Making our ends meet: shared intention,goal adoption and the third-person perspective

Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s achieve p because and as long as another agent has that goal that p. Having clarified the relevance of mutual goal adoption for acting jointly, I argue that when an intention is shared between several agents, each individual has an intention in favour of the joint action and one in favour of a joint mode of reasoning. This mode of reasoning is allocentric reasoning. Finally, I elaborate on the consequences of this view for the scientific study of human collaboration.     

Infants’ perception of goal-directed actions: A multi-lab replication reveals that infants anticipate paths and not goals

Influential developmental theories claim that infants rely on goals when visually anticipating actions. A widely noticed study suggested that 11-month-olds anticipate that a hand continues to grasp the same object even when it swapped position with another object (Cannon, E., & Woodward, A. L. (2012). Infants generate goal-based action predictions. Developmental Science, 15, 292–298.). Yet, other studies found such flexible goal-directed anticipations only from later ages on. Given the theoretical relevance of this phenomenon and given these contradicting findings, the current work investigated in two different studies and labs, whether infants indeed flexibly anticipate an action goal. Study 1 (N = 144) investigated by means of five experiments, under which circumstances (e.g., animated agent, human agent) 12-month-olds show flexible goal anticipation abilities. Study 2 (N = 104) presented 11-, 32-month-olds and adults both a human grasping action as well as a non-human action. In none of the experiments did infants flexibly anticipate the action based on the goal, but rather on the movement path, irrespective of the type of agent. Although one experiment contained a direct replication of Cannon and Woodward (2012), we were not able to replicate their findings. Overall our work challenges the view that infants are able to flexibly anticipate action goals from early on, but rather rely on movement patterns when processing other’s actions.     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.     

Spontaneous and experimentally induced action planning and coping planning for physical activity: A meta-analysis

ObjectivesThe main objective of this review was to provide summary effects for spontaneous and experimentally induced action planning (AP) and coping planning (CP) for physical activity (PA). These summary effects were then used to test key theoretical postulates using meta-analytic path analysis, and examine possible boundary conditions via moderation analyses.DesignThis review employed a quantitative research synthesis design.MethodUsing the method of Lipsey and Wilson (2001), fixed- and random-effects meta-analysis was performed on over 150 effect sizes from 23 correlational and 21 experimental studies. The method of Viswesvaran and Ones (1995) was used to test two mediation models using the correlational meta-analytic data. Group comparisons and meta-regression were used to test moderation.ResultsAmong the correlational studies, findings indicated a medium-to-large summary effect of spontaneous AP (φ = .41) and CP (φ = .38) on PA. Among the experimental studies, results revealed a small-to-medium summary effect (φ = .24) when comparing all experimental conditions versus all controls and a medium-to-large summary effect (φ = .37) when comparing purely planning conditions versus neutral controls. Support was found for AP and CP as partial mediators in the relation between intention and PA. Numerous significant moderators emerged.ConclusionThis review offers the first meta-analytic estimates of both spontaneous and experimentally induced AP and CP for PA, while supporting the role of both spontaneous AP and CP as mediators in both a multiple and sequential mediation model. Relevant moderators will serve to inform future research in this area.     

The psychological causality implicit in language

We are concerned with the causality implicit in English verbs that name interactions, either mental or behavioral, between two persons, verbs such as like, notice (mental), and help, cheat (behavioral) in such a context as Ted—Paul. Using four different methods, we show that adult native speakers think of causality in such verbs as unequally apportioned between interactants. For behavioral (or action) verbs greater causal weight is given to the Agent argument of the verb (e.g., Ted in Ted helps Paul) than to the Patient argument (Paul). For mental (or state) verbs greater causal weight is given to the Stimulus argument of the verb (e.g., Paul in Ted likes Paul) than to the Experiencer argument (Ted). For English verbs of the type studied, derivational adjectives often exist (e.g., helpful, cheating, likable, noticeable). Such adjectives are attributive to one or the other argument of the verb base (Agent or Patient; Stimulus or Experiencer). We show that the direction of causal attribution in the adjective (e.g., helpful is attributive to Ted the Agent; likable is attributive to Paul the Stimulus) predicts the primary causal weightings assigned in our experimental tasks. We also show that in the English language adjectives derived from action verbs are almost attributive to the Agent and adjectives derived from state verbs to the Stimulus. Because certain facts about English morphology predict certain ways of thinking about causality, our main finding may seem to be a Whorfian one, a demonstration that language affects thought. However, we argue that it is not that but rather a demonstration that two modes of thought (the Agent-Patient Schema and the Stimulus-Experiencer Schema) affect language use. We suggest that the schemas are universals of human thought.     

