Intentionality Analysis and the Problem of Self and Other

Dennett recounts an alarm clock dream which he experienced as taking a long time even though the alarm presumably sounded for only a short time. His explanation of this paradoxical behavior of time in dreams is that there actually is no dream experience but that unexperienced dreams are composed directly into memory banks and are subsequently played back on awakening. I critique Dennett's theory of dreams in Heideggerian terms on the grounds that he takes temporality in a common-sense superficial way. I review Heidegger's theory of time and using Dennett's own dream show that “temporality temporalizes itself' in dreams too as a free production of dreaming Dasein. Dream time is what dreaming temporality produces whatever the clocks of waking show, and is entirely consistent with authentic dream experience. An appreciation of the process of dreaming temporality temporalizing itself supports Heidegger's concept of temporality as an a priori of Dasein's Being.     

Animality in Lacan and Derrida: the Deconstruction of the Other

In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida’s last seminar, Derrida criticizes Lacan for making no room for animality in the Other, in the unconscious transindividual normativity of language. In this paper, I take into account the history of Derrida’s interactions with Lacan’s psychoanalysis to argue that Derrida’s early agreement with Lacan’s conception of subjectivity as split by the signifier gives place in his late thought to a deconstruction of Lacan’s fall into humanist metaphysics, which makes a sharp moral distinction between the animal and the human in order to subordinate animals to the domination of mankind.     

On the Existence of Duties to the Self (and Their Significance for Moral Philosophy)

Contemporary philosophers generally ignore the topic of duties to the self. I contend that they are mistaken to do so. The question of whether there are such duties, I argue, is of genuine significance when constructing theories of practical reasoning and moral psychology. In this essay, I show that much of the potential importance of duties to the self stems from what has been called the “second‐personal” character of moral duties—the fact that the performance of a duty is “owed to” someone. But this is problematic, as there is reason to doubt whether a person can genuinely owe to herself the performance of an action. Responding to this worry, I show that temporal divisions within an agent's life enable her to relate to herself second‐personally, in the way required by morality. The upshots, I argue, are that we need an intra‐personal theory of justice that specifies the extent of a person's authority over herself, and that we need to rethink our theories of moral emotions in order to specify how an individual ought to respond to attacks on her interests and autonomy that she herself perpetrates.     

Hegel: Death of God and Recognition of the Self

Abstract

This paper covers the theme of the death of God considered from a Hegelian standpoint. For Aristotle, the image of God as ‘thought thinking itself’ was an image of the knowledge aspired to in philosophy. With the notion of God becoming man and his insistence on the icon of the Cross, Hegel challenged the Aristotelian goal of philosophy as immutable knowledge of an ‘ultimate’ reality. Hegel viewed the crisis of normativity (the death of the Cartesian divine guarantor) as strictly linked to the conception of the self. It is Nietzsche who is best known for alluding to the full significance of this image for modern life, but Hegel’s thought on the complex relations of philosophy and religion in the modern world can be regarded as an attempt to think through this same historical phenomenon. In this paper, I focus on the philosophical relevance of Hegel’s notion of the death of God. I argue that unpacking the significance of the ‘truths’ presented symbolically in modern Christianity is crucial in understanding the requirements that an idealistic philosophy must meet.     

Solving the (Real) Other Minds Problem

People care about others’ thoughts, feelings, and intentions but can have considerable difficulty reading others’ minds accurately. Recent advances in understanding how people make such inferences provide significant insight into when people are likely to be reasonably accurate mind readers and when they are not. People tend to reason about others’ mental states by starting with their own and only subsequently adjusting that egocentric default to accommodate differences between themselves and others. Such adjustments tend to be insufficient, rendering final estimates egocentrically biased. When more information about others is available, people tend to rely on existing stereotypes or other expectations to intuit others’ mental states. Systematic errors resulting either from excessive egocentrism or inaccurate expectations can lead to miscommunication, misunderstanding, and social conflict, but these biases also suggest useful strategies for improving mind reading in everyday life.     

