The Interplay of News Frames on Cognitive Complexity

This research considers how distinct news frames work in combination to influence information processing. It extends framing research grounded in prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and attribution theory (Iyengar, 1991) to study conditional framing effects on associative memory. Using a 2 × 3 experimental design embedded within a probability survey (N= 379), tests examined the effects of two different frame dimensions—loss‐gain and individual‐societal—on the complexity of individuals' thoughts concerning the issue of urban growth. Findings indicate that news frames interact to generate more or less complex cognitive responses, with societal‐gain frame combinations generating the most detailed cognitions about the causes, components, and consequences of urban growth. Directions for research on media framing are discussed.     

Framing Emotional Response

Framing studies typically are concerned with how people's opinions are affected by opposing ways of presenting, or framing, an issue or event. This paper investigates whether different frames also lead to different patterns of emotional response. Cognitive appraisal models of emotion suggest that frames can alter emotional reactions. An experiment compared students' emotional responses to versions of a newspaper article that emphasized underlying social conditions as the cause of the 1992 Los Angeles riots (situational frame) or emphasized irresponsibility and criminality on the part of the rioters (dispositional frame). Few systematic framing effects were found when examining whether respondents reported experiencing a particular emotion. However, consistent with recent work showing that predispositions mediate the effect of frames on opinion, frames altered the relationship between predispositions and emotion. Patterns suggestive of framing effects also emerged in an examination of the content of people's emotional reactions. The findings are consistent with the claim that framing affects emotional responses, reinforce the claim that framing effects depend on individual predispositions, and underscore the importance of accounting for the content of people's emotional responses in the study of emotion.     

Finding the Right Value: Framing Effects on Domain Experts

By defining the essence of a policy problem, an issue frame shapes how individuals think about a political issue. In this research, we investigate framing effects among domain experts, an understudied yet increasingly important set of individuals in the policymaking process. Because domain experts have extensive and highly structured knowledge on a particular topic, they are likely to actively process issue frames to which they are exposed. Consequently, we hypothesize that frames consistent with experts' values will be particularly influential, whereas frames inconsistent with their values will lead to contrast effects. We test our hypotheses on a unique set of domain experts by examining professional farmers' attitudes toward no‐till agriculture. Using an experimental design, we find evidence that environmental values interact with frames to influence farmers' interest in no‐till, especially when farmers are exposed to a novel frame.     

Multiple Framing: Verbal,Facial, and Vocal Cues in Risky Choice

Verbal framing effects have been widely studied, but little is known about how people react to multiple framing cues in risk communication, where verbal messages are often accompanied by facial and vocal cues. We examined joint and differential effects of verbal, facial, and vocal framing on risk preference in hypothetical monetary and life–death situations. In the multiple framing condition with the factorial design (2 verbal frames × 2 vocal tones × 4 basic facial expressions × 2 task domains), each scenario was presented auditorily with a written message on a photo of the messenger's face. Compared with verbal framing effects resulting in preference reversal, multiple frames made risky choice more consistent and shifted risk preference without reversal. Moreover, a positive tone of voice increased risk‐seeking preference in women. When the valence of facial and vocal cues was incongruent with verbal frame, verbal framing effects were significant. In contrast, when the affect cues were congruent with verbal frame, framing effects disappeared. These results suggest that verbal framing is given higher priority when other affect cues are incongruent. Further analysis revealed that participants were more risk‐averse when positive affect cues (positive tone or facial expressions) were congruently paired with a positive verbal frame whereas participants were more risk‐seeking when positive affect cues were incongruent with the verbal frame. In contrast, for negative affect cues, congruency promoted risk‐seeking tendency whereas incongruency increased risk‐aversion. Overall, the results show that facial and vocal cues interact with verbal framing and significantly affect risk communication. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Explaining outcome type interactions with frame: Aspiration level and the value function

Research on framing effects has revealed cases where the type of outcome at risk (e.g., human lives vs. animal lives) affects the magnitude of the framing effect. Some authors have appealed to the shape of the value function as predicting when framing effects will occur: The more valuable the outcome type, the more nonlinear its value function, and the larger the resulting framing effect (Levin & Chapman, 1990). However, having a more or less nonlinear value function cannot explain situations in which participants strongly prefer the same option in both frames. Another factor that may be at work in these types of outcome effects is an aspiration level (AL; Lopes, 1987; Schneider, 1992), which determines how acceptable the options are and combines (or competes) with the risk attitude encouraged by frame. The results described here indicate that differences in the shape of the value function between outcome types are evident but are inconsistent between framed losses and gains, though nonlinearity in the value function can be increased with a manipulation that also encourages framing effects. The results also demonstrate that an AL can lead to the same predominant risk preference in the positive and negative frame. These findings indicate that the shape of the value function and the AL each play a role in outcome type interactions with frame, and in some cases, a combination of the two factors may be at work.     

