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1.
Danielle Macbeth 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):27-39
In his Locke Lectures Brandom proposes to extend what he calls the project of analysis to encompass various relationships
between meaning and use. As the traditional project of analysis sought to clarify various logical relations between vocabularies
so Brandom’s extended project seeks to clarify various pragmatically mediated semantic relations between vocabularies. The
point of the exercise in both cases is to achieve what Brandom thinks of as algebraic understanding. Because the pragmatist
critique of the traditional project of analysis was precisely to deny that such understanding is appropriate to the case of
natural language, the very idea of an analytic pragmatism is called into question by that critique. My aim is to clarify the
prospects for Brandom’s project, or at least something in the vicinity of that project, through a comparison of it with what
I will suggest we can think of as Kant’s analytic pragmatism as developed by Peirce. 相似文献
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Daniele Porello 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):99-119
In this paper, I discuss the analysis of logic in the pragmatic approach recently proposed by Brandom. I consider different
consequence relations, formalized by classical, intuitionistic and linear logic, and I will argue that the formal theory developed
by Brandom, even if provides powerful foundational insights on the relationship between logic and discursive practices, cannot
account for important reasoning patterns represented by non-monotonic or resource-sensitive inferences. Then, I will present
an incompatibility semantics in the framework of linear logic which allow to refine Brandom’s concept of defeasible inference
and to account for those non-monotonic and relevant inferences that are expressible in linear logic. Moreover, I will suggest
an interpretation of discursive practices based on an abstract notion of agreement on what counts as a reason which is deeply
connected with linear logic semantics. 相似文献
5.
Luca Baccelli 《Res Publica》2011,17(4):369-376
This paper offers a critical analysis of two central issues in Luigi Ferrajoli’s Principia iuris, and more generally of his theory of rights. One is the way in which ‘expectations’ play a crucial role in his deontic theory
by establishing the logical basis for his guarantee-based conception of law and rights. The axiomatic way in which Ferrajoli
arrives at his conception of fundamental rights is questioned, for it fails to give a full account of the nature of subjective
rights. The other issues discussed here is Ferrajoli’s own defence of the universality of fundamental rights, and how this
is made to depend on a ‘normative technique’ that one can associate with legal discourse and modern law in Western societies.
This, however, poses the problem of how this formal universalism can be reconciled with the intercultural dialogue that Ferrajoli
also advocates. 相似文献
6.
Michael Wolff 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):359-371
In an earlier article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 341–355) I have compared Aristotle’s syllogistic with Kant’s theory
of “pure ratiocination”. “Ratiocinia pura” („reine Vernunftschlüsse“) is Kant’s designation for assertoric syllogisms Aristotle has called ‘perfect’. In Kant’s view
they differ from non-pure ratiocinia precisely in that their validity rests only on the validity of the Dictum de omni et nullo (which, however, in Kant’s view can be further reduced to more fundamental principles) whereas the validity of non-pure ratiocinia additionally presupposes the validity of inferences which Kant calls consequentiae immediatae. I have argued that Kant’s view is in some (not in all) essential features in accordance with Aristotle’s view concerning
perfect syllogisms and certainly leading to a tenable and interesting logical theory. As a result I have rejected not only
the interpretation of Aristotle adopted by Theodor Ebert, but also the objections he has raised against Kant’s logical theory.
As far as Aristotle is concerned, Ebert has attempted to defend his position in the first part of his reply to my article
published in J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 357–365, and I have argued against this defence in issue 1 of the J Gen Philos Sci (2010) 41: 199–213 (cf. Ebert’s answer
in the same issue pp. 215–231). In the following discussion I deal with Eberts defence of his criticism of Kant published
in the second part of his reply to my article (see J Gen Philos Sci (2009) 40: 365–372). I shall argue, that Kant’s principle ‘nota notae est nota rei ipsius’ and his use of technical vocabulary stand up to the objections raised by Ebert. His attempts to prove that Kant’s logical
theory is defective are based on several misinterpretations. 相似文献
7.
Setargew Kenaw 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2010,41(2):315-332
The paper shows how Karl Popper’s critique of ‘historicism’ is permeated by psychoanalytic discourse regardless of his critique
that psychoanalysis is one of the exemplars of pseudoscience. Early on, when he was formulating his philosophy of science,
Popper had an apparently stringent criterion, viz. falsifiablity, and painstaking analysis. The central argument of this paper is that despite his
representation of psychoanalysis as the principal illustration of the category he dubs as ‘pseudoscience’, Popper’s analysis
has been infused with psychoanalysis when it comes to his social and political philosophy. Besides, not only was his interpretation
of the proponents of ‘historicism’ and the ‘closed’ society mediated by the very concepts of a field which he indicted as
pseudoscientific but also he frequently slipped into vacuous and unverifiable accusations forgetting the jurisdiction he formerly
accorded to empirical adequacy and logical consistency when examining and assessing theories. 相似文献
8.
