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Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):79-86
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long
as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples
fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person
will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is
consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. 相似文献
3.
Ben Kotzee 《Argumentation》2010,24(3):265-281
In this paper, a challenge is outlined for Walton’s recent analysis of the fallacy of poisoning the well. An example of the
fallacy in action during a debate on affirmative action on a South African campus is taken to raise the question of how Walton’s
analysis squares with the idea that disadvantaged parties in debates about race may be “epistemically privileged”. It is asked
when the background of a participant is relevant to a debate and it is proposed that a proper analysis of the poisoning the
well will outline conditions under which making one participant’s background an issue in a debate would be legitimate and
illegitimate. Expanding Walton’s analysis to deal with the challenge, it is concluded that calling into question a participant’s
suitability to take part in a debate is never legitimate when it is based simply on a broad fact about their background (like
their race or gender). 相似文献
4.
Daniele Porello 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):99-119
In this paper, I discuss the analysis of logic in the pragmatic approach recently proposed by Brandom. I consider different
consequence relations, formalized by classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, and I will argue that the formal theory developed
by Brandom, even if provides powerful foundational insights on the relationship between logic and discursive practices, cannot
account for important reasoning patterns represented by non-monotonic or resource-sensitive inferences. Then, I will present
an incompatibility semantics in the framework of linear logic which allow to refine Brandom’s concept of defeasible inference
and to account for those non-monotonic and relevant inferences that are expressible in linear logic. Moreover, I will suggest
an interpretation of discursive practices based on an abstract notion of agreement on what counts as a reason which is deeply
connected with linear logic semantics. 相似文献
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Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):405-415
Some philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status
(rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial
motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue
that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, in some cases, appears
to bring about) a change in deontic status. 相似文献
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Danielle Macbeth 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):27-39
In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project of analysis to encompass various relationships
between meaning and use. As the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical relations between vocabularies
so Brandom’s extended project seeks to clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies. The
point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist
critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that such understanding is appropriate to the case of
natural language, the very idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My aim is to clarify the
prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with what
I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as developed by Peirce. 相似文献
7.
David Lauer 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):55-73
Robert Brandom defends the intelligibility of the notion of a fully discursive practice that does not include any kind of
logical vocabulary. Logical vocabulary, according to his account, should be understood as an optional extra to discursive
practice, not as a necessary ingredient. Call this the Layer Cake Picture of the relation of logical to non-logical discursive
practices. The aim pursued in this paper is to show, by way of an internal critique, that the Layer Cake Picture is in fact
incompatible with the most central claims of Brandom’s philosophy. A way is sketched how to give up the Layer Cake Picture
and still hold on to a position that is central to Brandom’s philosophical outlook, namely his expressivism about logic. 相似文献
8.
Neal DeRoo 《Husserl Studies》2011,27(1):1-12
In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis
of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi’s concern),
but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of
Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper provides a new, more precise vocabulary in which to carry on the debate,
in the hopes of bringing it to a mutually satisfactory resolution. After briefly laying out the terms of the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski
debate (Sect. 2), I then elaborate a three-fold distinction in consciousness from the Analyses (Sect. 3) and relate that back to the issue of objectivity in the debate (Sect. 4). I end by suggesting how this three-fold model from the Analyses helps us preserve the essentially tripartite structure (as Brough and Sokolowski insist we do) while not making one of these
levels the object of another (in keeping with Zahavi’s critique) (Sect. 5). 相似文献
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Albert J. J. Anglberger 《Studia Logica》2008,89(3):427-435
In Meyer’s promising account [7] deontic logic is reduced to a dynamic logic. Meyer claims that with his account “we get rid
of most (if not all) of the nasty paradoxes that have plagued traditional deontic logic.” But as was shown by van der Meyden
in [4], Meyer’s logic also contains a paradoxical formula. In this paper we will show that another paradox can be proven,
one which also effects Meyer’s “solution” to contrary to duty obligations and his logic in general.
Presented by Hannes Leitgeb 相似文献
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In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. 相似文献
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Michelle Ciurria 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):259-269
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action
as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed
to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a
person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In
this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be
supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining
its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases.
I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break
down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. 相似文献
13.
