道德精神、道德语言与道德适用

道德精神是道德的灵魂 ,道德语言是道德精神的载体。若对道德语言的理解发生错误 ,道德精神则会被歪曲。道德精神若被歪曲 ,就可能扩大道德适用的范围。若扩大道德适用的范围 ,道德精神就可能被人为地归入谬误 ,从而会彻底否定某一道德精神。因此 ,有必要研究道德精神、道德语言和道德适用三者之间的关系。     

道德自觉·道德自信·道德自强

文化三自的提出和阐述对思考道德三自,即道德自觉、道德自信、道德自强有重要启示。道德自觉是指道德对于时代的伦理使命和教化责任要有一个自觉的担当和深切的认同,道德要努力地构建时代的精神高地。道德自信源于对中华文化的自信,表现为在内涵上,相信并坚守着自己道德文化的优势和优越;在外延上,相信并扩大自己道德文化的实力和魅力。道德自强源于它立足于人性内部,来自于人性自身,即道德可以自强是因为道德可以从人性自身汲取永恒的力量。与法律相比道德自身拥有一种自强的力量,拥有一种内在约束力和内在的驱动力。     

从道德情感走向道德自由

道德情感是人所具有的高级社会性情感,是与人的道德认识相伴而生的,是人产生善的道德行为的力量和源泉。本文在对道德情感进行伦理分析的基础上,对道德情感与道德理性的相通性进行了阐释,并针对今天人类道德生活中的情感缺失问题指出,道德自由的境界是道德情感与道德理性和谐统一的境界,人类要走向道德自由的理想王国就必须将道德情感还原于人的生活世界中去,给予道德情感应有的地位。     

论道德相对性及其道德实践意义——兼析道德相对主义

道德相对性表现为道德准则规范具有具体性、差异性和不确定性.道德相对性中渗透了道德绝对性即存在普遍的、共同的、不变的道德价值.道德相对主义的错误在于夸大相对性而否定了绝对性.但道德相对主义基于道德相对性的某些主张有一定的合理性.正确理解道德相对性在道德实践中有重要意义.个体道德自主性的提高,既要把握绝对的道德价值观念,同时需要把握道德的相对性以提高具体情境中道德判断和选择能力.     

论大众道德

大众道德是指既满足个人自身的基本心理需求、价值需要和个人正当利益诉求,同时主观上没有损害他人、社会的故意,客观上没有造成他人、社会的损害后果的行为方式,在某种程度上该行为方式也常常是对他人和集体有利的。大众道德是时代的需要,也是道德榜样的基础。它非常重视道德义务与道德权利有效整合,并将其融汇在个体的工作和生活之中。     

何谓道德成熟

现代道德哲学常常在“正当”与“善”二者谁更优先的问题上争执不休.对这一问题的回答关涉我们对道德哲学性质的理解.本文试图从现象学、女性主义伦理学以及儒家伦理的视角来补充康德主义伦理学对这一问题的回答,并挑战主流的道德认知理论对何谓道德成熟的看法.     

从道德自律到道德自然

道德需要自律,自律无疑优于他律.但自律仍然带有强制性,只不过是用内在强制取代了他律的外在强制.因此,道德不能以自律为极限,而应当超越自律,即由道德自律走向道德自然.道德自然通过对道德自律的扬弃,否定了道德自律中的内在强制因素,但将道德的本质属性予以存留,且将其自由升华至极致,这就造就了没有任何强制的道德以及道德选择中充分的、完全的个体自由.与道德自律相比较,道德自然具有非强制、无意识、不造作等特征.道德自然是一种最高的道德境界,这种道德境界是在人的原初心理基础上,经过实践、反思与情感升华的长期过程而逐渐生成的.     

论道德挫败对道德态度的影响

道德挫败之根由是个体道德价值与道德行为收获的社会结果之间产生失调,经过外部刺激、主体行为、社会反馈、心理失落这一系列过程而让主体的道德态度产生改变,其结果会导致个体或社会质疑原本积极的道德价值,产生道德冷漠、道德怀疑、道德自利之类的消极道德态度.     

