Busting Out: Predictive Brains,Embodied Minds,and the Puzzle of the Evidentiary Veil

Biological brains are increasingly cast as ‘prediction machines’: evolved organs whose core operating principle is to learn about the world by trying to predict their own patterns of sensory stimulation. This, some argue, should lead us to embrace a brain‐bound ‘neurocentric’ vision of the mind. The mind, such views suggest, consists entirely in the skull‐bound activity of the predictive brain. In this paper I reject the inference from predictive brains to skull‐bound minds. Predictive brains, I hope to show, can be apt participants in larger cognitive circuits. The path is thus cleared for a new synthesis in which predictive brains act as entry‐points for ‘extended minds’, and embodiment and action contribute constitutively to knowing contact with the world.     

Learning As Support For Organizational Innovation: Possibilities And Limitations

Abstract

The present article tells an intervention story where two collectives, from business and academia, came together to address a business problem through collaborative action research. Among other things, the project created new ways of learning and therefore, knowing about the “business problem.” The author argues that in order to talk about an organizational intervention in a learning context, it was helpful to focus observation at the level of practice, in this case the different learning practices brought to the project by the organization and the research group. The “scientific narrative” focuses on how the two practices interacted. The present story's plot revolves around the following questions: What happens when one collective—used to a particular style of learning—decides to engage with another collective with a different approach to learning and what are the consequences for organizational innovation?     

Blind Intuitions: Modernism's Critique of Idealism

Adorno contends that something of what we think of knowing and rational agency operate in ways that obscure and deform unique, singular presentations by relegating them to survival-driven interests and needs; hence, in accordance with the presumptions of transcendental idealism, we have come to mistake what are, in effect, historically contingent, species-subjective ways of viewing the world for an objective understanding of the world. And further, this interested understanding of the world is deforming in a more radical way than just obscuring what is there for the sake of interested needs and purposes; these instrumental ways of knowing and acting, are broadly self-interested, in the interest of survival, without effective concern for the well-being and worth of others; by becoming generalized and exclusive, hegemonic, by driving out modes of encountering things and persons that support their differences and independence, their needs and interests, these instrumental practices are the deepest cause of the ills of our time. As heightened forms of rational self-interest, self-interest being the drive of reason, transcendental interests suppress the interests of others. Adorno argues that modernist artistic practices perform a critique of the set of assumptions governing idealism by demonstrating how there is a suppressed rational form of human comportment directed towards the making and comprehension of unique sensuous particulars. Art, according to Adorno's ‘Aesthetic Theory’, is a broken off and isolated fragment of human knowing; in its hibernates the rational forms of acting and knowing that have been suppressed in the coming to be of Enlightened modernity.     

Xunzi on Moral Expertise

This paper is about two proposals endorsed by Xunzi. The first is that there is such a thing as a moral expert, whose moral advice we should adopt even when we cannot appreciate for ourselves the considerations in favor of it. The second is that certain political authorities should be treated as moral experts. I identify three fundamental questions about moral expertise that contemporary philosophy has yet to address in depth, explicate Xunzi??s answers to them, and then give an account of politically authorized moral expertise as Xunzi understands it. The three questions at the heart of this study are these: how should we distinguish between knowing the correct course of action on another??s authority and knowing it for oneself? What exactly are the underlying considerations that the expert grasps and the novice does not? Who are the experts and in what spheres of life can they legitimately claim expertise?     

Thinking with the Weight of the Earth: Feminist Contributions to an Epistemology of Concreteness

This essay proposes a possible direction for feminist epistemology—an embodied rationality that defines the process of knowing as a dialogue with particulars or the “things themselves.” On the grounds that modem reality is marked by abstract projects of homo mensura, I argue that the task of postmodernism is to ground cognition in the world by breaking the habit of looking at the world, as if from a distance, and by ceasing to think about the world as if it were composed of a collection of objects-in-general.     

Scepticism and the Senses

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to identify and to suggest reasons to reject those assumptions about the nature and scope of perceptual knowledge that appear to make an unacceptable scepticism the only strictly defensible answer to the philosophical problem of knowledge of the world in general. The suggestion is that our knowing things about the world around us by perception can be satisfactorily explained only if we can be understood to sometimes perceive that such‐and‐such is so, where what we perceive to be so is the very state of the world that we thereby know to be so. This is not proposed as a better answer to the philosophical problem, but as a way of seeing how that problem as traditionally understood could not really present a threat to anyone who can think about the world at all.     

