Consuming experience: Why affective forecasters overestimate comparative value

The hedonic value of an outcome can be influenced by the alternatives to which it is compared, which is why people expect to be happier with outcomes that maximize comparative value (e.g., the best of several mediocre alternatives) than with outcomes that maximize absolute value (e.g., the worst of several excellent alternatives). The results of five experiments suggest that affective forecasters overestimate the importance of comparative value because forecasters do not realize that comparison requires cognitive resources, and that experiences consume more cognitive resources than do forecasts. In other words, because forecasters overestimate the extent to which they will be able to think about what they did not get while experiencing what they got.     

The effect of comparative context on evaluative conditioning

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a change in the evaluation of a stimulus after the stimulus co-occurred with affective stimuli. The present research examined whether EC of one stimulus depends also on the co-occurrence of another stimulus with positive or negative stimuli. We paired two target people with affective stimuli. We found that a person who appeared eight times with positive stimuli and eight times with negative stimuli was liked more when the other person appeared always (16 times) with negative stimuli than when the other person appeared always with positive stimuli. The manipulation did not change the US evaluation or the general standard on the value dimension of what a positive or negative stimulus is. We suggest that like other evaluative traits (e.g., evil, pretty) co-occurrence with affective stimuli is sensitive to temporary standards. The manipulation changed the standard of what co-occurrence with affective stimuli is considered positive versus negative.     

Distinguishing affective and non-affective reactions to daily events

The study of daily events has been dominated by a focus on affective reactions to daily events. Although informative, this research needs to be complemented by research on non-affective and cognitive reactions to events. Although daily events are certainly related to how people feel, they are also related to how people think, particularly about themselves. The present article presents the results of a series of studies examining relationships between daily events and both affective and non-affective states. These results suggest that although affective and non-affective reactions to daily events may covary (e.g., when people feel badly, they may think more poorly about themselves and vice versa), this covariation is not perfect. Non-affective states covary with daily events above and beyond the covariation between events and affect, and affective states covary with events above and beyond the covariation between events and non-affective states.     

Being bad isn't always good: affective context moderates the attention bias toward negative information

Research has demonstrated that people automatically devote more attention to negative information than to positive information. The authors conducted 3 experiments to test whether this bias is attenuated by a person's affective context. Specifically, the authors primed participants with positive and negative information using traditional (e.g., subliminal semantic priming) and nontraditional (e.g., social interactions) means and measured the amount of attention they allocated to positive and negative information. With both event-related brain potentials (Experiment 1) and the Stroop task (Experiments 2 and 3), results suggest that the attention bias to negative information is attenuated or eliminated when positive constructs are made accessible. The implications of this result for other biases to negative information and for the self-reinforcing nature of emotional disorders are discussed.     

Music, pandas, and muggers: on the affective psychology of value

This research investigated the relationship between the magnitude or scope of a stimulus and its subjective value by contrasting 2 psychological processes that may be used to construct preferences: valuation by feeling and valuation by calculation. The results show that when people rely on feeling, they are sensitive to the presence or absence of a stimulus (i.e., the difference between 0 and some scope) but are largely insensitive to further variations of scope. In contrast, when people rely on calculation, they reveal relatively more constant sensitivity to scope. Thus, value is nearly a step function of scope when feeling predominates and is closer to a linear function when calculation predominates. These findings may allow for a novel interpretation of why most real-world value functions are concave and how the processes responsible for nonlinearity of value may also contribute to nonlinear probability weighting.     

A theoretical exploration and model of consumer expectations,post‐purchase affective states and affective behaviour

Through a detailed review of the service quality and (dis)satisfaction literatures, this paper presents a theoretical model exploring the interrelationship between expectations, affective post‐purchase states and affective behaviour. Drawing together a comprehensive hierarchy of expectations culled from the service quality literature, the authors seek to apply levels of expectation to specific post‐purchase affective states and affective behaviour. The authors argue that consumers have two types of expectation that influence post‐purchase affective states: the core or predictive ‘will be’ expectation; and peripheral expectations—that can range from the ideal standard to the minimum tolerable level. By applying the levels‐of‐expectation approach to the expectation‐disconfirmation paradigm, the authors argue that there are four types of post‐purchase affective states: delight, satisfaction (or positive indifference), acceptance (or negative indifference) and dissatisfaction. These four states may lead onto affective action—ie varying degrees of complaining or complimenting behaviour. The paper presents 11 propositions relating to expectations and their interrelationship with post‐purchase affective states and subsequent consumer behaviour, with the aim of stimulating further scholarly enquiry. The managerial implications of the analysis are also considered. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.     