Perceived Autonomy Support Moderates the Relations between Counseling Self-Efficacy and Flow among Filipino Counselors

Contemporary literature has emphasized the vital role of supervision in the professional growth of counselors and therapists. Even some counselor developmental models argued that improvement in counselor autonomy, motivation, and self-efficacy is highly contingent upon counseling supervision, especially in Western settings. Yet, there is marked scarcity of studies examining the antecedents of flow in non-Western contexts. As such, the central aim of the current study was to assess the moderating effects of perceived autonomy support from supervisors on the relations between counseling self-efficacy (CSE) and state flow among Filipino counselors. A sample of 131 Filipino counselors in Metro Manila participated in the research through answering questionnaires that measured the aforementioned constructs. The findings of correlational analyses have shown that counseling self-efficacy and perceived autonomy support are positively associated with state flow. The results of path analysis revealed a significant moderation effect. This suggests that for Filipino counselors who had greater perceptions that their supervisors provide autonomy in their counseling practice (perceived autonomy support), having lower perceived capabilities in performing counseling duties may lead to higher immersion and enjoyment in counseling activities, while for those who have low perceived autonomy support, having higher levels of counseling self-efficacy will lead to lower flow. Implications of these findings in theory and practice are elucidated.     

How Valuable Could a Person Be?*

We investigate the value of persons. Our primary goal is to chart a path from equal and extreme value to infinite value. We advance two arguments. Each argument offers a reason to think that equal and extreme value are best accounted for if we are infinitely valuable. We then raise some difficult but fruitful questions about the possible grounds or sources of our infinite value, if we indeed have such value.     

(ANTI)‐Anti‐Intellectualism and the Sufficiency Thesis

Anti‐intellectualists about knowledge‐how insist that, when an agent S knows how to φ, it is in virtue of some ability, rather than in virtue of any propositional attitudpaes, S has. Recently, a popular strategy for attacking the anti‐intellectualist position proceeds by appealing to cases where an agent is claimed to possess a reliable ability to φ while nonetheless intuitively lacking knowledge‐how to φ. John Bengson and Marc Moffett and Carlotta Pavese have embraced precisely this strategy and have thus claimed, for different reasons, that anti‐intellectualism is defective on the grounds that possessing the ability to φ is not sufficient for knowing how to φ. We investigate this strategy of argument‐by‐counterexample to the anti‐intellectualist's sufficiency thesis and show that, at the end of the day, anti‐intellectualism remains unscathed.     

The applicability of self-regulation theories in sport: Goal adjustment capacities,stress appraisals,coping, and well-being among athletes

ObjectivesWe examined a model, informed by self-regulation theories from the health psychology literature, which included goal adjustment capacities, appraisals of challenge and threat, coping, and well-being.DesignProspective.MethodsTwo-hundred and twelve athletes from the United Kingdom (n = 147) or Australia (n = 65), who played team (n = 135) or individual sports (n = 77), and competed at international (n = 7), national (n = 11), county (n = 67), club (n = 84), or beginner (n = 43) levels participated in this study. Participants completed measures of goal adjustment capacities and stress appraisals two days before competing. Athletes also completed coping and well-being questionnaires within 3 h of their competition ending.ResultsThe way an athlete responded to an unattainable goal was associated with his or her well-being in the period leading up to and including the competition. Goal reengagement positively predicted well-being, whereas goal disengagement negatively predicted well-being. Further, goal reengagement was positively associated with challenge appraisals, which in turn was linked to task-oriented coping, and task-oriented coping positively associated with well-being.ConclusionWhen highly-valued goals become unattainable, consultants and coaches could encourage athletes to generate alternative approaches to achieve the same goal or help them develop a completely new goal in order to promote well-being among athletes.     

