-personal thoughts are distinctive in also being first-personal thoughts. Thus, second-personal thinking provides a way of sharing another person's first-personal thoughts.