On the generality of the affective Simon effect

In affective Simon studies, participants are to select between a positive and negative response on the basis of a nonaffective stimulus feature (i.e., relevant stimulus feature) while ignoring the valence of the presented stimuli (i.e., irrelevant stimulus feature). De Houwer and Eelen (1998) showed that the time to select the correct response is influenced by the match between the valence of the response and the (irrelevant) valence of the stimulus. In the affective Simon studies that have been reported until now, only words were used as stimuli and the relevant stimulus feature was always the grammatical category of the words. We report four experiments in which we examined the generality of the affective Simon effect. Significant affective Simon effects were found when the semantic category, grammatical category, and letter-case of words was relevant, when the semantic category of photographed objects was relevant, and when participants were asked to give nonverbal approach or avoidance responses on the basis of the grammatical category of words. Results also showed that the magnitude of the affective Simon effect depended on the nature of the relevant feature.     

The impact of affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation

We examined the effects of unobtrusive affective and cognitive focus on attitude formation. To induce focus, participants worked on a word-search puzzle consisting of either affective (e.g., emotion) or cognitive (e.g., reasoning) words. They then read positive and negative affective and cognitive information about a new attitude object. In the affective focus condition, evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the affective information than they were in the cognitive focus condition, where evaluations were more congruent with the valence of the cognitive information than they were in the affective focus condition. Affective focus also resulted in enhanced recall of affective information. The effects on evaluations remained stable over time, whereas effects on memory disappeared. Finally, affective focus was associated with faster response times, suggesting enhanced accessibility of affect-based attitudes. The present research shows that an affective or cognitive focus leads to the formation of different attitudes.     

The effects of diffuse and distinct affect

In a series of suboptimal priming studies, it was shown that both affective and nonaffective reactions to a stimulus may occur without awareness. Moreover, it was demonstrated that affective information is detected earlier than nonaffective information. Therefore, early reactions to an affect-laden stimulus (e.g., a smiling man) are cognitively unappraised and thus diffuse (e.g., "positive"), whereas later affective reactions can be more specific and distinct (e.g., "a smiling man"). Through variations of prime exposure (extremely short, moderately short) the impact of early diffuse and late distinct affect on judgment was investigated. Findings show that distinctness (and prime-target similarity) is an essential determinant of whether the effect of affect is null, assimilation, or contrast. Furthermore, whether affect priming activates diffuse or distinct reactions is a matter of a fraction of seconds.     

Good feelings in christianity and buddhism: religious differences in ideal affect

Affect valuation theory (AVT) predicts cultural variation in the affective states that people ideally want to feel (i.e., "ideal affect"). National and ethnic comparisons support this prediction: For instance, European Americans (EA) value high arousal positive (HAP) states (e.g., excitement) more and low arousal positive (LAP) states (e.g., calm) less than Hong Kong Chinese. In this article, the authors examine whether religions differ in the ideal affective states they endorse. The authors predicted that Christianity values HAP more and LAP less than Buddhism. In Study 1, they compared Christian and Buddhist practitioners' ideal affect. In Studies 2 and 3, they compared the endorsement of HAP and LAP in Christian and Buddhist classical texts (e.g., Gospels, Lotus Sutra) and contemporary self-help books (e.g., Your Best Life Now, Art of Happiness). Findings supported predictions, suggesting that AVT applies to religious and to national and ethnic cultures.     

Stress and affective experiences: The importance of dark personality features

Personality has been shown to play an important role in the negative outcomes associated with stress. The purpose of the present study was to examine whether Dark Triad personality features (i.e., psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism) moderated the associations between stress and affective experiences. This was accomplished using a sample of 193 Israeli community participants who completed measures concerning dark personality features and affective expectations for their vacation prior to checking-into exclusive hotels in a resort city in southern Israel. Follow-up assessments concerning affective experiences and stress during vacation were completed by participants before checking-out. Results showed that psychopathy moderated the associations between stress and affective experiences such that individuals with high levels of psychopathy were more reactive to stress.     

Self-regulation of goal setting: turning free fantasies about the future into binding goals

Fantasy realization theory states that when people contrast their fantasies about a desired future with reflections on present reality, a necessity to act is induced that leads to the activation and use of relevant expectations. Strong goal commitment arises in light of favorable expectations, and weak goal commitment arises in light of unfavorable expectations. To the contrary, when people only fantasize about a desired future or only reflect on present reality, expectancy-independent moderate goal commitment emerges. Four experiments pertaining to various life domains supported these hypotheses. Strength of goal commitment was assessed in cognitive (e.g., making plans), affective (e.g., felt attachment), and behavioral terms (e.g., effort expenditure, quality of performance). Implications for theories on goal setting and goal striving are discussed.     

Ego involvement moderates the assimilation effect of affective expectations

Based on the affective expectations model and research on mental effort mobilization, two experiments manipulated affective expectations (no expectations versus positive expectations) and ego involvement (low versus high) and assessed participants’ affective reactions to hedonically neutral stimuli. In Experiment 1, evaluations were more positive when participants had positive expectations about neutral photos—but only when ego involvement was low. High ego involvement neutralized this affective expectation assimilation effect. Experiment 2 replicated these findings for experienced mood after reading a hedonically neutral short essay. Furthermore, high ego involvement led to longer response latencies in the affect ratings in Study 1. The findings support the idea that high ego involvement resulted in relatively high mental effort that was necessary to detect discrepancies between affective expectations and stimuli’s real affective potential and therefore moderated the assimilation effect to affective expectations.