Jan Broersen 《Journal of Applied Logic》2004,2(1):153
Dynamic deontic logics reduce normative assertions about explicit complex actions to standard dynamic logic assertions about the relation between complex actions and violation conditions. We address two general, but related problems in this field. The first is to find a formalization of the notion of ‘action negation’ that (1) has an intuitive interpretation as an action forming combinator and (2) does not impose restrictions on the use of other relevant action combinators such as sequence and iteration, and (3) has a meaningful interpretation in the normative context. The second problem we address concerns the reduction from deontic assertions to dynamic logic assertions. Our first point is that we want this reduction to obey the free-choice semantics for norms. For ought-to-be deontic logics it is generally accepted that the free-choice semantics is counter-intuitive. But for dynamic deontic logics we actually consider it a viable, if not, the better alternative. Our second concern with the reduction is that we want it to be more liberal than the ones that were proposed before in the literature. For instance, Meyer's reduction does not leave room for action whose normative status is neither permitted nor forbidden. We test the logics we define in this paper against a set of minimal logic requirements. 相似文献
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Todd Bernard Weber 《Argumentation》2002,16(4):459-472
In this paper I argue for modesty concerning what theoretical reason can accomplish in the moral dilemmas debate. Specifically, I contend that philosophers' conclusions for or against moral dilemmas are driven less by rational argument and more by how the moral world intuitively appears to them.I support this thesis by first considering an argument against moral dilemmas, the argument from deontic logic, and showing that its persuasive force depends on one's having already accepted its conclusion. I then make a different, and general, case that any argument in the moral dilemmas debate concerning the defeasibility of conflicting obligations can be marginalized by making not-unreasonable adjustments in the conditions for wrongdoing.These two strands of argument are related by the notion of inescapable wrongdoing. It is our standing intuitions about inescapable wrongdoing which make the relevant deontic logical principles plausible or implausible to us. And whether wrongdoing can be inescapable is central to deciding what the conditions for wrongdoing are. My conclusion is that the arguments in the moral dilemmas debate merely implement whatever standing intuition we have concerning inescapable wrongdoing, and that apart from any such intuition the arguments are unpersuasive. 相似文献
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Tomoyuki Yamada 《Synthese》2008,165(2):295-315
In this paper, illocutionary acts of commanding will be differentiated from perlocutionary acts that affect preferences of
addressees in a new dynamic logic which combines the preference upgrade introduced in DEUL (dynamic epistemic upgrade logic) by van Benthem and Liu with the deontic update introduced in ECL II (eliminative command logic II) by Yamada. The resulting logic will incorporate J. L. Austin’s distinction between illocutionary
acts as acts having mere conventional effects and perlocutionary acts as acts having real effects upon attitudes and actions
of agents, and help us understand why saying so can make it so in explicit performative utterances. We will also discuss how
acts of commanding give rise to so-called “deontic dilemmas” and how we can accommodate most deontic dilemmas without triggering
so-called “deontic explosion”. 相似文献
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Kyung-Man Kim 《Human Studies》2011,34(4):393-406
Although the success of Habermas’s theory of communicative action depends on his dialogical model of understanding in which
a theorist is supposed to participate in the debate with the actors as a ‘virtual participant’ and seek context-transcendent
truth through the exchange of speech acts, current literature on the theory of communicative action rarely touches on the
difficulties it entails. In the first part of this paper, I will examine Habermas’s argument that understanding other cultural
practices requires the interpreter to virtually participate in the “dialogue” with the actors as to the rationality of their
cultural practice and discuss why, according to Habermas,such dialogue leads to the “context-transcendent truth”. In the second
part, by using a concrete historical example, I will reconstruct a “virtual dialogue” between Habermas and Michael Polanyi
as to the rationality of scientific practice and indicate why Habermas’s dialogical model of understanding based on the methodology
of virtual participation cannot achieve what it professes to do. 相似文献
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Hent de Vries 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2006,60(1-3):77-97
This essay discusses Stanley Cavell’s remarkable interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought against the background of his
own ongoing engagement with Wittgenstein, Austin, and the problem of other minds. This unlikely debate, the only extensive
discussion of Levinas by Cavell in his long philosophical career sofar, focuses on their different reception of Descartes’s
idea of the infinite. The essay proposes to read both thinkers against the background of Wittgenstein’s model of philosophical
meditation and raises the question as to whether Cavell and Levinas do not indirectly shed light on the early modern motif
of the spiritual automaton. 相似文献
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In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes,
as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collins’s theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents’
mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide
logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they
allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory. 相似文献
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Kjartan Koch Mikalsen 《Res Publica》2010,16(1):23-40
It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible
with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations
have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not
considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently
substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor
with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology
of testimony. 相似文献