Frames of reference and cooperative social decision-making

Cooperative decision-making was studied as a function of the decision-makers' own, and the interdependent other party's gain or loss frame. As expected, results showed that (a) an own gain frame produced less cognitive activity than an own loss frame and (b) other's loss frame caused more cooperation than other's gain frame, but only in case of an own gain frame.     

Psychiatric Disorders and Childhood Parental Loss in Obesity: Relationship with the Mode of Weight Gain

We assessed the association between psychiatric disorders, childhood parental loss, and weight gain mode in 150 obese patients seeking bariatric surgery and with a history of sudden or gradual weight gain mode. Subjects with sudden weight gain mode (47%) showed significantly higher bipolar II disorder (p < .001), childhood parental death (p < .01), and separation (p < .01), but lower pure hypomania (p < .001) prevalence than subjects with gradual weight gain mode. We found preliminary evidence that lifetime bipolar spectrum disorders and childhood parental loss may influence weight gain mode in obese subjects. These findings may contribute to predict patients’ weight trajectories and implement preventive interventions.     

Information Seeking in a Non-Hypothesis Testing Task

The information gain model (Oaksford and Chater, Psychological Review 101, 608–631, 1994) advocates that participants attempt to achieve a larger expected information gain when they have to test an if-then rule or hypothesis. However, acquisition of larger expected information gain could also be operational when participants do not have to test a hypothesis. This study devised a new task to investigate whether participants would seek larger expected information gain when they were not required to test a hypothesis. The task required participants to select one out of two balance scales for weighing coins in order to detect an underweight coin. We discovered that participants more frequently selected the balance scale that provided smaller expected information gain. This finding suggests that the preference for larger expected information gain may not apply to non-hypothesis testing settings.     

A high-gain,low-noise amplifier for EEG

This paper describes an amplifier for an electroencephalograph with gain of 1×10⁴ to 1×10⁶ and made entirely of commercially available IC components. The two-stage amplifier has a preamplifier stage with fixed gain of 1000, and a second stage with variable gain from 1 to 100. The final stage, an anti-aliasing filter, adds a gain of 10 to the signal. The circuit has high common mode rejection, low input bias current, very low noise characteristics, low offset voltages, and offset nulling capability built into the circuit.     

Watching a cursor distorts haptically guided reproduction of mouse movement

Participants moved a mouse along a force-feedback-defined linear path, either without vision or while watching a cursor set to 1 of 3 levels of visual:haptic gain (all >1:1). They attempted to haptically reproduce the movement without visual feedback. Errors increased with gain, reaching 70% overestimation at the highest gain. Forewarning participants about gain variability did not eliminate this effect. The gain level was potentially cued during the movement by the mismatch between visual feedback and kinesthetic feedback. Moreover, because participants did not achieve cursor-speed constancy across gain levels, visual speed was another cue to gain. Collectively, these cues failed to prevent visual distortion of movement reproduction.     

Distinct pathways to persuasion: The role of affect in message‐framing effects

Health‐promoting messages can be framed in terms of the gains that are associated with healthy behaviour (gain frame) or the losses that are associated with unhealthy behaviour (loss frame). In the present research, we examined the role of positive and negative affect in the persuasive effects of gain‐ and loss‐framed health‐promoting information. Experiment 1 (N = 98) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance than loss‐framed information and that this effect was mediated by positive affect. The results of Experiment 2 (N = 129) showed that gain‐framed information resulted in higher levels of information acceptance and attitude, an effect that was again mediated by positive affect. In addition, loss‐framed information resulted in more negative affect than gain‐framed information and negative affect increased participants' intention to engage in the healthy behaviour. These results suggest that affect may be of great importance in the persuasion process and may be particularly helpful to explain the underlying mechanisms of message framing effects. The findings also suggest that gain‐ and loss‐framed messages offer distinct pathways to persuasion. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Sharing losses and sharing gains: Increased demand for fairness under adversity

There is ample experimental evidence showing that people have a strong preference for equity in wealth allocation and social interaction. Although the behavior of gain sharing and responses to (un)fairness in allocation of wealth has been extensively investigated in studies employing economic exchange games, few studies have focused on how people respond to an unfair division of loss between individuals. In this study we developed a new variant of the ultimatum game and examined the participants' reactions to (un)fairness in both gain and loss sharing. Results from three experiments showed that the rejection rates to unfair offers were generally higher in the loss than in the gain domain. Moreover, participants were inclined to associate loss with “unfair” and gain with “fair”, with stronger associations leading to higher rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Furthermore, in subjective rating, unfair offers were perceived as being more unfair in the loss than in the gain domain. These results demonstrate an increased demand for fairness under adversity and the importance of justice in liability sharing.     

