Building Cognition: The Construction of Computational Representations for Scientific Discovery

Novel computational representations, such as simulation models of complex systems and video games for scientific discovery (Foldit, EteRNA etc.), are dramatically changing the way discoveries emerge in science and engineering. The cognitive roles played by such computational representations in discovery are not well understood. We present a theoretical analysis of the cognitive roles such representations play, based on an ethnographic study of the building of computational models in a systems biology laboratory. Specifically, we focus on a case of model‐building by an engineer that led to a remarkable discovery in basic bioscience. Accounting for such discoveries requires a distributed cognition (DC) analysis, as DC focuses on the roles played by external representations in cognitive processes. However, DC analyses by and large have not examined scientific discovery, and they mostly focus on memory offloading, particularly how the use of existing external representations changes the nature of cognitive tasks. In contrast, we study discovery processes and argue that discoveries emerge from the processes of building the computational representation. The building process integrates manipulations in imagination and in the representation, creating a coupled cognitive system of model and modeler, where the model is incorporated into the modeler's imagination. This account extends DC significantly, and we present some of the theoretical and application implications of this extended account.     

Building human-like communicative intelligence: A grounded perspective

Modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems excel at diverse tasks, from image classification to strategy games, even outperforming humans in many of these domains. After making astounding progress in language learning in the recent decade, AI systems, however, seem to approach the ceiling that does not reflect important aspects of human communicative capacities. Unlike human learners, communicative AI systems often fail to systematically generalize to new data, suffer from sample inefficiency, fail to capture common-sense semantic knowledge, and do not translate to real-world communicative situations. Cognitive Science offers several insights on how AI could move forward from this point. This paper aims to: (1) suggest that the dominant cognitively-inspired AI directions, based on nativist and symbolic paradigms, lack necessary substantiation and concreteness to guide progress in modern AI, and (2) articulate an alternative, “grounded”, perspective on AI advancement, inspired by Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enactive Cognition (4E) research. I review results on 4E research lines in Cognitive Science to distinguish the main aspects of naturalistic learning conditions that play causal roles for human language development. I then use this analysis to propose a list of concrete, implementable components for building “grounded” linguistic intelligence. These components include embodying machines in a perception–action cycle, equipping agents with active exploration mechanisms so they can build their own curriculum, allowing agents to gradually develop motor abilities to promote piecemeal language development, and endowing the agents with adaptive feedback from their physical and social environment. I hope that these ideas can direct AI research towards building machines that develop human-like language abilities through their experiences with the world.     

It's a great big universe: Astrobiology and future trends for an astrotheology

Despite the awe and wonder that discoveries related to astrobiology inspire, the sheer volume and diversity of new discoveries related to space science can become overwhelming without meaningful frames of reference by which to organize our understanding of these phenomena. I suggest that a critical feature of the future of “astrotheology” relates to how it serves as an organizing correlate to astrobiology and space research. Considering that the prefix astro‐ has an amplicative and abductive effect on the fields of study to which it is applied, I contend that astrotheology implies a creative and constructive shift in how we conceptualize meaningful human being for theology that parallels how astrobiology effects a creative and constructive shift in how we conceptualize living systems.     

Divine Action,Resurrection, and the Transformation of the Universe

Abstract

The article examines the notion of self-organization and explores the reality of biological processes from an epistemological point of view. First, I briefly analyze what is currently regarded as one of the most important discoveries not only in physics, but also in biology—namely, complex systems and deterministic chaos; secondly, I offer some reflections on the new frontiers of contemporary biology— namely, functional genomics and systems biology. The central part of the article focuses on the epistemological transition from genetic determinism to the new conception of “meaning” as emergence.     

