Units of phonological recoding of word-like stimuli used by children and adults

Third-grade, sixth-grade, and coUege-age subjects performed a “same”-“different” task, using a phonological identity criterion for visually presented pseudowords. Consistent with Krueger’s (1978) model of single-glance “same”-“different” judgments, judgments of phonologically matching stimuli were made more quickly and less accurately than were judgments of phonologically nonmatching stimuli, and error rates and RTs were longer for phonologically similar nonmatching pairs than for phonologically dissimilar nonmatching pairs. It was concluded that subjects of all ages tested could process phonologically recoded information in a holistic fashion, and the implications of these conclusions with respect to reading processes are discussed.     

Confidence ratings in speech perception research: Evaluation of an efficient technique for discrimination testing

Discriminability of voice onset time was determined for four naive Ss in order to evaluate the relative efficiency of a testing procedure which utilized confidence ratings along with the conventional oddity task. Ss rated their judgments on oddity trials as “very very sure,” “somewhat sure,” or “just guessing.” Each S’s discrimination scores were given weights according to his ratings, yielding functions that were compared with those computed using unweighted percent correct scores. The confidence-rating technique produced readily interpretable results with about one-third as many judgments as are needed when the conventional procedure is used. Possible problems with the interpretation of the functions and the generalizability of the technique are discussed.     

Moral relativism and deontic logic

If a native of India asserts “Killing cattle is wrong” and a Nebraskan asserts “Killing cattle is not wrong”, and both judgments agree with their respective moralities and both moralities are internally consistent, then the moral relativist says both judgments are fully correct. At this point relativism bifurcates. One branch which we call content relativism denies that the two people are contradicting each other. The idea is that the content of a moral judgment is a function of the overall moral point of view from which it proceeds. The second branch which we call truth value relativism affirms that the two judgments are contradictory. Truth value relativism appears to be logically incoherent. How can contradictory judgments be fully correct? For though there will be a sense of correctness in which each judgment is correct — namely by that of being correct relative to the morality relative to which each was expressed — if contradictory, the judgments cannot both be true, and thus cannot both be correct in this most basic sense of correctness. We defend truth value relativism against this sort of charge of logical incoherence by showing it can be accommodated by the existing semantical metatheories of deontic logic. Having done this we go on to argue that truth value relativism is the best version of relativism.     

Remembering and knowing: Two means of access to the personal past

The nature of recollective experience was examined in a recognition memory task. Subjects gave “remember” judgments to recognized items that were accompanied by conscious recollection and “know” judgments to items that were recognized on some other basis. Although a levels-of-processing effect (Experiment 1) and a picture-superiority effect (Experiment 2) were obtained for overall recognition, these effects occurred only for “remember” judgments, and were reversed for “know” judgments. In Experiment 3, targets and lures were either preceded by a masked repetition of their own presentation (thought to increase perceptual fluency) or of an unrelated word. The effect of perceptual fluency was obtained for overall recogrntion and “know” judgments but not for “remember” judgments. The data obtained for confidencejudgments using the same design (Experiment4) indicated that “remember”/”know” judgments are not made solely on the basis of confidence. These data support the two-factor theories of recognition memory by dissociating two forms of recognition, and shed light on the nature of conscious recollection.     

The moral psychology of rationing among physicians: the role of harm and fairness intuitions in physician objections to cost-effectiveness and cost-containment

Introduction

Physicians vary in their moral judgments about health care costs. Social intuitionism posits that moral judgments arise from gut instincts, called “moral foundations.” The objective of this study was to determine if “harm” and “fairness” intuitions can explain physicians’ judgments about cost-containment in U.S. health care and using cost-effectiveness data in practice, as well as the relative importance of those intuitions compared to “purity”, “authority” and “ingroup” in cost-related judgments.

Methods

We mailed an 8-page survey to a random sample of 2000 practicing U.S. physicians. The survey included the MFQ30 and items assessing agreement/disagreement with cost-containment and degree of objection to using cost-effectiveness data to guide care. We used t-tests for pairwise subscale mean comparisons and logistic regression to assess associations with agreement with cost-containment and objection to using cost-effectiveness analysis to guide care.

Results

1032 of 1895 physicians (54%) responded. Most (67%) supported cost-containment, while 54% expressed a strong or moderate objection to the use of cost-effectiveness data in clinical decisions. Physicians who strongly objected to the use of cost-effectiveness data had similar scores in all five of the foundations (all p-values?>?0.05). Agreement with cost-containment was associated with higher mean “harm” (3.6) and “fairness” (3.5) intuitions compared to “in-group” (2.8), “authority” (3.0), and “purity” (2.4) (p?<?0.05). In multivariate models adjusted for age, sex, region, and specialty, both “harm” and “fairness” were significantly associated with judgments about cost-containment (OR?=?1.2 [1.0-1.5]; OR?=?1.7 [1.4-2.1], respectively) but were not associated with degree of objection to cost-effectiveness (OR?=?1.2 [1.0-1.4]; OR?=?0.9 [0.7-1.0]).

