Torturers and the Tortured

Abstract

Patrick Lenta and Jessica Wolfendale have written two very thoughtful discussions on torture. A central question that arises in responding to these essays in terms of my recent book, Stoic Warriors, is whether ancient Stoicism affords any insights into both the propensity to inflict torture as well as the capacity to endure it. Wolfendale suggests that the learned capacity to endure torture, and in particular, becoming desensitised to pain, may be part of the psychological background that informs a willingness to inflict torture. Training in resisting torture, such as that which special operations troops typically go through, involves not only learning techniques, which can then be reverse engineered in applying torture (what some argue has happened in Guantanamo Bay), but also learning the kind of stress inoculation that makes one willing to use those techniques. In short, military training that involves torture resistance hardens one’s soul and makes one indifferent to the suffering that torture involves. This indifference, Wolfendale claims, is not unlike Stoic apathy. I want to argue, on the contrary, that Stoic apathy is substantively different. However, before making the case, I take up a number of other preliminary points raised in both papers. I conclude with some remarks about interrogation in general.     

Healers or Interrogators: Psychology and the United States Torture Regime

United States abuses at Guantánamo and other detention centers, including the CIA's “Black Sites,“ have a long history. In the Cold War period, the CIA pursued an extensive research program on “coercive interrogations,“ which became codified in torture manuals used to train Latin American military leaders who utilized torture against their populations. Also during the Cold War, the U.S. military developed the Survival, Evasion, Resistance, Escape (SERE) program to train U.S. military personnel in resisting torture. When the U.S. government turned to torture after 9/11, they turned to SERE psychologists to develop their interrogations strategies. This occurred, first at the CIA secret Black Sites, and then at Guantánamo and elsewhere. Psychologists helped develop, implement, and standardize U.S. torture techniques. The American Psychological Association (APA), rather than oppose this use of psychologists, provided cover for U.S. interrogation abuses. They formed a task force on Psychological Ethics and National Security—stacked with a majority of members from the military-intelligence establishment, several with possible involvement in abusive interrogations. This task force supported psychologist participation in detainee interrogations. Various APA antitorture statements since then have not changed APA's pro-participation stance. As a result, a movement of psychologists arose to oppose these APA policies.     

The fine line between interrogation and retribution

The use of harsh interrogation techniques on terrorism suspects is typically justified on utilitarian grounds. The present research suggests, however, that those who support such techniques are fuelled by retributive motives. An experimental study conducted with a broad national sample of US residents found that the desire for harsh interrogation is largely isomorphic with the desire to punish, and that both effects are mediated by the perceived moral status of the target, but not the perceived effectiveness of the interrogation. Results are discussed with regard to retributive justice and the national policy on interrogation and torture.     

How a terror attack affects right‐wing authoritarianism,social dominance orientation,and their relationship to torture attitudes

Self‐reported level of right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA ), the two facets of social dominance orientation (SDO ‐Dominance and SDO ‐Egalitarianism) and pro‐torture attitudes were measured both in the immediate aftermath (terror salience, N = 152) of the terror attacks in Paris and Brussels and when terrorism was not salient (non‐salience, N = 140). Results showed that RWA and pro‐torture attitudes, but not SDO ‐Dominance and SDO ‐Egalitarianism, were significantly higher immediately after. Furthermore, RWA and SDO both predicted pro‐torture attitudes more strongly under terror salience. We argue that the reason why RWA is higher under terror salience is a response to external threat, and that SDO ‐Dominance may be more clearly related to acceptance of torture and other human‐rights violations, across context. Future research on the effects of terror‐related events on sociopolitical and pro‐torture attitudes should focus on person‐situation interactions and also attempt to discriminate between trait and state aspects of authoritarianism.     

The Purposes of Torture

Abstract

In this essay, I take seriously Jeremy Bentham’s caution against treating torture as though it were a single phenomenon, susceptible to moral justification or condemnation independently of the purposes for which it is used. My aim is to identify the types of torture that occur nowadays. I discuss a number of forms of violence that have recently been identified as types of torture, including interrogational, terroristic, dehumanising and sadistic torture, as well as torture as a form of punishment. To this list of types I add a further, often overlooked, type: ‘spectacular’ torture as described by Michel Foucault. Rather than obsolete, as Foucault’s Disciple and Punish might suggest, I argue that there is no reason why a form of spectacular torture could not take place today. I consider the possibility that the torture that has taken place at Guantanamo Bay is of this kind.     

