Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Perception,meaning, and mind

Earlier versions of this paper were read in the Philosophy department at the University of Helsinki, in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh, at Vanderbilt University, at the Indiana Philosophical Association, and at the Institute for Logic and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston. I am grateful for very helpful comments on each of these occasions, and I am especially appreciative to John Haugeland, Mark Johnson, and George McClure for their comments and suggestions. Thanks, too, to Robert Solomon who urged me to amplify my claims about perceptual meaning.     

Individualism,causal powers,and explanation

Versions of this paper were presented at the 17th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June 1991, at Cornell University in October 1991, and at Queen's University in January 1992; I thank Terence Horgan and Carl Ginet, respectively, for their comments on the first two of these occasions. I would also like to thank Terence Irwin, Sydney Shoemaker, Bob Stalnaker, Ed Stein, and J. D. Trout for comments on earlier versions of the paper, and Joe Moore, Dave Robb and Sergio Sismondo for useful discussion.     

Demonstratives,demonstrations, and demonstrata

I would like to thank Kate Kearns and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Partitions,probabilistic causal laws,and Simpson's paradox

I wish to thank Elisabeth Lloyd, Samuel Mitchell, Greg Ray, Piers Rollins and two anonymous readers for their insightful criticisms and comments.     

Autonomy,free speech and automatic behaviour

One of the strongest defences of free speech holds that autonomy requires the protection of speech. In this paper I examine five conditions that autonomy must satisfy. I survey recent research in social psychology regarding automatic behaviour, and a challenge to autonomy is articulated. I argue that a plausible strategy for neutralising some of the autonomy-threatening automatic responses consists in avoiding the exposure to the environmental features that trigger them. If this is so, we can good autonomy-based pro tanto reasons for controlling exposure to certain forms of speech. Earlier drafts of this paper were presented in the 2005 Warwick Graduate Conference in Political theory, the 2005 ALSP Conference at the University of Strathclyde, and the Discussion Group of Political Theory at Warwick University. I am grateful for the many comments received on those occasions, especially to Peter Jones, Graham Long, Glen Newey, Fabienne Peter, Jonathan Seglow and Will Smith. Two anonymous referees for Res Publica gave me helpful comments that benefited the argument defended here. Especial thanks are due to Matthew Clayton and Susan Hurley who provided me with detailed written comments and fruitful discussion.     

Replies to Wallace,Queloz, and Kirwin

In this article, I reply to the comments offered by R. Jay Wallace, Matthieu Queloz, and Claire Kirwin on my book, The Will to Nothingness. An Essay on Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality (OUP, 2021). These comments and my replies cover central features of the book, including my analysis of ressentiment as an expression of the will to power; the concept of self-undermining functionality I introduce to make sense of Nietzsche's critique of the ascetic ideal; and my reasons for omitting to examine the “unconditional will to truth,” which he presents as the latest embodiment of this ideal.     

Replies to Deng,Lee, and Skow

This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on Chapters 2 and 6. In Chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In Chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in Chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.     

Strict coherence,sigma coherence and the metaphysics of quantity

I would like to thanks Louis Narens for comments on an earlier version of this paper.     

Geometry, intuition and experience: From kant to husserl

I take this opportunity to thank my colleagues at ZiF for their very helpful comments and criticisms during the academic year. For the preparation of this paper, I am especially indepted to Michael Hallett, who not only improved my English but also saved me from a number of errors.     

Mind,consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science

I would like to thank Steven Crowell from Rice University (Philosophy Department) for helpful comments and suggestions about my discussion of Husserl and other phenomenologists, and Edouard Philippe, also from Rice University (Electrical Engineering Department), for offering me the opportunity to formulate my views on cognitive science and artificial intelligence.     

The Dimensions of Consequentialism: Reply to Schmidt,Brown, Howard-Snyder,Crisp, Andric and Tanyi,and Gertken

In this article I respond to comments and objections raised in the special issue on my book The Dimensions of Consequentialism. I defend my multi-dimensional consequentialist theory against a range of challenges articulated by Thomas Schmidt, Campbell Brown, Frances Howard-Snyder, Roger Crisp, Vuko Andric and Attila Tanyi, and Jan Gertken. My aim is to show that multi-dimensional consequentialism is, at least, a coherent and intuitively plausible alternative to one-dimensional theories such as utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and mainstream accounts of egalitarianism. I am very grateful to all contributors for reading my book so closely and for devoting time and intellectual energy to thinking about the pros and cons of multi-dimensional consequentialism.     

