Hume's nominalism and the Copy Principle

I consider some ways in which the Copy Principle (CP) and Hume's nominalism impinge on one another, arguing for the following claims. First, Hume's argument against indeterminate ideas isn't cogent even if the CP is accepted. But this does not vindicate Locke: the imagistic conception of ideas, presupposed by the CP, will force Locke to accept something like Hume's view of the way general terms function, the availability of abstract ideas notwithstanding. Second, Hume's discussion of nominalism provides support for the “old Hume” interpretation, that which takes the CP to be a criterion of meaningfulness, as against the “new Hume” reading, according to which it constrains what we can know. Finally, nominalism forces Hume to adopt a more complicated theory of ideas.     

The topological inventions of life: From the specialization of multicellular colonies to the functioning of the vertebrate brain

The evolution of biological (intermediary) complexity strongly depends upon the information‐processing advantages it confers to cells and organisms. As a matter of fact, highly complex biological structures such as the cellular signaling system and the vertebrate nervous system have been evolved in order to inform the living system about its surround, subsequently orienting the internal, productive activities. The evolutionary success of these types of informational structures ("infostructures") exemplifies that, almost universally, the “bit” may act as a successful substitute for the “joule”. Recent molecular biology research on cellular signaling systems has disclosed their amazing information‐processing sophistication and the crucial role they play in the formation and functioning of the vertebrate brain. In the neurosciences, duality theory has highlighted the way in which the cortical maps and the cerebral substructures of the vertebrate brain are “topologically” integrated in order to perform an adaptive information‐processing. The development of comprehensive conceptualizations relating brain processing and intracellular processing may well be a strategic step in the development of a vertical “information science”.     

细胞因子和抑郁症

在心理神经免疫学领域,越来越多的证据表明神经和免疫之间存在双向交流通路,免疫系统可能在一些心理精神障碍中具有重要作用。“抑郁症的细胞因子假说”认为细胞因子作为神经调质,可能在抑郁症的病因和病理过程中具有重要作用。这个假说得到了很多证据的支持。而在动物身上应用前炎性细胞因子也能够引起与人类抑郁症行为症状非常类似的“病态行为”。研究认为外周细胞因子通过信号传导进入脑内与中枢产生的细胞因子共同作用于下丘脑－垂体－肾上腺轴和5－羟色胺系统,从而导致抑郁症。细胞因子的中枢效应可以解释很多抑郁症状,“抑郁症的细胞因子假说”为探讨抑郁症状的机制和治疗抑郁症提供了一个新的视角     

Carson Strong's “positive killing and the irreversibly unconscious patient”: A commentary

There is general agreement that death of the entire brain results in death of the person, and that such a condition can exist in a body which is still technically “alive.”1,2 Dr. Strong additionally contends that in cases of irreversible coma, since cognitive abilities characteristic of the person are no longer manifest and cannot be expected to reappear, such an individual no longer has the “right to life” and somatic death can be initiated by “positive killing.” This, the author claims, can be considered a logical and morally acceptable extension of the conceptual framework now in force for dealing with cases of isolated brain death.     

Neurophysical substrates of arousal and attention

The study of arousal and attention could be of prominent importance for elucidating both fundamental and practical aspects of the mind–brain puzzle. Defined as “general activation of mind” (Kahnemann in Attention and effort. Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1973), or “general operation of consciousness” (Thacher and John in Functional neuroscience: foundations of cognitive processing. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, 1977), arousal can be considered as a starting point of fundamental research on consciousness. Similar role could be assigned to attention, which can be defined by substituting the attributes “general” with “focused”. Concerning the practical applications, the empirically established correlation between neuronal oscillations and arousal/attention levels is widely used in research and clinics, including neurofeedback, brain–computer communication, etc. However, the neurophysical mechanism underlying this correlation is still not clear enough. In this paper, after reviewing some present classical and quantum approaches, a transition probability concept of arousal based on field–dipole quantum interactions and information entropy is elaborated. The obtained analytical expressions and numerical values correspond to classical empirical results for arousal and attention, including the characteristic frequency dependence and intervals. Simultaneously, the fundamental (substrate) role of EEG spectrum has been enlightened, whereby the attention appears to be a bridge between arousal and the content of consciousness. Finally, some clinical implications, including the brain-rate parameter as an indicator of arousal and attention levels, are provided.     