How Otto did not extend his mind,but might have: Dynamic systems theory and social-cultural group selection

Proponents of cognitive Situationism argue that the human mind is embodied, embedded in both natural and social-cultural environments and extended creating both extended and distributed cognition. Anti-situationists reject all or some of these claims. I argue that four major objections to extended cognition: (1) the mark of the cognitive, (2) the function-identity fallacy, (3) cognitive bloat, and (4) scientific irrelevance lose much of their sting in the case of distributed cognition, the extension of cognitive agency to a group of cognitive agents, such as a scientific research team. However, I claim that a crucial fifth challenge, that advocates of the extended mind commit the causal-constitution fallacy, has yet to be satisfactorily addressed. I focus on Spyridon Palermos’ use of dynamic systems theory to refute this charge and I argue that his appeal to dynamic systems theory as a way of understanding system-constitution fails. Instead, I suggest a social-cultural group selection hypothesis for understanding system-constitution. But, I leave it for another day to elaborate that hypothesis’ empirical plausibility.     

Discussions Dynamical Explanation in Cognitive Science

Summary  Applying the concepts of dynamical systems theory to explain cognitive phenomena is still a fairly recent trend in cognitive science and its potential and consequences are not nearly mapped out. A decade ago, dynamical approaches were introduced as a paradigm shift in cognitive science and in this paper I concentrate on how to substantiate this claim. After having considered and rejected the possibility that continuous time is the crucial factor, I present Kelso’s model of a near-cognitive phenomenon which invokes self-organization as the guiding principle. Then, the explanatory strategy implicit in this approach is explicated and its underlying assumption presented. Finally, I discuss how we should characterize this explanatory framework using the notion of emergence.     

Can competitive paradigms increase the validity of experiments on primate social cognition?

Experiments vary in their ability to distinguish between competing hypotheses. In tests on primate cognition the majority of this variation is due to an experimenter's ability to test primates in valid settings while providing the adequate amount of experimental control. While experimenters studying primate cognition can use methods of control perfected in captivity, it is still very unclear how to design and then objectively evaluate the external validity of new experimental paradigms. I recommend that more effort be allocated to specify how to create relevant test settings for primates. Primate social life is highly competitive. This means that all aspects of primates themselves, including their cognitive abilities, have likely been shaped by the need to out-compete conspecifics. Based on this hypothesis, sophisticated cognitive abilities of primates might best be demonstrated in competitive contexts. Thus, it is suggested that one possible measure of validity is whether investigators integrate a competitive component into their experimental designs. To evaluate this methodological prediction I review the literature on chimpanzee perspective-taking as a case study including several recent studies that include a competitive component in their experimental designs. Accepted after revision: 8 April 2001 Electronic Publication     

生成认知：理论基础与实践走向

生成认知是具身认知思潮中的一个新取向。它主张认知是通过身体活动“生成的” (enacted)。认知的起点不是一个怎样精确表征世界的信息加工问题, 而是行动者在情境中怎样利用知觉来指导自己的行动。认知不是通过精确的心理表征“恢复”世界, 而是通过知觉引导的行动“生成”或“造就”一个自己的世界。认知是具身的行动, 认知结构形成于经常和反复出现的感觉运动模式, 与身体构造和身体活动具有深刻连续性。梅洛·庞蒂的身体现象学对生成认知具有深刻影响。同时, 詹姆斯、杜威等人的实用主义哲学对于实践行动的强调也深刻影响了生成认知。这种认知观强调了“行动”对心智的意义, 引发许多争议, 也促进了心理学研究范式的转变。     

The Biomedical Paradigm and the Nobel Prize: Is It Time for a Change?

An examination of the early history of Nobel Committee deliberations, coupled with a survey of discoveries for which prizes have been awarded to date – and, equally revealing, discoveries for which prizes have not been awarded – reveals a pattern. This pattern suggests that Committee members may have internalized the received, biomedical model and conferred awards in accord with the physicalistic premises that ground this model. I consider the prospect of a paradigm change in medical science and the possible repercussions of such a change on the distribution of Nobel prizes within the domain of physiology or medicine. For expository purposes, I contrast a model based on a science of pathophysiology with one based on a science of pathopsychophysiology. I propose a means whereby members might minimize the potentially blinding effects of model-dependence and come to evaluate medical discoveries from an inter-model rather than an exclusively intra-model perspective. By bringing to light questions rarely asked and proposing answers, I seek to open a dialogue and furnish a vehicle by which the putative delimiting effects of model-dependence might be overcome.     

