The Myth of Reverse Compositionality

In the context of debates about what form a theory of meaning should take, it is sometimes claimed that one cannot understand an intersective modifier-head construction (e.g., ‘pet fish’) without understanding its lexical parts. Neo-Russellians like Fodor and Lepore contend that non-denotationalist theories of meaning, such as prototype theory and theory theory, cannot explain why this is so, because they cannot provide for the ‘reverse compositional’ character of meaning. I argue that reverse compositionality is a red herring in these debates. I begin by setting out some positive arguments for reverse compositionality and showing that they fail. Then I show that the principle of reverse compositionality has two big strikes against it. First, it is incompatible with all theories of meaning on the market, including the denotationalism favored by neo-Russellians. Second, it explains nothing that is not already explained by its venerable predecessor, the principle of (forward) compositionality.     

Two Ways to Smoke a Cigarette

In the early part of the paper, I attempt to explain a dispute between two parties who endorse the compositionality of language but disagree about its implications: Paul Horwich, and Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore. In the remainder of the paper, I challenge the thesis on which they are agreed, that compositionality can be taken for granted. I suggest that it is not clear what compositionality involves nor whether it obtains. I consider some kinds of apparent counterexamples, and compositionalist responses to them in terms of covert indexicality and unspecific meanings. I argue that the last option is the best for most of the cases I consider. I conclude by stressing, as against Horwich and Fodor and Lepore, that the appropriate question concerns the extent to which compositionality obtains in a natural language, rather than whether it obtains or not, so that the answer is essentially messy, requiring detailed consideration of a wide range of examples.     

Why Compositionality Won't Go Away: Reflections on Horwich's 'Deflationary' Theory

Paul Horwich argues for a 'deflationary'account of compositionality, according to which, '. . . the compositionality of meaning imposes no constraint at all on how the meaning properties of words are constituted'. We have arrived at a tentative diagnosis, which is that Horwich fails to enforce several distinctions that turn out to be crucial. For example, sometimes he puts his main conclusion in the way we just quoted but sometimes, even on the following page, he puts it like this: 'understanding one of oneÕs own complex expressions (non-idiomatically) is, by definition, nothing over and above understanding its parts and knowing how they are combined'. We propose, in what follows, to consider how Horwich's deflationary account of compositionality fares if the distinction between theories of meaning and theories of understanding is properly attended to. Here's how we think it all turns out:
– Horwich is right to claim that compositionality is neutral with respect to the metaphysics of understanding expressions when 'understanding' refers to a (merely) dispositional state; but not when it refers to an occurrent state.
– Horwich is right strictu dictu to claim that compositionality is neutral with respect to the character of lexical meanings, but only strictu dictu.
– Compositionality taken, together with other constraints that semantic theories are required to satisfy, reduces the options in the theory of lexical meaning to a bare minimum.
The first part of the paper is about compositionality and understanding, the second part is about compositionality and lexical meaning.     

What Compositionality Still Can Do

Proponents of deflationism about meaning often claim that the principle of compositionality, when properly understood, places no constraint whatsoever on the nature of lexical meaning. This deflationary thesis admits of both strong and weak readings. On the strong reading, the principle does not rule out any theory of lexical meaning either alone or in conjunction with other independently plausible semantic assumptions. On the weak reading, the principle alone does not rule out any such theory. I argue that, though weak deflationism about compositionality has better initial prospects than strong, neither version of the thesis is credible. In particular, weak deflationism cannot be maintained in conformity with the deflationist commitment to explaining facts about phrase meanings in compositional terms, that is, by appeal to facts about the lexicon.     

Truth or Meaning? A Question of Priority

There is an incompatibility between the deflationist approach to truth, which makes truth transparent on the basis of an antecedent grasp of meaning, and the traditional endeavour, exemplified by Davidson, to explicate meaning through of truth. I suggest that both parties are in the explanatory red: deflationist lack a non‐truth‐involving theory of meaning and Davidsonians lack a non‐deflationary account of truth. My focus is on the attempts of the latter party to resolve their problem. I look in detail at Davidson's more recent work and suggest that it seeks to articulate a primitive notion of truth that may balance between a notion that collapses into deflationism and one that is wholly subsumed under a general theory of interpretation. I conclude that this tightrope walk is ultimately unsuccessful. Equally, however, some reasons are provided for thinking that deflationism might be equally unsuccessful with its problem. ‘Truth or meaning?’remains an open question.     

A Non-Compositional Inferential Role Theory

I propose a version of inferential role theory which says that having a concept is having the disposition to draw most of the inferences based on the stereotypical features associated with this concept. I defend this view against Fodor and Lepore’s objection that it violates compositionality. I show that it is possible to account for productivity and systematicity without assuming compositionality.     