Approval-directed agency and the decision theory of Newcomb-like problems

Decision theorists disagree about how instrumentally rational agents, i.e., agents trying to achieve some goal, should behave in so-called Newcomb-like problems, with the main contenders being causal and evidential decision theory. Since the main goal of artificial intelligence research is to create machines that make instrumentally rational decisions, the disagreement pertains to this field. In addition to the more philosophical question of what the right decision theory is, the goal of AI poses the question of how to implement any given decision theory in an AI. For example, how would one go about building an AI whose behavior matches evidential decision theory’s recommendations? Conversely, we can ask which decision theories (if any) describe the behavior of any existing AI design. In this paper, we study what decision theory an approval-directed agent, i.e., an agent whose goal it is to maximize the score it receives from an overseer, implements. If we assume that the overseer rewards the agent based on the expected value of some von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function, then such an approval-directed agent is guided by two decision theories: the one used by the agent to decide which action to choose in order to maximize the reward and the one used by the overseer to compute the expected utility of a chosen action. We show which of these two decision theories describes the agent’s behavior in which situations.

     

The biological treatment of dangerous sexual offenders: A review and preliminary report of the Oregon pilot depo-Provera program

Despite advances in the cognitive and behavioral treatment of sexual offenders made over the past 10 years, a number of such individuals released from custody and on parole in their communities remain dangerous to be at large. Even if such men are currently undergoing treatment, psychological approaches by themselves cannot be expected to immediately reduce risk. Therefore, interest has been expressed in medical approaches to making such individuals safer to be at large while undergoing more traditional treatment techniques. While surgical castration has been endorsed by some European countries in the past, it continues to be considered a capital punishment beyond the scope of judicial mandate in the US. Instead, medications to reduce sexual drive have been promoted as adjuncts in the treatment of dangerous sexual offenders. The present review examines the body of literature investigating three classes of medications currently employed to achieve this goal: (1) hormonal agents acting peripherally, predominantly medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) (depo-Provera), (2) hormonal agents acting centrally, predominantly leuprolide (Leupron), and (3) serotonin-active antidepressants, such as fluoxetine (Prozac) and paroxetine (Paxil). Finally, preliminary results are presented from a pilot program in Oregon in which potentially dangerous sexual offenders are identified in state institutions prior to release and recommendations made for depo-Provera once they reach their communities. Initial follow-up results are presented along with recommendations for similar programs to enhance safety in this select group of offenders.     

Spatial Updating Strategy Affects the Reference Frame in Path Integration

This study investigated how spatial updating strategies affected the selection of reference frames in path integration. Participants walked an outbound path consisting of three successive waypoints in a featureless environment and then pointed to the first waypoint. We manipulated the alignment of participants’ final heading at the end of the outbound path with their initial heading to examine the adopted reference frame. We assumed that the initial heading defined the principal reference direction in an allocentric reference frame. In Experiment 1, participants were instructed to use a configural updating strategy and to monitor the shape of the outbound path while they walked it. Pointing performance was best when the final heading was aligned with the initial heading, indicating the use of an allocentric reference frame. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to use a continuous updating strategy and to keep track of the location of the first waypoint while walking the outbound path. Pointing performance was equivalent regardless of the alignment between the final and the initial headings, indicating the use of an egocentric reference frame. These results confirmed that people could employ different spatial updating strategies in path integration (Wiener, Berthoz, & Wolbers Experimental Brain Research 208(1) 61–71, 2011), and suggested that these strategies could affect the selection of the reference frame for path integration.     