Not quite dead: why Egyptian doctors refuse the diagnosis of death by neurological criteria

Drawing on two years of ethnographic fieldwork in Egypt focused on organ transplantation, this paper examines the ways in which the “scientific” criteria of determining death in terms of brain function are contested by Egyptian doctors. Whereas in North American medical practice, the death of the “person” is associated with the cessation of brain function, in Egypt, any sign of biological life is evidence of the persistence, even if fleeting, of the soul. I argue that this difference does not exemplify an irresolvable culture clash but points to an unsettling aspect of cadaveric organ procurement that has emerged wherever organ transplantation is practiced. Further, I argue that a misdiagnosis of the problem, as one about “religious extremism” or a “civilizational clash,” has obfuscated unresolved concerns about fairness, access, and justice within Egyptian medical spheres. This misdiagnosis has led to the suspension of a cadaveric procurement program for over 30 years, despite Egypt’s pioneering efforts in kidney transplantation.     

“Ratios” and “differences” in perceived sweetness intensity

For a number of perceptual continua, it has been shown in previous studies that subjects use only one quantitative comparison between two sensory impressions of a pair of stimuli, irrespective of whether they are instructed to judge “ratios” or “differences”. This comparison can be described by algebraic subtraction. The present study was designed to investigate whether this one-operation theory for psychophysical judgment also applied to the sensory continuum of sweetness. Subjects were presented with pairs of fructose solutions, and judged “ratios” of, or “differences" in, perceived sweetness intensities. The pairs were constructed on the basis of a factorial judgment design. The results showed that the reported “differences” could be adequately described by a difference response model, and that the reported “ratios” could be adequately described by a ratio response model. However, the reported “ratios” and reported “differences” were monotonically related, and the marginal means of the log-transformed response matrix of “ratios” were a linear function of the marginal means of the response matrix of “differences”. These results are incompatible with the notion that subjects judged differences when instructed to judge “differences”, but ratios when instructed to judge “ratios”. The consistency of the ratio response model with “ratio” judgments is probably caused by a comparative operation based on “differences” in combination with an exponential response output function. It may be concluded that subjects judge only “differences”, and not “ratios”, between perceived sweetness intensities.     

Dialectic – a universal for consciousness?

Dialectic is a word of many meanings but used here in the classical sense of the apposition of thesis and antithesis leading to synthesis. The first, counterfactual phase is expressible symbolically by the symmetric difference $, “one or the other, but not both”. The second, synthesis phase is taken here to correspond to the complement ∼$, consisting of commonality and context within the universe of discourse. After a brief discussion of parallels between “events” in quantum theory and the dialectical pair ($, ∼$), it is argued that the latter is more fundamental for brain and mind. Consciousness is “carved at the joints” as comprising basic awareness (=not-unconscious), self-awareness, perception and cognition factored by attention, and emotion. The dialectical pair ($, ∼$) is then referred to Working Memory and Long-Term Memory, categories both mathematical and psychological, knowledge and learning, negotiation and dialogue, problem solving, affect and emotion, and brain structure and function. Coupling previous work by the author for the ($, ∼$) model with the present analysis, it is concluded that the dialectical pair provides a universal for consciousness parallel to its known universal property for the most general sorts of equivalences in mathematics.     