Perspectives,Perceptions, and Risk-Taking Behavior

Several organizational researchers have recently argued that the propositions of Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory are in conflict with commonly held notions of risk taking for opportunities and risk aversion for threats. This investigation was an attempt to empirically separate threat and opportunity perceptions from loss and gain perspectives. Experiment 1 (N= 244) revealed that most decision makers, faced with a traditional framing problem, perceived the risky alternative as an opportunity when they were in the loss domain, but perceived it as a threat when they were in the gain domain. Experiment 2 showed that framing the same (loss and gain) problems as threats versus opportunities influenced risk taking, such that management students (N= 84) were more risk taking for opportunity-framed problems and risk averse for threat-framed problems. At the same time, the students took more risks for the loss problem than for the gain problem. We conclude that threat and opportunity perceptions are theoretically and empirically distinguishable from loss and gain perspectives.     

Motivational bases of choice in three-choice decomposed games

Subjects were presented a series of decomposed games that permitted them to select alternatives that maximize one or more of the following motivational dispositions: (1) own gain (individualism), (2) joint gain (cooperation), (3) relative gain (competition), or (4) minimization of other's gain (aggression). There were two types (cases) of games. Case 1 games permitted the S the same or a greater number of points than the other player across all alternatives; Case 2 games afforded the same or fewer points than the other player across all alternatives. It was found: (1) the motive of minimization of other's gain was negligibly reflected in Ss' choices; (2) the other motives were present and affecting Ss' choices; (3) more competitive and fewer cooperative choices occurred in Case 2 than in Case 1 games; (4) sex of subject affected choice behavior in only one game, where males tended to be more cooperative and females more individualistic; and (5) though information on choice and outcome of others was highly limited, some behavioral imitation occurred within dyads.     

Therapeutic alliance and weight gain during cognitive behavioural therapy for anorexia nervosa

This study examined the relationship between therapeutic alliance and primary symptom change (weight gain) during CBT for anorexia nervosa. The aims were threefold: (1) to establish the strength of the therapeutic alliance across the treatment, (2) to determine whether early therapeutic alliance is associated with the completion of CBT for this client group, and (3) to determine the direction of the relationship between therapeutic alliance and weight gain. Adult outpatients (N = 65) with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa (or atypical anorexia nervosa) completed a measure of alliance at session six and at the end of treatment. Weight was recorded at the start of treatment, session six and at the end of treatment. The strength of the alliance was consistently high in the sample. However, early therapeutic alliance was not associated with either the likelihood of completing treatment or subsequent weight gain. In contrast, both early and later weight gain were associated with the strength of subsequent alliance. These findings indicate that it might be advisable to focus on techniques to drive weight gain rather than rely on the therapeutic alliance to bring about therapeutic change.     

Dissociation of oxytocin effects on body weight in two variants of female Sprague-Dawley rats

As a counterpoint to studies that make a case for the use of oxytocin in short-term inhibition of food intake, the aim of the present study was to determine whether the peptide facilitates weight gain in female rats in a more long-term perspective. Two different variants of female Sprague-Dawley rats were used. The two variants differed in daily weight gain (0.38 g/day vs. 1.41 g/day during 28 days), and were designated slowly and rapidly growing rats (SGR and RGR) respectively. Oxytocin 1 mg/kg given s.c. to SGR for a five-day period increased weight gain significantly in comparison to a previous five-day period with NaCl-treatment (18.0 g/5 days versus 5.0 g/5 days; p<0.01). In a separate study, oxytocin 1 mg/kg given for four days increased weight gain significantly in SGR versus saline-treated controls (7.5 g/4 days versus 1.6 g/4 days; p<0.05). The weight-difference persisted six days later (p<0.001). The weight increase of oxytocin occurred only during estrus (p<0.05) and was not accompanied by any measurable increase in food intake. In RGR, oxytocin-treatment decreased food intake significantly (p<0.001) and tended to decrease weight gain, although not significantly. The SGR and RGR also had different endocrine profiles with, for example, twice as high oxytocin (p<0.01) and insulin levels (p<0.01) in RGR compared to the SGR. These data suggest that oxytocin influences weight gain and food intake differently in the two variants of Sprague-Dawley rats, perhaps depending on factors such as endocrine profile and oxytocin sensitivity.     

