Age-Related Changes in Children's and Adults’ Explanations of Interpersonal Actions

We investigated the content of children's and adults’ explanations of interpersonal actions. Participants were 5-, 7-, and 9-year-old children, as well as adults, who were presented with 8 stories containing either prosocial or antisocial target actions, and asked to explain why each actor performed that action. In half of the stories, an interpersonal event preceded the action. Children and adults provided situational and mental-state explanations, but mental-state explanations were especially common for antisocial actions not preceded by an interpersonal event. With increasing age, participants explained prosocial actions by referring to the actor's goals, but referred to the actor's emotions and beliefs to explain antisocial actions. Finally, adults were most likely to mention psychological goals. These results suggest that (a) elementary school children provide a variety of explanations for interpersonal events; (b) children use different types of explanations flexibly, depending on the context and nature of the target action; (c) the frequency of different types of explanations for interpersonal actions changes during childhood; and (d) between middle childhood and adulthood, the recognition of psychological goals increases greatly.     

The Intelligence of White Foreign Born Criminals

Children's understanding of cognition increases greatly between early childhood and adolescence. This increase provides a developmental bridge between young children's understanding of mental states to adolescents' and adults' epistemological reflection. The author presents a framework for describing developmental changes in children's understanding of cognitive activities. He distinguishes 4 aspects of children's understanding of cognition: (a) knowledge of mental states, (b) knowledge of occurrence of particular activities, (c) knowledge of organization of cognitive activities, and (d) epistemological thought. He discusses phenomenological awareness of cognitive activities and social experience as influences on children's concepts of cognition.     

Evaluating the Theory-of-Mind Hypothesis of Autism

ABSTRACT— Two decades ago, the theory-of-mind hypothesis of autism was introduced by Baron-Cohen and his colleagues; this theory provided a unified cognitive explanation for the key social and communication symptoms in that disorder. I evaluate the theory-of-mind hypothesis in light of studies that have addressed several key questions: Do children with autism develop theory-of-mind concepts? How can we explain why some children with autism pass theory-of-mind tasks? Do deficits in theory of mind account for the major impairments that characterize autistic disorder? Current research supports the view that autism involves delays and deficits not only in the development of a theory of mind but also in additional aspects of social-affective information processing that extend beyond the traditional boundaries of theory of mind.     

Contributions of Functional Neuroimaging to the Study of Social Cognition

ABSTRACT— Increasingly, researchers have been applying the methods of cognitive neuroscience—especially functional neuroimaging—to address questions about how humans make inferences about the mental states of others. At the same time, a number of critics have warned against the use of these new techniques by suggesting that functional neuroimaging has been unable to provide novel insights into the nature of social cognition. Addressing these critiques, this article briefly describes some of the ways in which functional neuroimaging has indeed redirected the study of the social mind, reviewing not only the novel data these techniques have provided but also the ways in which cognitive neuroscience has prompted researchers to consider entirely new questions about the organization of human social cognition. Such questions include whether or not there are cognitive processes dedicated for social thought; what the constituent parts of our social-cognitive system might be; how social cognition overlaps with other mental processes in previously unanticipated ways; and whether social cognition might play a privileged role in the human cognitive repertoire.     

人类社会认知的神经机制:来自社会脑研究的证据

社会认知是指从环境互动的过程中推测他人意图、情感和思想等内部状态的心理加工过程。社会脑假说认为,包括人类在内的灵长类大脑内肯定存在着一个旨在认识和理解他人表情的神经机制,在社会交往中通过该中枢迅速处理与他人相互作用的各种信息。本文通过回顾社会脑的构成与基本功能,镜像神经元的发现及功能,以及社会脑、镜像神经元对社会认知影响的相关研究,提出了人类社会认知不同于其他物种的三个主要区别。     

Theory of Mind Impairments in Social Anxiety Disorder

Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a common psychiatric disorder characterized by a persistent, excessive fear and avoidance of social and performance situations. Research on cognitive biases indicates individuals with SAD may lack an accurate view of how they are perceived by others, especially in social situations when they allocate important attentional resources to monitoring their own actions as well as external threat. In the present study, we explored whether socially anxious individuals also have impairments in theory of mind (ToM), or the ability to comprehend others’ mental states, including emotions, beliefs, and intentions. Forty socially anxious and 40 non-socially-anxious comparison participants completed two ToM tasks: the Reading the Mind in the Eyes and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. Participants with SAD performed worse on ToM tasks than did non-socially-anxious participants. Relative to comparison participants, those with SAD were more likely to attribute more intense emotions and greater meaning to what others were thinking and feeling. These group differences were not due to interpretation bias. The ToM impairments in people with SAD are in the opposite direction of those in people with autism spectrum conditions whose inferences about the mental states of other people are absent or very limited. This association between SAD and ToM may have important implications for our understanding of both the maintenance and treatment of social anxiety disorder.     

Mother–Child Conversation and Children's Social Understanding During Middle Childhood

The authors investigated the relationship between mother–child conversation and children's social understanding during middle childhood. Thirty-eight mother–child pairs participated, including a younger group (5–7 years old) and an older group (8–10 years old). Children completed 2 measures of social understanding and mothers and children discussed 4 stories involving social dilemmas. Results indicated that compared to the younger group, the older group (a) performed better on both measures of social understanding and (b) produced more basic mental talk (i.e., talk about beliefs, emotions, personality traits, and desires), and more advanced mental talk (i.e., talk about contrasting perspectives, recursion and relationship between mental states, and advanced emotions). Mothers of older children also produced more basic and advanced mental talk. Mothers' advanced mental talk predicted both children's social understanding and children's advanced mental talk.     

Moral reasoning in autistic individuals: a theoretical review / El razonamiento moral en personas con Trastorno del Espectro Autista: una revisión teórica

Abstract

Individuals diagnosed with an Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) often find it difficult to attribute mental states to others and to understand their own and others’ behaviour (Theory of Mind, [ToM]/social cognition). These difficulties can affect their moral judgements. The present article focuses on evidence on moral reasoning and ToM, with the aim of analysing theoretical and review research into autism. The weight intention has in moral reasoning and the causal relation between mental states, actions and outcomes is an essential part of this study. Evidence in the field of autism reports how autistic people would not be able to make moral judgements based on the agent’s intention. Instead, they would reason based on the outcomes of the action. For example, this can be translated into misunderstandings, malicious judgements or ‘over-blaming’ in accidental situations (ambiguous valences). These impairments can confirm the association between ToM and moral reasoning.     

Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences

Two samples, one gifted, the other “normal,” of 30 children each (11 to 13 years of age) were matched on age, sex, race, and father's occupation. A parent of each child completed the Children's Behavioral Classification Project instrument, and a profile of 30 scaled scores was obtained for each protocol. A discriminant analysis on the basis of the profiles classified 50 of the 60 Ss correctly into their respective sample category, either gifted or normal. Though the results of a multivariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences between the groups when the 30 profile factors were viewed as a whole, univariate analyses on the separate factors yielded significant group differences on several related factors. These were interpreted with caution. Additional factors displayed significant sex differences and one demonstrated a group-by-sex interaction effect.

Coefficients of pattern similarity (the r_p ) were computed among all pairs of the 60 Ss. An unweighted average linkage cluster analysis grouped 34 of the 60 Ss into six clusters which accounted for 26 of 30 possible gifted children.

After an item analysis was performed on the original data, a 42 item subscale of the CBCP questionnaire was constructed which correctly classified 31 of 40 individuals in a cross-validation sample.