Plantinga and probabilistic atheism

Conclusion Plantinga underestimates the prospects for probabilistic atheism. He employs a flawed mathematical rendition of the atheist's crucial claim, (1) and he misunderstands the utility (1) would have for the atheist.     

On fideism and Alvin Plantinga

The first version of this paper was presented at a summer workshop on Skepticism and Fideism in 1986 at the University of Notre Dame, sponsored by The Society of Christian Philosophers. Subsequent versions have been read at the Mississippi Philosophical Association and the American Academy of Religion. I would like to thank the director of the workshop, Phil L. Quinn, and the participants for providing an intellectual springboard for developing my ideas on the topic of fideism and the proper basicality of theistic belief.     

Alvin Plantinga on the ontological argument

By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence of God.