Life story research: A relevant methodology for counsellors and psychotherapists

Aims: This paper introduces, describes and proposes life story research as an important, relevant and appropriate contribution to counselling and psychotherapy research. It shows how narrative knowledge is created and constructed through the stories people tell about their lived experiences and explores the concept of ‘narrative knowing’ (Bruner, 1986). Methods: Drawing on life story research with people who linked their history of problematic drug use with experiences of historic trauma/abuse, the paper contributes to the ongoing discussion related to the similarities/differences between therapy and research and what we might learn from each that informs the other. Implications for practice: The paper offers narrative ideas and practices as ways of researching matters of social and psychological importance. It suggests that therapists (and counselling researchers) could learn from what participants tell us about the therapeutic value of using life story methods which one participant described as helping him to face ‘out into the world, without unduly or specifically delving into, or focusing on [my] emotional state’. This learning may be particularly relevant for therapists working with traumatised clients.     

Political accountability,public constitution of recent past and the collective memory of socio‐political events: A discursive analysis

This paper presents a discursive analysis of a political news interview as a site for the interactional organization of the public constitution of recent past. In a context of commemoration and finding out the truth about the past, the focus is on how the collective memory of socio‐political events and political accountability is managed and what discursive practices representatives of nation‐states draw upon to understand and construct ideological representations of socio‐political events, namely the Romanian ‘revolution’ of 1989. The analysis shows how the possibility versus the actuality of knowing the truth about the events, (political) accountability and stake for actions are discussed, framed and given significance by constituting the ‘events’ of 1989 as ‘revolution’. The analysis further reveals how this ascribed categorial meaning is used by the interviewee as background for delegitimizing critical voices and sidestepping responsibility for past actions and knowing the truth. Social and community psychologists can learn more about how individuals and communities construct ideological versions of socio‐political events by considering the interplay between questions of political accountability and arguments over the meaning of political categories, and engaging with the accounting practices in which the meaning of socio‐political events is being negotiated by members of society Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The knowledge argument,the open question argument,and the moral problem

Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem.     

Explaining Normative Versus Nonnormative Action: The Role of Implicit Theories

The current research investigates what motivates people to engage in normative versus nonnormative action. Prior research has shown that different emotions lead to different types of action. We argue that these differing emotions are determined by a more basic characteristic, namely, implicit theories about whether groups and the world in general can change. We hypothesized that incremental theories (beliefs that groups/the world can change) would predict normative action, and entity theories (beliefs that groups/the world cannot change) as well as group identification would predict nonnormative action. We conducted a pilot in the context of protests against a government plan to relocate Bedouin villages in Israel and a main study during the Israeli social protests of the middle class. Results revealed three distinct pathways to collective action. First, incremental theories about the world predicted hope, which predicted normative action. Second, incremental theories about groups and group identification predicted anger, which also predicted normative collective action. Lastly, entity theories about groups predicted nonnormative collective action through hatred, but only for participants who were highly identified with the group. In sum, people who believed in the possibility of change supported normative action, whereas those who believed change was not possible supported nonnormative action.     

Playing the fool: Activists' performances of emotion in policy making spaces

This paper draws upon dramaturgical concepts from performance studies scholarship to examine how situated performance and context enmesh with the emotional content of the practices of policy making. Drawing on sociological dramaturgical perspectives, the cultural and literary criticism that inspired them, and in particular Bahktin's concepts of the grotesque and heteroglossia, I investigate the subversive use of humour in policy work as a way of revealing “emotional knowledge” about the issues under discussion. First I set out the way “emotion” was understood by participants in an NGO's programme of policy activities as a mode of knowing the world, and how emotion and rationality were embodied in the forums by activists and civil servants respectively. I take as a case study activists “playing the Fool” within a programme of policy work in which I conducted ethnographic research. These performances, once set within a mise-en-scène that includes furniture, smells, lighting and the physicality of the people involved, create complex, unsettling and intersecting networks of meaning about power and knowledge in policy work. I argue that such a dramaturgical approach to interpreting the work of making policy challenges scholars to accurately represent the multiplicity of meanings of “emotion” at play in any context.     

Simulation and Understanding Other Minds

There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mind‐reading, behavior‐reading, and simulation each have and need to have in our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is implemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring understanding of another's action despite involving no higher‐order processing, whereas most epistemologists writing about understanding think that it requires reflective access to one's grounds, which is closer to the intuitions of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what it is that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of the context of cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1) that theoretical mind‐reading and simulation bring understanding in virtue of the same epistemic feature, and 2) why the kind of motor representation without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient for action understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be paid to the potential disadvantages of a simulative method of knowing. Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring vulnerability, wear and tear on one's personal equipment, and unintended mimicry.     

Practice on the margins: reflections from the disability services sector

People labelled with disabilities are frequently positioned on the margins of society. Their positioning points to discursive practices underpinned by ableism which place and keep them there. In this article, a scenario based on actual events is used to reflect upon professional practice. The story is situated in a disability service, an area of practice located at the margins of the broader Human Services sector. The scenario raises important questions about how to establish respectful and productive relationships with people, develop person-centred practices which contribute to personal knowing and transformation, balance rights and risk, equitably manage relations of power and fulfil societal expectations on the provision of care. In this article, the author explores how reflection can negotiate meaning, challenge ableism and expose disablist practices. She seeks to open spaces where one might begin to re-story professional practices by centring the lived experiences of those who inhabit the margins.     

