Perception

Book Information Perception. Perception Barry Maund, Chesham : Acumen Publishing, 2003, 240, £12.95 (paper) By Barry Maund. Acumen Publishing. Chesham. Pp. 240. £12.95 (paper:),     

Distance Perception

ABSTRACT— Distance perception seems to be an incredible achievement if it is construed as being based solely on static retinal images. Information provided by such images is sparse at best. On the other hand, when the perceptual context is taken to be one in which people are acting in natural environments, the informational bases for distance perception become abundant. There are, however, surprising consequences of studying people in action. Nonvisual factors, such as people's goals and physiological states, also influence their distance perceptions. Although the informational specification of distance becomes redundant when people are active, paradoxically, many distance-related actions sidestep the need to perceive distance at all.     

Phillips on Unconscious Perception and Overflow

Philosophia - Phillips (Philosophy & Phenomenological Research, 93, 419–451, p. 433, 2016a) argues that Block faces a “serious internal challenge” in defending the claim...     

Body Temperature Influence on Time Perception

The chemical clock hypothesis implies a causal link between body temperature and the perception of duration. A strict interpretation of this construct requires a common slope value in an Arrhenius plot that relates time to temperature for every individual tested. Previous studies testing this proposition have confirmed a general relationship for data summed across multiple subjects. However, the same studies raise doubts as to whether this relationship holds for each and every individual tested. Unfortunately, these investigations have been limited by methodological constraints, thus, one could argue that the strong isomorphism intrinsic to the chemical clock hypothesis has yet to be fairly tested. In the present experiment, I sought to distinguish the effects of selective head temperature changes on the estimation of duration. Nonlinear decreases in estimated duration were observed with ascending deep auditory canal temperature. These findings support the contention of a thermally stable region of temporal perception bounded by conditions in which temporal estimates directly depend on body temperature. In contradicting physiological adequacy as an explanatory construct, the present results suggest a direct relationship between time perception and the homeothermic platform. I compare these results with earlier findings concerning the chemical clock concept and examine respective discrepancies as a basis for a fuller understanding of a temporal phenomenon that is frequently referred to as me internal clock.     

情绪对时间知觉的影响

研究了情绪唤醒度和愉悦度对时间知觉的影响及其机制.以53名大学生为被试,采用中国情绪图片系统为情绪诱发材料,使用时间两分法和泛化法考察唤醒和注意机制对时间知觉的影响.结果表明:在短时距下,(1)唤醒度和愉悦度对时间知觉的影响可能是独立的,两个实验中交互作用都不显著;(2)情绪主要通过唤醒机制影响时间知觉,被试在高唤醒情绪下知觉到的时间显著长于在低唤醒情绪下知觉到的时间.     

A Coming-of-Age for Research on Interpersonal Perception

ABSTRACT Research on accuracy and consensus in interpersonal perception has become a major topic in the social sciences. Key methodological issues in this research are research design, statistical measures of agreement, unit of analysis, and data aggregation. I discuss the twelve articles devoted to these topics in this special issue in terms of moderators of agreement, the weighted average model of consensus and accuracy (Kenny, 1991), and methodological innovations.     

胡塞尔论感知意识的视域结构

视域性是意识行为的一个本质特征。目前学界对感知意识之视域结构的研究主要集中于内视域和外视域。本文将依据新近出版的胡塞尔著作,结合新近有关"弱想象"的研究成果,力图呈现一幅关于感知视域的更全面的图景。本文第一部分将展示感知意识视域结构和功能的基础:滞留和前摄;第二部分分析由感知的本质构成要素"动感"所构成的身体权能的视域,胡塞尔在此区分的动感的两种基本功能对于接下来的阐述具有根本性的指导意义;第三部分分析视域意向性与身体权能性视域的共同作用,内视域和外视域即是由这种共同作用形成的一种视域的可能性;第四部分引入由"弱想象"构成的情景式想象的视域,最后将考察上述几种视域共同作用时的情形。     

风险认知的结构,因素及其研究方法

风险认知是心理学的热门研究领域之一。风险认知是人们对影响日常生活和工作的各种因素的心理感受和认识,是测量公众心理恐慌的指标。风险认知的研究方法包括:风险估计,风险认知的测量;风险认知结构具有复杂性。风险认知的影响因素有:个体因素,期望水平,风险沟通,风险的可控程度,风险的性质,知识结构,成就动机,事件风险度。     

Perception and Belief

An attempt is made to pinpoint the way in which perception is related to belief. Although, for familiar reasons, it is not true to say that we necessarily believe in the existence of the objects we perceive, nor that they actually have their ostensible characteristics, it is argued that the relation between perception and belief is more than merely contingent
There are two main issues to address. the first is that 'collateral' beliefs may impede perceptual belief. It is argued that this still assigns an essential role to belief in perception, though the belief may be of an attenuated form. the second is Fred Dretske's claim that even attenuated belief may be entirely absent from perception. It is argued that (a) 'non-epistemic'perception can be understood only by employing the concept of 'epistemic'perception; (b) that the former can occur only partially—i.e., within perceptions that are otherwise epistemic; and (c) that by switching attention from the perception of objects to the Phenomenological tradition's concern with the perception of world, we can see that perception must be entirely permeated with 'doxastic'force.     

Perception in chess

This paper develops a technique for isolating and studying the perceptual structures that chess players perceive. Three chess players of varying strength — from master to novice — were confronted with two tasks: (1) A perception task, where the player reproduces a chess position in plain view, and (2) de Groot's (1965) short-term recall task, where the player reproduces a chess position after viewing it for 5 sec. The successive glances at the position in the perceptual task and long pauses in the memory task were used to segment the structures in the reconstruction protocol. The size and nature of these structures were then analyzed as a function of chess skill.     

Perception of gait

Our ability of perceive the identity and naturalness of a human gait is examined in a series of four experiments involving computer-animated stick figures. The results indicate that the perceived naturalness of a walking or running gait can be influenced by the motion of any limb segment, but the perceived identity of these gaits is primarily determined by the movements of the lower leg (i.e., the tibia). The results also demonstrate that a perceptually salient walking gait can be transformed into running (or vice versa) by adding or subtracting a constant value to the angle of the lower leg over the entire step cycle. The size of this constant value is affected by the shape of the lower leg angle function and the motion of other limb segments.     

Perception and Representation

I oppose the popular view that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience consists in the subject's representing the (putative) perceived object as being so-and-so. The account of perceptual experience I favor instead is a version of the "Theory of Appearing" that takes it to be a matter of the perceived object's appearing to one as so-and-so, where this does not mean that the subject takes or believes it to be so-and-so. This plays no part in my criticisms of Representationalism. I mention it only to be up front as to where I stand. My criticism of the Representationalist position is in sections. (1) There is no sufficient reason for positing a representative function for perceptual experience. It doesn't seem on the face of it to be that, and nothing serves in place of such seeming. (2) Even if it did have such a function, it doesn't have the conceptual resources to represent a state of affairs. (3) Even if it did, it is not suited to represent, e.g., a physical property of color. (4) Finally, even if I am wrong about the first three points, it is still impossible for the phenomenal character of the perceptual experience to consist in it's representing what it does. My central argument for this central claim of the paper is that it is metaphysically, de re possible that one have a certain perceptual experience without it's presenting any state of affairs. And since all identities hold necessarily, this identity claim fails.