Tension within Triangulation

Philosophers disagree about how meaning connects with history. Donald Davidson, who helped deepen our understanding of meaning, even disagreed with himself. As Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig note, Davidson's account of radical interpretation treats meaning as ahistorical; his Swampman thought experiment treats it as historical. Here I show that while Lepore and Ludwig are right that Davidson's views are in tension, they are wrong about its extent. Unbeknownst to them, Davidson's account of radical interpretation and Swampman thought experiment both rely—in different ways—on the same model of triangulation. I revise one of those ways to resolve the tension within Davidson's views. I close by detailing what role history should play in Davidson's views overall.     

What is Radical Interpretation? Davidson,Fodor, and the Naturalization of Philosophy

Jerry Fodor and Ernest Lepore have recently criticized Davidson's methodology of radical interpretation because of its apparent failure to reflect how actual interpretation is achieved. Responding to such complaints, Davidson claims that he is not interested in the empirical issues surrounding actual interpretation but instead focuses on the question of what conditions make interpretation possible. It is argued that this exchange between Fodor and Lepore on one side, and Davidson on the other, cannot be viewed simply as a naturalist reaction to non-naturalist philosophical inquiry. Through a careful excavation of the hidden assumptions and commitments underlying this debate, we recognize a more serious disagreement over the intellectual obligations of naturalism; a position with a firm hold on current philosophical imaginations. In the process, we gain a new appreciation for how such commitments shape these naturalist positions, and recognize that any resolution to this specific debate will require careful attention to the divergent commitments that are its real source.     

Is even thought compositional?

Fodor (Mind Lang 16:1–15, 2001) endorses the mixed view that thought, yet not language, is compositional. That is, Fodor accepts the arguments of radical pragmatics that language is not compositional, but he claims these arguments do not apply to thought. My purpose here is to evaluate this mixed position: Assuming that the radical pragmaticists are right that language is not compositional, what arguments can be provided in support of the claim that thought is compositional? Before such arguments can be evaluated, the relevant notion of compositionality must be clarified. So I first clarify this notion of compositionality, and then consider three arguments in support of the mixed position. All three of these arguments are found to be inadequate, and thus I conclude that the mixed position is unstable: If one endorses the arguments of radical pragmatics against the compositionality of language, then one should also reject the compositionality of thought.     

Connectionist representation,semantic compositionality,and the instability of concept structure

Summary In the present paper connectionist approaches to the problem of internal representation and the nature of concepts are discussed. In the first part the concept of representation that underlies connectionist modeling is made explicit. It is argued that the connectionist view of representation relies on a correlational theory of semantic content- i.e., the covariation between internal and external states is taken as the basis for ascribing meaning to internal states. The problems and virtues of such a correlational approach to internal representation are addressed. The second part of the paper is concerned with whether connectionism is capable of accounting for the apparent productivity and systematicity of language and thought. There is an evaluation of the recent arguments of Fodor and Pylyshyn, who claim that systematicity can only be explained if one conceives of mental representations as structured symbols composed of context-free constituents. There is a review of empirical evidence that strongly suggests that concepts are not fixed memory structures and that the meaning of constituent symbols varies, depending on the context in which they are embedded. On the basis of this review it is concluded that the meaning of a complex expression is not computed from the context-free meanings of the constituents, and that strong compositionality, as endorsed by Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), seems implausible as a process theory for the comprehension of complex concepts. Instead, the hypothesis is endorsed that constraint satisfaction in distributed connectionist networks may allow for an alternative account of weak compositionality compatible with the context sensitivity of meaning. In the final section, it is argued that neither mere implementation of a language of thought in connectionist networks nor radical elimination of symbol systems seems to be a fruitful research strategy, but that it might be more useful to discuss how connectionist systems can develop the capacity to use external symbol systems like language or logic without instantiating symbol systems themselves.     

Reinflating Truth as an Explanatory Concept

Abstract: Despite his protests, there have been numerous efforts to enroll Davidson in the deflationist program. Michael Williams has recently continued this enterprise, arguing that a truth-theoretic Davidsonian approach to meaning can be harnessed to a deflationary approach to truth. It is our contention that Williams' attempt is unsuccessful.     

Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?

Abstract

Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.     

Language Learning in Wittgenstein and Davidson

In this paper, I discuss language learning in Wittgenstein and Davidson. Starting from a remark by Bakhurst, I hold that both Wittgenstein and Davidson’s philosophies of language contain responses to the problem of language learning, albeit of a different form. Following Williams, I hold that the concept of language learning can explain Wittgenstein’s approach to the normativity of meaning in the Philosophical Investigations. Turning to Davidson, I hold that language learning can, equally, explain Davidson’s theory of triangulation. I sketch an account of triangulation as Davidson’s response to the problem of the normativity of meaning and explain the role that language learning plays in this account.     

SCIENCE AND SEMANTICS: THE CASE OF VAGUENESS AND SUPERVALUATION*

Abstract: It is widely assumed that the methods and results of science have no place among the data to which our semantics of vague predicates must answer. This despite the fact that it is well known that such prototypical vague predicates as ‘is bald’ play a central role in scientific research (e.g. the research that established Rogaine as a treatment for baldness). I argue here that the assumption is false and costly: in particular, I argue one cannot accept either supervaluationist semantics, or the criticism of that semantics offered by Fodor and Lepore, without having to abandon accepted, and unexceptionable, scientific methodology.     