Meta-insight: do people really know how others see them?

Although people can accurately guess how others see them, many studies have suggested that this may only be because people generally assume that others see them as they see themselves. These findings raise the question: In their everyday lives, do people understand the distinction between how they see their own personality and how others see their personality? We examined whether people make this distinction, or whether people possess what we call meta-insight. In 3 studies, we assessed meta-insight for a broad range of traits (e.g., Big Five, intelligent, funny) across several naturalistic social contexts (e.g., first impression, friends). Our findings suggest that people can make valid distinctions between how they see themselves and how others see them. Thus, people seem to have some genuine insight into their reputation and do not achieve meta-accuracy only by capitalizing on the fact that others see them similarly to how they see themselves.     

Latent inhibition in human affective learning

This study presents the results of a new visual procedure designed to generate affective learning, namely the change in the affective rating of a previously neutral stimulus by simply pairing it with a liked or disliked stimulus. Specifically, an experiment was conducted to evaluate the effect of nonreinforced preexposures to the to-be-conditioned stimulus (a non-sense shape) on affective conditioning. This manipulation, intended to produce latent inhibition, typically results in retarded learning when the preexposed stimulus is paired with the unconditioned stimulus. The results revealed that it is possible to modify the affective value of a previously neutral non-sense shape by pairing it with a liked or disliked unconditioned stimulus, and that latent inhibition affects affective conditioning.     

Recognition hypermnesia: The growth of recognition memory (d') over time with repeated testing

This study sought to determine whether recognition hypermnesia (unforgetting) might be obtained over time with repeated testing of recognition memory. Four types of stimuli were investigated: pictures or words (captions) from configured (funny) or non-configured (non-funny) cartoons. Three recognition tests, each comprising the same stimulus and distractor items, were successively administered after the presentation of a large set of captioned cartoons. Silent think intervals of 5 min were interpolated between recognition tests. Recognition hypermnesia, measured by increasing d' estimates of accessible recognition memory, was obtained with the pictures from configured (funny) cartoons but not with any of the other groups.     

Seeing pink elephants: fourteen-month-olds' interpretations of novel nouns and adjectives.

Words from different grammatical categories (e.g., nouns and adjectives) highlight different aspects of the same objects (e.g., object categories and object properties). Two experiments examine the acquisition of this phenomenon in 14-month-olds, asking whether infants can construe the very same set of objects (e.g., four purple animals) either as members of an object category (e.g., animals) or as embodying a salient object property (e.g., four purple things) and whether naming (with either count nouns or adjectives) influences infants' construals. Results suggest (1) that infants have begun to distinguish count nouns from adjectives, (2) that infants share with mature language-users an expectation that different grammatical forms highlight different aspects, and (3) that infants recruit these expectations when extending novel words. Further, these results suggest that an expectation linking count nouns to object categories emerges early in acquisition and supports the emergence of other word-to-world mappings.     

Who’s funny: Gender stereotypes,humor production,and memory bias

It has often been asserted, by both men and women, that men are funnier. We explored two possible explanations for such a view, first testing whether men, when instructed to be as funny as possible, write funnier cartoon captions than do women, and second examining whether there is a tendency to falsely remember funny things as having been produced by men. A total of 32 participants, half from each gender, wrote captions for 20 cartoons. Raters then indicated the humor success of these captions. Raters of both genders found the captions written by males funnier, though this preference was significantly stronger among the male raters. In the second experiment, male and female participants were presented with the funniest and least funny captions from the first experiment, along with the caption author’s gender. On a memory test, both females and males disproportionately misattributed the humorous captions to males and the nonhumorous captions to females. Men might think men are funnier because they actually find them so, but though women rated the captions written by males slightly higher, our data suggest that they may regard men as funnier more because they falsely attribute funny things to them.     

Cognitive and affective matching effects in persuasion: an amplification perspective

Past research suggests that cognitive and affective attitudes are more open to change toward cognitive and affective (i.e., matched) persuasive attacks, respectively. The present research investigates how attitude certainty influences this openness. Although an extensive literature suggests that certainty generally reduces an attitude's openness to change, the authors explore the possibility that certainty might increase an attitude's openness to change in the context of affective or cognitive appeals. Based on the recently proposed amplification hypothesis, the authors posit that high (vs. low) attitude certainty will boost the resistance of attitudes to mismatched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by cognitive messages) but boost the openness of attitudes to matched attacks (e.g., affective attitudes attacked by affective messages). Two experiments provide support for this hypothesis. Implications for increasing the openness of attitudes to both matched and mismatched attacks are discussed.