Framing Persuasive Appeals: Episodic and Thematic Framing, Emotional Response, and Policy Opinion

Those seeking to frame political issues to their advantage recognize the power of emotional appeals. Yet the study of framing has focused mainly on the cognitive effects of framing rather than on its emotional effects. This study presents the results of two experiments designed to explore the effect of episodic and thematic framing on emotional response and policy opinion. Participants were randomly assigned to read a column arguing against mandatory minimum sentencing that employed either a thematic or one of two episodic frames featuring a woman who received a harsh sentence under the policy. Episodic framing was more emotionally engaging. Furthermore, the specific emotions elicited by the episodic frame—sympathy and pity for the woman featured in the column—were associated with increased opposition to mandatory minimum sentencing. Yet the thematic frame was actually more persuasive once this indirect effect of frame on emotional response was taken into account. The results are consistent with the conclusion that framing effects on policy opinion operate through both affective and cognitive channels. The theoretical and practical implications of the study are discussed.     

More Than Weighting Cognitive Importance: A Dual-Process Model of Issue Framing Effects

Issue frames in policy discourse and news reporting regularly influence citizens' political opinions. Yet, we only have a limited understanding of how and among whom these framing effects occur. I propose a dual-process model of issue framing effects arguing that we must understand mediators of framing (the how question) in connection with individual-level moderators of framing (the whom question). Experimental results show that issue framing affects opinion through different psychological processes depending on who the receiver of the frame is. Among the moderately politically aware or those having weak political values, framing effects were mediated through processes of changing importance of considerations as well as changing content of considerations. Among the highly aware, only the importance change process mediated framing effects, while there were no framing effects among those least aware or those having strong values.     

How Emotional Frames Moralize and Polarize Political Attitudes

Moralized issues, such as abortion and same‐sex marriage, are some of the most polarizing and divisive issues in politics. These topics motivate political engagement but present a barrier to democratic resolution. Yet we know little about how some issues become “moral issues” and others do not. In this article, I argue that exposure to persuasive frames, particularly those eliciting anger and disgust, serves to moralize and polarize public opinion. I test these hypotheses across three experiments on emerging debates over food politics. The results consistently show that persuasive frames increase issue moralization and, in turn, facilitate polarization. A panel analysis demonstrates that the effect of a single exposure lasts at least two weeks. Mediation analyses suggest that feelings of disgust and anger help explain how persuasive frames moralize political attitudes, while anger alone seems to explain the polarizing effects of framing. Overall, the findings provide new insight into framing, emotion, and the development of moral issues.     

Framing the Lewinsky Affair: Third-Person Judgments by Scandal Frame

Recent studies have documented a “third-person effect” whereby people are found to judge others as more influenced than themselves by the mass media. Meanwhile, contemporary research on issue framing has demonstrated the powerful role of mass media in shaping people's political judgments. But are the perceptual judgments that define third-person effects sensitive to how the media frame an issue? Two studies investigated this question in the context of the Lewinsky-Clinton scandal, one in late August 1998 and the other during spring 1999. Several hundred undergraduates in each study were randomly assigned to one of two media frames. In the 1998 study, the political scandal was depicted as a matter of sexual indiscretion by the president or as legal wrongdoing; in the 1999 study, the recently concluded impeachment process was depicted as the consequence of partisanship or of Clinton's actions. The participants’ judgments of media influence on themselves and on the public were then recorded. The results show that third-person effects were sensitive to issue framing, but change occurred primarily in participants’ judgments about their own vulnerability to media influence.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Deep thoughts and shallow frames: on the susceptibility to framing effects

