A philosophical reflection on the epistemology and methodology of indigenous psychologies

In order to answer the three crucial questions (why, what and how) about the development of indigenous psychology, three levels of breakthrough need to be made, namely, philosophical reflection, theoretical construction and empirical research. The controversial issues that have occurred in the earlier development of indigenous psychology are analyzed in terms of the switch in Western philosophy of science from positivism to post-positivism. Based on this analysis, it is argued that indigenous psychologists should construct formal theories illustrating the functioning of the human mind that may be applicable to various cultures, and then use these theories to study the particular mentalities of people in a given culture with the scientific methods of empirical research.     

Is there a problem with mathematical psychology in the eighteenth century? A fresh look at Kant's old argument

Common opinion ascribes to Immanuel Kant the view that psychology cannot become a science properly so called, because it cannot be mathematized. It is equally common to claim that this reflects the state of the art of his times; that the quantification of the mind was not achieved during the eighteenth century, while it was so during the nineteenth century; or that Kant's so-called "impossibility claim" was refuted by nineteenth-century developments, which in turn opened one path for psychology to become properly scientific. These opinions are often connected, but they are misguided nevertheless. In Part I, I show how the issue of a quantification of the mind was discussed before Kant, and I analyze the philosophical considerations both of pessimistic and optimistic authors. This debate reveals a certain progress, although it remains ultimately undecided. In Part II, I present actual examples of measuring the mind in the eighteenth century and analyze their presuppositions. Although these examples are limited in certain ways, the common view that there was no such measurement is wrong. In Part III, I show how Kant's notorious " impossibility claim" has to be viewed against its historical background. He not only accepts actual examples of a quantitative treatment of the mind, but also takes steps toward an explanation of their possibility. Thus, he does not advance the claim that the mind as such cannot be mathematized. His claim is directed against certain philosophical assumptions about the mind, assumptions shared by a then-dominating, strongly introspectionist conception of psychology. This conception did and could not provide an explanation of the possibility of quantifying the mind. In concluding, I reflect on how this case study helps to improve the dispute over when and why psychology became a science.     

It's Time We Brought Introspection Out of the Closet

ABSTRACT— I identify the main reasons why introspection unofficially has been banned from the field for some 100 years, though it has been partly smuggled back in through the use of "verbal (self-) reports." I then show why introspection is indispensable to psychology. I argue that this ban has retarded the progress of psychology by taking attention away from the problem of the accuracy of self-reports, limiting our understanding of concepts like emotion, discouraging psychologists from using introspection themselves, and ignoring the study of how to develop introspective skill. I conclude by suggesting some approaches to validating introspective reports.     

Fragmentation or Differentiation: Questioning the Crisis in Psychology

There is a recurrent discourse about the fragmentation of psychology and its crises as a science, which often leads to a disenchanted view about its future. To this discourse we oppose a developmental one, in which crises can be occasions for development, and in which development might imply differentiation. We first review why psychology can be said to be in crisis. We then situate the crisis in the pragmatics of doing psychology. Crises occur when psychologists have problems either working with other psychologists or with communities. We argue that collaborative research is a way to overcome these crises. Specifically we suggest three specific scientific activities that can lead to the development of psychology: collaborative research methods, the identification of nodal concepts that enable the bringing together of different approaches and disciplines, and the creation and maintenance of institutional spaces that enable creative, collaborative work.

Political goals versus scientific truths: a response to Jackson (2003)

Three fundamental issues separate Jackson's (2003) methodological views from mine. One, whereas he believes an absolute moral view can prevail in a democracy, I assume moral pluralism is an inevitable byproduct of an open society. Two, Jackson feels that psychology can identify a correct moral position, whereas I postulate natural science psychology is only capable of revealing the empirical consequences of competing social policies and their moral implications. Three, Jackson espouses a politically active psychology that from my perspective is antithetical to a democratic and scientific ethic. In sum, Jackson's coupling of science with political advocacy will lead to a mistrust of psychology that will deny a democracy the opportunity to base its social policies on reliable psychological information.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.     

Elaborate reflections on a simple manifesto

In an earlier article (^{McFall, 1991}), I urged clinical psychologists to work toward the goal of integrating science and practice and proposed the adoption of a principle and two corollaries aimed at achieving this goal. In general, I argued that all aspects of clinical psychology must be guided by the highest scientific and ethical standards, that clinical practice be limited to empirically supported procedures, and that clinical training be devoted to producing clinical scientists. In the present article, I elaborate and defend these points by offering reflections on a number of submitted questions provoked by the earlier article. I address four major issues: the philosophical foundations for a scientific epistemology, the implications of this epistemology for clinical practice, the implications for clinical training, and the likely impact of adopting this epistemology on the field of clinical psychology.     