Conclusions

Moral intuitions shed light on variation in physician judgments about cost issues in health care.

     

Action representations activated by task‐irrelevant information: Is it really irrelevant?

Accessing action knowledge is believed to rely on the activation of action representations through the retrieval of functional, manipulative, and spatial information associated with objects. However, it remains unclear whether action representations can be activated in this way when the object information is irrelevant to the current judgment. The present study investigated this question by independently manipulating the correctness of three types of action‐related information: the functional relation between the two objects, the grip applied to the objects, and the orientation of the objects. In each of three tasks in Experiment 1, participants evaluated the correctness of only one of the three information types (function, grip or orientation). Similar results were achieved with all three tasks: “correct” judgments were facilitated when the other dimensions were correct; however, “incorrect” judgments were facilitated when the other two dimensions were both correct and also when they were both incorrect. In Experiment 2, when participants attended to an action‐irrelevant feature (object color), there was no interaction between function, grip, and orientation. These results clearly indicate that action representations can be activated by retrieval of functional, manipulative, and spatial knowledge about objects, even though this is task‐irrelevant information.     

反应选项对时序知觉重复启动效应的影响

先前研究采用两项反应任务发现了时序知觉重复启动效应, 这可能是反应选项导致的虚假效应, 本研究采用三项反应任务对此进行了检验。实验1运用三项判断任务以消除缺乏中间选项所致的反应偏向, 结果发现重复启动显著影响“哪个图形先出现”和“两个图形同时出现”的时序判断; 实验2在实验1的基础上对“同时出现”反应选项进行两种指导语操作, 实验结果不仅与实验1一致, 而且“有把握时判断为同时出现”和“有无把握都判断为同时出现”之间没有显著差异, 说明被试能够识别时序加以判断, 不支持反应偏向的前提条件。因此, 时序知觉重复启动效应不是反应选项产生的反应偏向引发的虚假效应, 重复启动对“系列性”和“同时性”时序知觉都存在显著影响。     

Dissimilarities as indices of individual perceptual structure

The generality of dissimilarity judgments and of configurations obtained by multidimensional scaling (MDS) as indices of perceptual structure was examined. The Ss made magnitude estimates of dissimilarity of pairs of photos, and MDS configurations were constructed separately for each S. The compatability of dissimilarities (judgments or distances in MDS configurations) with two other tasks Ss performed was then examined. These additional tasks, an “encoding” and a “decoding” task, required the S to first construct a message by making use of a set of four photos and, a week later, to decode the messages. Results obtained were interpreted as indicating a degree of generality of the dissimilarities and supporting a hypothesis of individual differences in perceptual structure for the stimulus set. A “data-purification” hypothesis for MDS was discussed and examined.

     

Perceptual encoding in comparative judgments of race

Ss made comparative judgments along the black-white racial dimension using opposite response sets (“Which is blacker?” or “Which is whiter?”). Three classes of pictures were used: B (black),W (white), and M (racially mixed). I or the BM judgments. “Which is whiter?” took significantly longer. The MW and BW judgments showed no difference between response instructions. Analysis of the stimuli showed that skin tone was not the primary perceptual attribute used in racial encoding. The observation of a funnel effect in the judgment latencies is shown to be consistent with other research demonstrating the effect of response set in comparative judgments Further. the results support sociological observations about the cultural use of the linguistic labels “black” and “white”     

Male and Female Observers’ Evaluations of a Bullying Case as a Function of Degree of Harm,Type of Bullying,and Academic Level

Acting as disciplinary committee members, participants listened to a school bullying case that varied in terms of type (relational or verbal), degree of harm (low or high), and academic level of the victim and defendant (high school or university). Participants’ judgments (e.g., verdict, recommended sentence, seriousness, perceptions of both students) generally favored the victim when he experienced more rather than less harm, regardless of bullying type, and when the incident took place in a high school rather than a university. Additionally, women’s judgments supported the victim more than men’s. We propose that previous results suggesting that observers downgrade relational bullying occurred because no harm was specified. Moreover, we contend that observers relied on a “bullying schema” that includes the component that bullying occurs in primary and secondary schools, which led them to make less punitive judgments in the university case.     

Memory and display search in binary classification reaction time

Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics - Character classification tasks and “same” “different” judgments of letter strings were examined with reference to major...     

Reaction times and error rates for judging nominal identity of letter strings

Most theories of “same”-“different” judgments predict that “same” responses should be at least as slow as “different” responses. However, the contrary has often been found. To explain this, a two-processor model has been proposed. In this model, a fast processor and a slow processor operate simultaneously. “Same” responses are initiated by whichever processor first indicates that the stimuli are “same,” whereas “different” responses are initiated only by the slow processor. In the experiment reported here, Ss judged whether two successively presented letter strings were nominally “same” or “different.” It was expected that the fast processor would be incapable of making nominal identity judgments. Thus, both “same” and “different” responses would be initiated by the slow processor. Consequently, “same” responses should have been slower than “different” responses. However, this did not occur. This finding casts doubt upon, but does not disprove, the two-processor model.     