Mechanisms of Gene–Environment Interaction Effects in the Development of Conduct Disorder

ABSTRACT— The gene–environment interaction effect in the development of conduct disorder is one of the most important discoveries of the past decade, but the mechanisms through which this effect operates remain elusive. I propose a model of these processes that focuses on the individual's response to a threatening stimulus in ongoing social interaction. The individual's response coordinates three interrelated systems: neural, autonomic, and information-processing. In each system, adaptive, evolutionarily selected response patterns characterize normal responding, but in psychopathology these patterns have gone awry. Antecedents of individual differences in these response patterns arise from genetic polymorphisms, adverse environmental experiences early in life, and their interaction. Programs of research are proposed to test hypotheses in the model through longitudinal, experimental, and clinical intervention methods. This model can serve as a template for inquiry in other forms of developmental psychopathology.     

Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?

According to the embodied cognition hypothesis, the mental symbols used for higher cognitive reasoning, such as the making of deductive and inductive inferences, both originate and reside in our sensory-motor-introspective and emotional systems. The main objection to this view is that it cannot explain concepts that are, by definition, detached from perception and action, i.e., abstract concepts such as TRUTH or DEMOCRACY. This objection is usually merely taken for granted and has yet to be spelled out in detail. In this paper, I distinguish three different versions of this objection (one semantic and two epistemic versions). Once these distinctions are in place, we can begin to see the solutions offered in the literature in a new, more positive, light.     

Assimilation and discovery

My aim in this paper is to examine a rational discovery strategy that I call “assimilation”, the attempt to understand a new domain by systematically interpreting the items it contains in terms of an established conceptual structure. The claim that this approach can lead to important new discoveries is illustrated by considering Galileo's attempt to develop a mathematical theory of the strength of materials and his discovery of mountains on the moon.     

Behavior systems and reinforcement: an integrative approach.

Most traditional conceptions of reinforcement are based on a simple causal model in which responding is strengthened by the presentation of a reinforcer. I argue that reinforcement is better viewed as the outcome of constraint of a functioning causal system comprised of multiple interrelated causal sequences, complex linkages between causes and effects, and a set of initial conditions. Using a simplified system conception of the reinforcement situation, I review the similarities and drawbacks of traditional reinforcement models and analyze the recent contributions of cognitive, regulatory, and ecological approaches. Finally, I show how the concept of behavior systems can begin to incorporate both traditional and recent conceptions of reinforcement in an integrative approach.     

Embracing integration and complexity: placing emotion within a science of brain and behaviour

ABSTRACT

The present paper addresses conceptual issues that are central to emotion research. What is emotion? What are its defining characteristics? The field struggles with questions like these almost constantly. I argue that definitions, and deciding what is the proper status of emotion, are not a requirement for scientific progress – in fact, they can hinder it. Therefore, “emotion” researchers should strive to develop a science of complex behaviours, and worry less about their exact nature. But for interesting behaviours, is most of the explaining that is needed present at the level of isolated systems (perception, cognition, etc.) or at the level of interactions between them? I suggest that the level of interactions is where most of the work is needed. Accordingly, I advocate that it is important to embrace integration, and not to strive to necessarily disentangle the multiple contributions underlying behaviours. More generally, it is argued that we need to revise models of causation adopted when reasoning about the mind and brain. Instead, a “complex systems” approach is required where the interactions between multiple components lead to system-level – emergent – properties that cannot be isolated or attributed to more elementary parts.     

Models of Success Versus the Success of Models: Reliability without Truth

In computer simulations of physical systems, the construction of models is guided, but not determined, by theory. At the same time simulations models are often constructed precisely because data are sparse. They are meant to replace experiments and observations as sources of data about the world; hence they cannot be evaluated simply by being compared to the world. So what can be the source of credibility for simulation models? I argue that the credibility of a simulation model comes not only from the credentials supplied to it by the governing theory, but also from the antecedently established credentials of the model building techniques employed by the simulationists. In other words, there are certain sorts of model building techniques which are taken, in and of themselves, to be reliable. Some of these model building techniques, moreover, incorporate what are sometimes called “falsifications.” These are contrary-to-fact principles that are included in a simulation model and whose inclusion is taken to increase the reliability of the results. The example of a falsification that I consider, called artificial viscosity, is in widespread use in computational fluid dynamics. Artificial viscosity, I argue, is a principle that is successfully and reliably used across a wide domain of fluid dynamical applications, but it does not offer even an approximately “realistic” or true account of fluids. Artificial viscosity, therefore, is a counter-example to the principle that success implies truth – a principle at the foundation of scientific realism. It is an example of reliability without truth.     