Psychology and its role in information technology

This paper discusses a role for psychology in the development of information technology. Because of the popularity of psychology as an undergraduate major, psychology’s expertise in measurement, and the assertion of some that cognitive science provides the scientific basis for advancements in information technologies, psychology has a responsibility as a discipline to advance information technology and to educate students about this technology. Studies suggest that higher education in psychology can facilitate reasoning about general issues. A process-oriented course in psychology and computers is suggested as a way of incorporating computer literacy into the psychology curriculum. The role of the Society for Computers in Psychology is also discussed.     

Challenges in Piaget’s Legacy

The publication of After Piaget (Martí and Rodríguez 2012) hopefully triggers a new effort to understand the richness of the efforts of that major psychologist of the 20th century. Piaget was consistently concerned with part/whole relationships throughout his life. He addressed this issue philosophically, epistemologically, and psychologically. Conceptually Piaget struggled with the issue of continuity/discontinuity in development and changed his mind about how to reconcile the discontinuities of stages with his concept of development. I also attribute his variability to the implications of his important work on perception, and to his willingness to get involved in widespread concrete applications of his approach to education including the education of children with special needs; his center for genetic epistemology, and his interest in psychoanalysis. Benefiting from all the authors of After Piaget, I want to point out that Piaget has identified many major issues that will continue to constitute challenges to psychology in this century. These include specifying terms such as ‘development;’ methodological issues such as sampling both quantitatively in one culture and across cultures; comprehensive inclusion of the psychological processes covered by introductory textbooks in psychology; and conceptual issues such as the relationships among all these parts within a whole. I make a distinction between an ‘issue’ and a ‘problem’—problems have solutions; while issues refer to controversies in science generally as well as in psychology that have persisted for centuries.     

Why researchers don't study women: The responses of 62 researchers

Sixty-two researchers accounting for 64 single-sex studies that appeared in 1970 1971 issues of the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology reported why they had limited their studies to a single sex and why they had preferred either males or females for their studies. Also, articles and abstracts were read as a way of checking researchers' reporting practices. The replies were analyzed for thematic content and formed three major types: scientific (56%), practical (28%), and extrascientific (15%). The responses helped to explain why there has been an imbalance in psychology which led to the study of men rather than women instead of the exploration of both sexes. Sggestions are offered to help counteract this trend in future psychological research and reporting.     

Irrelevant Cultural Influences on Belief

Recent work in psychology on ‘cultural cognition’ suggests that our cultural background drives our attitudes towards a range of politically contentious issues in science such as global warming. This work is part of a more general attempt to investigate the ways in which our wants, wishes and desires impact on our assessments of information, events and theories. Put crudely, the idea is that we confirm our assessments of the evidence for and against scientific theories with clear political relevance to our pre‐existing political beliefs and convictions. In this article, I explore the epistemological consequences of cultural cognition. What does it mean for the rationality of our beliefs about issues such as global warming? I argue for an unsettling conclusion. Not only are those on the ‘political right’ who reject the scientific consensus on issues like global warming unjustified in doing so, some of those on the ‘political left’ who accept the consensus are also unjustified in doing so. I finish by addressing the practical implications of my conclusions.     

The nature of psychology: the great dilemmas

Research about the nature of psychology, its subject matter, its level of analysis, its scientific laws, its relationship with other disciplines, and its social relevance has been a matter of great concern and interest during the development of psychology. This problem can be analyzed in terms of the dilemmas of the psychological discipline, which have been choice points, crossroads, alternative decisions that bring psychologists face to face with the following issues: (a) the subject matter of psychology: psyche, mind, or behavior?; (b) the role of scientific methodology: is psychology a natural science, a social/behavioral/human science, or a part of the humanities?; (c) the universality or particularity of scientific laws in psychology: are laws universal or culture-bound and contextual?; and (d) the balance between science and profession: is psychology a basic science, a socially relevant profession, or both?     