The Atomistic Self versus the Holistic Self in Structural Relation to the Other

I argue that meaning or significanceper se, along with the capacity to be conscious thereof, and the values, motives and aspirations, etc. central to the constitution of our intrinsic personal identities, arise, as indeed do our extrinsic social identities, and our very self-consciousness as such, from socio-cultural structures and relations to others. However, so far from our identities and behavior therefore being determined, I argue that the capacity for critical reflection and evaluation emerge from these same structural relations, the more complex and quintessentially human aspects of our behavior being explained not in terms of responses to stimuli but as choices reflecting our evaluation of meaningful or significant alternatives. Finally I provide theoretical grounds for accepting the existence of other subjects and give a holistic, as opposed to a dialectical, account of the way individuals may challenge and change the very socio-cultural ways of relating to and interacting with others so central to constituting their capacities and identities.     

从康德到黑格尔：罗伯特·布兰顿的语用学语言哲学

哈贝马斯在本文中系统评价了布兰顿在《清晰阐释》中所阐发的语言哲学,称之为理论哲学中的里程碑.哈贝马斯认为布兰顿在形式语用学与推理语义学之间实现了富有创新性的关联,清晰地阐明了自我理解.这里选录的两节首先在总体上描述布兰顿方法的特征,讨论了他将形式语用学和推理语义学的富有创新性的结合,其次讨论了这样一个问题:为什么我们会对我们言说的内容要求客观有效性--此问题被布兰顿视为核心问题.     

On the Very Idea of Continental (or for that Matter Anglo–American) Philosophy

For most of the past century, philosophers on the Continent and those in the United States and Britain have taken themselves to be working in very different, even mutually exclusive, philosophical traditions. Although that may have been true until recently, it is no longer so. This piece surveys ten different proposed distinctions that have been offered between the two traditions, and it shows that none of them works, as there are major thinkers on both sides of each proposed distinction that do not neatly fit the proposal. The upshot of this is that it no longer makes sense to uphold the idea of two traditions, and that it is time we all dropped the mutual suspicion and denigration that have characterized relationships between us for the past hundred years.     

Cultural Differences in the Self: From Philosophy to Psychology and Neuroscience

Different thinking styles in Westerners and Chinese (analytic vs. holistic) lead to disparities between the two cultures not only in perception and attention but also in high‐level social cognition such as self‐representation. Most Western philosophers discussed the self by focusing on personal self‐identity, whereas Chinese philosophers emphasized the relation between the self and others. Dissimilar philosophical thinking of the self is associated with distinct cognitive styles of self‐representation (i.e., the independent self in Westerners and the interdependent self in Chinese). Recent brain imaging studies found that Westerners employed the medial prefrontal cortex to represent only the individual self, whereas Chinese utilized the same brain area to represent both the self and close others, providing neural basis of cultural differences in self‐representation. We suggest that the cultural differences in thinking styles between Westerners and Chinese influence both psychological and neural structure of self‐representation.     

On the Divide: Analytic and Continental Philosophy of Music

On offer here is a tradition‐neutral way of understanding the distinction between analytic and continental philosophy of music. The distinction is drawn in terms of methodology, rather than content, by identifying contrasting methodological tendencies of each tradition—initial maneuvers that frame an investigation, which are related to one another insofar as they involve, or do not involve, two kinds of methodological detachment. These maneuvers are extracted through a consideration of contrasting pairs of examples. The pairs consist of an analytic and a continental account of a core issue in the philosophy of music. The issues considered are musical experience, musical ontology, and the relationship between music and the emotions. The philosophers considered are Roger Scruton and Pierre Bourdieu, Jerrold Levinson and Lydia Goehr, Peter Kivy, and Andrew Bowie.     

Francis J. Ambrosio (ed.), The Question of Christian Philosophy Today (Perspectives in Continental Philosophy,No. 9)

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Reference to Self and Other in the Digital Public Sphere: The Case of Political Blogs

In this paper, we analyze how a political blog author (Spanish Alejo Vidal-Quadras) establishes the reference to self and other in his blog entries. We furthermore look into how the commentators to this blog react and establish reference to self and other in the digital public sphere. More concretely, we show that they not only take up the references established by the main blog author but also create new references. These allow, on the one hand, for profiling themselves as part of a group and, on the other hand, identifying their interlocutor among the variety of possible interlocutors in the digital public sphere. By addressing different interlocutors, the commentators turn the comments section into a dialogic space, a dimension that is lacking in the main blog entries. However, the fact that they almost invariably identify interlocutors other than Vidal-Quadras but address Vidal-Quadras without explicitly identifying him, shows that Vidal-Quadras remains the main ratified interlocutor in view of his ownership of the blog. This paper shows then how participants in the digital public sphere create a complex relationship of self and other reference in political blogs.