The importance of frameworks for directing empirical questions: reply to Goodie and Fantino (2000)

A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) make two main criticisms of the predictions of M. C. Lovett and C. D. Schunn's (1999) RCCL model. (RCCL is pronounced "ReCyCLe"; it stands for Represent the task, Construct a set of action strategies, Choose from among those strategies according to success rate, Learn new success rates.) In both cases, the authors believe the criticisms reflect a failure to appreciate the difference between broad frameworks and specific mathematical/computational models. In this article, the value of a broad framework, such as RCCL, in directing new empirical analyses and guiding theoretical development is shown. In particular, RCCL expands on existing work to reveal how variability and change in mental representations influence base-rate sensitivity. The authors also address several other issues raised by A. S. Goodie and E. Fantino (2000) and show that qualitative shifts in individuals' choice behavior are present in their original data--a key prediction of RCCL that does not appear in previous accounts.     

Mystery and meaning: a reply to Green (2000)

In "George A. Miller, Language, and the Computer Metaphor of Mind" (see Note 1), I sought to explain how and why Miller invested the computer metaphor of mind with such strongly revolutionary, antibehaviorist meanings. In reply, Christopher Green (see Note 2) has argued that the answer to this question has to do with the importance of mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists. In response, I argue that, though mental representation was an important issue to cognitivists, there were several other factors of equal or greater importance: specifically, the fascination of Miller and his cohort with language and communication, their frustration with the narrowness of the disciplinary vision of the behaviorists, and their involvement in a different experimental program than that of mainstream behaviorists.     

The interaction between time and number in a temporal bisection task: a reply to Vicario (2011)

Abstract. We discuss the results of Vicario (2011, Perception 40 23-29), in the light of an experiment designed to bypass some of the limits of that study. There, participants were asked to perform a temporal bisection on numerical stimuli (small or large digits) presented either for 700/900 ms or 2000/2200 ms. For the two longest durations only, bisections of larger digits occurred later than those of smaller digits. Here, subjects judged the temporal position of a flick occurring during the visual presentation of a digit (1, 5, or 9) which lasted on the screen for either 700 ms or 2000 ms. Results revealed no difference in the perceived temporal midpoints of large compared to small digits. In contrast, they showed a response bias: only with the shortest-duration stimuli the digit's magnitude affected the subject's response.     

Delay-reduction theory--the case for temporal context: comment on Grace and Savastano (2000)

R. C. Grace and H. I. Savastano (2000) have devised a procedure to determine whether the effectiveness of a stimulus as a conditioned reinforcer depends on the temporal context of reinforcement. Although they interpret their results in terms of the contextual choice model, which maintains that value is independent of context, the results also support delay-reduction theory, which maintains that value depends on temporal context. It is argued that the delay-reduction view of the role of temporal context is also intuitively more plausible and more consistent with the way choice responds to changes in conditions.     

Serial processing in reading aloud: reply to Zorzi (2000)

K. Rastle and M. Coltheart (1999; see also M. Coltheart & K. Rastle, 1994) reported data demonstrating that the cost of irregularity in reading aloud low-frequency exception words is modulated by the position of the irregularity in the word. They argued that these data implicated a serial process and falsified all models of reading aloud that operate solely in parallel, a conclusion that M. Zorzi (2000) challenged by successfully simulating the position of irregularity effect with such a model. Zorzi (2000) further claimed that a reanalysis of K. Rastle and M. Coltheart's (1999) data demonstrates sensitivity to grapheme-phoneme consistency (which he claimed was confounded across the position of irregularity manipulation) rather than the use of a serial process. Here, the authors argue that M. Zorzi's (2000) reanalyses were inappropriate and reassert that K. Rastle and M. Coltheart's (1999) findings are evidence for serial processing.     

Learning to walk is still an "old" problem: a reply to Zelazo (1983)

Zelazo (1983) proposes that two cognitive prerequisites are necessary for the development of locomotion: The conversion of neo-natal reflexive stepping into instrumental behavior and a shift from stereotypical to relational play. I argue that these cognitive assumptions are unnecessary. The disappearance of neo-natal stepping can be explained as a result of increasing leg mass, and the retention of this reflex with practice may be simply an exercise effect. Comparative and evolutionary evidence suggests that locomotion is not associated with abstract reasoning ability. Learning to walk is a complex, gradual process of maturation of motivation, the integration of subcortical pattern-generating centers with the neural substrate for control of posture and balance, and important changes in body proportions and bone and muscle strength. The control of walking is likely the province of mechanism phylogenetically more primitive than the human cerebral cortex. There is no need to invoke cortical explanations when more simple ones are sufficient.     

The controlled application of a strategy can still produce automatic effects: reply to Redington (2000)

The deliberate application of a strategy can have unintended discriminative effects. It is argued that these effects or influences on discriminative responding are the source of automatic influences and can be dissociated from controlled influences under appropriate circumstances. Such automatic influences are often latent in the interaction between the memory structures and the strategies that participants bring to bear in many implicit learning tasks.     

The temporal dynamics of retention of a context memory: something is missing

We use a variation of contextual fear conditioning, called the context pre-exposure facilitation effect (CPFE) to study the rat's memory for context. In this paradigm, the rat is pre-exposed to a conditioning context and later returned to that context, where it is immediately shocked. The memory context is revealed by the fact that pre-exposure to the conditioning context, but not to a different context, greatly enhances conditioned fear produced by immediate shock. We report that rat's retention of the context memory is a nonmonotonic U-shaped function of the interval separating pre-exposure and immediate shock. Retention performance decays rapidly so that within 2 min of pre-exposure there is no evidence that the rat was pre-exposed to the context. Within a few hours, however, a strong CPFE was observed that persisted for at least 28 d. Two hypotheses are discussed: (1) the descending arm of the U represents a retrieval failure, and (2) the U-shaped function represents two discontinuous memory processes initiated in parallel-short-term synaptic changes that are rapidly initiated, but also decay rapidly, and long-term synaptic processes that take time to generate but can endure for days.     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: reply to Saiki (2000)

J. Saiki (2000) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (1998) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes.     