Representations and Cognitive Explanations: Assessing the Dynamicist's Challenge in Cognitive Science

Advocates of dynamical systems theory (DST) sometimes employ revolutionary rhetoric. In an attempt to clarify how DST models differ from others in cognitive science, I focus on two issues raised by DST: the role for representations in mental models and the conception of explanation invoked. Two features of representations are their role in standing-in for features external to the system and their format. DST advocates sometimes claim to have repudiated the need for stand-ins in DST models, but I argue that they are mistaken. Nonetheless, DST does offer new ideas as to the format of representations employed in cognitive systems. With respect to explanation, I argue that some DST models are better seen as conforming to the covering-law conception of explanation than to the mechanistic conception of explanation implicit in most cognitive science research. But even here, I argue, DST models are a valuable complement to more mechanistic cognitive explanations.     

Evolutionary psychology: the emperor's new paradigm

For some evolutionary psychology is merely a field of inquiry, but for others it is a robust paradigm involving specific theories about the nature and evolution of the human mind. Proponents of this paradigm claim to have made several important discoveries regarding the evolved architecture of the mind. Highly publicized discoveries include a cheater-detection module, a psychological sex difference in jealousy, and motivational mechanisms underlying parental love and its lapses, which purportedly result in child maltreatment. In this article, I argue that the empirical evidence for these "discoveries" is inconclusive, at best. I suggest that, as the reigning paradigm in evolutionary psychology has produced questionable results, the evolutionary study of human psychology is still in need of a guiding paradigm.     

The role of the basal ganglia in learning and memory: insight from Parkinson's disease

It has long been known that memory is not a single process. Rather, there are different kinds of memory that are supported by distinct neural systems. This idea stemmed from early findings of dissociable patterns of memory impairments in patients with selective damage to different brain regions. These studies highlighted the role of the basal ganglia in non-declarative memory, such as procedural or habit learning, contrasting it with the known role of the medial temporal lobes in declarative memory. In recent years, major advances across multiple areas of neuroscience have revealed an important role for the basal ganglia in motivation and decision making. These findings have led to new discoveries about the role of the basal ganglia in learning and highlighted the essential role of dopamine in specific forms of learning. Here we review these recent advances with an emphasis on novel discoveries from studies of learning in patients with Parkinson's disease. We discuss how these findings promote the development of current theories away from accounts that emphasize the verbalizability of the contents of memory and towards a focus on the specific computations carried out by distinct brain regions. Finally, we discuss new challenges that arise in the face of accumulating evidence for dynamic and interconnected memory systems that jointly contribute to learning.     

How we think and act together

In this paper, I examine the challenges socially extended minds pose for mainstream, individualistic accounts of social cognition. I argue that individualistic accounts of social cognition neglect phenomena important to social cognition that are properly emphasized by socially extended mind accounts. Although I do not think the evidence or arguments warrant replacing individualistic explanations of social cognition with socially extended explanations, I argue that we have good reason to supplement our individualistic accounts so as to include the ways in which situational context affects social interactions. The result, I hope, is a more sophisticated individualism that offers a more comprehensive account of how we think and act together.     

Multiple Cultures,Multiple Selves,and Analytic Influence: A Response to Goldin’s “The Storied Self”

Using a dynamic systems contextual model, I expand Daniel Goldin’s ideas about narrative and the “storied self.” I identify two issues that are key to the development of a coherent life story: first, the identification and integration of the multiple psychic self-states and external cultures with which and in which people live, and second, the meeting and melding of important minds in the person’s environment.