Nonadversarial Methods for Sensitizing Jurors to Eyewitness Evidence

Tested the effects, on juror decision making, of court-appointed expert testimony and judge's instructions designed to sensitize jurors to eyewitness evidence. Subjects ( N = 144) viewed a videotaped trial in which the primary evidence was the testimony of and identification by an eyewitness. Three levels of expert advice (court-appointed expert, judge's instructions, no expert advice) were crossed with two levels of witnessing and identification conditions and two levels of witness confidence The court-appointed expert produced skepticism toward the identification but did not improve juror sensitivity to the eyewitness evidence. The judge's instructions produced neither skepticism or sensitization effects.     

Sensitizing Potential Jurors to Variations in Eyewitness Evidence Quality Using Counterfactual Thinking

Jurors often have difficulty evaluating eyewitness testimony. Counterfactual thinking is a type of mental simulation that informs causal inference. Encouraging jurors to think counterfactually about eyewitness factors may sensitize them to these factors' causal influence on eyewitness identification and testimony accuracy, improving their overall judgments (such as verdicts). One hundred twenty‐one undergraduate participants were randomly assigned to read a scenario containing either high‐quality or low‐quality eyewitness evidence and to evaluate eyewitness factors adopting either their default or a counterfactual mindset via a question‐order manipulation. Logistic regressions and analyses of variance revealed that a counterfactual mindset lowered perceptions of eyewitness accuracy and guilty verdicts (compared with the default mindset) when the evidence was poor; a counterfactual mindset, however, did not increase perceptions of accuracy and guilty verdicts when evidence was strong. We discuss possible mechanisms underlying these effects and identify several potential avenues for future research.Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expert testimony and jury decision making: An empirical analysis

This experiment examines the influence of expert psychological testimony on juror decision making in eyewitness identification cases. Experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors viewed versions of a videotaped trial, rated the credibility of the eyewitness and the strength of the prosecution's and defense's cases, and rendered verdicts. In the absence of expert testimony jurors were insensitive to eyewitness evidence. Expert testimony improved juror sensitivity to eyewitness evidence without making them more skeptical about the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. Few differences emerged between the experienced jurors and undergraduate mock jurors.     

Beliefs about factors affecting the Reliability of eyewitness testimony: A Comparison of judges,jurors and the general public

We surveyed 164 members of the juror pool of the Court of Appeal and a representative sample of 1000 adult Norwegians without juror experience, about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of Norwegian judges. Although the judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than jurors and the general public, all groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. Juror experience, in terms of number of times serving as juror, did not correlate with eyewitness knowledge. Consistent with this finding, the knowledge scores of the jurors were similar to the scores of the general public, tested with an abridged seven‐item version of the questionnaire. Comparisons with the results of surveys conducted in the US, indicate similar levels of knowledge among law professionals and jurors in the two countries. Increasing the knowledge of eyewitness testimony among the principal participants in the judiciary system may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Speech style and occupational status affect assessments of eyewitness testimony

This study examined how speech style and occupational status affect mock jurors' assessments of eyewitness testimony. Mock jurors (n = 120) watched a video of a man testifying about witnessing an attempted robbery. The eyewitness exhibited either a powerless or powerful speech style and reported either a high or low (or no) status occupation during his testimony. Results indicated that high occupation status and powerful speech style led to more favorable evaluations of the eyewitness's testimony and of the case against the defendant than powerless speech style and low/no occupation status. Implications of these results on considerations of eyewitness testimony and future research are discussed.     

A Lay Perspective on the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony1

To understand more about what laypeople think they “know” about eyewitness testimony, 276 jury-eligible university students were asked to indicate what factors they believe affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. In contrast to the large proportion of eyewitness-memory research that concerns system variables, the lay respondents overwhelmingly generated factors related to estimator variables, while system-variable factors such as police questioning and identification procedures were rarely mentioned. Respondents also reported that their own common sense and everyday life experiences were their most important sources of information about the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Not only do these results clarify the need for further research on the lay perspective of eyewitness testimony, but they also provide some insight into the way in which many jurors might approach cases involving eyewitness evidence.     