Holding your place: Reactions to the prospect of status gains and losses

This paper examines individuals’ reactions to the prospect of gaining or losing status in groups. The results of three experiments provide evidence that individuals attach greater value to status when recalling the risk of status loss than when recalling the potential for status gain (Experiment 1), are willing to pay more to avoid a status loss than to achieve a status gain (Experiment 1), and put forth greater effort when striving to prevent status loss than when striving to gain status (Experiment 2). Finally, individuals who risk losing status allocate more resources toward personal status concerns (and away from group interests and potential monetary gain) than do individuals who have a chance of gaining status (Experiment 3). We discuss the implications of this research both in terms of individuals’ psychological experience of their status, as well as status attainment and maintenance concerns in groups.     

Effects of gain—loss frames on satisfaction with self–other outcome-differences

This research concerned satisfaction with outcome-differences (advantageous inequity, equity, or disadvantageous inequity) as a function of the individual's gain or loss frame, other's gain or loss frame, the cooperative or noncooperative nature of the relationship, and their interactions. After reading a scenario, subjects rated on a satisfaction-dissatisfaction scale a series of outcome-pairs providing themselves and another party with outcomes. Consistent with Equity Theory, results showed that gain framed individuals found equity more pleasing than advantageous inequity, which in turn was preferred over disadvantageous inequity, but only when the decision making context was coopera- tive rather than noncooperative. In a noncooperative context, gain framed individuals were as pleased with equity as with advantageous inequity. Contrary to Equity Theory, but consistent with Prospect Theory, loss framed individuals were relatively insensitive to outcome-differences and the nature of the relationship. Results finally suggested that advantageous inequity was preferred less when the other party had a loss rather than gain frame, albeit only under cooperative circumstances.     

Hedonic Intensity of Disappointment and Elation

This research is an investigation of the hedonic intensities of elation and disappointment following the outcomes of risky gambles using two principles: disappointment aversion and the principle of limited emotion processing. Disappointment aversion implies a stronger impact of disappointment compared with elation; the principle of limited emotion processing predicts a smaller impact of elation if it occurs with a real gain, and a smaller impact of disappointment if it occurs with a real loss. Both principles support each other in the gain domain but operate against each other in the loss domain. It was predicted that disappointment would outweigh elation in the gain domain. For the loss domain, this question was left open to empirical scrutiny. Participants were provided with hypothetical gambles and were required to imagine having won, not won, lost, or not lost, money. Results supported the prediction for the gain domain; mixed results emerged for the loss domain. The model adds to the understanding of the cognitive and emotional processes following the outcomes of risky events.     

Dual adaptation and adaptive generalization of the human vestibulo-ocular reflex

In two experiments, we examined the possibility that the human vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) is subject todual adaptation (the ability to adapt to a sensory rearrangement more rapidly and/or more completely after repeated experience with it) andadaptive generalization (the ability to adapt more readily to a novel sensory rearrangement as a result of prior dual adaptation training). In Experiment 1, the subjects actively turned the head during alternating exposure to a visual-vestibular rearrangement (target/head gain=0.5) and the normal situation (target/head gain=0.0). These conditions produced both adaptation and dual adaptation of the VOR but no evidence of adaptive generalization when tested with a target/head gain of 1.0. Experiment 2, in which exposure to the 0.5 gain entailed externally controlled (i.e., passive) whole body rotation, resulted in VOR adaptation but no dual adaptation. As in Experiment 1, no evidence of adaptive generalization was found.     

Do medical decision analyses' largest gains grow from the smallest trees?

