Sense of reality,reality testing and reality processing in borderline patients1

Although borderline patients are suitable for it, they often undergo repeated testing of phantasies against objective reality without success. A reason for these partial failures is that subjects have not been able to build a solid sense of reality and have found many diffi culties for processing reality demands and possibilities. The author puts forward some thoughts on this question, such as the importance of working through the depressive position and the Oedipus complex in the process of building up a solid sense of reality. A sense of reality also favours continuous reality processing. When reality processing becomes as continuous as life itself, the repetition of individual reality tests becomes less frequent and necessary, and more satisfying. The author also presents some recommendations for the psychoanalytic treatment of such patients, stressing the importance and the diffi culties of the introduction of the borderline patient into the triangular situation because primitive defences‐such as disavowal and denial‐are mobilized.     

How the eye measures reality and virtual reality

If virtual reality systems are to make good on their name, designers must know how people perceive space in natural environments, in photographs, and in cinema. Perceivers understand the layout of a cluttered natural environment through the use of nine or more sources of information, each based on different assumptions—occlusion, height in the visual field, relative size, relative density, aerial perspective, binocular disparities, accommodation, convergence, and motion perspective. The relative utility of these sources at different distances is compared, using their ordinal depth-threshold functions. From these, three classes of space around a moving observer are postulated: personal space, action space, and vista space. Within each, a smaller number of sources act in consort, with different relative strengths. Given the general ordinality of the sources, these spaces are likely to be affine in character, stretching and collapsing with viewing conditions. One of these conditions is controlled by lens length in photography and cinematography or by field-of-view commands in computer graphics. These have striking effects on many of these sources of information and, consequently, on how the layout of a scene is perceived.     

Appearance and reality

There is tension between the appealing idea that visual experience puts us in touch with objective reality and the doctrine of perceptual relativity, the claim that experience varies with such factors as distance, lighting, and angle of view. In this paper I present arguments for relativity, and then go on to propose that in view of relativity, we should believe that the properties presented to us in perception are relational and viewpoint‐dependent. I conclude by sketching a theory of how we nonetheless manage to achieve contact with objective properties. According to the theory, such contact is best explained in terms of perceptual representations acting in concert with cognitive and motoric representations, not in terms of perceptual representations alone.     

Countertransference and reality

The psychoanalytic situation provides many opportunities for people to observe their analysts closely. These observations are inevitably woven into the fabric of patients’ transference experience. Because the observations can be uncomfortable for the analyst, there is a constant temptation to ignore or deny the plausibility of patients’ perceptions. They can be, and often are, quickly reinterpreted as derivatives of sexual or aggressive urges. Psychoanalytic drive theory, with its emphasis on impulse rather than observation as the force behind transference experience, can encourage counter‐transferential disclaimers and lead to blind spots. Some technical suggestions are offered to avoid this tendency and are based on a relational understanding of the nature of transference.     

Memory and reality

Although it may be disconcerting to contemplate, true and false memories arise in the same way. Memories are attributions that we make about our mental experiences based on their subjective qualities, our prior knowledge and beliefs, our motives and goals, and the social context. This article describes an approach to studying the nature of these mental experiences and the constructive encoding, revival, and evaluative processes involved (the source monitoring framework). Cognitive behavioral studies using both objective (e.g., recognition, source memory) and subjective (e.g., ratings of memory characteristics) measures and neuroimaging findings are helping to clarify the complex relation between memory and reality. ((c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).     

Metamemory and reality monitoring

Metamemory judgements and reality monitoring judgements were compared for real and imagined stimuli. Line drawings of everyday items were either perceived or imagined in differing ratios, to (a) investigate people's ability to predict the class of item that would be better recalled (Judgements of Learning, JOL), and the class of item which would be better sourced (Judgements of Source, JOS) in a future recall test, and (b) test the hypothesis that participants would show a bias towards calling remembered items real when the source had been forgotten. Although participants' JOLs indicated that they believed real items would be more memorable than imagined, in both experiments a larger proportion of items from either class (real or imagined) was only recalled when presentation modality was less frequent for that class. By contrast, JOSs were no different for real or imagined items, even though source attribution was more accurate for real than imagined items. An attribution of memories to real rather than to imagined events that often occurs when participants are unsure about the source (labelled a ‘bias towards the real’) was due to phenomenological qualities of the memories. The results are discussed in terms of Johnson and Raye's ( 1981 ) reality‐monitoring model. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.