Logics for Epistemic Programs

We construct logical languages which allow one to represent a variety of possible types of changes affecting the information states of agents in a multi-agent setting. We formalize these changes by defining a notion of epistemic program. The languages are two-sorted sets that contain not only sentences but also actions or programs. This is as in dynamic logic, and indeed our languages are not significantly more complicated than dynamic logics. But the semantics is more complicated. In general, the semantics of an epistemic program is what we call aprogram model. This is a Kripke model of ‘actions’,representing the agents' uncertainty about the current action in a similar way that Kripke models of ‘states’ are commonly used in epistemic logic to represent the agents' uncertainty about the current state of the system. Program models induce changes affecting agents' information, which we represent as changes of the state model, called epistemic updates. Formally, an update consists of two operations: the first is called the update map, and it takes every state model to another state model, called the updated model; the second gives, for each input state model, a transition relation between the states of that model and the states of the updated model. Each variety of epistemic actions, such as public announcements or completely private announcements to groups, gives what we call an action signature, and then each family of action signatures gives a logical language. The construction of these languages is the main topic of this paper. We also mention the systems that capture the valid sentences of our logics. But we defer to a separate paper the completeness proof. The basic operation used in the semantics is called the update product. A version of this was introduced in Baltag et al. (1998), and the presentation here improves on the earlier one. The update product is used to obtain from any program model the corresponding epistemic update, thus allowing us to compute changes of information or belief. This point is of interest independently of our logical languages. We illustrate the update product and our logical languages with many examples throughout the paper.     

"Enhanced" interrogation of detainees: do psychologists and psychiatrists participate?

After revelations of participation by psychiatrists and psychologists in interrogation of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay and Central Intelligence Agency secret detention centers, the American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological Association adopted Position Statements absolutely prohibiting their members from participating in torture under any and all circumstances, and, to a limited degree, forbidding involvement in interrogations. Some interrogations utilize very aggressive techniques determined to be torture by many nations and organizations throughout the world. This paper explains why psychiatrists and psychologists involved in coercive interrogations violate the Geneva Conventions and the laws of the United States. Whether done with ignorance of professional ethical obligations or not, these psychiatrists and psychologists have crossed an ethical barrier that may best be averted from re-occurring by teaching medical students and residents in all medical specialties about the ethics principles stemming from the 1946–1947 Nuremberg trials and the Geneva Conventions, together with the Ethics Codes of the World Medical Association and the American Medical Association; and, with regard to psychiatric residents and psychological trainees, by the teaching about The Principles of Medical Ethics With Annotations Especially Applicable to Psychiatry and the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, respectively. In this way, all physicians and psychologists will clearly understand that they have an absolute moral obligation to "First, do no harm" to the human beings they professionally encounter.     

Torture, Terrorism and the State: a Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument

abstract   Much of the literature on torture in recent years takes the position of denouncing the barbarity of torture, while allowing for exceptions to this veto in extreme circumstances. The ticking-bomb argument, where a terrorist is tortured in order to extract information of a primed bomb located in a civilian area, is often invoked as one of those extreme circumstances where torture becomes justified. As the War on Terrorism intensifies, the ticking-bomb argument has become the dominant line of reasoning used by both academics and policy advisers to justify a legalized, state-sponsored program of torture.
This paper argues for the unconditional refutation of any attempt to justify torture, without exceptions. We argue against the consequentialist reasoning of the ticking-bomb argument not from a deontological position, but on consequentialist grounds. Empirical evidence suggests that the institutionalization of torture practices creates serious problems. Torture interrogation fails to fulfil its initial purpose as a low-cost life saver, while its long-term potential is the devastation of democratic institutions.     

