An Essay on Understanding the Mind

Several conjectures by A. S. Iberall on life and mind are used as a backdrop to sketch a theory of mental activity that respects both the contents of thought and the dynamics of thinking. The dynamics, in this case, refers fundamentally to animated, meaningfully coupled self-organizing processes (coordination dynamics) and exhibit multistability, switching, and, because of symmetry breaking, metastability. The interplay of 2 simultaneously acting forces underlies the metastable mind: the tendency for the coordinating elements to couple together (integration) and the tendency for the elements to express their individual autonomy (segregation). Metrics for metastability are introduced that enable these cooperative and competitive tendencies to be quantified. Whereas bistability is the basis for polarized, either/or thinking, the metastable régime—which contains neither stable nor unstable states, no states at all, in fact—gives rise to a far more fluid, complementary mode of operation in which it is possible for apparent contraries to coexist in the mind at the same time.     

Mind,Machine, and Creativity: An Artist's Perspective

Harold Cohen is a renowned painter who has developed a computer program, AARON, to create art. While AARON has been hailed as one of the most creative AI programs, Cohen consistently rejects the claims of machine creativity. Questioning the possibility for AI to model human creativity, Cohen suggests in so many words that the human mind takes a different route to creativity, a route that privileges the relational, rather than the computational, dimension of cognition. This unique perspective on the tangled web of mind, machine, and creativity is explored by an application of three relational models of the mind to an analysis of Cohen's talks and writings, which are available on his website: www.aaronshome.com .     

An Other State of Mind is Possible: Anarchism and Psychology

When order is presumed to rely upon centralised authority, anarchy is assumed to mean violent chaos. However, anarchists have long argued, and demonstrated, that other forms of order are both possible and beneficial: ecologically, socially and psychologically. While anarchism has been influential in the development of psychology and is currently being taken up in related disciplines, with the exception of Dennis Fox's body of work, anarchism has yet to be taken seriously in contemporary psychology. Drawing on anarchist, poststructuralist and feminist theory as well as personal experience, this paper offers an introduction to anarchism as not only a public social practice but also an inner state of mind. This is offered in contrast to the state of mind which underpins the state as institution. The statist state of mind is characterised by representation over and above direct experience, an attraction to domination and control, and a continual reliance on fear. An other state of mind, necessary for and produced by anarchist(ic) social relations, is characterised by vitality (freedom–equality), non‐attachment to memory, and love. Such a state of mind, I argue, is cultivated through (spiritual) practice internally and through free, equal and loving relations with others. Such nano‐ and micro‐level processes networked together potentially result in macro‐level anarchist social relations more commonly associated with anarchist thought.     

An Open Heart,an Open Mind: An Interview With Dr. Cheri Smith

Dr. Cheri Smith has been a distinguished and contributing member of the Association for Spiritual, Ethical, and Religious Values in Counseling (ASERVIC) for over 20 years. Dr. Smith's commitment as well as advocacy for ASERVIC and the counseling profession is remarkable. The purpose of this article is to highlight Dr. Smith's contributions to ASERVIC through an interview that focuses on her inspirations and influences; involvement in various leadership roles; and views on ASERVIC's past, present, and future.     

Dennett's Mind

Drawing on data from contemporary experimental psychology and research in artificial intelligence, Dennett argues for a multiple drafts model of human consciousness, which he offers as an alternative to what he calls Cartesian materialism. I argue that the considerations Dennett advances do not, in fact, call for the abandonment of Cartesian materialism. Moreover, the theory presented by Dennett does not, as he claims, succeed in explaining consciousness; in particular, it fails to do justice to qualia. Illuminating though Dennett's discussion is, in many ways, it nevertheless leaves the traditional mind‐body problem intact.     

An IRT Analysis of the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test

Relationships between intelligence level and Rorschach measures of developmental level (genetic scores) were examined in clinically normal adults, hebephrenic and catatonic schizophrenics, paranoid schizophrenics, psychoneurotics, cerebrally damaged, and a mixed group of neuropsychiatric patients. The Ss were white males with an IQ range of 79 to 146, and with a chronological age range of 19 to 70. The unaltered forms of the genetic (developmental) scores were used for correlation with primarily Wechsler IQs. Generally no statistically significant relationships were found between genetic scores and intelligence level.     

Mind Misreading

Most people think of themselves as pretty good at understanding others’ beliefs, desires, emotions, and intentions. Accurate mindreading is an impressive cognitive feat, and for this reason the philosophical literature on mindreading has focused exclusively on explaining such successes. However, as it turns out, we regularly make mindreading mistakes. Understanding when and how mind misreading occurs is crucial for a complete account of mindreading. In this paper, I examine the conditions under which mind misreading occurs. I argue that these patterns of mind misreading shed light on the limits of mindreading, reveal new perspectives on how mindreading works, and have implications for social epistemology.     

Telic and Mechanistic Explanations of Mind and Meaningfulness: An Empirical Illustration

ABSTRACT Two traditions of personality theorizing, teleology and mechanism, are contrasted on their views of mind and the pivotal cognitive phenomenon of meaningfulness A major, albeit less well known, distinction between these traditions involves the assumption of time The fact that contemporary cognitive models rely on time (e g, temporal sequences or past events) places them firmly in the mechanistic tradition of personality theorizing Telic implications for cognition have been relatively overlooked, and are herein explored theoretically and empirically Cognition without temporality is described and distinguished from modern cognitive models that employ telic terminology An original study is provided to illustrate how these distinctions can be operationalized and addressed empirically     

The Emergence of the Modern Mind: An Evolutionary Perspective on Aesthetic Experience

On the basis of archaeological data and cognitive research, this article proposes an evolutionary story about aesthetic experience, arguing three intertwined theses. Aesthetic experience is adaptive; that is, it represents a specific implementation of the epistemic goal of knowing. It refunctionalizes antecedents and precursors: play and dreaming, technology and the ability to manipulate, and proto‐aesthetic elements and aesthetic preferences. Mind and aesthetic experience co‐evolve; that is, aesthetic experience requires mind reading and metacognition, and it helps them to reach their advanced metarepresentational architecture.     

Extended Mind and After: Socially Extended Mind and Actor-Network

The concept of extended mind has been impressively developed over the last 10 years by many philosophers and cognitive scientists. The extended mind thesis (EM) affirms that the mind is not simply ensconced inside the head, but extends to the whole system of brain-body-environment. Recently, some philosophers and psychologists try to adapt the idea of EM to the domain of social cognition research. Mind is socially extended (SEM). However, EM/SEM theory has problems to analyze the interactions among a subject and its surroundings with opposition, antagonism, or conflict; it also tends to think that the environment surrounding the subject is passive or static, and to neglect the power of non-human actants to direct and regulate the human subject. In these points, actor-network theory (ANT) proposed by Latour and Callon is more persuasive, while sharing some important ideas with EM/SEM theory. Actor-network is a hybrid community which is composed of a series of heterogeneous elements, animate and inanimate for a certain period of time. I shall conclude that EM/SEM could be best analyzed as a special case of actor-network. EM/SEM is a system which can be controlled by a human agent alone. In order to understand collective behavior, philosophy and psychology have to study the actor-network in which human individuals are situated.