Suffering, Sympathy, and (Environmental) Security: Reassessing Rorty’s Contribution to Human Rights Theory

This article reassess Rorty’s contribution to human rights theory. It addresses two key questions: (1) Does Rorty sustain his claim that there are no morally relevant transcultural facts? (2) Does Rorty’s proposed sentimental education offer an adequate response to contemporary human rights challenges? Although both questions are answered in the negative, it is argued here that Rorty’s focus on suffering, sympathy, and security, offer valuable resources to human rights theorists. The article concludes by considering the idea of a dual approach to human rights, combining Rorty’s emphasis on sentiment with an analysis of patterns of responsibility for the underfulfilment of human rights.     

Identity,Incentives, and Religious Defense of Human Rights: Marshall Meyer and the DAIA in Argentina's Dirty War

Whether religious groups advance or limit human rights has been a topic of recent debate among human rights scholars. This article studies the conditions under which religious leaders advance human rights in the context of Argentina's Jewish community during the country's 1976–1983 military dictatorship. Three major influences on religious support for human rights—autonomy from a religious community's establishment, a missionary-reformer identity, and congregational mobilization—are highlighted. Original archival research from the papers of U.S.-born rabbi Marshall T. Meyer illustrates his defense of human rights in Argentina, contrasting his work with the inaction of a major established Jewish organization. Quantitative cross-national analysis extends the case study findings by showing a relationship between religious institutions’ autonomy from the state and defense of human rights.     

商讨理论视野中的伦理、民主、人权和民族国家

本文根据哈贝马斯的访华演讲和相关著述,对商讨理论视野中的伦理、民主、人权和民族国家概念进行了考察,并在此基础上提出了某些基本的判断和论点。     

Rethinking Human Rights A Review Essay on Religion, Relativism, and Other Matters

In reviewing five edited collections and one monograph from the 1990s, the article summarizes the present status of the "human rights revolution" that was signaled by the adoption in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . It goes on to elaborate and evaluate some of the attempts contained in these books to deal with theoretical and practical controversies surrounding the subject of human rights, particularly the discussion of what to make of "cultural relativism" as far as human rights are concerned. Finally, the article summarizes some recent thinking and research on a neglected area, namely compliance with human rights standards protecting "freedom of religion or belief."     

Hobbes's Theory of Rights – A Modern Interest Theory

The received view in Thomas Hobbes scholarship is that theindividual rights described by Hobbes in his political writings andspecifically in Leviathan are simple freedoms or libertyrights, that is, rights that are not correlated with duties orobligations on the part of others. In other words, it is usually arguedthat there are no claim rights for individuals in Hobbes's politicaltheory. This paper argues, against that view, that Hobbes does describeclaim rights, that they come into being when individuals conform to thesecond law of nature and that they are genuine moral claim rights, thatis, rights that are the ground of the obligations of others to forebearfrom interfering with their exercise. This argument is defended againstboth Jean Hampton's and Howard Warrender's interpretations of rights inHobbes's theory. The paper concludes that the theory of rightsunderlying Hobbes's writing is not taken from Natural Law but isprobably closer to a modern interest theory of rights.     

Rethinking citizenship rights of non‐Muslims in an Islamic state: Rashid al‐Ghannūshi's contribution to the evolving debate

Of interest to Islamists of the twentieth century has been the question of minority rights in an Islamic state and of how non‐Muslim minorities should be treated: in particular, should they enjoy equal citizenship rights and responsibilities with Muslims? Traditional Islamic law did not accord equal rights to non‐Muslim protected minorities (ahl al‐dhimma), placing Muslims above them in several key areas. Notwithstanding the law, however, early Muslim rulers exercised some pragmatic discretion according to the imperatives of their day. With the Islamic revival of the twentieth century, the traditional view has been adopted by several Muslim thinkers and leaders, though the traditional view is at odds with the concept of the nation‐state. The nation‐state is built on a secular premise, with no single religious group favoured over another. Within this context, a number of Muslim thinkers have attempted to reinterpret the traditionally held view of ‘citizenship rights’. This article will focus on the contribution of one such thinker, the Tunisian Islamist Rashid al‐Ghannūshi, who espouses somewhat ‘liberal’ views on the issue and argues for rethinking on a number of related aspects. Commencing with some background to the problem, the article explores the issue of citizenship rights as espoused by Ghannūshi, and notes the key importance of the concept of justice as their basis, in his view. Specific rights examined are: freedom of belief, including for Muslims who wish to change their religion; the holding of public office by non‐Muslims; equal treatment for Muslims and non‐Muslims in terms of fiscal duties and benefits. Throughout his arguments, Ghannūshi emphasizes justice as central to the issue, and as the basis of interpreting and developing related rules and laws. Although Ghannūshi's views are not entirely new, he goes well beyond what has been acceptable in Islamic law, and his contribution should be considered important in the efforts at rethinking Islamic law in this area.     