Compositionality: A Connectionist Variation on a Classical Theme

Connectionism has been attacked on the grounds that it does not employ compositionally structured representations (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). This article develops the response that Connectionist models can, and in fact sometimes do, employ compositionally structured representations without, thereby, simply implementing a Classical “Language of Thought.” Focusing on the mode of combination employed in constructing representations, it distinguishes concatenative compositionality, essential to the Classical approach, from a merely functional counterpart increasingly common in Connectionist research. On the basis of this distinction it is possible to demonstrate that Connectionist representations can be compositional without being Classical, and further, that Fodor and Pylyshyn's supposedly conclusive arguments in favor of the Classical approach do not in fact support that approach over the Connectionist alternative (as opposed to an “ossociotionist” straw man).     

Minimalism on quotation? Critical review of Cappelen and Lepore’s language turned on itself

Research on quotation has mostly focussed in the past years on ??mixed?? or ??open?? quotation. In a recent book-length discussion of the topic, Cappelen and Lepore have abandon their previous Davidsonian allegiances, proposing a new view that they describe as minimalist, to a good extend on the basis of facts concerning mixed quotation. In this paper I critically review Cappelen and Lepore??s new minimalist proposals, briefly outlining my preferred Davidsonian view as a useful foil. I explore first their allegedly non-Davidsonian, anti-contextualist views about pure quotation, and then their new views on mixed quotation. I have complained in the first place that their proposals are not presented as perspicuously as they should be; and in the second place that, when we have a clearer picture of what appears to be the favoured account, the differences with their previous proposals and others already in the literature are not as great as they claim.     

Self-defence Against the Innocent

Do we have the right to defend ourselves against innocent aggressors? If I amattacked in a lift by a knife-wielding lunatic, may I kill or maim him to protect my own life? On one view the insane man’s plight is his bad luck and I am under no obligation to let it be transferred to me. On the opposing view it is my bad luck to be under attack and I have no right to transfer it to an innocent man by killing him to protect myself. It is perhaps becauseneither of these opposing viewpoints is obviously preferable to the other that there is no consensus about the question. Nevertheless we can find considerations for favouring the first view over the second.     

The ‘Compositional Rigidity’ of Recognitionality

Abstract

Empiricist philosophers of mind have long maintained that the possession conditions of many concepts include recognitional abilities. One of Jerry Fodor's recent attacks on empiricist semantics proceeds by attempting to demonstrate that there are no such, ‘recognitional’ concepts. His argument is built on the claim that if there were such concepts, they would not compose: i.e., they would exhibit properties which are not in general ‘inherited’ by complex concepts of which they are components. Debate between Fodor and his critics on this issue has focused on his construal of compositionality, the critics in effect advocating a weaker conception than that assumed by Fodor. I argue that the critics' contention is under-motivated, and in the current context ad hoc. But there is something else wrong with Fodor's argument. He misidentifies the notion of recognitionality in which the empiricist should trade. A proper understanding of recognitionality allows us to disarm Fodor's argument without resolving the question about compositionality that divides Fodor and his critics. I end with two very general remarks. First a contention about the motivation for empiricist semantics, and second, a suggestion that my proposal about recognitionality may be extended to disarm a more familiar and influential type of concern about their viability.     

Compositional Semantics and Normative ‘Ought’

According to the paradigm view in linguistics and philosophical semantics, it is lexical semantics (LS) plus the principle of compositionality (PC) that allows us to compute the meaning of an arbitrary sentence. The job of LS is to assign meaning to individual expressions, whereas PC says how to combine these individual meanings into larger ones. In this paper I argue that the pair LS?+?PC fails to account for the discourse-relevant meaning of normative ‘ought’. If my hypothesis is tenable, then the failure of LS?+?CS extends to normative language in general. The reason I offer that this is so is that semantics for normative language is, in an important respect, a substantive semantics (SS). The ‘substantive’ in question means that the meaning of normative vocabulary in use is driven by metanormative views associated with a particular normative concept. SS rejects the model LS?+?CS and replaces it with a discourse-relevant semantics built around an interactional principle that ascribes to a particular surface syntactical form of ‘ought’ sentences a logical form that represents its discourse-salient normative content. In the paper I shall sketch how SS works and why it is worth serious consideration.

     

Sociality,Expression, and This Thing called Language

Davidson’s well-known language skepticism—the claim that there is no such a thing as a language—has recognizably Gricean underpinnings, some of which also underlie his continuity skepticism—the claim that there can be no philosophically illuminating account of the emergence of language and thought. My first aim in this paper is to highlight aspects of the complicated relationship between central Davidsonian and Gricean ideas concerning language. After a brief review of Davidson’s two skeptical claims and their Gricean underpinnings, I provide my own take on how Davidson’s continuity skepticism can be resisted consistently with his rejection of the Gricean priority claim, yet without giving up some of Grice’s own insights regarding the origins of meaning.