The nature of primary consciousness. A new synthesis

While the philosophical puzzles about “life” that once confounded biology have all been solved by science, much of the “mystery of consciousness” remains unsolved due to multiple “explanatory gaps” between the brain and conscious experience. One reason for this impasse is that diverse brain architectures both within and across species can create consciousness, thus making any single neurobiological feature insufficient to explain it. We propose instead that an array of general biological features that are found in all living things, combined with a suite of special neurobiological features unique to animals with consciousness, evolved to create subjective experience. Combining philosophical, neurobiological and evolutionary approaches to consciousness, we review our theory of neurobiological naturalism that we argue closes the “explanatory gaps” between the brain and subjective experience and naturalizes the “experiential gaps” between subjectivity and third-person observation of the brain.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

中文语境下的“心理”和“心理学”

“心”或“心理”等词语在汉语中有相当长的历史,对这些词语的理解反映了中国人关于“心理”的认识。中文的“心”往往不是指一种身体器官而是指人的思想、意念、情感、性情等,故“心理学”这三个汉字有极大的包容性。任何学科都摆脱不了社会文化的作用,中国心理学亦曾受到意识形态、科学主义和大众常识等方面的影响。近年中国学者对心理学自身的问题进行了反思。从某种意义上说,中国人对“心理”和“心理学”的理解或许有助于心理学的整合,并与其他国家的心理学一道发展出真正的人类心理学     

Near-Death Experiences in patients with locked-in syndrome: Not always a blissful journey

Memories of Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) most often are recounted as emotionally positive events. At present, no satisfactory explanatory model exists to fully account for the rich phenomenology of NDEs following a severe acute brain injury. The particular population of patients with locked-in syndrome (LIS) provides a unique opportunity to study NDEs following infratentorial brain lesions. We here retrospectively characterized the content of NDEs in 8 patients with LIS caused by an acute brainstem lesion (i.e., “LIS NDEs”) and 23 NDE experiencers after coma with supratentorial lesions (i.e., “classical NDEs”). Compared to “classical NDEs”, “LIS NDEs” less frequently experienced a feeling of peacefulness or well-being. It could be hypothesized that NDEs containing less positive emotions might have a specific neuroanatomical substrate related to impaired pontine/paralimbic connectivity or alternatively might be related to the emotional distress caused by the presence of conscious awareness in a paralyzed body.     

The reinforcing value of several types of aggressive behavior: A review

Field observations of “surplus killing” and laboratory studies of operant performance rewarded by prey-killing opportunities suggest that predatory behavior is positively reinforcing. Similarly, both repeated encounter and operant performance studies suggest that intraspecific aggression can be positively reinforcing for successful aggressors. While a few studies suggest that defensive aggression under aversive conditions may also be positively reinforcing, it appears that when appropriate response modes are available escape and/or avoidance are preferred to attack. Studies of the reinforcing properties of aggression-eliciting brain stimulation are in general agreement with these conclusions, but methodological problems with these latter observations render them less compelling. The progressive escalation of aggression seen in “warm-up effects” of birds and fish, “priming effects” of mice, and ecstatic violence of humans may be analogous processes based on the positively self-reinforcing characteristics of some kinds of aggression. The transient reductions of aggression which appear as refractory periods and satiation effects in a variety of species may reflect temporary reductions in the reinforcing value of aggression. All these temporal effects must be considered in the evaluation of experiments on the reinforcing value of aggression. More generally, it is possible that these temporal fluctuations reflect the operation of common motivational processes (aggressive states) which regulate overt aggression by changing its reinforcing value.     

Neuroscience and Whitehead II: Process-Based Ontology of Brain

While neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain, the implications of these empirical findings for ontological questions in philosophy including the mind–body problem remain yet unclear. In the first paper, I discussed the model of brain that as implied and supported by the empirical data. This leads me now to the question of an empirically plausible ontology of brain. Therefore, the aim in this second paper is the ontological characterization of the brain in terms of a process-based ontology that avoids what Whitehead described as “simple location” and “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. The discussion of the model of the brain is complemented by developing a process-based ontological characterization of the brain. Specifically, as based on Whitehead, I argue that “simple location” of the brain as thing or object in time and space amounts to nothing but an abstraction rendering what Whitehead described as “fallacy of misplaced concreteness”. Instead of describing the brain as static, non-temporal and isolated thing or object, I characterize the brain ontologically by dynamic, temporal, and relational processes. This leads me to a process-based ontology of brain which may be specified in spatiotemporal terms. Since the world’s larger spatiotemporal range or scale contains, e.g., nests, the smaller one of the brain, I characterize their ontological relationship by “spatiotemporal nestedness” and “spatiotemporal directedness”. Such spatiotemporal relationship between world and brain precludes the confusion between the world as whole and the brain as part, e.g., “mereological confusion”. I conclude that process-based or better, more specifically, spatiotemporal ontology of the brain and its relationship to the world may offer novel views on the question for the ontological relationship between mind and brain, e.g., the mind–brain problem, by converting or reformulating it as “world-brain problem”.     