Some decision analysts recommend reserving their models for careful, complete study of complex problems. Others believe simple problem analyses provide the greatest gains. To clarify these issues, I tested: (1) whether simple published analyses compared to complex ones, produced results as non-intuitive; and (2) whether non-intuitiveness represented analytic gain (or equivalently, intuitive loss). Very limited data also examined (3) the gain from adding model intricacy for a given problem vs. selecting more complex problems for analysis. To assess two non-intuitiveness measures, 75 subjects (33 physicians and 42) non-physicians stated their intuitive preferences in 40 (22 published and 18 unpublished) medical dilemmas. For both physicians and non-physicians, simpler models (those with lees than 30 terminal branches in the decision tree) had about one third the non-intuitiveness of more complex ones. Three tests also supported the premise that analyses outperform intuition, therefore that on average the formers' non-intuitiveness reflects less analytic gain. In addition, for different models of the same problem, tree complexity did not correlate with gain. Thus, simpler trees may not generally gain less because they inadequately describe problems. Instead, simpler analyses may represent simpler problems, with more similar intuitive and formal solutions. If so, these findings may help us avoid some costly but unnecessary simple analyses.     

The differential processing of price in gains and losses: the effects of frame and need for cognition

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of decision theory is that more money is preferred to less: the principle of desired wealth. Based on this and other principles such as reference dependence and loss aversion, researchers have derived and demonstrated mental accounting (MA) rules for multiple outcome situations. Experiment 1 tested the invariance of the desired wealth principle and two mental accounting rules (mixed gain, e.g. $100 gain and a $50 loss; mixed loss, e.g. $100 loss and a $50 gain) across types of decision maker and frame. The desired wealth principle and the MA rule for mixed gains were found to vary depending upon (1) the thoughtfulness of the decision maker (need for cognition, NC), and (2) the frame used to describe gains and losses (e.g. a gain of $x versus a gain of y%). The MA rule for mixed losses, however, was found to be immune to framing effects, even among people who are generally less thoughtful. The differential processing of gains and losses across frames (dollar versus percentage) and individuals (less versus more thoughtful) was tested further in Experiment 2 where evaluations of mixed losses were made at the level of the gestalt as well as the constituent (the gain and the loss being evaluated separately). Framing effects were evidenced only among subjects lower in NC and only when the constituent gain was evaluated. Evaluations of the overall mixed loss and the constituent loss were comparable across situation and individual, suggesting that losses motivate greater processing among people otherwise inclined toward cognitive miserliness. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of managerial regulatory fit priming on reactions to explanations

We investigated the interactive effects of regulatory focus priming and message framing on the perceived fairness of unfavorable events. We hypothesized that individuals’ perceptions of fairness are higher when they receive a regulatory focus prime (promotion versus prevention) that is congruent with the framing of an explanation (gain versus loss), as opposed to one that is incongruent. We also hypothesized that these effects are mediated by counterfactual thinking. Three studies revealed that primed regulatory fit (promotion/gain or prevention/loss) led to higher levels of justice perceptions than regulatory misfit (promotion/loss or prevention/gain). Additionally, “could” and “should” counterfactuals partially mediated the relationship between regulatory fit and interactional justice (Study 3).     

Inpatient Group Psychotherapy: Practical Considerations and Special Problems

A comparison is made between group-analytic and group focal conflict theory in terms of the conceptualization of the group as a whole; the emergence of group-level phenomena from the interaction of individuals; the associative flow as the material for therapy; facilitative and nonfacilitative group conditions; the therapist's aims on behalf of the persons in the group and perceived routes toward therapeutic gain; general factors contributing to therapeutic gain; specific factors contributing to therapeutic gain; and the therapist's role. Differences in terminology are examined to determine whether and how they reflect differences in substance. Many similarities and some differences in emphasis can be shown to exist. Both approaches generate respect for the power and potential of the group to support significant reexperiencing, with attendant opportunities for personal benefit and change.     

An economic perspective on the Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory of personality

Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory postulates personality factors of ‘reward sensitivity’ and ‘punishment sensitivity’ linked to neural systems that control approach and avoidance, respectively. In contrast, behavioural economics distinguishes gain (‘reward’) and loss (‘punishment’) valuation systems that are orthogonal to approach/avoidance behaviour. We combined gain and loss with both their presentation and omission and found evidence for separate gain valuation, loss valuation, approach, and avoidance systems. This suggests that it is possible to integrate valuation/input and behaviour/output views of ‘reward’ and ‘punishment’ in a way that may be of use to both personality theory and economics and so forge closer links between these two major perspectives on decision-making and behaviour.