Intentionalism,defeasibility, and justification

According to intentionalism, perceptual experience is a mental state with representational content. When it comes to the epistemology of perception, it is only natural for the intentionalist to hold that the justificatory role of experience is at least in part a function of its content. In this paper, I argue that standard versions of intentionalism trying to hold on to this natural principle face what I call the “defeasibility problem”. This problem arises from the combination of standard intentionalism with further plausible principles governing the epistemology of perception: that experience provides defeasible justification for empirical belief, and that such justification is best construed as probabilification. After exploring some ways in which the standard intentionalist could deal with the defeasibility problem, I argue that the best option is to replace standard intentionalism by what I call “phenomenal intentionalism”. Where standard intentionalism construes experiences as of p as having the content p, phenomenal intentionalism construes (visual) experiences as of p as having “phenomenal” or “looks contents”: contents of the form Lp (it looks as if p).     

One Thought Too Few: Where <Emphasis Type="Italic">De Dicto</Emphasis> Moral Motivation is Necessary

De dicto moral motivation is typically characterized by the agent’s conceiving of her goal in thin normative terms such as to do what is right. I argue that lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation (at least in a certain broad sense of this term) would put the agent in a bad position for responding in the morally-best manner (relative to her epistemic state) in a certain type of situations. Two central features of the relevant type of situations are (1) the appropriateness of the agent’s uncertainty concerning her underived moral values, and (2) the practical, moral importance of resolving this uncertainty. I argue that in some situations that are marked by these two features the most virtuous response is deciding to conduct a deep moral inquiry for a de dicto moral purpose. In such situations lacking an effective de dicto moral motivation would amount to a moral shortcoming. I show the implications for Michael Smith’s (1994) argument against Motivational Judgment Externalism and for Brian Weatherson’s (2014) argument against avoiding moral recklessness: both arguments rely on a depreciating view of de dicto moral motivation, and both fail; or so I argue.     

Clock time vs. event time: Temporal culture or self-regulation?

Cross-cultural research documented two types of temporal culture governing the way individuals schedule tasks over time: clock-time, where individuals let an external clock dictate when tasks begin/end; and event-time, where tasks are planned relative to other tasks and individuals transition between them when they internally sense that the former task is complete. In contrast with this prior literature - that credits culture as the reason for variation in temporal norms - we show in two experiments that individuals choose clock- vs. event-time as a self-regulation strategy to achieve a regulatory goal (efficiency vs. effectiveness). A third experiment shows that this strategy enhances confidence and performance on a task. Participants solved significantly more math problems when their task scheduling (clock- vs. event-time) matched their regulatory state (promotion vs. prevention). Since clock-/event-time may both lead to superior performance, clock-time is not the single best way to organize productive activities in industrial societies—a result that counters a foundational principle of modern economics.     

All for us and us for all: Introducing the 5R Shared Leadership Program

While most leadership programs seek to develop the leadership qualities of the formal team leader, programs that aim to develop the leadership qualities of team members are rare. This article draws on insights from organisational and sport psychology to develop and introduce a new leadership development program — the 5R Shared Leadership Program (5R^S) — that (1) implements a structure of shared leadership (through Shared Leadership Mapping) and (2) further develops participants’ leadership potential (through the 5R’s of Readying, Reflecting, Representing, Realising, and Reporting). More specifically, being a close intertwinement of shared leadership theorising and the social identity approach to leadership, 5R^S helps leaders in the team to create, embody, advance, and embed a collective sense of ‘us’ in their teams. In this article, we aim to shed light on the underpinning theoretical foundation of 5R^S, while also sharing insights about how 5R^S can be delivered in practice. Furthermore, to provide initial insight into the applicability of 5R^S in both organisational and sport contexts, we conducted a longitudinal qualitative comparison study. This involved collecting qualitative data from two initial implementations: with an organisational team (N = 16) and a sport team (N = 16). A critical reflection on these initial implementations of 5R^S leads to recommendations for future efforts to develop shared leadership in organisational and sporting teams. In particular, we highlight the importance of explaining the nature of shared leadership at the start of the program and of having multiple follow-up sessions for participants. In conclusion, by helping leaders in the team to develop and mobilise a sense of ‘us-ness’, 5R^S gives leaders and their teams the tools to create the best possible version of ‘us’.     