论道德语言在道德思维中的地位和作用

道德语言是道德思维的主要工具,其在道德思维中具有重要作用。一是对道德思维主体、道德思维对象、道德思维过程的作用：对主体而言,它提供了道德思维的动力、意义和标准;对对象而言,具有概括与抽象作用;对过程而言,它使概念得以形成,使判断和推理成为可能,并对道德思维的结果进行表述。二是对个体道德思维形成的作用：记忆贮存道德信息,形成特定心理结构,进行导向和定向。三是在道德劝服、道德态度改变和道德价值澄清中也具有重要作用。     

论民族道德与政治道德

民族道德与社会政治道德具有不可分割的关系。一般说来,民族道德易受制于政治道德,而民族道德又会反作用于政治道德,同时,民族道德与政治道德作为一种有联系的精神实体,又会在相互影响、相互作用的过程中协调发展。     

Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment

According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. One important implication of Haidt’s model is that in giving reasons for their moral judgments people tend to confabulate – the reasons they give in attempting to explain their moral judgments are not really operative in producing those judgments. Moral reason-giving on Haidt’s view is generally a matter of post hoc confabulation. Against Haidt, we argue for a version of rationalism that we call ‘morphological rationalism.’ We label our version ‘morphological’ because according to it, the information contained in moral principles is embodied in the standing structure of a typical individual’s cognitive system, and this morphologically embodied information plays a causal role in the generation of particular moral judgments. The manner in which the principles play this role is via ‘proceduralization’ – such principles operate automatically. In contrast to Haidt’s intuitionism, then, our view does not imply that people’s moral reason-giving practices are matters of confabulation. In defense of our view, we appeal to what we call the ‘nonjarring’ character of the phenomenology of making moral judgments and of giving reasons for those judgments.

Hermeneutical Portrait of Today’s 18–22 Year Old Young Adult Male

This article’s objective is to help uncover today’s 18–22 year old young adult male in his modern day milieu in order to paint a hermeneutical portrait of his maleness and masculinity. It will attempt to do so utilizing two main categories: (1) psycho-social development and (2) socio-cultural types and archetypes. Psycho-social development refers to the meaning and telos of the young man’s “maleness” and “masculinity.” It is the self-perceived direction of his sexuality explored within the frameworks of physiology and post-modern implications of his development. Socio-cultural types and archetypes refer to the established male roles and masculine identity markers as well as the human energy that operates in the daily life of college men today. The article concludes with a portrait of the young man’s overall perception of the public sphere, how he is placed within a social and political mindset and imagination regarding maleness and masculinity today.     

人的存在的历史性及其现代境遇

This article argues that the problem of modernity concerns the circumstances of existence and human destiny in modern times. To understand the nature of this problem and find the corresponding solution, we need to reinterpret the thought of Karl Marx regarding the contradictions of human existence and its historical dimensions. Following Marx’s line of thinking, this article reviews his critical sequence, creative transformation, and development of duality of thought on man and the world in Western history, focusing on the following four issues: (1) how Marx, on the basis of man’s sensuous objective activities, observes the duality of man and the world as well as the relationship between man’s internal and external activities; (2) how Marx discloses the true connotation and real significance of man’s historical existence, history, and historicity; (3) how Marx reveals the inherent contradictions of modern capitalist society and the destiny of modern man based on historic thought concerning man’s existence; and (4) by praising Marx’s views on material production and the eternal significance of ancient Greek culture, the article reveals another dimension of Marx’s thought, a dimension that tends to be ignored. This article holds that in this era of globalization, it is extremely important and urgent to have an in-depth understanding of Marx’s historical thoughts regarding human existence and of the feasibility of his theory. Moreover, it is imperative to further develop this understanding to create a clearer picture of our own path of development and our outlook on humanity. Translated by Cui Hui from Zhongguo Shehuikexue Wenzhai 中国社会科学文摘 (China Social Science Digest), 2005, (3): 44–46     

Imagining human enhancement: whose future,which rationality?

This article critically evaluates bettering human life. Because this involves lives that do not exist yet, the article investigates human eugenics and enhancement through the social prism of ‘the imaginary’ (defined ‘as a set of assumptions and concepts for thinking and speaking about human enhancement and its future direction’) [1]. “Exploring basic assumptions underlying the idea of human enhancement” investigates underlying assumptions and claims for human enhancement. Firstly, human eugenics and enhancement entangles a factual as well as a normative claim about what improvement/betterment maybe constitutive of. Secondly, claims about what a better life is, is often a future orientated claim about whether certain kinds of life that do not exist yet should ever exist. Moral images of thought are introduced and how they work to make normative judgments about lives that do not exist. This implicates the moral problem of difference, where an image of a ‘better’ life—classically expressed in eugenics as a ‘superior’ and/or ‘normal’ life—necessarily entails inferiority and/or deviance from a norm. “Moral imagination in contemporary fiction and the history of old eugenics”, introduces moral images in history of eugenics and demonstrates how examples fall foul of the problem. “The new (liberal) eugenics and the moral image of therapy” examines progress in contemporary debates, the move from authoritarian to non-authoritarian eugenics (human enhancement), and how, to some extent, this has solved the problem of difference, through liberal defence of personal choice. “The heart of the eugenic issue” suggests that personal choice in liberal non-authoritarian eugenics is not immune to basic drive behind all eugenic arguments; desire as lack which is expressed as the continual dissatisfaction of not having our future expectations met.