What constitutes torture?: psychological impediments to an objective evaluation of enhanced interrogation tactics

Torture is prohibited by statutes worldwide, yet the legal definition of torture is almost invariably based on an inherently subjective judgment involving pain severity. In four experiments, we demonstrate that judgments of whether specific interrogation tactics constitute torture are subject to an empathy gap: People who are experiencing even a mild version of the specific pain produced by an interrogation tactic are more likely to classify that tactic as torture or as unethical than are those who are not experiencing pain. This discrepancy could result from an overestimation of the pain of torture by people in pain, an underestimation of the pain of torture by those not in pain, or both. The fourth experiment shows that the discrepancy results from an underestimation of pain by people who are not experiencing it. Given that legal standards guiding torture are typically established by people who are not in pain, this research suggests that practices that do constitute torture are likely to not be classified as such.     

The “Good” Psychologist, “Good” Torture,and “Good” Reputation—Response to O’Donohue,Snipes, Dalto,Soto, Maragakis,and Im (2014) “The Ethics of Enhanced Interrogations and Torture”

O’Donohue et al. (2014) sought to derive, from classical ethical theories, the ethical obligation of psychologists to assist “enhanced interrogations and torture” (EIT) in national defense scenarios under strict EIT criteria. They asked the American Psychological Association to adopt an ethics code obligating psychologists to assist such EIT and to uphold the reputation of EIT psychologists. We contest the authors’ ethical analyses as supports for psychologists’ forays into torture interrogation when (if ever) the EIT criteria obtain. We also contend that the authors’ application of these ethical analyses violates the Geneva Conventions, contravenes military doctrine and operations, and undermines psychology as a profession. We conclude that “good” public reputation is not owed to, or expected by, “good” intelligence professionals, and collaborating operational psychologists must share their providence.     

TORTURE AND JUST WAR

I offer an argument for why torture, as an act of state‐sponsored force to gain information crucial to the well‐being of the common good, should be considered as a tactic of war, and therefore scrutinized in terms of just war theory. I argue that, for those committed to the justifiability of the use of force, most of the popular arguments against all acts of torture are unpersuasive because the logic behind them would forbid equally any act of mutilating or killing in battle. I will also argue that looking at torture through the perspective of the just war tradition forces us to place strictures on the practice that make it hard to justify, helps us to see why torture should never be legalized, helps us to clarify when circumstances might justify torture, and suggests what sort of character is required to recognize when those circumstances have occurred.     

Psychologists and the Ethical Use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Save Lives

Arrigo, DeBatto, Rockwood, and Mawe (2015) take issue with a number of arguments in our previous article (O’Donohue et al., 2014). We respond in four major ways: (a) pointing out that they never really take on, let alone refute, the key argument in our article—that utilitarian, deontic, and virtue ethical theories are not only consistent with the use of enhanced interrogation and torture in the ticking time bomb scenario but these prescribe it; (b) there are numerous other exegetical problems in their article; (c) they make unsubstantiated claims about the ineffectiveness of EITSLs techniques that we argue are much too strong; and (d) they conflate the ethical with the legal and but even in doing so miss many important issues regarding the legality of EITSLs in the war on terrorism.     

Stoic Warriors and Stoic Torturers: The Moral Psychology of Military Torture

Abstract

Nancy Sherman’s book Stoic Warriors provides an interesting reflection on how a modified version of the ancient teachings of stoicism may be applicable to the concerns and needs of the modern military. In the course of her book, she explains different aspects of the Stoic teachings, such as the importance of outward comportment and control of the emotions, and discusses how they might be relevant to the modern military. In this paper I will focus on her discussion of Abu Ghraib and other atrocities such as the My Lai massacre in the Vietnam War. I argue that her analysis of the contributing factors that lead to those abuses demonstrates a lack of understanding of how systematic atrocities come to occur and how military torturers are trained. In this paper I show that systematic torture arises not only out of unrestrained rage and hatred, but through a training process that builds on many of the features of basic military training and, ironically, incorporates many of the techniques of self-control and detachment that are characteristic of stoicism.     

Spurious Causal Kinds: A Problem for the Causal-Power Conception of Kinds

There is an assumption common in the philosophy of mind literature that kinds in our sciences—or causal kinds, at least—are individuated by the causal powers that objects have in virtue of the properties they instantiate. While this assumption might not be problematic by itself, some authors take the assumption to mean that falling under a kind and instantiating a property amount to the same thing. I call this assumption the “Property-Kind Individuation Principle”. A problem with this principle arises because there are cases where we can sort objects by their possession of common causal powers, and yet those objects do not intuitively form a causal kind. In this short note, I discuss why the Property-Kind Individuation Principle is thus not a warranted metaphysical assumption.     