This paper examines the occurrence of framing effects when more thought is given to problems. In Study 1, participants were presented with one of two frames of several decision problems. Participants' Need for Cognition (NC) scores were obtained, and half the participants were asked to justify their choices. Substantial framing effects were observed, but the amount of thought purportedly given to a problem, whether manipulated by justification elicitation or measured by NC scores, did not reduce the incidence of framing effects. In Study 2, participants responded to both frames of problems in a within‐subjects design. Again, NC scores were unrelated to responses on the first frame encountered. However, high‐NC, compared to low‐NC, participants were more consistent across frames of a problem. More thought, as indexed here, does not reduce the proclivity to be framed, but does promote adherence to normative principles when the applicability of those principles is detectable. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing effects on metacognitive monitoring and control

Three experiments explored the contribution of framing effects on metamemory judgments. In Experiment 1, participants studied word pairs. After each presentation, they made an immediate judgment of learning (JOL), framed in terms of either remembering or forgetting. In the remember frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would remember each pair on the upcoming test. In the forget frame, participants made judgments about how likely it was that they would forget each pair. Confidence differed as a result of the frame. Forget frame JOLs, equated to the remember frame JOL scale by a 1-judgment conversion, were lower and demonstrated a smaller overconfidence bias than did remember frame JOLs. When judgments were made at a delay, framing effects did not occur. In Experiment 2, people chose to restudy more items when choices were made within a forget frame. In Experiment 3, people studied Spanish—English vocabulary pairs ranging in difficulty. The framing effect was replicated with judgments and choices. Moreover, forget frame participants included more easy and medium items to restudy. These results demonstrated the important consequences of framing effects on assessment and control of study.     

The Role of Inference in Attribute Framing Effects

Previous research has shown that a speaker's choice between logically equivalent frames is influenced by reference point information, and that listeners draw accurate inferences based on the frame. Less clear, however, is whether these inferences play a causal role in generating attribute framing effects. Two experiments are reported, which suggest that frame‐dependent inferences are sufficient to generate attribute framing effects, and that blocking such inferences may block framing effects. Experiment 1 decomposed the typical framing design into two parts: One group of participants saw a target described in one of two attribute frames and reported their estimates (inferences) of the typical attribute value. These estimates were then given to a second group of yoked participants, who evaluated the target. Although this latter group was not exposed to different attribute frames, they nevertheless exhibited a “framing effect” as a result of receiving systematically different inferences. In contrast, Experiment 2 shows that experts—who are familiar with an attribute's distribution and are therefore less likely to draw strong frame‐based inferences—exhibit a diminished framing effect. Together, these findings underscore the role of inferences in the generation and attenuation of attribute framing effects. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Policy Frames, Metaphorical Reasoning, and Support for Public Policies

This article evaluates the predictive value of a new theory for understanding public support for alternative solutions to policy problems, which we call policy metaphors. A policy metaphor represents a particular form of cognitive framing that makes use of commonly understood social institutions and judgments about their effectiveness to form "archetypes" against which proposed solutions to new policy problems are compared. We test the extent to which both understanding of and preference for particular policy frames predicts the nature and strength of policy choices by a representative sample of the American public. After controlling for factors that past research has shown to be important in understanding public opinion, including general partisan and ideological attitudes, self-interest, political values, and emotions, the cognitive frames specified by the general theory of policy metaphors are shown to strongly predict public support for hypothetical solutions to three different policy problems. These frames also predict support for President Clinton's 1993–94 health care reforms after controlling for those same conventional predictors. Most importantly, we demonstrate that these cognitive frames help constrain the beliefs of even the least politically aware members of the general public. Discussion centers on the implications of this new approach for understanding public opinion.     

Framing the EU as Common Project vs. Common Heritage: Effects on Attitudes Towards the EU Deepening and Widening

The present study investigated the effects of framing the European Union (EU) as a common project vs. a common heritage on participants’ attitude towards EU integration (Experiment 1) and EU enlargement (Experiment 2). An additional aim was exploring whether the different frames affected the strength of identification with the EU, and if the framing effect on attitudes was mediated by participants’ identification with the EU and/or by their message evaluation (Experiment 3). Results showed that a common project-based frame was more effective than a common heritage-based frame in promoting positive attitude toward EU integration and enlargement, as well as participants’ identification with the EU, which mediated the framing effect on both attitudes; the mediation of participants’ message evaluation was not significant. The procedure of the last experiment was replicated on a British sample (Experiment 4), showing a similar pattern of results.     

