From the fixity of the past to the fixity of the independent

There is an old but powerful argument for the claim that exhaustive divine foreknowledge is incompatible with the freedom to do otherwise. A crucial ingredient in this argument is the principle of the “Fixity of the Past” (FP). A seemingly new response to this argument has emerged, the so-called “dependence response,” which involves, among other things, abandoning FP for an alternative principle, the principle of the “Fixity of the Independent” (FI). This paper presents three arguments for the claim that FI ought to be preferred to FP.

     

Manipulation Arguments and the Freedom to do Otherwise

I provide a manipulation‐style argument against classical compatibilism—the claim that freedom to do otherwise is consistent with determinism. My question is simple: if Diana (the designer) really gave Ernie (the designed) free will, why isn't she worried that he won't use it precisely as she would like? Diana's non‐nervousness, I argue, indicates Ernie's non‐freedom. Arguably, the intuition that Ernie lacks freedom to do otherwise is stronger than the direct intuition that he is simply not responsible; this result highlights the importance of the denial of the principle of alternative possibilities for compatibilist theories of responsibility. Along the way, I clarify the dialectical role and structure of “manipulation arguments”, and compare the manipulation argument I develop with the more familiar Consequence Argument. I contend that the two arguments are importantly mutually supporting and reinforcing. The result: classical compatibilists should be nervous—and if PAP is true, all compatibilists should be nervous.     

Genetic modification and genetic determinism

In this article we examine four objections to the genetic modification of human beings: the freedom argument, the giftedness argument, the authenticity argument, and the uniqueness argument. We then demonstrate that each of these arguments against genetic modification assumes a strong version of genetic determinism. Since these strong deterministic assumptions are false, the arguments against genetic modification, which assume and depend upon these assumptions, are therefore unsound. Serious discussion of the morality of genetic modification, and the development of sound science policy, should be driven by arguments that address the actual consequences of genetic modification for individuals and society, not by ones propped up by false or misleading biological assumptions.     

Just How Correct is Political Correctness? A Critique of the Opposition's Arguments

I begin by examining three factors which enable the term political correctness (hereafter PC) itself to feed into the hands of its opponents: namely, the trivialization of the actual issues which are attributed to PC, the villainization of those involved in the PC movement, and the conferring of a sense of legitimacy on the opposition movement.The bulk of the paper provides a detailed summary and critique of every single articulated Canadian position I encountered against such PC measures as fair language policies. I have distinguished between arguments directed at the ideological content and the methodology of PC. Arguments directed at the ideological content are divided into the threat to freedom of expression argument, the threat to academic freedom argument, and the degeneration into triviality argument; arguments directed at the methdology are divided into the argument that PC commits the very evils that it addresses and the argument that PC uses unjust means to get its way.The paper ends by claiming that if PC means minimizing sexual and racial harrassment, discourgaing homophobic, racist, and sexist discourse within educational settings, and curtailing policies which victimize oppressed groups, then political correctness is not merely correct, but morally obligatory as well.     

论医学伦理学的自主性原则

医学伦理学的自主性原则是对个人的自主和自由的尊重,其核心是对人权的尊重,包含有知情同意、保密、隐私等具体规则。自主性原则是根源于西方强调个性自由和选择的自由主义道德传统,我国古代哲人也提出过相近乃至相同的看法。     

The Possibility of Religion in a Scientific and Secular Culture

Abstract

In this article religion is defmed in terms of our concern for the fulfilment of our most fundamental natural desires, especially those that seem beyond all human power to fulfil, such as the achievement of death-transcending life or a complete and enduring community between free beings such as human persons are. A god is always seen as the source of power sufficient to achieve this in us. Our conceptions of our god and of human nature are therefore always linked. The arguments for the existence of a god in the history of European philosophy show this. From the cosmological arguments of pre-modern times, through arguments from design and anthropological arguments in the modern period, to a contemporary argument from interpersonal relationships, a deepening insight into human nature produces an ever more comprehensive conception of a god, one that is not incompatible with a scientific world-view, or the secular rejection of the supernatural in the name of human freedom.     

Five arguments on the rationality of suicide terrorists

This is a critical review of five arguments against the scholarly consensus that individual suicide terrorists are rational actors. The first three arguments are analytic, meaning that they hold that suicide terrorism is inherently irrational, based on assumptions regarding the nature of the perpetrators' interests as individuals. The fourth argument is empirical, based on alleged evidence of suicide terrorist psychopathology. And the fifth argument is pragmatic, based on the strategic implications of ‘conceding’ the status of rationality to enemies. This article highlights weaknesses in these arguments and considers assessing the rationality of suicide terrorists by measuring their act to cultural or community goals subject to a division of labor principle.     