A Bishop Saving ‘Singers’: Tales of Torture in Pinochet's Chile

Abstract : The article provides a brief biographical introduction of Lutheran Bishop Helmut Frenz, co‐founder of the Committee for Peace, credited with saving at least 6,000 lives of persecuted Chileans following the September 1973 military coup at the hands of the brutal general Agosto Pinochet. Excerpts from Frenz' book, Mi Vida Chilena, document Pinochet's acknowledgment that torture was the regime's official policy, and share the poignant story of one suspected leftist's brutal torture.     

Narrative identity,practical identity and ethical subjectivity

The narrative approach to identity has developed as a sophisticated philosophical response to the complexities and ambiguities of the human, lived situation, and is not – as has been naively suggested elsewhere – the imposition of a generic form of life or the attempt to imitate a fictional character. I argue that the narrative model of identity provides a more inclusive and exhaustive account of identity than the causal models employed by mainstream theorists of personal identity. Importantly for ethical subjectivity, the narrative model gives a central and irreducible role to the first-person perspective. I will draw the connection between narrative identity and ethical subjectivity by way of an exposition of work by Paul Ricoeur and Marya Schechtman, and a brief consideration of Korsgaard’s work on practical identity and normative ethics. I argue that the first-person perspective – the reflective structure of human consciousness – arises from human embodiment, and therefore the model of identity required of embodied consciousness is more complex and irreducibly first-personal than that provided in a causal account. What is required is a self-constitution model of identity: a narrative model of identity.     

Causal modeling with the TETRAD program

Drawing substantive conclusions from linear causal models that perform acceptably on statistical tests is unreasonable if it is not known how alternatives fare on these same tests. We describe a computer program, TETRAD, that helps to search rapidly for plausible alternatives to a given causal structure. The program is based on principles from statistics, graph theory, philosophy of science, and artificial intelligence. We describe these principles, discuss how TETRAD employs them, and argue that these principles make TETRAD an effective tool. Finally, we illustrate TETRAD's effectiveness by applying it to a multiple indicator model of Political and Industrial development. A pilot version of the TETRAD program is described in this paper. The current version is described in our forthcoming Discovering Causal Structure: Artificial Intelligence for Statistical Modeling.     

What is terrorism and can psychology do anything to prevent it?

Terrorism has a long history, which continues to unfold, and takes many forms. Notwithstanding these facts, there is no generally accepted definition of terrorism. I set forth the definitional issues that underlie the current debate about terrorism. By comparing terrorism with various forms of violence, I argue that it is plausible to construe terrorism as crime and, in support of this, I demonstrate why terrorism cannot be morally justified. Next, I cluster various immediate and long-term approaches intended to prevent terrorism, highlighting psychologically based strategies, such as behavioral profiling, teaching tolerance and citizenship, modifying media images of terrorism, and building peace. In order to understand and respond more effectively to 21st-century terrorism, I advocate adoption of a multidisciplinary, contextually sensitive approach.     

Lakatos’s Challenge? Auxiliary Hypotheses and Non-Monotonous Inference

Summary  Gerhard Schurz [2001, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 32, 65–107] has proposed to reconstruct auxiliary hypothesis addition, e.g., postulation of Neptune to immunize Newtonian mechanics, with concepts from non-monotonous inference to avoid the retention of false predictions that are among the consequence-set of the deductive model. However, the non-monotonous reconstruction retains the observational premise that is indeed rejected in the deductive model. Hence, his proposal fails to do justice to Lakatos’ core-belt model, therefore fails to meet what Schurz coined “Lakatos’ challenge”. It is argued that Lakatos’s distinction between core and belt of a research program is not mapable onto premise-set and consequence-set and that Schurz’s understanding of a ceteris paribus clause as a transfinite list of (absent) interfering factors is problematic. I propose a simple reading of Lakatos’s use of the term ceteris paribus clause and motivate why the term hypothesis addition, despite not being interpretable literally, came to be entrenched.

It is not that we propose a theory and Nature may shout NO; rather we propose a maze of theories and Nature may shout INCONSISTENT. Lakatos (1978, p. 45)