Moore’s Paradox and Moral Motivation

Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’). I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory. 2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational.     

Stanisław Brzozowski on the ideal of the modern man

Stanisław Brzozowski formulated the ideal of modern man in the polemic with the contemporary man, who has ceased to believe in truth and moral values and is devoid of the will to act. For Brzozowski modernity involves the discovery of truth about the human condition: about man as an autonomous subject, a creator of values, who struggles with non-human reality. This truth was formulated in Kant’s idea of autonomy and in Marx’ idea of a collective conquest of the world of nature. For Brzozowski, ideal modern man is “the conscious labourer,” who labours because he wants to proudly impose a human law on the non-human world. At the same time Brzozowski used the term “modernity” to describe life of constant change in the modern world, understood as a set of results of man’s reign over nature. For the sake of human maturity, Brzozowski expected the truly modern man to perceive modern life as an unquestionable value. Undoubtedly, there is an evident tension in Brzozowski’s ideal of modern man between the affirmation of creativity in the world of change and the necessity of disciplined production, including unchangeable moral foundations of labour. There is also a major shift in this ideal, stemming from Brzozowski’s change of attitude towards religion.     

The influence of war on moral judgments about harm

How does war influence moral judgments about harm? While the general rule is “thou shalt not kill,” war appears to provide an exception to the moral prohibition on intentional harm. In three studies (n = 263, n = 557, n = 793), we quantify the difference in moral judgments across peace and war contexts, and explore two possible explanations for the difference. The findings demonstrate that third-party observers judge a trade-off of one life for five as more morally acceptable in war than in peace, especially if the one person is from an outgroup of the person making the trade-off. In addition, the robust difference in moral judgments across “switch” and “footbridge” trolley problems is attenuated in war compared to in peace. The present studies have implications for moral psychology researchers who use war-based scenarios to study broader cognitive or affective processes. If the war context changes judgments of moral scenarios by triggering group-based reasoning or altering the perceived structure of the moral event, using such scenarios to make decontextualized claims about moral judgment may not be warranted.     

牟宗三先生以"自律道德"的理论诠释儒学之蠡测

Mou Zongsan uses the highest moral principle “autonomy” to interpret Confucius’ benevolence and Mencius’ “inherent benevolence and righteousness”, focuses on the self-rule of the will. It does not do any harm to Mencius’ learning, on the contrary, it is conducive to the communication between Chinese and Western philosophies. If we stick to Kant’s moral self autonomy and apply it to interpreting Zhu Xi’s moral theory, similarly we will discover the implications of Zhu Xi’s “autonomy” in his moral learning. Therefore, it is inappropriate for Mou Zongsan to say that Zhu Xi’s ethics belongs to the autonomous one. __________ Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2005, (6): 33–39     

Choosing Between Capitalisms: Habermas, Ethics and Politics

In Between Facts and Norms Habermas both accepts the place of distinctively ethical considerations about ‘the good’ in political deliberation, and advances a particular view of the nature and justification of ethical judgments. Whilst welcoming the former, this paper criticises the latter, with its focus on issues of identity and self-understanding, and suggests instead a broadly Aristotelian alternative. The argument proceeds, first, through a detailed engagement with Habermas’s theoretical claims about ethical reasoning in politics, in which it is argued that he fails to show how different ethical possibilities can be critically evaluated, and second, through the analysis of a practical example, that of a political choice being made between different kinds of capitalism. Here the paper draws on recent work in comparative political economy on the institutional differences between varieties of capitalism, and uses this to contrast the implications of Habermas’s conception of ethics, according to which what would matter is the congruence between economic institutions and a political community’s historically shaped identity, with those of its preferred alternative, which requires a comparison between the different conceptions of the good that each kind of capitalism institutionally favours, and collective judgments about their respective contributions to human well-being.