Therapeutic jurisprudence and the resolution of value conflicts: what we can realistically expect, in practice, from theory

This article assesses the criticisms of therapeutic jurisprudence that it cannot resolve value conflicts, especially between autonomy rights and therapeutic values, or, less radically, that it has not provided a general method for resolving conflicts. Grounded in general jurisprudential principles about conflict resolution, including novel developments respecting the meaning of weighing and balancing, the article rejects the criticisms as unfounded. The article also develops and critiques arguments maintaining that therapeutic jurisprudence cannot resolve certain value conflicts because the values are incommensurable. The argument is illustrated by examples concerning the right to refuse treatment, and jurisprudential analyses of that right.     

Moral Arguments in the Debate over Nanotechnologies: Are We Talking Past Each Other?

How are we to understand the fact that the philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological development? With this issue as its starting point, the study reported on here, intended to further comprehension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of what is being said through the appeals made to this or that principle in the range of arguments put forward in publications on the subject. We present the results of the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay out the seven categories of argument that emerged from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity, autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present the background moral stances that support each category of argument. Identifying the different categories of argument and the moral stance that underlies each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the tendency towards talking past each other that all too often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implications of the moral arguments deployed in the debate over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce the confusion observable in these exchanges and contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their current unproductiveness.     

Respect for autonomy and medical paternalism reconsidered

We offer a critique of one prominent understanding of the principle of respect for autonomy and of analyses of medical paternalism based on that understanding. Our main critique is that understanding respect for autonomy as respect for freedom from interference is mistaken because it is overly influenced by ‘four-alarm’ cases, because it fails to appreciate the full dimensions of legal self-determination (one of its main sources), because it conflates the research and therapeutic settings, and because it fails to appreciate themes of authority and power that have historically shaped the principle of respect for freedom from interference. We argue that respect for autonomy involves more than just freedom from interference and, on this basis, offer a critique of prevailing accounts of medical paternalism.     

Sexual Justice and the Sceptical Feminist

ABSTRACT The article considers various arguments put forward, on the subject of 'sexual justice', by Janet Radcliffe Richards in her book, The Sceptical Feminist: a Philosophical Enquiry. These arguments rest upon a version of 'the difference principle', and owe much to the exposition of this principle by John Rawls. It is argued that Radcliffe Richards fails to support her argument for sexual justice by reference to the difference principle. Indeed, it is argued that reliance by Radcliffe Richards upon this principle vitiates her advocacy of sexual justice. The article concludes by putting forward an obvious alternative to the difference principle; and with a suggestion as to why Radcliffe Richards fails to acknowledge the strength of this alternative.     

The diversity principle in the testing of arguments

According to the diversity principle of scientific reasoning, hypotheses receive greater confirmation when they are supported by diverse rather than similar sets of data. This article examines whether people reason like intuitive scientists by conforming to the diversity principle in the testing of arguments. The results of two experiments demonstrate that people do indeed conform to the diversity principle by choosing a set of diverse rather than similar premises to test the conclusion of an argument. These findings are discussed in terms of the different reasoning processes involved in argument evaluation, argument testing, and rule discovery.     

Challenging the bioethical application of the autonomy principle within multicultural societies

This article critically re-examines the application of the principle of patient autonomy within bioethics. In complex societies such as those found in North America and Europe health care professionals are increasingly confronted by patients from diverse ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds. This affects the relationship between clinicians and patients to the extent that patients' deliberations upon the proposed courses of treatment can, in various ways and to varying extents, be influenced by their ethnic, cultural, and religious commitments. The principle of patient autonomy is the main normative constraint imposed upon medical treatment. Bioethicists typically appeal to the principle of patient autonomy as a means for generally attempting to resolve conflict between patients and clinicians. In recent years a number of bioethicists have responded to the condition of multiculturalism by arguing that the autonomy principle provides the basis for a common moral discourse capable of regulating the relationship between clinicians and patients in those situations where patients' beliefs and commitments do or may contradict the ethos of biomedicine. This article challenges that claim. I argue that the precise manner in which the autonomy principle is philosophically formulated within such accounts prohibits bioethicists' deployment of autonomy as a core ideal for a common moral discourse within multicultural societies. The formulation of autonomy underlying such accounts cannot be extended to simply assimilate individuals' most fundamental religious and cultural commitments and affiliations per se. I challenge the assumption that respecting prospective patients' fundamental religious and cultural commitments is necessarily always compatible with respecting their autonomy. I argue that the character of some peoples' relationship with their cultural or religious community acts to significantly constrain the possibilities for acting autonomously. The implication is clear. The autonomy principle may be presently invalidly applied in certain circumstances because the conditions for the exercise of autonomy have not been fully or even adequately satisfied. This is a controversial claim. The precise terms of my argument, while addressing the specific application of the autonomy principle within bioethics, will resonate beyond this sphere and raises questions for attempts to establish a common moral discourse upon the ideal of personal autonomy within multicultural societies generally.     