Judicial Responses to Civil Disobedience: A Comparative Approach

In this paper, I compare the extent of Anglo-American judicial engagement in response to civil disobedience with that of the French judiciary. I begin by examining what the civil disobedient can realistically expect to achieve in a court of law. I shall argue that his priority should be to require the judge, acting as a mouthpiece for the law, to respond to his complaints. To do this, the civil disobedient must be able to deny liability for the offence he has allegedly committed by urging a different interpretation of the law on the basis of an alternative -- but plausible -- reading of constitutional or human rights. If the civil disobedient can do this, he can claim a victory of sorts, even if his claims are ultimately unsuccessful. But legal culture can present a further barrier. Judges have different roles in different jurisdictions and therein lie further difficulties for the French civil disobedient.     

Human Rights and Human Dignity

Why should all human beings have certain rights simply by virtue of being human? One justification is an appeal to religious authority. However, in increasingly secular societies this approach has its limits. An alternative answer is that human rights are justified through human dignity. This paper argues that human rights and human dignity are better separated for three reasons. First, the justification paradox: the concept of human dignity does not solve the justification problem for human rights but rather aggravates it in secular societies. Second, the Kantian cul-de-sac: if human rights were based on Kant’s concept of dignity rather than theist grounds, such rights would lose their universal validity. Third, hazard by association: human dignity is nowadays more controversial than the concept of human rights, especially given unresolved tensions between aspirational dignity and inviolable dignity. In conclusion, proponents of universal human rights will fare better with alternative frameworks to justify human rights rather than relying on the concept of dignity.     

Asylum Seekers and Human Rights

Asylum seekers, by their very circumstances, test our common assumptions and practice in relation to human rights. The treatment of asylum seekers in many European countries has become harsher, more restrictive and less tolerant in recent years, raising questions about the violation of their rights. The article examines the bases of the rights that asylum seekers do have and whether these are best supported as human rights or more limited rights that attach to the place of their temporary residence and to obligations made by their country of temporary residence. Given the propensity of receiving countries to afford increasingly limited rights, the article identifies a limited set of rights that should take priority in a hierarchy of rights and which might claim widespread acceptance as those which asylum seekers must enjoy. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

GLOBAL ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A REFLECTION

This paper examines the contributions that the international human rights community can make to the definition and framing of a practically effective global ethic, especially in light of ongoing concerns about social and economic justice, environmental issues, and systematic abuses of vulnerable populations. The principal argument is that the human rights movement in all of its dimensions (moral, legal, political) provides the pivotal foundation for a practicable global ethic now and for the foreseeable future. Evidence for the truth of this claim is discerned in the movement's contemporary efforts to intersect explicitly with other areas of international law and politics. Examples adduced include developments with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples, decision making about the environment, and transitional justice.     

International Justice,Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

谈谈中国临床试验研究中受试者权益保障问题

随着国家《药品临床试验管理规范》的颁布与实施,我国新药临床试验研究水平有相当的提高,但也存在着一些问题。其中包括保护受试者权益问题。国家GCP有关章节中明确指出要保护受试者权益。并有具体规定,但在执行中尚有出入,如试验方案未经伦理委员会批准,未向受试者告知试验内容。或告知的不够充分,甚至在未签署知情同意书时就开始试验等。为此,我国采取了相应的措施,如设立药品临床研究培训中心;定期对临床试验基地的研究者以及相关人员如与试验有关的医师,药师及申办者进行GCP培训,基地审核制度,以法律手段来保证受试者权益等。     

Reframing capabilities between welfarism and resourcism in the collaboration for the right to health

Since the Constitution of the World Health Organization (1946) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) were drafted, two broad approaches to the human right to health have been prominent: the health-in-itself approach (WHO)—a kind of welfarism—and the standard-of-living approach (UDHR)—a kind of resourcism. More recently, the capabilities approach to human development has provided a viable third alternative. This article reframes the idea of human capabilities to health as a mediating baseline between welfarism and resourcism so that, first, the main strengths of both of these parent approaches are retained. Second, the emerging dialogical capabilities approach (DCA) opens up smoothly towards collaboration among faith-based approaches within human rights thought and law. While DCA allows a broad diversity of foundational understandings of the human right to health, it supports the need for a high-level practical consensus in terms of human rights. But if the capabilities approach is understood as sharply contrasted to either welfarism or resourcism, or if it is grounded in an exclusively secular manner, it risks becoming a peculiarly narrow agenda that could hardly serve as a conceptual baseline for the collaborative promotion of the human right to health.     