异同判断中“快同效应”的大脑机制：一项ERP研究

采用高密度的事件相关电位（ERPs）技术,记录分析了大学生被试在执行异同判断任务[包括不同颜色刺激对（DC）,不同形状刺激对（DS）和相同刺激对（Same）]时的脑内时程动态变化。行为结果表明,“同”反应的确显著快于“异”反应,表现出明显的快同效应。ERP结果显示：在280-320 ms内,DS和DC条件均比Same条件诱发一个更负的N2成分。偶极子溯源分析表明,DC和DS条件下,N2可能起源于大脑的前扣带皮层（ACC）,可能与“异”反应早期不一致信息（颜色或形状）的认知监控和调节有关;反之Same条件下,N2成分可能起源于楔前叶,主要反映了“同”反应早期知觉识别中整体特征比较加工的过程（同一性指示器）。另外,在450 ms左右, DC和DS比Same条件均诱发了一个更负的P3成分,可能反映了对刺激局部特征的比较和识别（慢速比较器）,并与选择性注意和资源分配等高级认知活动有关;并且,Same条件下P3成分的潜伏期更短,与行为结果一致。以上研究结果表明,异同判断中“同”反应和“异”反应可能有着不同的比较通道和大脑机制,支持双过程模型理论;同时表明,慢速比较器和同一性指示器可能是序列加工的。     

Measurement and the mental map

In order to test between subtractive and ratio theories of stimulus comparison, judges were asked to estimate “ratios” and “differences” of easterliness and westerliness of U.S. cities. “Difference” judgments fit the subtractive model, and “ratio” judgments fit the ratio model. However, “ratios” and “differences” were monotonically related, contrary to the theory that judges compute both relations on a common scale. Results are consistent with the theory that there is but one operation for both “ratios” and “differences.” To assume that the single operation is a ratio requires the complex interpretation that easterliness and westerliness are nonlinearly related. A simpler interpretation is provided by a subtractive theory, in which all four types of judgments are monotonically related to subjective differences on a single cognitive map.     

The Effect of Evidential Impact on Perceptual Probabilistic Judgments

In a series of three behavioral experiments, we found a systematic distortion of probability judgments concerning elementary visual stimuli. Participants were briefly shown a set of figures that had two features (e.g., a geometric shape and a color) with two possible values each (e.g., triangle or circle and black or white). A figure was then drawn, and participants were informed about the value of one of its features (e.g., that the figure was a “circle”) and had to predict the value of the other feature (e.g., whether the figure was “black” or “white”). We repeated this procedure for various sets of figures and, by varying the statistical association between features in the sets, we manipulated the probability of a feature given the evidence of another (e.g., the posterior probability of hypothesis “black” given the evidence “circle”) as well as the support provided by a feature to another (e.g., the impact, or confirmation, of evidence “circle” on the hypothesis “black”). Results indicated that participants’ judgments were deeply affected by impact, although they only should have depended on the probability distributions over the features, and that the dissociation between evidential impact and posterior probability increased the number of errors. The implications of these findings for lower and higher level cognitive models are discussed.     

Comparative judgments of distal size: A chronometric analysis

Observers were required to make comparative judgments of the distal sizes of squares at various perceived distances in a pictorial array. It was predicted that observers would normalize distance prior to judgment. Chronometric analyses indicated that the time to make “same” judgments increased systematically with the relative distance of the two stimuli. The time required to make “different” judgments depended on the nature of the difference. When the stimuli differed in proximal size, distal size, and distance, response time increased with distance ratio. However, when the stimuli differed in distal size and distance but not proximal size, response time decreased with distance ratio. In addition, when the stimuli differed in both distal and proximal size but not distance, RT decreased with size ratio. These results are consistent with a class of models that incorporate distance normalization into the comparative size-judging process. These and alternative models are discussed.     

Analyzing the accuracy of probability judgments for multiple events: An extension of the covariance decomposition

The probability score (PS) can be used to measure the overall accuracy of probability judgments for a single event, e.g., “Rain falls,” or “This patient has cancer.” It has been shown previously how a “covariance decomposition” of the mean of PS over many occasions indexes several distinct aspects of judgment performance (J. F. Yates, Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 30, 132–156 (1982)). There are many situations in which probability judgments are reported for sample space partitions containing more than one event and its complement, e.g., medical situations in which a patient might suffer from Disease X, Disease Y, or Disease Z, or testing situations in which the correct answer to an item might be any one of alternatives (a) through (e). The probability score for multiple events (PSM) serves as a measure of the overall accuracy of probability judgments for the events in partitions of any size. The present article describes and interprets an extension of the covariance decomposition to the mean of PSM. The decomposition is illustrated with data from two contexts, medicine and education.     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.