右侧颞顶联合区及道德加工脑网络的功能连接预测社会性框架效应：来自静息态功能磁共振的证据

社会性框架效应指个体进行社会性决策时, 描述方式(即框架)对其选择倾向的影响。采用“伤害/帮助框架”范式, 本研究在行为上发现了显著的框架效应：被试在伤害框架下比帮助框架下, 更倾向于选择利他选项, 这可能是由于伤害框架凸显了伤害他人的后果及有意性, 从而提高了道德冲突水平。在神经活动上发现(1)静息态下, 右侧颞顶联合区(TPJ)的低频振荡振幅(ALFF)与框架效应强度存在显著正相关; (2)道德加工相关脑区构成的局部脑网络内部的功能连接强度(FC)能够有效预测框架效应强度。本研究首次利用静息态功能连接探讨个体的社会性决策受到语言表述方式影响的神经机制, 为进一步揭示社会决策中的个体差异提供了神经学证据。     

Thinking about product attributes: Investigating the role of unconscious valence processing in attribute framing

In the present investigation we conducted three studies to examine how unconscious valence processing influences participants' quality judgments in an attribute-framing task. In Studies 1 and 2 we observed how individuals who had depleted cognitive resources, through distraction (Study 2) and time constraint (Study 3), differed in their responses to an attribute-framing task. In Study 3 we subliminally primed participants with attribute frames and then presented them with a frameless decision task. Our results revealed that attribute framing arises from unconscious valence processing and conscious processing may only play a role when the frame is especially salient.     

How to keep on keeping on: Framing civil rights accomplishments to bolster support for egalitarian policies

Drawing attention to historic increases in equality carries the risk of encouraging complacency about the need to further advance equality. This risk may be reduced by carefully framing the interpretation of increased equality. We apply an influential goal-framing model (Fishbach and Zhang, 2008) to test whether framing the accomplishments of the American Civil Rights Movement in terms of progress toward equality vs. commitment to equality influences white Americans' support for further egalitarian policies. In two experiments, we manipulated whether progress or commitment was in mind when participants considered civil rights accomplishments. As hypothesized, participants more strongly supported egalitarian policies when civil rights accomplishments were framed as evidence of commitment to equality than when these same accomplishments were framed as evidence of progress toward equality. We discuss implications for applying the goal-framing model to political goals and the advantages of using experimental methods to study framing processes in social movements.     

Framing, intentions, and trust–choice incompatibility

The present paper examines how framing of messages and the intentions inferred from different—positive vs. negative—framings, interact with the development of trust. Empirical evidence is presented showing that different, logically equivalent, frames are supposedly interpreted as implying different intentions. Next, the relationship between different frames (and the corresponding intentions reflected from these frames) and trust are explored. Finally, and most important, the relationship between the assessment of trust, inferred from different frames, and the corresponding choice behavior resulting from these frames, are investigated. Specifically, consider agents A and B offering to sell exactly the same commodity, except that one agent formulates it in a positive and the other in a negative frame. The different frames may lead to different assessments of the trustworthiness of the two agents. Following common wisdom, if agent A is trusted more than B, then one should prefer to conduct transactions with the former rather than with the latter agent. Several experiments are presented that are incompatible with this conjecture. For example, when faced with a choice between two butchers, whose ground beef is advertised as containing 25% fat (negative frame) or 75% lean (positive frame), respectively, most people have more trust in the former yet most indicate they would buy their meat from the latter butcher. This phenomenon, in which negative framing weighs more in trust assessments, and positive framing weighs more in choice, is labeled trust–choice incompatibility. The robustness of the phenomenon is further demonstrated in several experiments, and possible explanations for its occurrence are discussed.     

Gender-Based Effects of Frames on Bullying Outcomes

The study extends research on the effect of frames. It is the first study to examine how framing affects the impact of being bullied. College students were randomly assigned to one of two groups: one framing bullying in terms of resilience and the other framing bullying with negative psychosocial consequences. Participants were asked to engage in a brief writing task aimed to actively create a frame and then completed both implicit and explicit measures. There was a significant main effect by gender and several significant interaction effects between frame and gender. These results suggest that framing impacts an individual’s conceptualization of emotionally salient personal memories and should be considered when developing bullying interventions. The impact of framing bullying may vary by gender.