The belief bias effect is aptly named: a reply to Klauer and Kellen (2011)

In "Assessing the Belief Bias Effect With ROCs: It's a Response Bias Effect," Dube, Rotello, and Heit (2010) examined the form of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for reasoning and the effects of belief bias on measurement indices that differ in whether they imply a curved or linear ROC function. We concluded that the ROC data are in fact curved and that analyses using statistics that assume a linear ROC are likely to produce Type I errors. Importantly, we showed that the interaction between logic and belief that has inspired much of the theoretical work on belief bias is in fact an error stemming from inappropriate reliance on a contrast (hit rate-false alarm rate) that implies linear ROCs. Dube et al. advanced a new model of belief bias, which, in light of their data, is currently the only plausible account of the effect. Klauer and Kellen (2011) disputed these conclusions, largely on the basis of speculation about the data collection method used by Dube et al. to construct the ROCs. New data and model-based analyses are presented that refute the speculations made by Klauer and Kellen. We also show that new modeling results presented by Klauer and Kellen actually support the conclusions advanced by Dube et al. Together, these data show that the methods used by Dube et al. are valid and that the belief bias effect is simply a response bias effect.     

Client perspectives and open-ended questions: a reply to Dean, et al. (2000)

Utilizing an open-ended question may allow subjects to respond in their own words but does not necessarily avoid the problem of narrowing the focus to a specific predetermined topic.     

A self-presentational view of psychotherapy: reply to Hill, Gelso, and Mohr (2000) and to Arkin and Hermann (2000)

The self-presentational view of psychotherapy challenges current assumptions about the benefits of high levels of clients' openness in therapy (A. E. Kelly, 2000). The author responds to questions about whether clients' discretion really is linked to favorable therapy process ratings and outcomes. She also addresses problems that may emerge if readers apply a narrow definition of self-presentation as a form of deliberate manipulation, rather than the intended definition of consciously or unconsciously showing oneself to be a particular kind of person for audiences. A brief review of the evidence on the role of audience feedback in self-concept change is offered, along with suggestions for explaining self-concept change to clients. The author concludes by clarifying and reasserting her suggestion that it is acceptable for clients to reveal the themes as opposed to details of their problems that seem particularly heinous or humiliating.     

Sex differences in physical aggression to partners: a reply to Frieze (2000), O'Leary (2000), and White, Smith, Koss, and Figueredo (2000)

The following points are made in reply to critical comments on the author's meta-analysis of partner physical aggression (J. Archer, 2000): (a) The theoretical dichotomy used in the review is one clearly identifiable in published articles, and the distinction between acts (aggression) and consequences (violence) is clearer than alternative definitions involving victims' perceptions; (b) despite the database containing many samples of U.S. students, there were sufficient other samples to draw meaningful conclusions; (c) the Conflict Tactics Scale may be limited, but in contrast to suggested alternatives, it involves clearly defined categories; (d) sexual aggression, although forming an important part of partner violence, cannot legitimately be aggregated with nonsexual physical aggression; and (e) there is a marked contrast between sex differences in physical aggression toward partners and toward same-sex opponents.     

Revisiting the constraint attunement hypothesis: reply to Ericsson, Patel, and Kintsch (2000) and Simon and Gobet (2000)

This article is part of an exchange concerning the contributions of the constraint attunement hypothesis (CAH) to the understanding of expertise effects in memory recall. K. A. Ericsson, V. Patel, and W. Kintsch (2000) and H. A. Simon and F. Gobet (2000) claim that the CAH is not novel and that existing theories of this phenomenon do not have the limitations that were attributed to them. In this reply, the CAH is argued to be the only theory of expertise effects in memory recall to adopt the abstraction hierarchy as a theory of the environment, a feature that has important theoretical implications. Also, other theories focus on psychological mechanisms but have not satisfied the burden of scientific proof required of process theories. Progress can be made by integrating the complementary advantages of existing theories into a unified theory that acknowledges the equally important roles of the organism and the environment.     

Necessary considerations for a theory of form perception: a theoretical and empirical reply to Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986)

Boselie and Leeuwenberg (1986) recently defended their version of the minimum principle, called structural information theory or SIT, against a varied set of criticisms. Two of the most notable of these criticisms are (i) that perceptual organization can proceed as a piecemeal, rather than as a global, process (as demonstrated by partially-biased Necker cubes and 'impossible' figures), and (ii) that perceptual organization is influenced by subjective variables as well as by stimulus variables (Peterson and Hochberg 1983). The second criticism was acknowledged by Boselie and Leeuwenberg but not addressed. The first criticism was addressed by the introduction of two new variables into SIT in order to argue that the perceived organization of partially-biased Necker cubes and impossible figures can be predicted by a global coding scheme, thereby supporting rather than refuting global minimum principles. It is argued here that the criticisms cannot be dismissed by this rebuttal, which is focused narrowly on single examples rather than on the general principles embodied by the demonstrations. The implications of piecemeal perception and subjective mediation are spelled out, and both old and new data showing that the applicability of global minimum principles must be reexamined, not merely defended, are discussed. Finally, the argument for a richer, more interacting, theory of form perception is presented.