WHAT IT TAKES TO LIVE PHILOSOPHICALLY: OR,HOW TO PROGRESS IN THE ART OF LIVING

This essay presents an account of what it takes to live a philosophical way of life: practitioners must be committed to a worldview, structure their lives around it, and engage in truth-directed practices. Contra John Cooper, it does not require that one’s life be solely guided by reason. Religious or tradition-based ways of life count as truth directed as long as their practices are reasons responsive and would be truth directed if the claims made by their way of life are correct. The essay argues that these three conditions can be met by progressors as well as sages. Making progress in how one acts in the world, and improving one’s understanding and direction through being part of a community is living a philosophical way of life. The offered view acknowledges more ways to develop the art of living and enables a broader range of people to count as living philosophically.     

The Automaton Self: Defensive organisation,psychodynamics and treatment approaches

Abstract

This paper is not primarily concerned with the content of theory and what we then, in the light of this and of our own experience, say to our clients. Rather, it is concerned with the nature of this knowledge that we are using and that the client in turn uses and experiences in the counselling.

How, or the way in which, we know, defines our knowledge as much as the actual content of that knowledge. The paper delineates two fundamental ways of knowing. One is our ordinary practical and rational way of understanding reality and is usually about achieving some goal – this is what I am calling the product side of counselling: the other is concerned with our more immediate first-hand experiential knowing of ourselves and our world.

The paper opens with a definition of these two kinds of knowledge, product and process, and presents some clinical material to show how these different ways of knowing can have a real effect on the counselling. It then moves on to the question of why counselling trainings are becoming increasingly concerned with product knowledge, and ends with a discussion of how Freud himself was constantly using both ways of knowing as if they were the same, without understanding the implications of this for therapeutic practice.     

Persons as Sui Generis Ontological Kinds: Advice to Exceptionists

Many metaphysicians tell us that our world is one in which persisting objects are four‐dimensionally extended in time, and persist by being partially present at each moment at which they exist. Many normative theorists tell us that at least some of our core normative practices are justified only if the relation that holds between a person at one time, and that person at another time, is the relation of strict identity. If these metaphysicians are right about the nature of our world, and these normative theorists are right about what justifies our normative practices, then we should be error theorists about the justification of at least some of our core normative practices and in turn, arguably we should eliminate those practices for which justification is lacking. This paper offers a way of resolving the tension between these two views that does not lead into the grips of error theory. It is a way that is amenable to “exceptionists” about persons: those who think there is something special about persons and the first‐person perspective; that personhood cannot be explained naturalistically, and the first‐person perspective is naturalistically irreducible. The conclusion is thus a conditional: given that one is an exceptionist, an attractive way to resolve this tension is to embrace the view that persons are sui generis ontological kinds.     

Intergroup relations in action: Questions asked about lesbian,gay and bisexual issues in diversity training

This paper focuses on the questions which heterosexual trainees ask about lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) experience within diversity training about LGB issues. Drawing on a data corpus of 162 questions asked by trainees in 13 tape‐recorded training sessions, questions were coded into six categories: (1) general ‘understanding’ questions; (2) questions about the trainer's life, experience and practices; (3) professional practice questions; (4) questions about lesbian and gay related legislation, policies and procedures; (5) questions about specific people and projects and (6) questions about the meanings, derivations and correct use of terms and symbols. ‘Real’ questions are compared with the decontexualized questions (and answers to them) that are provided in training manuals and it is demonstrated that these questions differ markedly from how questions actually get asked and how they actually get answered. Recommendations are provided for improving training and the argument made for turning towards analyses of the real world in action, especially when considering intergroup relations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Politics on the Couch? Psychotherapy and Society—Some Possibilities and Some Limitations

The ideas and practices of psychotherapy, together with fresh thinking from many other sources, can help to revitalize Western politics which seem broken and moribund. The author describes various professional experiences of his own at the interface of politics and psychotherapy. These include consulting with mainstream and activist politicians and groupings. He discusses how politics in the West is changing in the general direction of what he calls “transformative politics.” He also asks if psychotherapists can make a difference in the political world today, explaining that, though enthusiastic about the prospect, he is also skeptical about it because the record of psychotherapists' involvement in politics is not very good. The paper includes an experiential and personally oriented section (“The Inner Politician”) that looks at how the political self is formed in culture, family, and the inner world. The notion of differing political styles as a source of conflict is explained and explored. The author concludes with some reflections on the relations between psychotherapy, politics, and spirituality.