The Monogamous Conception of Romantic Love and Western Critiques of Polygamy in African Traditions

Abstract

I critically examine how, from a Western cultural perspective of romantic love and Judeo-Christian tradition, certain liberal cultural values and prejudices are used presumptuously to criticize polygamy in African traditions. These criticisms assume, circularly, the superiority of Western cultural monogamous values over African cultural traditional practice of polygamy. I argue that these arguments are specious and particularly unreasonable from an intercultural philosophical perspective. A plausible liberal justification for Western legal imposition of monogamy is to prevent harm. I argue that if polygamy is so harmful as to warrant legal restriction based on the liberal principle of harm, such harm also exists in monogamy. The harm that is falsely associated with polygamy is not the result of polygamy per se but other factors relating to the social-cultural context of the marriage or the character of the individuals in the marriage.     

André du Toit

Abstract

In this commentary, I suggest that Sam Vice’s exploratory and communicative goals in ‘How Do I Live in This Strange Place?’ are not appropriately advanced by the form of her writing. In particular, her analysis and recommendations—which I regard as perceptive and profound—would have been better presented in a non-argumentative format, and by employing a less direct mode of communication.     

… Ever Ever After

Summary

In this article the Drs. Perls look at twelve couples who have each been married at least 30 years. Common values among the couples are explored including commitment, mutual respect, philosophical viewpoints, and monogamy. Developmental experiences and socio-cultural changes are presented as a framework for understanding how this particular sample of couples continued in their longterm relationships with satisfaction.     

ADOLESCENTS' PERCEPTION OF POLYGAMOUS FAMILY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-CONCEPT

This study investigated children's perception of the degree of affection present in their monogamous/polygamous families and assessed the influence of the perception on the subjects' self-concepts. It also examined the relationship of polygamy/monogamy to children's self-concepts. A total of 308 adolescents (134 from polygamous families and 174 from monogamous families) in eight secondary schools in Oyo State, Nigeria filled out a questionnaire and Akinboye's (1975) self-concept inventory. The subjects' assessment of their families was categorized into “secure ”and “insecure”. The results indicated that self-concept significantly correlated with the subjects' assessment of their families as “secure ”or “insecure”. Self-concept was also significantly related to the family being polygamous or monogamous. Family structure (polygamy/monogamy), however, showed no significant correlation with children's perception of their family as “secure ”or “insecure”.     

Intersectional cosmopolitanism: Muslim women’s engagement with polygamy on Malaysian and Indonesian screens

ABSTRACT

This article interrogates how the diverse realities of Muslim women fray the concept of ‘Muslim cosmopolitanism’ in Southeast Asia. By comparing how Malaysian Muslim women interpret polygamy in Malaysian and Indonesian screens, this article problematises the idea of a unified cosmopolitanism experienced by Muslims from the Malay world. Based on findings from interviews with 25 educated women, this article shows that media representations of polygamy and Muslim femininity can differ even between two Southeast Asian countries sharing common gendered and religious practices. It argues that the women’s understanding of polygamy is based on the intertwinement of their ethnic, gendered and classed subjectivities that are not necessarily informed by their religious beliefs per se but rather by the broader socio-political contexts in which they live. Through this embodiment of intersectional cosmopolitanism, they not only disrupt existing notions of ‘Muslim cosmopolitanism’ but highlight the heterogeneous experiences of Muslims within Southeast Asia.     

Practising the Space Between: Embodying Belief as an Evangelical Anglican Student

Abstract

This article explores the formation of British evangelical university students as believers. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a conservative evangelical Anglican congregation in London, I describe how students in this church come to embody a highly cognitive, word-based mode of belief through particular material practices. As they learn to identify themselves as believers, practices of reflexivity and accountability enable them to develop a sense of narrative coherence in their lives that allows them to negotiate tensions that arise from their participation in church and from broader social structures. I demonstrate that propositional belief—in contexts where it becomes an identity marker—is bound up with relational practices of belief, so that distinctions between ‘belief in’ and ‘belief that’ are necessarily blurred in the lives of young evangelicals.     

Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation

Abstract

Belief allows us to coordinate our thought with our action. As Ramsey famously puts it, belief is a map by which we steer. For belief to play its role, on the one hand it must be stable under certain kinds of informational change; on the other hand it must be sensitive to changing evidence. Keeping belief stability in mind, we can ask about the norms that govern belief change in circumstances where there is epistemic pressure on us to change our belief. One such circumstance involves interpersonal conflict—in cases of disagreement with others. Another such circumstance involves intrapersonal conflict—the case of epistemic temptation. In this paper, I focus on a particular epistemic temptation case to explore what is rationally permitted and what is rationally required for us to do in the name of stability of belief.     

Towards a New Kind of Semantic Normativity

Abstract

Hannah Ginsborg has recently offered a new account of normativity, according to which normative attitudes are essential to the meaningful use of language. The kind of normativity she has in mind –– not semantic but ‘primitive’ — is supposed to help us to avoid the pitfalls of both non-reductionist and reductive dispositionalist theories of meaning. For, according to her, it enables us both to account for meaning in non-semantic terms, which non-reductionism cannot do, and to make room for the normativity of meaning, which reductive dispositionalism cannot do. I argue that the main problem with Ginsborg’s account is that it fails to say what makes it possible for expressions to be governed by conditions of correct application to begin with. I do believe, however, that normative attitudes are essential to meaning, but they have to be thought of as fully semantic. And I suggest that conditions of correct application can be present only when those attitudes are present.     

The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory

Abstract

In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O ‐ which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality — and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.     

EVALUATING THE EXTENDED MIND

According to proponents of radically extended cognition, some cognition is located outside the boundaries of biological organisms. In this paper, I offer a new argument for a modest version of this view according to which some cognitive processes are radically extended. I do so by showing that features of a subject's environment—in particular, the pen and paper that a subject uses to solve complex mathematical problems—can have epistemic roles that are indicative of cognitive roles. I end the paper by discussing how epistemology might play a significant role in diagnosing alleged cases of radically extended cognition.     

Foucauldian Imprints in the Early Works of Ian Hacking

Ian Hacking has defined himself as a philosopher in the analytic tradition. However, he has also recognized the profound influence that Michel Foucault had on much of his work. In this article I analyse the specific imprint of certain works by Foucault—in particular Les mots et les choses—in two of Hacking’s early works: Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? and The Emergence of Probability. I propose that these texts not only share a debt of Foucauldian thought, but also are part of what I believe is Hacking’s central project: the analysis of the historical and situated conditions of possibility for the emergence of concepts and of objects, inspired also by the French philosopher’s thought.     

The Body and the Sacred in the Digital Age: Thoughts on Posthuman Sexuality

Abstract

Considerable scholarly discussion has been given to the idea that we are moving toward a state of "posthumanism." In this essay, I examine some possible implications of a posthuman existence, specifically as it relates to that most basic of human needs—sexuality. More specifically, I am interested in exploring the spiritual aspects of sexuality to see what is lost and what is gained in technologically mediated forms of sexuality. To that end, I consider the interplay between sexual behaviour and our conceptions of the sacred, how technologies are changing our views of—and realities concerning—our bodies, and the potential for a sacred posthuman sexuality.     

Let's exist again (like we did last summer)

ABSTRACT

This paper is a defence of a psychological view of personal identity against the attack Peter Unger launches against it in his Identity, Consciousness and Value. Unger attempts to undermine the traditional support which a psychological criterion of identity has drawn from thought-experiments, and to show that such a criterion has totally unacceptable implications—in particular, that it allows that persons can go out of and come back into existence. I respond to both aspects of this criticism, arguing that the relevant thought- experiments (and the support they appear to offer) survive Unger's attack intact, and that he does not establish his case against intermittent existence.     

Simulation and Irrationality

Abstract

In this paper, I hope to show how a recent theory in the philosophy of mind concerning how we ‘read’ the minds of others—namely, Heal's version of simulation theory—is consistent with the view that the kind of understanding we bring to bear on the irrational is different in kind from the way we understand one another in the course of everyday life. I shall attempt to show that Heal's version of simulation theory (co-cognition) is to be favoured over its rival ‘theory theories’ in the light of its accommodation of deeply irrational mental states. I claim that simulation theory preserves an asymmetry of psychological explanation which is not similarly preserved by a theory theory account, and I argue that this preservation of asymmetry is an advantage of Heal's account.     