Exploring the Causes of Subjective Well-Being: A Content Analysis of Peoples’ Recipes for Long-Term Happiness

This study set out to explore conceptions of the elements or ingredients that lead to long-lasting happiness. A content analysis (Smith in Handbook of research methods in social and personality psychology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000; Weber 1990) coded 201 respondents’ (18–84 years old) written happiness recipes for the mention of a priori (pre-defined from a literature review) and empirical (from a pilot study) content analysis categories. These were organized into six dimensions (i.e. Personality, Circumstances, Social Relationships, Behavioral Activities, Cognitive Activities and Volitional Activities) based on a model of the causes of long-term happiness (Lyubomirsky et al. in Rev Gen Psychol 9(2):111–131, 2005b). Participants were happy and mentally healthy. An overwhelming majority of responses referred to Social Relationships such as with Family, Friends and Partners, supporting the assertion that relationships are necessary for happiness (Diener and Oishi in Psychol Inquiry 16(4):162–167, 2005; Diener and Seligman in Psychol Sci Public Interest 5(1):1–32, 2002). Participants frequently mentioned Circumstances such as Health despite the fact these have been found to have a minimal influence over long-term happiness (Argyle in The foundations of hedonic psychology. Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 1999). Respondents mentioned a variety of New Behavioral Activities (e.g. time in Nature) that could offer a list of active leisure pursuits for use in happiness interventions. Finally, participants spoke of the importance of Social Values and having a Philosophy of Life (New Cognitive Activities). A recipe for long-term happiness is proposed based on past and current findings.     

Are the Votes of Ethics Committees in Germany for the Protection of Clinical Study Trial Subjects “Sovereign Acts?”

A sudden paradigm shift has resulted in governmental measures that greatly impact the scope in which the ethics committees in Germany can perform their task of providing expert opinions for clinical research. The so-called “revaluation” of the Medical Device Law Deutsches Medizinproduktegesetz—MPG) is, in our opinion, not based on sound political and professional judgment. In accordance with the changed regulations, ethics committees are now seen as being sub-organs of the state medical associations or the medical faculties and are therefore official authorities. It follows that the votes of ethics committees are then “sovereign acts” or authoritative measures! However, equality and justice speak against this misleading conclusion and its resulting consequence that an ethics committee’s vote is a sovereign act. This has, in turn, resulted in the public ethics committees obtaining their long-sought goal of having a state-sanctioned monopoly. The private ethics committees are not recognized as being authoritative bodies, nor are they to be seen as such in the future (i.e. such a status has been denied the Freiburg Ethics Commission International (FEKI) in Baden-Württemberg). This political mistake must be corrected, otherwise, conducting clinical research will become increasingly difficult.     

Toward an Evidence-Based System for Innovation Support for Implementing Innovations with Quality: Tools,Training, Technical Assistance,and Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement

An individual or organization that sets out to implement an innovation (e.g., a new technology, program, or policy) generally requires support. In the Interactive Systems Framework for Dissemination and Implementation, a Support System should work with Delivery Systems (national, state and/or local entities such as health and human service organizations, community-based organizations, schools) to enhance their capacity for quality implementation of innovations. The literature on the Support ystem has been under-researched and under-developed. This article begins to conceptualize theory, research, and action for an evidence-based system for innovation support (EBSIS). EBSIS describes key priorities for strengthening the science and practice of support. The major goal of EBSIS is to enhance the research and practice of support in order to build capacity in the Delivery System for implementing innovations with quality, and thereby, help the Delivery System achieve outcomes. EBSIS is guided by a logic model that includes four key support components: tools, training, technical assistance, and quality assurance/quality improvement. EBSIS uses the Getting To Outcomes approach to accountability to aid the identification and synthesis of concepts, tools, and evidence for support. We conclude with some discussion of the current status of EBSIS and possible next steps, including the development of collaborative researcher-practitioner-funder-consumer partnerships to accelerate accumulation of knowledge on the Support System.