Paul Tomassi 《Synthese》2006,148(1):31-56
In a recent paper on Truth, Knowability and Neutrality Timothy Kenyon sets out to defend the coherence of a putative anti-realist truth-predicate, superassertibility, due to Wright
(1992, 1999), against a number of Wright’s critics. By his own admission, the success of Kenyon’s defensive strategies turns
out to hinge upon a realist conception of absolute warrant which conflicts with the anti-realist character of the original proposal, based, as it was, on a notion of defeasible warrant. Kenyon’s potential success in resisting Wright’s critics brings a pyrrhic victory: either way, realism wins. Here I argue
that the link between superassertibility and defeasible warrant can be restored in a way which clarifies the consistency of
the pair, provided that the notion of inference to superassertibility is properly understood in logical terms. As one might expect, the requisite notion is not classical in character. As one
might not expect, the notion cannot be properly construed in intuitionist terms either. Hence, I propose an alternative logical
framework which, I believe, is at least formally adequate to the representation of superassertibility on the basis of defeasible
warrant. The price to be paid for rejecting the ‘third way’ proposed here in favour of either of the two more traditional
logical options is precisely that indicated by Kenyon’s discussion. 相似文献
9.
Morgan Luck 《Sophia》2005,44(1):7-23
In his bookThe Concept of Miracle and his paper ‘For the Possibility of Miracles’ Swinburne claims that there are no logical difficulties in supposing that
there could be strong historical evidence for the occurrence of miracles. This claim is based on three assertions; two of
which I demonstrate are only true contingently. In this paper I identify several logical difficulties regarding the possibility
of attaining historical evidence for the occurrence of miracles. On the strength of these logical difficulties I hope to demonstrate
that there is sufficient reason to doubt Swinburne’s central claim. 相似文献
10.
Heikki Kirjavainen 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2008,64(2):75-88
In this paper I want to argue for the optimal way to characterise the logical and semantical behaviour of the singular term
‘God’ used in religious language. The relevance of this enterprise to logical theory is the main focus as well. Doing this
presupposes to outline the two rivaling approaches of well-definition of singular terms: Kripke’s (“rigid designators”) and
Hintikka’s (“world-lines”). ‘God’ as a “rigid designator” is purified from all real-life-language-games of identification
and only spells out a metaphysical tag, which favours the view of “anything goes”. Instead, ‘God’ as a “world-line,” plus
two ways of quantification, is much more flexible to theological traditions, teachings of the church, religious practices
and personal feelings. Thus, it provides a sufficiently well-defined singular term for the purposes of logical theory.
The whole sketch is based on Jaakko Hintikka’s logical ideas, mainly on his responses to different authors in PJH. I have systematically omitted direct references to his texts because I have modified considerably his ideas for my own purposes. 相似文献
11.
Tadeusz Szubka 《Philosophia》2012,40(1):165-174
Although Brandom is critical of some features of narrowly conceived classical pragmatism, at the same time he explicitly embraces
a version of pragmatism, both in his overall philosophical outlook, and in his philosophy of language. Brandom’s distinctive
theoretical approach is based on what he calls rationalist pragmatism, which is a version of fundamental pragmatism. Within
the philosophy of language it takes the form of semantic pragmatism. The paper briefly discusses Brandomian version of fundamental
pragmatism and its semantic underpinning, and subsequently formulates a basic dilemma it encounters there. 相似文献
12.
Montgomery Link 《Synthese》2009,166(1):41-54
In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) presents the concept of order in terms of a notational iteration that is completely logical
but not part of logic. Logic for him is not the foundation of mathematical concepts but rather a purely formal way of reflecting
the world that at the minimum adds absolutely no content. Order for him is not based on the concepts of logic but is instead
revealed through an ideal notational series. He states that logic is “transcendental”. As such it requires an ideal that his
philosophical method eventually forces him to reject. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is more dialectical than transcendental. 相似文献
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Ewa Bergh Nestlog 《Argumentation》2009,23(4):437-449
Most pupils become confident with narrative texts. However, studies show that pupils do not learn to master discursive genres
in a satisfactory way. Therefore it is important to study pupils’ written argumentation and to develop knowledge about text
production in an education that also highlights linguistic structures. The present article investigates written argumentations
produced by 10–12 year-old pupils. The aim is to investigate perspectives in the texts, and thereby catch the entire texts—their
content, function and form—and to relate text analysis to interaction in the classroom. The theoretical framework emanates
from the dialogical and triadic conception of language and text where ideational, relational and textual aspects play a central
role. In this article the focus is on the three perspective dimensions—relief, hierarchy and sequences—in one argumentative text written by a 10-year-old girl and the discursive practice within which her text is produced. 相似文献
15.