To succeed in failing—a dialectically constructed unity in Jaspers's thought

ABSTRACT

Jaspers is justly famous both for his exploration of aportas (Grenzsituationen,) in various fields, as well as for his trenchant pre- and post-war criticism of life in both Germany and in the world at large. In this article I attempt to indicate the extent to which his analyses of both are informed by a metaphysics of foundering/failure (das Scheitern). His apparently paradoxical thesis is that our very failure to achieve sufficient comprehension—in the fields of science, in self-understanding, and in metaphysical striving—ensures us a measure of reconciliation with our fate which may enable us to cope with recurrent crisis-situations. Like Adorno, Jaspers propounds a negative dialectics through which he hopes to indicate how we might succeed in overcoming in practice what seems insoluble in theory. I critically explore the theory-practice relationship, while indicating the underlying unity of his thought.     

Antiracist Moral Identities,or Iris Murdoch in South Africa

Abstract

I argue that Samantha Vice understates the moral resources white people have available to them to minimize their falling into distorted ways of perceiving and responding to the world caused by bare white advantage. In doing so, she paints an unjustifiably pessimistic picture of white civic involvement in South Africa, and anywhere where white people are unjustly advantaged, such as the United States. I delineate two similar but distinct antiracist moral identities—the ‘white ally’ and the ‘person committed to racial justice’—that can guide civic engagement, as well as provide a counterweight to the distortions of whiteness. I argue that Vice’s recommendation of withdrawal from public engagement in humble silence is not the most morally appropriate response to white privilege.     

How to do things with (recorded) words

The aim of this paper is to evaluate which context determines the illocutionary force of written or recorded utterances—those involved in written texts, films and images, conceived as recordings that can be seen or heard in different occasions. More precisely, my paper deals with the “metaphysical” or constitutive role of context—as opposed to its epistemic or evidential role: my goal is to determine which context is semantically relevant in order to fix the illocutionary force of a speech act, as distinct from the information the addressee uses to ascertain the semantically relevant context. In particular I will try to assess two different perspectives on this problem, a Conventionalist Perspective and an Intentionalist Perspective. Drawing on the literature on indexicals in written texts and recorded messages, I will argue in favor of the Intentionalist Perspective: the relevant context is the one intended by the speaker. Bringing intentions into the picture, however, requires qualification; in particular, I will distinguish my Weak Intentionalist proposal from a Strong Intentionalist one. I will show that the Weak Intentionalist Perspective is flexible enough to deal with cases of delayed communication, but not so unrestricted as to yield counter-intuitive consequences.     

A socioeconomic dimension of the therapeutic relationship the analyst's perspective

Abstract

Gojman de Millan S. A Socioeconomic Dimension Of Therapeutic Relationship. The Analyst's Perspective. Int Forum Psychoanal 1997;6:241—249. Stockholm. ISSN 0808-706X.

Two clinical vignettes are described. I wish to show how much an open recognition of the social conditions of both participants in a treatment process may enrich the analyst's understanding of the transference-countertransference dynamics. I claim that although analysts intuitively integrate this aspect of the therapeutic relationship they commonly do it without a specific formulation.

In an explicit and systematic manner, Fromm emphasized the social dimensions of human experience. His background knowledge of the social sciences framed his therapeutic practice. The clinical implications which derive from this perspective will be illustrated.

The clinical material which I present shows how today's psychoanalytic attention to the dynamic interaction between analyst and patient while it enables us to deal with the complexity and different layers of the treatment process can also include the social dimension. The benefits and difficulties of developing our consciousness about our own social roles and our involvement in the social milieu deserve our careful and critical attention.     

Venerating Death

Abstract

In this paper, I am concerned with elucidating and expanding our attitudes toward our own death. As it is, our common attitudes toward our death are the following: we fear our premature death, and we dread our inevitable death. These attitudes are rational, but I want to argue that our attitudes toward death should be more complicated than this. A condition upon our value, our preciousness, as creatures is that we are vulnerable, and our vulnerability is, at bottom, a vulnerability to death. A corollary of this is that we could not be loved, either by ourselves or by others, for one cannot love—be concerned for—a being invulnerable to death. As a consequence, death plays a deep and abiding role in our value systems. Our susceptibility to premature and inevitable death is a condition upon our being valuable creatures and, in turn, it is a condition upon our being loved. Given the high value that we place on being valuable creatures who deserve love, we should equally place a high value on the constitutive conditions for being precious and loved. If, as I suggest, one of these conditions is that we will die, we should see our deaths not simply as something to fear or dread, but as something of great importance in our lives. Our deaths should be treated with awe, respect, and even praise.