Beyond Sectarianism? On David Miller’s Theory of Human Rights

In his most recent book, National Responsibility and Global Justice, David Miller presents an account of human rights grounded on the idea of basic human needs. Miller argues that his account can overcome what he regards as a central problem for human rights theory: the need to provide a ‘non-sectarian’ justification for human rights, one that does not rely on reasons that people from non-liberal societies should find objectionable. The list of human rights that Miller’s account generates is, however, minimal when compared to those found in human rights documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. This article argues that contrary to what Miller claims, his account is ‘sectarian’, since it relies on reasons that some non-liberals should find objectionable given their divergent values. It goes on to question whether ‘sectarianism’, as Miller defines it, is, in any case, a problem for human rights theory. The article concludes that Miller provides us with no reason to abandon commitment to a more extensive list of human rights.     

The five connections: A human rights framework for psychologists

This article provides a brief introduction to human rights, describes why human rights are intrinsic to psychology, and introduces the “Five Connections Framework,” which was adopted by the American Psychological Association in 2021. This framework articulates five distinct relationships between human rights and psychology: (a) Psychologists possess rights by virtue of being human, as well as specific rights essential to their profession and discipline; (b) Psychologists apply their knowledge and methods to the greater realisation of human rights; (c) Psychologists respect human rights and oppose the misuse of psychological science; (d) Psychologists ensure access to the benefits of psychological science and practice; and, (e) Psychologists advocate for human rights. Each of the five connections is described, highlighting implications for psychological research, practice, training and advocacy, with suggestions for how these connections can guide and inspire individual psychologists and psychological associations worldwide.     

Negotiating the spaces: exploring issues of human rights in an Indian text

This article is an attempt to negotiate the spaces between a number of problematic positions concerning Hinduism and human rights through the close study of one particular text, the Rājadharmaparvan of the Mahābhārata. By examining safeguards and provisions for subjects articulated in the text’s discourse of kingly duty, it engages with some of the arguments forwarded in the theoretical literature on human rights. Here it interrogates, in particular, the idea that Hinduism is distinctively incompatible with these norms in a way other historical or cultural traditions are not. The article concludes by asking whether it is possible to counter Eurocentric tendencies in global debates without furthering illiberal agendas within local ones. Discussing the appropriation of ‘Raj dharma,’ and the texts that deal with it, by the Hindu Right, it briefly outlines some recent moves in human rights theory that help facilitate the reclamation of a rich and plural textual heritage.     

作为一项权利的人的尊严

The concept of human dignity and the relationship between dignity and human rights have been important subjects in contemporary international academia. This article first analyzes the different understandings of the concept of dignity, which has left great influences in history (including the “theory of attribution-dignity”, the “theory of autonomy-dignity” or the “theory of moral completeness/achievement-dignity”, and the “theory of end-in-itself-dignity”); it then exposes the obvious defects of these modes of understanding; finally, it tries to define dignity as a moral right to be free from insult. Meanwhile, the relationship between human dignity and human rights is clarified as a result of this research: Rather than being the foundation of human rights, human dignity is one of human rights. The idea of dignity nevertheless has a particular status in ethics in that it embodies a kind of core moral concern, representing a basic demand rooted in the human self or individuality, and hence representing an important aspect of human rights. We may anticipate that sooner or later, the idea of human dignity will become, together with other human rights, the only intangible cultural heritage of human society. __________ Translated by Zhang Lin from Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2008, (6): 85–92     

Women, piety and practice: A study of women and religious practice in Malaysia

While the definition of religion in sociology has been highly contentious, we define religion in this article as simply the acts of piety that are conducted within the religious sphere. The point of this definition is to draw attention to practice and away from belief. This approach to religion appears to be especially useful in the case of contemporary Islam, where female piety has become a significant aspect of religious renewal. The idea of a religious sphere is taken from the work of Luc Boltanski and his colleagues who have coined the expression ‘the inspirational city’. Religion thus consists of acts of piety within the inspirational city, where this space is seen to be in tension with the secular city. The measurement of piety in everyday life sharply differentiates the profane world from religion. These ideas are explored in this article through qualitative data that are drawn from a small sample of pious women in contemporary Malaysia. We explore three aspects of female piety: veiling, polygamy and child-rearing. The article attempts to understand the terms in which piety is measured within the broader context of the Islamization of public life in Malaysia.     

Moralism and Anti-Moralism: Aspects of Bonhoeffer’s Christian Ethic

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's thinking about ethics and Christianity is a fascinating attempt to combine different, and often conflicting, strands in the Christian intellectual tradition. In this article, I outline his thinking, analyse the advantages and disadvantages in his approach, and relate it to developments in contemporary philosophy. His critique of an excessive stress upon principles and abstraction in opposition to a concern for concrete circumstances is, I argue, best seen as a necessary critique of what I call moralism rather than morality. It is also related to recent philosophical theories of particularism and the debates about ‘emergency ethics’ in current philosophy. On the negative side, Bonhoeffer has a tendency to treat non-Christian ethics as necessarily relativist and at times is excessively influenced by the elements in Christian theological tradition that are hostile to the natural and to non-Christian philosophy. In addition, his invocation of ‘the Divine mandates’ seems to have undesirable implications for some genuine values in liberal democratic theory and practice.