Cooperation,fairness and utility

Conclusions In the situations canvassed I have argued that (a) the dominant aim of the utilitarian will be the establishment of a fair procedure, (b) under radical uncertainty cooperation will constitute his best bet, and (c) when he knowsthat all others will cooperate it is still an open question whether he will slack, and if under some conditions he does so he does not then act unfairly. It is wise to bear in mind, however, that an enormous number of possible situations, mostly mixtures of the pure cases, simply have not been considered. It is not inconceivable that in one of them the utilitarian will clearly act unfairly; I am inclined to think not, but the possibility is not entirely ruled out.An earlier version of this paper was read on March 9, 1969 as part of a Colloquium in Political Philosophy held at the University of Toronto. I am much indebted to David Lyons for the helpful comments he delivered on that occasion; many of the subsequent revisions in the paper have been made in the light of those comments.     

Hybrid Identifications,Mixed Feelings: Reply to Commentaries

In responding to the insightful papers of Suchet and White I explore further my own hybrid identifications in regard to the socially constructed category of race. The paper explores the dangers of both idealization and denigration of otherness. It shows how a traumatic confrontation with otherness may destabilize later identifications in favor of earlier more archaic ones. Melanie Suchet, in her very gracious response to my paper, comments that I refuse to “reside in the comfortable.” However, any wish I may have had to reside in the comfortable was derailed by the thought-provoking comments of both Melanie Suchet and Cleonie White. Both authors prompted me to confront myself and to examine a number of painful issues. These included not only a resistance to owning my own vicarious traumatization but the fact that I was subject to the return of the repressed as the personal meanings of the signifier black shifted and changed in the course of my paper. But most significantly, both authors confronted me with the challenge of Otherness.     

Supererogation,Sacrifice, and the Limits of Duty

It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always involves sacrifice and examine their limitations. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favor of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View.     

Believing the impossible

A version of this paper was read at the Western Division meetings of the APA in April 1990. I am indebted for the comments of my commentator on that occasion, Stephen Hetherington. I am also indebted to Ruth Marcus for helpful correspondence, and to Steven Luper-Foy for comments. Work on the paper was supported by an academic leave from Trinity University.     

Unemployment, Social Capital, and Subjective Well-Being

It has been shown in past research that unemployment has a large negative impact on subjective well-being of individuals. In this paper, I explore whether and to what extent people with more social capital are sheltered from the harmful effects of unemployment. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984–2004, I find that social capital is an important predictor of well-being levels, but there is no evidence that it moderates the effect of unemployment on well-being. Possible reasons for these findings are discussed, and suggestions for future research given. This paper was written while I was visiting scholar at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research in Kalamazoo, MI. I am grateful to the Institute for its hospitality, to Andrew Clark, Andrew Oswald and three anonymous referees for valuable comments, and to the German Socio Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, for providing the data.     

Circular definitions,circular explanations,and infinite regresses

This paper discusses some of the ways in which circular definitions and circular explanations entail or fail to entail infinite regresses. And since not all infinite regresses are vicious, a few criteria of viciousness are examined in order to determine when the entailment of a regress refutes a circular definition or a circular explanation.I would like to thank Professors Robert Tully, Howard Sobel, and Derek Allen for their constructive comments.     

Motivation,steady-state,and structural development

Stagner's homeostatic-discrepancy theory integrates a wide range of theory and data concerning the mobilization of energy in human motivation. It does not, however, deal directly with energetic and motivational bases for developmental changes in the level of organization of psychological structures or for the persistence of organisms in pursuing particular paths of individual development despite repeated negative external reinforcement. A broader conceptual model is therefore proposed in which both level and path of structural development are themselves treated as steady states. The homeostatic assumptions of motivational psychology and the structural assumptions of developmental psychology are thus seen as but different aspects of a single set of explanatory assumptions. Stagner's model then becomes that special case in which both level and path of structural development are held constant. The works of Freud, Werner, and Piaget and those of Prigogine, Waddington, and Thom are considered insofar as they bear upon these issues.This work was supported in part by a sabbatical leave grant from Wayne State University and in part by the University of Michigan-Wayne State University Institute of Gerontology. I wish to express my appreciation to Prof. Ross Stagner for his critical comments on his conceptualization of homeostasis as I have discussed it in this paper. His comments resulted in a significant clarification of my understanding of his position on the basic issues involved in this critique. Prof. Joel Ager and Ms. Kathryn Domurath also offered useful suggestions. However, I alone am solely responsible for the contents of this paper and especially for any deficiencies or inaccuracies that still remain.     

The Free will Revolution (Continued)

I seek to reply to the thoughtful and penetrating comments by William Rowe, Alfred Mele, Carl Ginet, and Ishtiyaque Haji. In the process, I hope that my overall approach to free will and moral responsibility is thrown into clearer relief. I make some suggestions as to future directions of research in these areas. I thank Michael McKenna for his thoughtful comments, his generous introduction, and all his hard work in putting this together. Also, I wish to thank J. Angelo Corlett for his very pleasantly surprising decision to do this volume, and for his outstanding work in editing this wonderful journal from its inception.