Revisiting the university front

The article argues that the most important trends in the recent metamorphosis of higher education, especially of university teaching and research, cannot be understood without placing them in the context of general developments in political life. Both processes reveal alarming features and there is a link between them. In recent decades a religion has established its dominance in the public policy field. Its dogmas are called “liberalization”, “economic man”, “individual preference”, “the free market”, “competition” and “efficiency”. The consequences of the progressive imposition of this doctrine on the universities—including on the relation between teaching and research—are well documented but not always well understood. It is argued that the “commercialization” of higher education and research means in reality their hyper-bureaucratization, via the imposition of so-called evaluation, assessment and accreditation schemes, the latest avatars of the managerialist ideology. Might the final result be the disintegration of the university as an institution?     

Pavlov’s “higher nervous activity”

The term higher nervous activity was introduced by Pavlov about 1909 to replace what he previously called “psychical” or “mental.” In Russia “higher nervous activity” is now used for what we often designate as psychophysiological or psychosomatic. “Higher nervous activity” was not a synonym in Pavlov’s use for psychical or mental; it indicates what physiology can deal with and measure as opposed to our subjective feelings and representations. The philosophical differences underlying Pavlov’s concepts, as well as the philosophical basis for distinguishing between what we measure physically and the subjective correlates, are discussed.     

Mechanism of the human diving response

The diving response in human beings is characterized by breath-holding, slowing of the heart rate (diving bradycardia), reduction of limb blood flow and a gradual rise in the mean arterial blood pressure. The bradycardia results from increased parasympathetic stimulus to the cardiac pacemaker. The reduction in limb blood flow is due to vasoconstriction resulting from increased activity of the sympathetic nerves supplying arteries in the arms and legs. Essentially the response is produced by the combination of water touching the face and either voluntary or involuntary (reflex) arrest of breathing. The nervous inputs and outputs for the response are coordinated in the brain stem by the respiratory, vasomotor and cardioinhibitory “centers.” The diving response in human beings can be modified by many factors but the most important are water temperature, oxygen tension in the arterial blood and emotional factors.     

Bilinguals who stutter: A cognitive perspective

PurposeBrain differences, both in structure and executive functioning, have been found in both developmental stuttering and bilingualism. However, the etiology of stuttering remains unknown. The early suggestion that stuttering is a result of brain dysfunction has since received support from various behavioral and neuroimaging studies that have revealed functional and structural brain changes in monolinguals who stutter (MWS). In addition, MWS appear to show deficits in executive control. However, there is a lack of data on bilinguals who stutter (BWS). This literature review is intended to provide an overview of both stuttering and bilingualism as well as synthesize areas of overlap among both lines of research and highlight knowledge gaps in the current literature.MethodsA systematic literature review on both stuttering and bilingualism studies was conducted, searching for articles containing “stuttering” and/or “bilingualism” and either “brain”, “executive functions”, “executive control”, “motor control”, “cognitive reserve”, or “brain reserve” in the PubMed database. Additional studies were found by examining the reference list of studies that met the inclusion criteria.ResultsA total of 148 references that met the criteria for inclusion in this paper were used in the review. A comparison of the impact of stuttering or bilingualism on the brain are discussed.ConclusionPrevious research examining a potential bilingual advantage for BWS is mixed. However, if such an advantage does exist, it appears to offset potential deficits in executive functioning that may be associated with stuttering.