What US judges know and believe about eyewitness testimony

In a survey, 160 US judges indicated their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony. Although correct on some issues, judges were often wrong on important issues such as whether at trial eyewitness confidence is a good indicator of eyewitness accuracy, and if jurors can distinguish accurate from inaccurate witnesses. Increased knowledge was associated with: a willingness to permit legal safeguards, including expert testimony at trial; a belief that jurors have limited knowledge of eyewitness factors; a reluctance to convict defendants solely from eyewitness testimony; a more accurate estimate of the extent to which wrongful convictions result from eyewitness error; and a belief that judges need more eyewitness training. Additional training about factors and procedures that affect eyewitness accuracy may help judges reduce the number of wrongful convictions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Discrediting Effect in Eyewitness Testimony1

Loftus (1974) had subjects read summaries of criminal trials that contained the testimony of either credible or discredited prosecution eyewitnesses, and found no effect of discrediting an eyewitness. Instead, almost as many subjects voted guilty with a discredited eyewitness as with a credible eyewitness; this led Loftus to the conclusion that jurors tend to overbelieve eyewitness testimony. Loftus's conclusion was subsequently challenged by others who reported a strong discrediting effect. A series of three experiments using college students was conducted to explore the characteristics of trial summaries that might account for the discrepancy in results, such as inclusion of judicial instructions concerning proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or an eyewitness's reaffirmation of his testimony following discrediting. In all cases, a strong discrediting effect was found. Apparently the discrediting effect appears regardless of wide variation in content of trial summaries. The present data do not support the overbelief claim.     

A Comparison of What U.S. Judges and Students Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony

We compared what 160 U.S. judges, 57 law students, and 121 undergraduates know and believe about factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Judges were no more knowledgeable than were undergraduates, and both groups were less knowledgeable than were law students. For all 3 groups, increased knowledge of eyewitness factors was associated with beliefs that might reduce wrongful convictions. Participants in all 3 groups underestimated what potential jurors know about eyewitness testimony. The results suggest that increasing judges' knowledge of eyewitness testimony might help them to reduce wrongful convictions and to more accurately assess when eyewitness experts are needed. The results also suggest that law schools need to do a better job of educating law students about eyewitness testimony.     

Judge's Instruction on Eyewitness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision1

Studies of the reliability of eyewitness identification show that such testimony may frequently be inaccurate; because of this inherent unreliability, the law has established certain safeguards to the use of eyewitness evidence. One safeguard has been the development of an instruction that a judge may use to focus jurors' attention on the eyewitness issue. The effectiveness of this instruction has never been assessed, although other studies confirm that jurors frequently misunderstand or incorrectly use instructions they get from the judge. The purpose of these studies was to evaluate comprehension of this instruction in the context of a videotaped trial and to develop a simplified instruction that would be easier for jurors to understand. Compared to jurors who heard the existing instruction, those with the revised version were more knowledgeable of the factors to consider when listening to eyewitness testimony and were less likely to convict the defendant. A sample of superior court judges in the U.S. thought the simplified instruction was more effective than the existing version at conveying the intended legal concepts to the jury, but also rated it as more strongly biased toward the defense.     

The Influence of Eyewitness Nonidentifications on Mock-Jurors' Judgments of a Court Case1

Two experiments examined the effect of an eyewitness nonidentificution on mock-jurors' verdicts in robbery cases, as well as the effects of number of identifying eyewitnesses and status of the identifying witness (victim or bystander). Subjects read court case summaries that included variable eyewitness evidence and constant alibi, circumstantial, and character evidence. In Experiment 1, frequency of guilty verdicts was significantly less when an eyewitness testified in court that the defendant was not the perpetrator, even when this nonidentification opposed two positive identifications. In Experiment 2, a low guilty rate was again associated with the presence of a nonidentifier, but only when the nonidentifier actually testified in court and stipulated that the defendant is “not the man.” On the average, 70% of the jurors delivered guilty verdicts when both the victim and bystander gave identifying testimony, whereas 12.5% delivered guilty verdicts when the bystander gave opposing nonidentifying testimony. Guilty rates were unaffected by the identifying eyewitness' status and (in Experiment 2, but not Experiment 1) were higher when there were two (vs. one) identifying eyewitnesses.     

Polygraph Testimony and Juror Judgments: A Comparison of the Guilty Knowledge Test and the Control Question Test1

The present experiment investigated the impact of the Control Question Test (CQT) and the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) on the verdicts of mock jurors. Although studies have indicated that polygraph evidence has little influence on jurors' verdicts (Cavoukian & Heselgrave, 1980; Spanos, Myers, Dubreuil, & Pawlak, 1992–1993), no research has previously distinguished between the different types of polygraph tests and their impact on juror verdicts. In the present study, jurors were shown a videotape of a simulated rape-murder trial that contained either CQT polygraph evidence, GKT polygraph evidence, or no polygraph evidence. No differences were found among the 3 conditions for either jury verdicts or individual juror verdicts, and jurors tended to rate both forms of polygraph testimony below other forms of equally suspect evidence, such as eyewitness testimony, in its influence on their decision-making process.     

Lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour: A British survey

One of the recent concerns in the study of eyewitness memory is how well lay knowledge, i.e. ‘common sense’, matches the findings of empirical research. A number of American and Canadian studies, some using questionnaire methodology, have found limitations in lay knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. Further studies have extended this general finding beyond the lay public–who are prospective jurors–to legal professionals such as lawyers and policemen. The present study utilized the Knowledge of Eyewitness Behaviour Questionnaire (KEBQ), an inventory used in previous studies, to replicate the North American studies with a British sample of students, including law students, and the general public. The results showed a great similarity between the North American and British samples' knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. A significant number of correct responses were made to eight of the 14 KEBQ items, with a significant number of incorrect responses to the remainder. It was also found that law students were no more knowledgeable than other subjects; that knowledge did not vary with age; and that previous experience as an eyewitness was not related to knowledge of eyewitness behaviour. In responding to some of the criticisms of questionnaire studies it is argued that the evidence is mounting in favour of the need for a recognized system to make jurors aware of the factors known to influence eyewitness testimony.     

Jurors' Views on the Value and Objectivity of Mental Health Experts Testifying in Sexually Violent Predator Trials

Although psychologists and psychiatrists often testify in court, we know relatively little about the extent to which jurors value the testimony they hear from these experts. We surveyed 161 jurors who rendered opinions in 14 sex offender civil commitment trials after hearing testimony from psychologists and psychiatrists serving as expert witnesses. Most jurors reported that the experts they heard testify were honest, and they tended to attribute disagreements among experts to case complexity, as opposed to adversarial allegiance or bias. Most reported that hearing from the experts helped them make better decisions and that experts using risk assessment instruments could make more accurate predictions than those who did not. Jurors were, however, more skeptical about the ability of experts to accurately predict recidivism when they heard testimony from both prosecution and defense experts. Findings suggest that jurors value risk assessment testimony from experts, but that experts must think carefully about how to best make risk assessment instrument results accessible to jurors. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testifying on Eyewitness Reliability: Expert Advice Is Not Always Persuasive1

This study investigates the impact of different types of expert testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identification. In two hypothetical court cases involving eyewitnesses, expert testimony was presented that was either sample-based (presenting the results of a research program on eyewitness identification) or person-based (presenting information about the particular eyewitness under consideration); the expert either offered causal explanations for his unreliability claim or failed to do so. Two additional control groups (with and without eye-witness identification) were not presented with any expert testimony. The results indicate that subjects who had been confronted with an expert statement made more lenient judgments about the offender but did not discount the eyewitness identification completely. Sample-based information had a moderate impact on the subjects' judgments, regardless of whether or not causal explanations were given. Person-based testimony was the most influential type of expert advice when a causal explanation was provided but the least influential one when no reasons were given. The practical (international differences in admissibility of expert testimony) and theoretical implications (processing of base-rate information) of these findings are discussed.     

Eyewitness memory is still not common sense: comparing jurors,judges and law enforcement to eyewitness experts

Knowledge of factors affecting eyewitness accuracy was examined in a sample of jurors, judges and law enforcement professionals. Participants completed a survey in which they were asked to agree or disagree with 30 statements about eyewitness issues, and their responses were compared to a sample of eyewitness experts who completed the same survey. Participant responses differed significantly from responses of eyewitness experts. Jurors disagreed with the experts on 87% of the issues, while judges and law enforcement disagreed with the experts on 60% of the issues. The findings show a large deficiency in knowledge of eyewitness memory amongst jurors, judges and law enforcement personnel, indicating that the legal system may benefit from expert assistance in the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases: The effects of evidence,coherence and credentials on juror decision making

Psychological experts have been used increasingly to testify in child sexual abuse cases, yet little research has investigated what specific factors make experts effective. This study examined the potential effects that credentials, evidence strength and coherence may have on juror decision making. Sixty‐four mock jurors read cases of child sexual abuse, followed by experts' testimony and rated guilt of the defendant, effectiveness of the expert testimony and credibility of the victim. Evidence strength and coherence of the testimony affected all dependent variables, and the interaction was significant. Guilt ratings of the defendant were lower and the victim was rated as less credible when both evidence strength and coherence were low. The credentials of the expert, however, had negligible impact. These findings indicate that experts can be effective and impact jurors when testimony is either high in coherence or high in evidence. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.