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE RELEVANCE OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY IN AFRICA

The article focuses on the need to make applied psychology more relevant to the realities of Africa. The writer argues that because applied psychology tends to be centro-cultural it has not made much impact in Africa. The writer observes, however, that the crucial factor is the tendency of many African psychologists to apply psychology in disregard of such mediating factors as values. The moderating influence of values on behaviour in applied settings is explored by citing some recent cases. The writer also identifies some underlying factors accounting for why theories and models relevant to African realities have not been developed by African psychologists. Four underlying issues crucial to the development of concepts and models relevant to Africa are outlined. Particular mention is also made of the need to properly market psychology in Africa.     

试论存在主义对人本主义心理学的影响

从人本主义心理学产生发展的背景,研究命题与体系式思想．研究方法及在咨询和治疗上的应用四个方面来探讨存在主义对人本主义心理学的积极影响。主要关注存在主义作为一种哲学思潮在对人性,人的生存方式和独特性的看法上给予人本主义心理学的启示．以及存在主义的创新的本体论对于人本主义心理学在跳出传统心理学模式走上“第三条道路”上的推动作用。     

Phenomenology and Critical Social Psychology: Directions and Debates in Theory and Research

There has been significant growth in critical approaches to social psychology in recent years. Phenomenological, discursive and psychoanalytically informed perspectives, amongst others, have become increasingly popular alternatives to ‘mainstream’ cognitive social psychology. This paper describes the fundamental philosophy and methodology underpinning phenomenological psychology along with discussion of a number of key issues in qualitative research in social psychology. In particular, I discuss the role of interpretation, the turn to language and need for political engagement within critical social psychology. More recently, there has been a growth in phenomenologically informed narrative theories and methodologies and in this paper I introduce my own development of a critical narrative analysis. In the process I discuss some of the most pressing debates about research within the phenomenological tradition and provide rebuttals, solutions and possible future directions for phenomenological theory and research that may lead to yet greater recognition for this social psychological perspective.     

Getting dirty: psychology's history of power

This introduction to the special issue on the history of power forwards the anthropological concept of "purification" as a means of drawing together disparate histories of psychology that invoke notions of power. Drawing on the work of Mary Douglas, Bruno Latour, Michel Foucault, and Donna Haraway, I argue for a history of psychology that links the carving up of people up into their properly natural and enculturated parts with keeping people in their place, the purification of interpretation by scientific representation, the maintenance of the body politic of the discipline, and the role of psychology in making up power in modern nation states.     

Developmental psychology and psychoanalysis: I. The context for a revolution in psychoanalysis

After describing the manner in which the integration of psychoanalysis and developmental psychology became a central problem for ego psychology, the author examines the conditions that make it possible for new research and theory in developmental psychology to contribute to a revolution in contemporary psychoanalytic theory. They include: (1) the emergence of a state of "crisis" in American psychoanalysis centering on questions of the nature of early development and how it can be known; (2) the explosive growth of developmental research on early childhood dealing with issues at the heart of that crisis; and (3) the presence of a new generation of psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically oriented researchers capable of bringing that research to bear on those issues.     

Issues in comparative psychology at the dawn of the 20th century

Comparative psychology emerged as part of the "new psychology" that took hold in the United States around 1900. Many of the issues that have occupied comparative psychologists throughout the 20th century were developed as research problems during this period. In some respects, comparative psychology was then an integral and widely respected part of psychology at large; in others, it was already marginalized. Issues emerging during this critical period set the program for the upcoming century and included those of methodology in the conduct of experiments and conceptual issues related to evolution, development, intelligence, and higher processes.     

Concerning the Importance of Ontological Issues for Cultural Psychology: a Reply to Comments

The paper continues the “ontological” discussion in IBPS, addressing the question of the importance of ontological issues for contemporary development of cultural psychology. The language psychological science speaks is considered as an ontological issue and a most topical one for cultural psychology, aiming at “constructing a psychology that is universal while being culture-inclusive” (Valsiner 2009, p.2). Ontological issues could stay implicit and neglected, as long as the ‘etant, “the mode of being”, “the particularities” were discussed within the circle of adherents of one and the same school, who implicitly had in mind the same ‘entre. However, as soon as the discussion involves representatives of different schools, ontological issues become crucial for mutual understanding and meanings of the words have to be explicated. Same words like “psyche”, “subjectivity”, “social”, “culture”, etc., ? often mean different things when they are pronounces or written by representatives of different theoretical trends. The discussion of the ‘etant without clear indicating of the ‘entre under consideration is likely to turn into a Babel. Global modernity requires constant efforts and insistent desire for mutual understanding across the diversified global scientific community. Thus, creative collaboration in epistemological developments has to ground on clear comprehension of the ontological stances of the debaters.