Three Arguments For Scientific Freedom

The principle of scientific freedom is usually taken forgranted; few attempts have been made to justify it systematically. The present paper discusses three “classic” arguments, which are used to justify this principle. However, it will become clear that (a) each argument refers to a different understanding of science and therefore justifies a different type of science, and that (b) each of them is based on assumptions which are not always consistent with the social reality of scientific research; the profound changes science has undergone since its inception are not sufficiently taken into account.     

Drugs, Morality and the Law

Arguments for and against the legal prohibition of drugs are surveyed. Various kinds of argument are identified and analysed: arguments against prohibition from a moral right to personal liberty; utilitarian and contractualist arguments for a right to personal liberty; arguments for prohibition from liberty–limiting principles (the harm principle, legal paternalism, legal moralism, Kantian duties to oneself, legal perfectionism, traditional conservatism, and communitarianism); utilitarian argument for prohibition; utilitarian argument against prohibition. It is concluded that none of the arguments for drug prohibition is convincing.     

Two types of debunking arguments

Debunking arguments are arguments that seek to undermine a belief or doctrine by exposing its causal origins. Two prominent proponents of such arguments are the utilitarians Joshua Greene and Peter Singer. They draw on evidence from moral psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary theory in an effort to show that there is something wrong with how deontological judgments are typically formed and with where our deontological intuitions come from. They offer debunking explanations of our emotion-driven deontological intuitions and dismiss complex deontological theories as products of confabulatory post hoc rationalization. Through my discussion of Greene and Singer’s empirically informed debunking of deontology, I introduce the distinction between two different types of debunking arguments. The first type of debunking argument operates through regular undercutting defeat, whereas the second type relies on higher-order evidence. I argue that the latter type of debunking argument, of which the argument from confabulation is an example, is objectionably sloppy and therefore inadmissible in academic discussion.     

Post-Soviet academia and class power: Belarusian controversy over symbolic markets

The article demonstrates that post-Soviet academic debates about theoretical concepts and visions of truth can be usefully interpreted in terms of different “class positions” of knowledge producers. One academic faction is interested in academic freedom, autonomy, and corporate solidarity, as the social and cultural capitals of its members are involved with the global symbolic market. The capitals of the other group are invested into the slightly modified Soviet academic system and local symbolic fields. Intellectuals necessarily are aligned with more powerful social actors and thus become involved in divisions and struggles that they cannot escape.     

Autonomy,Vote Buying,and Constraining Options

A common argument used to defend markets in ‘contested commodities’ is based on the value of personal autonomy. (1) Autonomy is of great moral value; (2) removing options from a person's choice set would compromise her ability to exercise her autonomy; (3) hence, there should be a prima facie presumption against removing options from persons’ choice sets; (4) thus, the burden of proof lies with those who wish to prohibit markets in certain goods. Christopher Freiman has developed a version of this argument to defend markets in votes. I argue that Freiman's argument fails, and that its failure illustrates the falsity of the widespread claim that the more options a person has available to her the better able she will be to exercise her autonomy. In Part 1, I outline Freiman's argument from ‘the presumption of voter liberty’ for legalising markets in votes. In Part 2, I argue that the option to sell one's vote in a legal market for them would be a ‘constraining option’ – an option which, if chosen, would be likely to lead to a diminution in a person's future ability to exercise her autonomy. In Part 3, I respond to objections to my arguments.     

Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide from Confucian Moral Perspectives

This essay first discusses the three major arguments in favor of euthanasia and physician-assisted-suicide in contemporary Western society, viz., the arguments of mercy, preventing indignity, and individual autonomy. It then articulates both Confucian consonance and dissonance to them. The first two arguments make use of Confucian discussions on suicide whereas the last argument appeals to Confucian social-political thought. It concludes that from the Confucian moral perspectives, none of the three arguments is fully convincing.     

An affirmed self and an open mind: Self-affirmation and sensitivity to argument strength

Self-affirmation seems to enable an individual to objectively evaluate information that would otherwise evoke a defensive reaction. If this objectivity reflects freedom from self-evaluative concerns, affirmation should sensitize people to central cues of a persuasive message, like argument strength. If affirmation simply induces agreeableness or trivializes the issue, affirmed participants should not particularly heed argument strength. Affirmed and non-affirmed participants rated the persuasiveness of pro- and counterattitudinal arguments that varied in strength. Among participants who rated their attitudes as personally important, self-affirmation decreased bias and increased sensitivity to argument strength, as predicted by self-affirmation theory.