Peter R. Wright 《Social Psychology of Education》2006,9(1):43-65
This study is an investigation into personal development and drama education where the constructs of self-concept, self-discrepancy
and role-taking ability were considered in the light of an in-school role play-based drama program. The 123 subjects from
5 different classes drawn from provincial city and rural village schools with a mean age of 11.5 years were the participants
in this investigation. The subjects were pre-tested using the Chandler Story Task on role-taking ability; the Self-Discrepancy
Questionnaire for self-discrepancy; the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (Revised) for vocabulary, and the Piers-Harris Children’s
Self-Concept Scales for self-concept. The subjects were then tested following the completion of a 10-week drama program. Results
indicated a significant growth in role-taking ability, vocabulary and an improvement in self-concept. Further analysis revealed
significant correlations between self-discrepancy, self-concept and vocabulary. Role-taking did not appear to be correlated
with self-concept, self-discrepancy and vocabulary. Attention is drawn to the rural-provincial city differences with an “enriched”
environment being suggested as an important determinant. The study supports the use of drama in schools as a means of personal
and social development. 相似文献
16.
John Collins 《Synthese》2009,171(1):175-194
Robert Hanna (Rationality and logic. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006) articulates and defends the thesis of logical cognitivism, the claim that human logical competence is grounded in a cognitive faculty (in Chomsky’s sense) that is not naturalistically
explicable. This position is intended to steer us between the Scylla of logical Platonism and the Charybdis of logical naturalism
(/psychologism). The paper argues that Hanna’s interpretation of Chomsky is mistaken. Read aright, Chomsky’s position offers
a defensible version of naturalism, one Hanna may accept as far as his version of naturalism goes, although not one that supports
the claim that cognitive science offers a place for logic that is somehow outside the natural, contingent order. 相似文献
17.
Thomas Mormann 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2007,38(1):127-146
Value judgments are meaningless. This thesis was one of the notorious tenets of Carnap’s mature logical empiricism. Less well
known is the fact that in the Aufbau values were considered as philosophically respectable entities that could be constituted from value experiences. About 1930,
however, values and value judgments were banished to the realm of meaningless metaphysics, and Carnap came to endorse a strict
emotivism. The aim of this paper is to shed light on the question why Carnap abandoned his originally positive attitude concerning
values. It is argued that his non-cognitivist attitude was the symptom of a deep-rooted and never properly dissolved tension
between conflicting inclinations towards Neokantianism and Lebensphilosophie. In America Carnap’s non-cognitivism became a major obstacle for a closer collaboration between logical empiricists and American
pragmatists. Carnap’s persisting adherence to the dualism of practical life and theoretical science was the ultimate reason
why he could not accept Morris’s and Kaplan’s pragmatist theses that cognitivism might well be compatible with a logical and
empiricist scientific philosophy. 相似文献
18.
Henry S. Richardson 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(4):419-462
Martha Nussbaum has powerfully argued in Frontiers ofJustice and elsewhere that John Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory cannot usefully be deployed to deal with issues pertaining
to justice for the disabled. To counter this claim, this article deploys Rawls’s sort of social-contract theory in order to
deal with issues pertaining to justice for the disabled—or, since, as Nussbaum stresses, we all have some degree of disability—for
the severely disabled. In this way, rather than questioning one by one Nussbaum’s interpretive claims about Rawls’s view,
one can simply see how the Rawlsian framework can work in application to this issue.
Following Rawls’s lead, the paper utilizes the idealized “initial choice situation” as an analytic and comparative device
for examining alternative principles of justice, developing three different interpretations of the initial choice situation
that each correspond to a different set of principles that apply to people of all levels of disability. One of these sets
of principles is a simple extension of Rawls’s, one is very close to what Nussbaum herself recommends, and the third is a
kind of hybrid. In this way, it is shown not only that Rawls’s social-contract device can usefully be applied to these issues,
but also that it is helpful for exploring the deep commitments underlying each of these competing sets of principles.
This extension to Rawls’s device clearly departs to some extent from his intentions; but the paper argues that the ideal of
reciprocity, which might be thought to pose the biggest obstacle to applying his social-contract device to issues pertaining
to the severely disabled (those who are not capable of being cooperative members of society), is not an independently essential
commitment of his mature social-contract view, central though it was to Rawls’s thought in the 1950s. 相似文献
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Joseph M. Kramp 《Journal of religion and health》2012,51(2):450-459
This psychobiographical essay aims to shift Boisen scholarship from a focus on his disputed psychiatric diagnosis to a more inclusive investigation of the disparate aspects of his personality. I conclude that Boisen’s central personality trait was a brand of loquacity that lacked substance—specifically the substance of his deepest secrets. This caused a kind of chronic frustration in his relations with others and, I argue, led to his chronic, psychotic state of being. Additionally, I argue that Boisen’s psychosis and religious practice worked together to sustain his psychological regression. 相似文献